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ABSTRACT 
The power of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) has become a major policy 
issue and an emerging topic in social sciences. Accounts of corporate tax 
avoidance, monopolistic practices of big tech companies, and mishandling of 
data by social media giants permeate the news. However, social scientists and 
business scholars have struggled to conceptualize the agency and governance 
of these increasingly powerful supranational entities. I tackle this theme by 
analyzing the challenges that corporate tax avoidance creates for the 
established concepts of global governance and for the ways in which MNEs are 
conceptualized within International Political Economy (IPE).  
While recent years have seen a growing interest in the study of the political 
aspects of MNEs and their tax avoidance capabilities, many of these findings 
are not as novel as they seem. The introductory chapter illustrates the complex 
and largely forgotten transdisciplinary history of tax avoidance and corporate 
power. The introduction demonstrates how scholarship on corporate power 
began with the birth of evolutionary economics, and how scholars such as 
Thorstein Veblen and John R. Commons discussed issues such as the tax 
aspects of immaterial rights — a highly topical theme today — already in the 
early 1900s. 
I trace the evolution of the scholarship on corporate power through the 
writings of Berle, Means, Galbraith, Hymer, Baran, Sweezy and other scholars 
associated with evolutionary economics, early International Business and 
Marxist studies. I also highlight the often-neglected role that policy-related 
research had in the analyses of corporate power within early evolutionary 
economics, as well as the supranational research conducted within the United 
Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) and its subgroups. 
By the end of the 1970s, a surprisingly mature understanding had emerged on 
international corporate tax avoidance and the powers it granted to MNEs over 
states. Ultimately, these findings were forgotten in the changing political-
economic climate of the 1980s. I argue that within IPE, the Open Economy 
Politics approaches of the 1990s left little room for analyzing corporate power. 
The first self-authored article of the dissertation analyses various 
groundbreaking policy proposals and analyses published by UNCTC and — to 
a lesser extent — the OECD in the 1960s–70s on corporate tax avoidance and 
corporate power. I argue that the decision of the Reagan administration to 
withdraw funding from UNCTC and the overall shift in economic policy 
thinking contributed to the shattering of the policy community around 
UNCTC. The second co-authored article develops a new methodology, 
qualitative financial accounts research, to uncover the ways in which MNEs 
employ complex international tax avoidance policies. By utilizing an industry-
wide tax-avoidance case study, the article highlights the role of immaterial 
rights in corporate wealth chains.  
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The third co-authored article turns attention to a yet another major 
institution in economic governance, namely WTO. The article focuses on two 
cases brought to WTO’s dispute resolution system by Panama. These case 
studies enable the analysis of the interrelationships of global tax governance 
and global trade governance, which has remained a virtually unexplored area 
in tax governance scholarship. As in the previous article, this paper also 
demonstrates a new method of gaining insight into tax avoidance, while also 
bringing into question some of the established proposals on how to regulate 
the problem. Finally, the article suggests new ways for further developing the 
theory of new constitutionalism. 
The fourth co-authored article operates at a different level by bringing a 
focus on the freedom enjoyed by large MNEs to determine where to book their 
profits, which carries a major impact on tax revenues, regulation and 
transparency. It is proposed that this intra-firm cross-subsidization should be 
perceived as a form of economic planning, and hence, as a political process 
that introduces new questions on the accountability and political nature of 
MNEs. Yale University granted this article the Amartya Sen prize in 2015. 
The penultimate, single-authored article further examines the 
undiscovered overlapping of global tax governance and other forms of 
international economic governance. It also proposes a novel approach for 
research on MNEs and their governance by focusing on a new set of case 
materials — IMF’s various country-level assessments — covering a timespan 
of nearly two decades in three countries. IMF, in a similar vein to WTO, is often 
described as a possible site for regulating transnational tax avoidance. I argue 
that any effort along these lines is likely to focus on individuals rather than the 
MNEs which are the most likely to engage in such practices. This is a forward-
looking paper that demonstrates the importance of detailed and in-depth case 
analysis over merely looking at the stated intentions of particular 
organizations – a recurrent theme of the dissertation. 
The final, also single-authored, article turns to a yet another set of 
institutions that could serve as potential regulators of multinational 
enterprises. I make the case that city-level procurement policies can be 
effective tools in a transnational push for fair taxation of MNEs — but only 
under stringent conditions. 
Overall, the dissertation can be read as a global tour of the instruments that 
could be used to tackle the seemingly intractable problem of the global 
governance of MNEs and their tax avoidance, and the theoretical issues evoked 
by these instruments and institutions. I question several established ways in 
which the agency of MNEs has traditionally been perceived in IPE and related 
disciplines and suggest new pathways for more ambitious research on MNEs 
and their governance. Moreover, I challenge the methodological nationalism 
that still prevails in many contributions published within IPE, as well as 
simplistic level-of-analysis schemas that rely on Westphalian concepts of 
sovereignty and rigid distinctions between local, state and international levels. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Corporate tax avoidance has become a much-discussed topic within social 
sciences, as well as in policy circles and public debates. In November 2017, a 
staggering 13.4 million files from several offshore financial service providers 
were released by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalism, 
highlighting in particular the role of the leading offshore law firm Appleby in 
international tax avoidance and evasion. The leak generated numerous front-
page news stories involving tax evasion and other illicit practices by high-level 
politicians and businesspersons all over the world. The scale of the leak was 
unprecedented, but it was hardly the first of its kind. Recent years have seen a 
number of information leaks from tax havens, most notably the Panama 
Papers incident, which focused on the Panamanian offshore service company 
Mossack Fonseca, and the LuxLeaks case, which involved secret tax rulings 
issued by Luxembourg and tailored by the tax advisory company PwC. PwC is 
one of the so-called ‘Big 4’ advisory companies that all have roots in the 
auditing business but derive a significant percentage of their profits from tax-
planning consultancy. 
Moreover, various investigations by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs: e.g. Hearson & Brooks, 2010), in the media (Bergin, 2012) and in 
academia (Finér & Ylönen, 2017; Ylönen & Laine, 2015) have illustrated how 
corporations and wealthy individuals can avoid taxes and other obligations to 
states where their production, sales efforts and other real business activities 
take place. While there is a body of accounting and economics literature on the 
magnitude and drivers of tax avoidance, global tax governance only started to 
emerge as a serious research topic in studies of global governance 
approximately 10 years ago (Dietsch & Rixen, 2016, p. 1). As an illustrative 
example, in 2011, Thomas Rixen stated that the causes of tax competition 
“have received no attention” in the scholarship of International Political 
Economy (IPE) (Rixen, 2011, p. 3). This situation has slowly started to change, 
even though most of the existing research has focused on the features of the 
world political economy that enable tax avoidance and evasion (such as tax 
havens), rather than Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) themselves. This 
dissertation is part of this effort. 
A great number of studies have been written on the societal impacts of 
MNEs with regard to labor and environmental issues. In addition, corporate 
social responsibility has become a major research topic in business studies and 
other disciplines. However, scholars have paid far less attention to the various 
ways in which tax avoidance opportunities shape the political role of MNEs in 
the global political economy.1 In line with Yuri Biondi and other critical legal 
                                               1	In	recent	years,	several	scholars	of	international	business	have	started	to	focus	on	so-called	“political	corporate	social	responsibility”.	However,	the	foundational	texts	in	this	line	of	studies	
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scholars (Avi-Yonah & Sivan, 2007; Biondi, Canziani, & Kirat, 2009; Robé, 
2011), I explore how MNEs can exploit their dual nature as a network of 
national accounting entities with a centralized mode of operation. This creates 
a better understanding of the relationship between markets and politics in 
contemporary world politics, including the ways in which the economic 
decisions of MNEs can shape the political-economic structures where they 
operate. In other words, the focus of my dissertation is on offshore finance in 
general and the societal power it grants to large MNEs in particular. 
This introductory article serves four partly interrelated purposes. First, I 
review how the research agenda on the political aspects of MNEs was shaped 
by the historical development of IPE. Second, I discuss how corporate tax 
avoidance emerged as a research concern, first in the 1970s as part of the 
broader interest in corporate power and later in the 1990s in studies of 
offshore finance. Third, I argue that early IPE research drew on much larger 
bodies of research than textbooks and historical accounts typically 
acknowledge: IPE was not just a marriage of international relations and 
international economics, but rather a pastiche of various disciplines ranging 
from accounting to international tax law and international business research. 
However, the discipline eventually lost part of this diversity, which has been 
detrimental to our understanding of the societal and political aspects of 
corporate tax avoidance. I argue that the IPE project began to recover from 
this blow only in the late 1990s and that, in one sense, this process is still 
underway. Fourth, this dissertation is also future-oriented, and I conclude by 
discussing some pathways for building a more comprehensive agenda for tax 
and corporate research within IPE studies. In other words, in addition to 
aiming for understanding, I also have an emancipatory cognitive interest in 
pursuing these goals (Habermas, 1971, p. 198). In line with Robert Cox, this 
could be conceived of as a way of reflective theorizing, which can “open up the 
possibility of choosing a different valid perspective from which the 
problematic becomes one of creating an alternative world” (Cox, 1981, p. 128).  
While I mostly refer to IPE for the sake of clarity and for historical reasons, 
the articles in this dissertation fall under the umbrella of Global Political 
Economy (GPE). Typically, researchers who adopted broader approaches to 
trans-border political economic questions have preferred the label global 
political economy, whereas scholars who saw the IPE project as a sub-field of 
International Relations (IR) often preferred the prefix “international” (Palan, 
2013). In the words of Palan (ibid.), one way to distinguish GPE is that it 
should perhaps be considered “not as a bounded but as a 'frontiered' 
discipline; an outer-, rather than inner-oriented field of study; its attention is 
directed towards an outlying area where it overlaps with other 'disciplines'.” 
                                               have	 typically	 omitted	 to	 discuss	what	 they	mean	 by	 politics,	 associating	 it	 with	 the	 service	provision	of	MNEs,	especially	in	fragile	states	(see	e.g.	Crane,	Matten,	&	Moon,	2008;	Matten	&	Moon,	2008).	
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Much of the power that corporations exert in world politics derives from 
their ability to exploit the offshore infrastructure of tax havens and other 
jurisdictions that are in a gatekeeper role in the offshore infrastructure. MNEs, 
for example, have a wide range of opportunities to artificially shift profits to 
their preferred jurisdictions. In order to analyze these issues, it is helpful to 
understand how the key terms related to corporate tax evasion and offshore 
finance are commonly defined. Corporate tax avoidance aims at avoiding taxes 
due in one or more countries. It is often contrasted with tax evasion, which is 
illegal, while tax avoidance is not. Corporate tax avoidance benefits from the 
offshore infrastructure (Christensen, 2011) of tax havens, whose history dates 
back to the early 1900s (Palan, 2003). In 1981, the U.S. Treasury published its 
landmark Gordon Report, which noted that there was no single, clear, 
objective criterion for labeling a country as a tax haven. The report offered a 
range of potential definitions instead (Gordon, 1981). The one common 
characteristic was opacity: “by definition, all of the jurisdictions with which we 
are concerned afford some level of secrecy or confidentiality to persons 
transacting business, particularly with banks” (Gordon, 1981, p. 15).  
From today’s viewpoint, the most influential definition was introduced in 
1998 by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), defining a tax haven as a country with no or only nominal taxes on 
relevant income; a lack of effective exchange of information between tax 
authorities; a lack of transparency in the operation of the legislative, legal or 
administrative provisions; and no substantial business activities (OECD, 1998, 
p. 23).2 Finally, some commentators have stressed the central role of secrecy 
in the business models of tax havens (in contrast to merely low tax rates), 
arguing that “secrecy jurisdiction” would be a better term to capture the nature 
of these activities (Beard, 1985). The Financial Secrecy Index of the Tax Justice 
Network adopts this approach by weighing several secrecy-related criteria 
against the weight that a particular jurisdiction has in the world economy. 
One occasionally overlooked division runs between corporate tax havens 
and investor tax havens. Although many jurisdictions are popular with both 
groups of clients, this is not always the case. As a rule of thumb, illegal tax 
evasion commonly associated with smaller-scale investment activities needs 
secrecy in order to conceal the real beneficiaries and the nature of the 
transactions. Multinational enterprises that engage in aggressive tax 
avoidance often benefit from secrecy legislation as well, but not all tax 
avoidance structures are associated with a high level of secrecy. To give just 
one example, a large tax treaty network and a tax law that boasts various 
exemptions have enabled the Netherlands to become one of the most 
important corporate tax havens, even though they provide relatively extensive 
public financial accounts of many of the holding corporations registered there. 
                                               2	 Some	 scholars	 have	 preferred	 “offshore	 financial	 centers”	 either	 as	 a	 synonym	 for	 tax	havens	or	as	a	subset	of	countries.	
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Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) have recently become commonly 
used terms. The OECD defines BEPS as “tax avoidance strategies that exploit 
gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax 
locations.” In effect, the term covers a wide range of mechanisms that MNEs 
use to avoid taxes. According to a very conservative estimate by the OECD, tax 
losses arising from BEPS are between 4 and 10% of corporate income tax 
revenues globally. In monetary terms, this would amount to tax losses of 
between 100 and 240 million USD, in 2014 dollars (OECD, 2015b, p. 15). 
Mirroring the great majority of the statistical research on corporate tax 
avoidance, this estimate is based on the commercial Orbis financial account 
database. Its data has several deficiencies, most of which contribute to an 
underrepresentation of the real scale of the phenomenon (Finér & Ylönen, 
2017). Most importantly, the Orbis database draws on national public financial 
accounts databases, even though many key tax havens do not publish these 
financial statements. The majority of statistical studies (including the one by 
the OECD mentioned above) also focus on differences in nominal corporate 
tax rates. However, much of international tax avoidance benefits from special 
tax exemptions, with nominal tax rates only playing a secondary role.  
Large corporations are often referred to as multinational companies, 
transnational corporations or variants of these terms (Wilkins, 2001, p. 5). In 
this article, I use the term MNE to describe large corporations that operate in 
more than one country. One rationale for this is that some cross-border 
enterprises can also operate in legal forms other than corporations and an 
MNE is always composed of many companies registered in several countries. 
However, the term “transnational corporation” also has merit. This term 
places more emphasis on the transnational nature of the MNEs’ business 
models. Hence, the term ‘transnational corporation’ is also used in some of the 
articles that comprise this dissertation. Finally, one crucial question for 
understanding MNEs’ potential to exert societal or political power is how to 
define politics, markets and the market mechanism. I discuss these questions 
in the following section and also in one of the articles of this dissertation (see 
Ylönen & Teivainen, 2017). 
The structure of this article is as follows. In the following section, I discuss 
some of the key meta-theoretical standpoints behind this dissertation, 
especially in the context of critical theory. This is followed by Section 2, in 
which I consider how the societal and political power of MNEs has been 
discussed in different social scientific and business disciplines from the early 
1900s onward. Drawing on various theoretical backgrounds, this section 
demonstrates how corporate power started to emerge as a viable research topic 
in the early 1900s. This section also considers the development and growth of 
International Business scholarship from the 1960s onward. However, as I 
argue in one of the subsequent articles (see Ylönen, 2016), many of these and 
subsequent strands of research had lost much of their appeal by the 1970s.  
After this groundwork, Section 3 discusses the other strands of research 
that eventually gave rise to IPE. Of particular relevance are certain Marxist and 
Introduction 
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developmentalist scholars, whose work I discuss in a dedicated sub-section. 
Section 3 also traces the evolution of IPE to its current form. In particular, I 
discuss the question of why the early IPE scholars did not continue pursuing 
themes related to corporate power. This theme only resurfaced in the 1990s 
and these contemporary theories of offshore finance and its relevance for 
corporate power are the topic of Section 4. Moreover, Section 4 also includes 
a discussion on how the articles of this dissertation contribute to existing 
scholarship. I conclude in Section 5 with a future-oriented discussion on some 
of the emerging trends in research and policy fields. 
 
 
1.1 META-THEORETICAL STANDPOINTS 
Broadly speaking, this dissertation falls under the umbrella of World Politics, 
which is typically understood as a sibling of IR. A body of literature has been 
written on the differences between world politics and international relations 
(e.g. Walker, 1993, 2010). For the purposes of this study, suffice it to say that 
most of the traditional strands in IR studies have largely centered on the 
traditional state system, whereas the past few decades have seen a significant 
increase in the variety of actors in the international system. In the words of 
Albert, “world politics is not something that emerges from pre-existing levels 
of (local, national etc.) politics, nor is it located somehow ‘above’ them. The 
system of world politics is differentiated as a subsystem within the political 
system, so questions of hierarchy between ‘levels’ do not play a large role in 
this respect” (Albert, 2016, pp. 6–7). 
Many of the issues I highlight are also relevant for understanding the 
demarcation line between political economy and mainstream neoclassical 
economics. Particularly after the marginalist revolution of the early 1900s, 
neoclassical economics has relied extensively on the assumption of perfect 
competition, at least as an analytical tool (Hodgson, 2001; Milonakis & Fine, 
2009). Consequently, the neoclassical framework treats monopolies, 
oligopolies and other glitches in the market system as exceptions, which 
brushes aside questions related to corporate power (Tsuk, 2005). According to 
the two first welfare theorems of neoclassical economics, no transaction costs 
exist because market participants have perfect information about markets. 
Each market participant is a price taker (i.e. pays the market price for their 
purchases) and no monopolies exist. As economist Franklin M. Fisher has 
argued, these “well understood and firmly founded” theorems “underlie all the 
looser statements about the desirability of a free-market system” (Fisher, 
2002, p. 74). Fisher’s colleague Kirman (2002, p. 470) concurs with him by 
stating that “the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics are the 
cornerstones for the arguments in favour of economic liberalism.” Therefore, 
as Susan Harding has contended, it can be argued that in some respects, 
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neoclassical economics “defends and legitimates the institutions and practices 
through which the distortions and their often exploitative consequences are 
generated” by certifying “as value-neutral, normal, natural, and therefore not 
political at all the policies and practices through which powerful groups can 
gain the information and explanations that they need to advance their 
priorities” (Harding, 1998, p. 132). 
In practice, however, entire sub-fields have emerged within neoclassical 
economics to study “anomalies” and different variations of disequilibrium 
(Fisher, 2002). During the first decades of the 1900s, mainstream economic 
theory had major difficulties with integrating multinational enterprises into 
the general framework. The major dilemma was that if markets are supposed 
to operate under market conditions where prices are determined efficiently 
within markets, corporations should not exist. After all, internalizing 
transactions that would otherwise take place through the market mechanism 
essentially requires superseding markets. Multinational enterprises are, after 
all, hierarchically organized systems. Drawing on Coase’s research (Coase, 
1937), transaction cost theory made a real breakthrough as the most important 
analytical tool to overcome this in the 1970s. Transaction cost theory is thus 
one sub-field with particular relevance to this dissertation. 
Spearheaded by contributions from Olivier Williamson (1971) and others 
(see Section 4), transaction cost theory associated the benefits of 
internalization with transactional market imperfections in situations where 
there are long time lags between initiation and completion of the production 
process. In other words, it considers situations in which “the efficient 
exploitation of market power over an intermediate product requires 
discriminatory pricing of a kind difficult or impossible to implement in an 
external market” (Ietto-Gillies, 2014, p. 44). Other instances include situations 
“when imperfections would lead to bilateral concentration of market power 
and thus to an unstable situation under external markets” or “when there is 
inequality in the position of the buyer and seller regarding knowledge on the 
value, nature and quality of the product” (Ietto-Gillies, 2014, p. 44). 
I will return to the subject of transaction cost theory in more detail later in 
this section when discussing the emergence of International Business 
scholarship. Related to this, I argue that the growing societal role of MNEs in 
the global political economy cannot be reduced to transaction cost theory or a 
similar framework. Rather, a better understanding of the politics of corporate 
tax avoidance and corporate power is needed. As I highlight in the article co-
written with Teivo Teivainen, the U.S. courts had to admit as early as the 1960s 
that in many cases, the intra-firm trade within MNEs does not follow any 
market-based prices. As a result, the courts advocated the use of different 
variations of cost-plus pricing for tax purposes in cases where market-based 
prices cannot be found. This flexibility in choosing the pricing model when 
determining the taxable income in different group companies was also 
subsequently reflected in the OECD’s influential transfer pricing guidelines. 
While the prevalence of cost-plus pricing is consistent with the empirical 
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material on how intra-firm trade operates, it is largely ignored in the 
economics-oriented theories of the firm. An exception to this can be found in 
post-Keynesian economics, which is based on a notion that firms aim to 
achieve market power and that their pricing models typically rely on cost-plus 
formulas instead of straightforwardly reflecting the forces of supply and 
demand (Lavoie, 2007, 2014). As I argue with Teivainen in the 
aforementioned article, the non-market nature of much of this intra-firm trade 
opens up possibilities of theorizing MNEs as political agents. 
Although the “linguistic turn”3 largely benefited social sciences from the 
1960s and 1970s onward (Giddens, 1984, pp. xv–xx), it also resulted in a 
situation where the attention given to discourses, deconstructions and 
linguistics diverted many researchers in political science away from the 
relationship between economic and political power. It can be argued that these 
developments contributed to the increasing segregation of studies on 
corporate power from neoclassical economics. Giddens (1984, p. xxxii) may 
not have perceived the irony when he wrote “if the social sciences are 
understood as they were during the period of dominance of the [earlier] 
orthodox consensus” that placed emphasis on the search for unbiased 
knowledge of society, “their attainments do not look impressive, and the 
relevance of social research to practical issues seems fairly slight.” In the 
subsequent decades, however, positivistic economic theories gained the upper 
hand over social scientists with their increasing emphasis on studying 
narratives and linguistic practices. 
Indeed, part of the relevance of transaction cost theory and other abstract 
assumptions in much of neoclassical theory derives from their role in 
constituting the social order in which they are applied. In other words, these 
assumptions are “reflections upon a social reality which they also help to 
constitute and which both has a distance from, yet remains part of, our social 
world that engages our attention” (Giddens, 1984, p. xxxv). Any attempt to 
genuinely reform these theories would require identifying and deconstructing 
unrealistic assumptions behind them in order to build a more plausible 
framework for analysis. This would also require questioning some 
categorizations of international relations that still enjoy wide popularity also 
within the IR field itself. As R.B.J. Walker has noted, much of the traditional 
analysis of international relations stems from the “level of analysis schema” of 
“man, states and international system” that has received too little critical 
appraisal (Walker 1993, p. 131). Even though Walker made this statement 
more than two decades ago, it still contains a significant truth. By adopting a 
broader focus than IR, World Politics expands this ontology by giving more 
weight to the diversity of actors than states in shaping the international realm.  
                                               3	The	linguistic	turn	typically	refers	to	a	development	whereby	scholars	started	to	pay	more	attention	to	the	relationship	between	philosophy	and	language.	In	social	sciences,	it	led	to	greater	attention	being	paid	to	discourses	in	the	construction	of	social	order.	
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Drawing on evolutionary economics, critical legal scholarship and other 
approaches, the key question I pose here is how should the world-political role 
of corporations be understood? An interesting departure point for this is the 
work of Roberto Mangabeira Unger, who has defined politics as a “struggle 
over material and passionate relationships over resources and arrangements 
of our everyday lives” (Unger, 1987, p. 145). This differs from the widely used 
conception of politics by Chantal Mouffe, who has defined it as an “ensemble 
of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order 
and organize human coexistence in conditions that are always potentially 
conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of ‘the political’.” The 
political in turn is characterized by a “dimension of antagonism that is 
inherent in human relations” (Mouffe, 1999, p. 15). Compared to Mouffe’s 
account, Unger’s conception directs the attention more to the material issues 
rather than to searching for “antagonisms” in society. However, by taking into 
account our “passionate relations”, Unger avoids defining politics in entirely 
materialist terms. 
Giddens (1984, pp. xxxi–xxxii) introduced the concept of “transformation 
points” that “translate” private property and a cluster of ownership rights into 
industrial authority or modes of sustaining managerial control. I maintain that 
the strict separation of states and markets is a key element sustaining this 
transformation and preventing its opening up to competing claims of 
authority. Specifically, understanding corporations as potentially political 
actors could expose them to demands that are normally valid only in the 
democratic sphere. In this sense, my dissertation includes a normative aspect. 
By raising new questions on the nature of corporate power, this project could 
also be seen as emancipatory (Sayer, 2000, p. 18) or liberating (Manicas, 1987, 
p. 321). Unger’s conception of politics allows us to transcend strict and 
somewhat artificial state-market divisions (Teivainen, 2002). Specifically, I 
focus on corporate tax avoidance mechanisms to demonstrate how not only 
states, but also companies can engage in struggles over material relationships. 
For example, a major mining company in a small developing country might 
have a large influence over that state’s ability to decide on material 
relationships through normal democratic processes. 
I also draw on the tradition of critical realism, which emerged initially from 
a rigorous critique of positivism in the natural sciences. In line with positivists, 
critical realists are “naturalists” in the sense that it is “both possible and 
desirable to study social phenomena ‘scientifically’” (Potter & López, 2001, p. 
8). However, even though there are causal mechanisms at play in our shared 
world, our understanding of them is always shaped by language. Therefore, we 
can never obtain completely neutral information about the world. As Sayer 
(2000, p. 16) has noted, “typically, social scientists are dealing not only with 
systems that are open but ones in which there are many interacting structures 
and mechanisms.” “This creates the risk of attributing to one mechanism (and 
its structure) effects which are actually due to another.” Consequently, there is 
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a need for a critical theory that “stands apart from the prevailing order of the 
world and asks how that order came about” (Cox, 1981, p. 129).  
In order to move forward from these propositions, we need to consider the 
factors that construct and reproduce the prevailing conceptions of states, 
markets and the legitimacy of firms (Sayer, 2000, p. 16). This is in line with 
Cox’s idea of critical theory that “does not take institutions and social and 
power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself 
with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of 
changing” (Cox, 1981, p. 129). To give one relevant example, it is important to 
analyze the concepts we use when talking about corporations. Are we taking 
them for granted as market-based entities or is it possible to find instances 
where the language of politics leads to more appropriate results? In the words 
of Manicas (1987, p. 318), “social structure is ‘product’ in the sense that 
speaking reproduces the language, going to work reproduces the system of 
capitalism, and voting reproduces electoral politics.” 
My contribution has a strong historical dimension. Much has been written 
on the political aspects of the corporation since 1904, when Thorstein Veblen 
first published his iconoclastic book The Theory of Business Enterprise 
(1919).4 However, as important as the works of Veblen, Berle and Means 
(1934), Galbraith (2010), Baran and Sweezy (1966), and others are, they are 
products of their time. As a result, historical horizons need to be treated 
carefully and sensitively to avoid misunderstandings of what history actually 
shows (Gadamer, 1989, p. 270). As insightful as many of the classics are, it 
would be a mistake to invariably apply their concepts in the analyses of 
contemporary uses of corporate power. Therefore, a proper understanding of 
corporate power today requires an analysis of both its historical roots and its 
contemporary manifestations. This is also in line with the mindset of critical 
realism in the sense that “social science is inevitably historical. History is not 
merely ‘the past’, but a sedimented past which, as transformed, is still 
present” (Manicas, 1987, p. 320, emphasis in the original). 
 
 
                                               4	Veblen	and	other	early	evolutionary	economists	also	drew	on	the	earlier	work	of	Richard	Ely	 and	 others,	 but	 their	 predecessors	 lacked	 the	 consistency	 and	 comprehensiveness	 that	characterized	Veblen’s	analyses.	
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2 THE EARLY HISTORY OF RESEARCH ON 
CORPORATE POWER 
Studies of the political and societal power of corporations have a long and 
scattered history. For more than a century, evolutionary economists, Marxists, 
legal scholars and other researchers have discussed the impacts of MNEs and 
their non-market impacts on the states and societies in which they operate. 
The founder of evolutionary economics, Thorsten Veblen, analyzed these 
issues in depth as early as 1904 in his aforementioned book The Theory of 
Business Enterprise. Even though most of the analyses written by Veblen 
(1919, 1923), John R. Commons (1934, 1957), Gardiner Means (1959, 1962), 
Adolf Berle (1947), Robert Hale (1935, 1952), and others were either relatively 
abstract or focused mostly on the United States, later IPE studies could have 
benefited in many ways from adopting some of the concepts and ideas 
developed by these scholars. To highlight one significant example of this, John 
Kenneth Galbraith — one of the greatest theoreticians of the societal power of 
the corporation — was in many ways influenced by earlier evolutionary 
economists, such as Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means (Galbraith, 1988; Parker, 
2005). 
Veblen wrote his first major work, The Theory of the Leisure Class, in 1899 
and his last, Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times: 
The Case of America, in 1923. These were among the most important and 
exciting decades in the development of the modern corporation, and Veblen 
was the first scholar to capture many of the significant changes that were 
taking place at the time. The key undercurrent which Veblen analyzed in his 
books Absentee Ownership (1923) and The Theory of Business Enterprise 
(1919) was the separation of business and industry, which until then had 
constituted a single field. According to Veblen, it was this transformation of 
ownership that resulted in the transformation of corporate control. 
One of Veblen’s theses was that absentee ownership and control were 
killing the competitive system “at the top,” as “free competitive production had 
ceased to be the rule in the key industries.” Veblen argued that this “decay” 
had “been spreading outwards and downwards” as lower branches of the 
industry had been “brought into line with the mechanical technology” (Veblen, 
1923, pp. 77–78). These developments also eroded the function of the 
entrepreneur as it had been understood in the original, competitive 
conceptions of capitalism. It “gradually fell apart in a two-fold division of 
labor, between the business manager and the office work on the one side and 
the technician and industrial work on the other side” (Veblen, 1923, p. 106). 
Veblen showed how the “modern machine process” gave way to greater 
specialization within industries, led to the standardization of processes, 
machinery and labor regulations, and ultimately standardized all of social 
existence, from work to consumption and leisure (Bowman, 1996, p. 111; 
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Veblen, 1919). Veblen’s analyses of corporate power, diverging interests within 
large corporations and so on laid the foundation for much of the subsequent 
social scientific research on corporations and management. 
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means developed some of Veblen’s ideas in their 
iconoclastic book The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Sometimes 
even hailed as the bible of the New Deal (Means, 1964, p. 27), the book 
provided a more nuanced analysis of the effects of absentee ownership and the 
separation of stock owners and managers in the modern corporation. One of 
the key concepts of Berle and Means was “administered prices,” which refers 
to the phenomenon in which the market mechanism became subdued within 
the managerial machineries of large corporations. In the preface to the revised 
edition, Berle and Means noted that the book was published at a time when 
the central body of economic theory “held that so long as there was 
competition among producers economic performance would be high” (Berle & 
Means, 1934, p. xxxiv). 
In the early 1930s, the world of corporations was in flux, and Berle and 
Means gave shape to ideas that had thus far existed only in embryonic form. 
Spearheading the concept of administered prices, the authors called for a 
research agenda that would overcome the assumption of classical economic 
theory that prices were automatically right (Means, 1962, p. 10). This 
resonated well with people at a time when the non-market aspects of large 
corporations were under increasing critical scrutiny and Berle and Means 
made great advances in further developing the theory of the modern 
corporation. The task before them was significant. As late as 1954, Berle noted 
in the new introduction to his 20th Century Capitalist Revolution that “no 
adequate study of twentieth-century capitalism exists” and that “scholarly 
commentators are quite aware that the descriptive clichés still in current use 
are little more than a deposit of verbiage left over from a previous historical 
age” (Berle, 1954, p. 9). 
Berle and Means used extensive sets of statistical data on the concentration 
of American industries to develop their theoretical thesis on the separation of 
ownership and control in the large corporations (Berle & Means, 1934).5 
Moreover, they noted that even though “men still living can recall a time when 
the present situation was hardly dreamed of … the new order may easily 
become completely dominant during the lifetime of our children.” When the 
authors were writing their book, the factory system had first “brought an 
increasingly large number of workers directly under a single management,” 
followed by the emergence of the modern corporation that “equally 
revolutionary in its effect, placed the wealth of innumerable individuals under 
the same central control” (Berle & Means, 1934, p. 5). As a result of this, the 
profit motive had become distorted (Berle & Means, 1934, p. 307). These were 
                                               5	In	addition	to	their	great	 impact	on	American	institutional	scholarship,	Berle	and	Means	influenced	 other	 strands	 of	 thought,	 such	 as	 the	 Frankfurt	 School	 (see	 for	 example	Marcuse,	2006).	
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bold statements, but later developments have proved that they were largely 
correct (Ware, 1992). Even in Berle and Means’ time, large corporations had 
become a prominent feature of U.S. capitalism. Their ownership was 
continually becoming more dispersed and the power that was formerly divided 
between a large number of owners had become increasingly concentrated. 
Together, these developments separated corporate control from ownership, 
thus establishing the corporate system (Berle & Means, 1934, pp. 9–10). 
The administered prices framework provided useful tools for analyzing a 
situation that could neither be portrayed as pure market competition nor as a 
monopoly as these concepts are usually understood (Means, 1962, p. 12). In a 
U.S. Senate hearing on administrative prices, Means (1957, p. 75) defined an 
administered price as “a price set by someone, usually a producer or seller, and 
kept constant for a period of time and for a series of transactions.” The 
opposite of an administered price is a market price “that fluctuates on the basis 
of supply and demand as these forces are felt in the market” (1957, p. 75). All 
established definitions of markets are based on prices that fluctuate on the 
basis of supply and demand. Means made an important point that in the 
modern economy, such freely fluctuating market prices are often nowhere to 
be found. Most prices are set for weeks or months at a time, as companies set 
target prices and plan their actions in the longer term (1957, p. 75; 1962, p. 
239). While Means argued that this phenomenon existed even in Adam 
Smith’s time, back then it was a minor issue and hence did not receive 
attention in classical economic theory (1957, p. 76). In contrast to this, today’s 
corporations have no choice but to plan their pricing for the longer term, even 
if they end up adjusting their prices at regular intervals based on demand, the 
prices charged by their competitors or other factors. This view is also 
supported by later accounting literature (Shim & Sudit, 1995). 
Of course, not all prices are administered. The major exception that Means 
mentions are the prices quoted in centralized marketplaces, such as those for 
wheat or cotton. Any major company needs to plan its production, sales and 
marketing efforts with models that essentially violate the textbook definitions 
of markets (Ylönen & Teivainen, 2017). Even today, a case can be made that 
“market forces will limit the range within which an administered price is likely 
to be set but they do not determine the price” (Means, 1957, p. 76).  
From the viewpoint of economic theory, a significant issue is that 
“wherever a price can be administered, there is almost certain to be a zone of 
relative indifference within which various prices would produce practically the 
same profit.” This zone of relative indifference does not depend on size or 
having a monopoly (Means, 1957, p. 82).6 Indeed, Means found the narrow 
understanding of monopoly in economics harmful. Specifically, he argued that 
“where you have administered prices you may have monopoly, you may have 
                                               6	As	a	result	of	this	and	other	challenges,	Means	believed	that	“administered	prices	lie	quite	outside	the	realm	of	traditional	economic	thinking	and	present	serious	problems	which	cannot	find	solution	within	the	realm	of	traditional	theory”	(1957,	p.	89).	
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what the economists have come to call oligopoly,” adding that he preferred 
calling this situation “administrative competition,” which is different from 
classical competition as it takes place using administrative prices (1959, p. 
4801). Means argued that, in the long run, the end result of administrative 
competition might roughly be the same as that of classical competition, but 
“whether it produces the same effect in the short run is a different matter” 
(1959, p. 4801). 
Berle and Means made progress in analyzing the behavior of administered 
prices in complex company structures. They noted that “through controlled 
directors the parent has all of the powers of directors,” and that this enables a 
parent of a holding corporation to perform all key operations “with respect to 
its subsidiaries and their assets and earnings” (Berle & Means, 1934, p. 183). 
Moreover, they noted that holding companies have “a far wider latitude in this 
respect perhaps than any other corporation.” In holding companies, “control 
of the parent’s directors over the subsidiaries’ machinery is absolute; even the 
information disclosed may be so blind as to be unintelligible.” Moreover, “the 
possibility of inter-company transactions — that is, sale of the assets of one 
subsidiary to another subsidiary; the routing of profitable business to one 
subsidiary in preference to another, the concealment of losses or the creation 
of non-existent deficits, make possible an almost unlimited variation in the 
resulting income account” (Berle & Means, 1934, p. 183). These were far-
sighted notions, given how important holding companies have become for the 
corporate planning system in subsequent decades. 
Both of these two scholars were unsure of the extent to which the powers 
conferred by the holding company system could actually be exercised. In 1947, 
Berle saw “the difference between outside creditors as against intra-enterprise 
or inter-corporate debts” as “striking” (Berle, 1947, p. 356). Today, the extent 
of these powers is better known and case studies on the use of intra-firm debt 
to gain artificial benefits have become commonplace. Berle and Means made 
important remarks on the role of information in intra-firm price 
administration. Administering prices requires detailed information, but “such 
information must be considered as a private matter, of interest only to its 
shareholders; and even in that regard limits in the extreme the information 
which the corporate management must make available, even to its 
shareholders” (Berle & Means, 1934, p. 279). 
Price administration posed a challenge to the established theories of 
economics and that it “brought a concentration of economic power which can 
compete on equal terms with the modern state” (Berle & Means, 1934, p. 313). 
They believed that this concentration of power leads to what Means called 
“competitive waste,” which referred to the tendency to provide “a price 
umbrella” for new entrants, “whether or not costs are also increased through 
competitive promotion” (Means, 1962, p. 214). Despite this, both Berle and 
Means were still relatively optimistic about the possibilities of reforming the 
system of administered prices. Means, for example, believed that 
administering prices “leads to greater efficiency and higher standards of 
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living” (1957, p. 75). Moreover, he maintained with Berle that “if the corporate 
system is to survive … the ‘control’ of the great corporations should develop 
into a purely neutral technocracy” (1934, p. 313). These suggestions resonated 
at a time when “the need for economic planning” was discussed widely and did 
not carry the same negative undertone as it does today (Plummer, 1971, p. 2). 
In 1941, Trotskyist scholar James Burnham published a book titled 
Managerial Revolution, in which he assessed the impact of the modern 
corporate form on the class struggle and other Marxist themes. Among other 
things, Burnham was interested in how corporate managers were able to exert 
power though property rights vested in them as individuals, but also indirectly, 
“through their control of the state which in turn will own and control the 
instruments of production.” He then argued that these powers make corporate 
managers the new ruling class in capitalism. However, for our purposes, 
Burnham’s most interesting idea was the distinction between managers, 
finance executives and finance capitalists. Criticizing Veblen for an overtly 
simplistic division between engineers and managers, Burnham highlighted the 
role of finance and banks in steering the great corporations. The first division 
was between managers, who oversaw the details of the production process, 
and the sales process, which was the responsibility of finance executives. 
However, for the purposes of this article, finance capitalists are the most 
interesting group. Utilizing holding companies, banks and other tools, the 
emerging group of finance capitalists shaped the financial aspects of all large 
companies, from mergers to stock and bond issues. “They may want to put 
some competitors out of business or influence politics or inflate prices; and 
any of such aims might be altogether independent of the requirements of 
production or profit,” Burnham argued. “Any number of variants is possible.” 
Finance capitalists often included directors of the company, and particularly 
big financiers and bankers who actually appointed the directors. Outside these 
three groups were the actual owners, given that the ownership in large 
corporations had become more dispersed, as Berle and Means already noted 
in the 1930s. However, Burnham criticized Berle and Means for their failure 
to “include any study of the way in which their supposedly self­perpetuating 
and autonomous managements are in actuality often controlled by big banks 
or groups of financiers.” 
In his landmark publication The New Industrial State (Galbraith, 2010, p. 
651), John Kenneth Galbraith put forward a more pessimistic vision of 
planned prices. Drawing his empirical evidence from the economic landscape 
of the United States of the late 1960s and addressing growing concerns over 
the powers of the American “military-industrial complex,” he introduced the 
framework for corporate planning. Galbraith described corporate planning as 
a situation in which the market is superseded by vertical integration with the 
planning unit taking over the source of supply or the outlet. In this context, 
vertical integration refers to the vertical ownership structures that 
characterize large corporations. Within this system, transactions that are 
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subject to bargaining over prices and amounts are thus replaced with transfers 
within the planning units. 
After World War II, ownership in many key U.S. industries became 
concentrated in the hands of relatively few companies. This situation sparked 
criticism of Ricardian theories of free trade that were based on the idea of an 
unobstructed market mechanism. Galbraith argued that, in contrast to 
orthodox theories of trade, “the great corporation maximizes not pecuniary 
return but the whole complex of organizational interests of which pecuniary 
return is only one part” (Galbraith, 2010, pp. 617–618). Other goals gradually 
overshadow these economic or “pecuniary” interests as the size and the 
relative importance of a corporation in a particular market grows (Galbraith, 
2010, p. 620). In line with Berle and Means, Galbraith saw planning as an 
inevitable activity for large corporations, as they constantly need to seek a 
balance between short-term profits, long-term risks and other factors. The 
“technostructure” of modern corporations “is compelled to put prevention of 
loss ahead of maximum return. Loss can destroy the technostructure; high 
revenues accrue to others. If, as will often happen, the maximization of 
revenues invites increased risk of loss, then the technostructure, as a matter of 
elementary interest, should forgo it” (Galbraith, 2010, p. 788). 
Galbraith wrote his book in the context of a relatively oligopolistic U.S. 
corporate economy and he mainly focused on corporations’ abilities to plan 
their prices in order to outbid competitors or to extract greater profits from 
geographical or business areas where the competition was less fierce. 
Galbraith’s key insight (2010, p. 733) on the consequences of the increased 
planning capacity of corporations for the dominant economic approaches is 
worth citing at length:  
 
“When planning replaces the market, [the] admirably simple 
explanation of economic behavior collapses. Technology and the 
companion commitments of capital and time have forced the firm to 
emancipate itself from the uncertainties of the market. And specialized 
technology has rendered the market increasingly unreliable. So the firm 
controls the prices at which it buys materials, components and talent 
and takes steps to ensure the necessary supply of these prices.”  
 
Galbraith’s writings had a major impact on the intellectual landscape of the 
1960s and 1970s. Two other researchers who made major contributions at the 
time when IPE scholarship began to emerge were Richard Barnet and Ronald 
Müller, who conducted important research on the role of the corporate 
planning framework in an international setting. Müller was a professor of 
economics, while Barnet has been described as "a blend of political scientist, 
historian, reporter and essayist,” even though his original degree was in legal 
studies (Holley, 2004). In their 1974 book Global Reach: The Power of the 
Multinational Corporations, Barnet and Müller provided a far-reaching 
analysis of the ways in which corporations can artificially shift their profits 
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from one country to another and thus exert power over states. They noted that 
the “global corporation is the first institution in human history dedicated to 
centralized planning on a world scale.” While its primary purpose is to 
“organize and integrate economic activity around the world in such a way as 
to maximize global profit, the global corporation is an organic structure in 
which each part is expected to serve the whole” (Barnet & Müller, 1974, p. 14). 
This has much in common with Galbraith’s ideas and could have provided a 
fertile point of departure for the GPE project. Another promising development 
for the GPE project was the investigation conducted in the 1960s by John F. 
Kennedy’s administration into possibilities of addressing offshore tax 
avoidance by U.S. multinationals. 
However, these ideas did not garner attention from the evolving strand of 
research within international business studies. The internationalization 
school evolved during the 1960s and 1970s and led to the birth of the first 
genuine theory of transnational corporations, as proposed in 1960 by Stephen 
Hymer in his doctoral dissertation. In his thesis, Hymer essentially created the 
theory of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Hymer, 1976). As Buckley and 
Cason (1976) have argued, the orthodox economic theory of the time was “not 
very helpful” in understanding why firms internationalize and “the theories of 
imperfect competition which explained the behavior of trusts” needed to be 
“reformulated and extended before they can be applied to the MNE.” 
Nevertheless, Hymer’s ideas were not appreciated at the time and MIT Press 
refused to publish the dissertation (Pitelis, 2006, p. 105).  
Prior to Hymer’s work, mainstream economic theory explained FDI 
primarily as a result of interest rate differences between countries. This did 
not reflect the reality of international business, given the multitude of factors 
that firms consider when investing abroad. Using empirical data from various 
industries, Hymer pointed out that FDI was concentrated in industries across 
nations rather than in particular nations across industries. He argued that 
there were two main drivers of a firm’s decision to invest abroad. The first was 
closer to the prevailing economic understanding of the time, namely “to ensure 
the safety of his investment” (Hymer, 1976, p. 24). However, Hymer argued 
that there was another rationale for foreign direct investment: “to remove 
competition between that foreign enterprise and enterprises in other 
countries” (1976, p. 25). 
Much of the remainder of Hymer’s thesis discussed how large corporations 
managed to suppress or remove competition. For example, he noted that 
enterprises in different countries often competed with one another “because 
they sell in the same market or because some of the firms sell to other firms” 
and that these situations often encouraged corporations to invest abroad to 
reduce competition (1976, p. 25). Moreover, major differences in MNEs’ 
abilities to operate in a particular industry also drove foreign direct 
investment. In sum, the “motivation for the investment is not the higher 
interest rate abroad but the profits that are derived from controlling the 
foreign enterprise” (1976, p. 26). In addition to these factors, Hymer 
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mentioned diversification as an additional but less important reason for 
investing abroad (1976, p. 33). 
Hymer wrote his thesis in an era of strict limitations on cross-border 
exports, imports, investments and capital movements. In this regard, his views 
became outdated as the deregulation of the world economy progressed. 
Nevertheless, the underlying analysis of the drivers of FDI shared many 
similarities with the analyses of Barnet and Müller more than a decade later. 
This is also highlighted in an article Hymer wrote in 1972. Discussing the 
“multinational corporation and the law of uneven development,” Hymer noted 
that “a government’s ability to tax multinational corporations is limited by the 
ability of these corporations to manipulate transfer prices and to move their 
productive facilities to another country” (1972, p. 128). According to Hymer, 
underdeveloped countries “will find it difficult to extract a surplus” from 
multinational corporations, in contrast to developed countries, in which “the 
home office[s] and financial center[s] of the multinational corporation[s] are 
located” and which can “tax the profits of the corporation[s] as a whole, as well 
as the high incomes of [their] management” (Hymer, 1972, p. 128). These 
aspects of Hymer’s work have not received much attention, and it is fair to say 
that his results were more far-reaching than many later commentators 
realized. In viewing FDI in terms of surpassing markets, Hymer cast doubt on 
the meaningfulness of much of the dominant economic theory. 
However, International Business scholars did not continue to develop the 
discipline along these lines. Hymer’s successors tied the theoretical 
development of transnational corporation research increasingly to the 
framework of neoclassical economics and management studies. While these 
approaches have produced significant quantities of research on how and why 
corporations transnationalize, the underlying issue of the relationship 
between markets and planning in the world economy has remained 
unaddressed. In this sub-section, I review these key studies with a focus on 
their contributions to understanding the corporate planning system.7 
Raymond Vernon was working on his international product lifecycle theory 
at around the same time that Hymer was developing his thesis. Vernon’s 
theory essentially pictured a process in which companies gradually move 
production outside of their borders as they grow and the markets in their home 
countries mature (Vernon, 1966). His work drew heavily on the wide-ranging 
Multinational Enterprise Project, which Vernon directed at Harvard from 
1965 onward. The project employed several researchers and generated a 
number of books, dissertations and articles. Its outcomes included, for 
example, two major historical accounts on the internationalization of 
American companies by Mira Wilkins (1970, 1974). In other words, while 
Vernon is typically credited as the second major theorist of IB (following 
                                               7	I	do	not	aim	to	provide	a	comprehensive	review	of	corporate	transnationalization	theses.	These	types	of	accounts	already	exist.	See,	for	example,	(Ietto-Gillies,	2005,	2014).	
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Hymer), his ideas were developed in close collaboration with a broader group 
of emerging scholars.8 
Compared to Hymer’s dissertation, Vernon’s most famous book, 
Sovereignty at Bay, paid more attention to developments in other disciplines, 
in addition to making a lasting impact on much of the subsequent GPE 
research. This book portrays an academic landscape in which theories of 
efficient markets were gaining increasing prominence. On the other hand, 
many scholars were convinced by Galbraith’s theories of an affluent society in 
which “demands for private goods have to be fabricated by the corporate world 
through the application of artificial stimuli.” Vernon also contended that these 
same scholars were “reluctant to believe that any substantial measure of 
competition may exist among the large corporations” (1971b, pp. 114–115). (I 
believe that this was either an exaggeration or a misunderstanding of 
Galbraith’s ideas). Vernon’s own main interest was in the role of products in 
the transnationalization of corporations. He also noted that economists were 
not overly interested in his book Sovereignty at Bay when it was published in 
1978, because most economists “saw research on the multinational enterprise 
as largely irrelevant to their discipline” (Vernon, 1993, p. 20). 
The key elements of Vernon’s theory were “innovation in products which 
gives the firm a temporary monopolistic position [and the] interaction 
between the life of the product, the degree of competition in the industry and 
the geography of trade and of FDI/production” (Ietto-Gillies, 2014, p. 43). 
Whereas Hymer focused on the ways in which corporations strove for 
monopoly power, Vernon acknowledged that there are also more subtle ways 
of bypassing markets. Specifically, he noted that “multinational enterprises… 
transfer goods and services among affiliates at prices that are often at variance 
with the results that independent buyers and sellers would reach.” However, 
in contrast to Barnet and Müller, he stated that “the cases so far uncovered do 
not create the basis for assuming that there is a systematic bias in favor of 
assigning the largest profit to the parent” (Vernon, 1971b, p. 139).  
Vernon updated his ideas on corporate power nearly three decades later in 
his book In the Hurricane’s Eye, but he did not radically alter his core thesis. 
Instead, he stated that the 1970s were “a period of great pain for the 
multinationals,” singling out Barnet and Müller’s Global Reach as “a much-
publicized attack,” complemented by U.S. Senate investigations into the role 
of U.S. enterprises in the Middle East and Latin America. In contrast, Vernon 
saw the 1980s and 1990s as a period of “redemption for the multinational 
enterprise,” because MNEs were being widely acknowledged as the principal 
bearers of technology across international borders and widely sought after for 
their capital resources and managerial skills (Vernon, 1998, p. 5). Moreover, 
                                               
8 Wilkins published pioneering work on historical structures from the early 1970s onward, in 
addition to commenting on the ideas of economic historians, such as Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Albert O. 
Hirschman and Charles P. Kindleberger, as well as those of Hymer, Dunning, Servan-Schreiber and 
Vernon (Wilkins, 1974, pp. xi–xii). 
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In the Hurricane’s Eye included a more sophisticated analysis of the various 
tax-planning techniques that companies have at their disposal, but this was 
still more of a sidestep than a new theoretical opening (1998, pp. 207–211). In 
her review of the history of the theory of the MNE, Ietto-Gillies has also noted 
that later technological developments brought shorter product lives and 
changed the sequences of locations involved in international production, thus 
undermining the explanatory potential of Vernon’s theory (2014, p. 43). 
Finally, and perhaps most crucially for the purposes of this dissertation, the 
shift of focus from enterprises to products left the active political agency of 
firms undertheorized. 
Vernon’s books have since become part of the canon of transnationalization 
literature, even when mainstream IB scholars began to utilize more 
mathematical methodologies than those used by Vernon. The same cannot be 
said for the works of Vernon’s two above-mentioned adversaries, Richard 
Barnet and Ronald Müller, whose ideas were rejected in the IB community 
early on. In hindsight, this was unfortunate because their book (Global Reach) 
Corporations was essentially the first major work to comprehensively discuss 
corporate planning in the context of transnational corporations (however, see 
also Galbraith, 1973). In a sense, Barnet and Müller adopted many of the key 
ideas that had been developed earlier in evolutionary economics and applied 
them to international situations. However, the earlier scholars on this 
continuum were not ignorant of the opportunities presented by 
internationalization. Berle (1954, p. 118), for one, noted that “most 
corporations shroud their international arrangements in deepest secrecy,” also 
discussing the anti-competitive power of international cartels in Europe and 
elsewhere. However, Berle focused mainly on the role of large corporations in 
foreign relations and did not pay attention to intra-firm planning power, which 
was an emerging issue when Berle wrote these words. 
When Barnet and Müller eventually published Global Reach, the situation 
had changed markedly. Speaking invariably about transnational corporations, 
planetary enterprises and global corporations, Barnet and Müller (1974, p. 14) 
maintained that their rise “is producing an organizational revolution as 
profound in its implications for modern man as the Industrial Revolution and 
the rise of the nation-state itself” (1974, p. 15). Presaging the later rise of 
commercialized sovereignty and other related concepts, they also maintained 
that the extraordinary powers of transnational corporations arose from their 
capabilities “to transform the world political economy and in so doing 
transform the historic role of the nation-state” (1974, p. 15). 
Barnet and Müller made significant and overlooked contributions to the 
analyses of intra-firm price planning. Essentially, their book can be perceived 
as a proverbial bridge between the early research on corporate planning and 
contemporary political economy analyses on corporate tax planning. Noting 
the importance of “esoteric techniques” made possible by tax havens such as 
Liechtenstein, the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Panama and Luxembourg, 
Barnet and Müller argued that the “simple expedient of selling to one’s own 
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wholly owned subsidiary at an absurdly high price where local taxes are high 
or at a bargain where taxes are low can do wonders for global profit 
maximization—which is, after all, the prime goal of corporate planning and the 
ultimate test of its success or failure” (Barnet & Müller, 1974, p. 37). As a result, 
“when the corporate headquarters is acting as both buyer and seller, the very 
concept of the market has lost its significance” (1974, p. 157). This may have 
sounded like a bold claim, but Barnet and Müller linked it to a rather 
impressive and mature analysis of the various techniques that global 
corporations use to plan their prices. Many of these methods are at least as 
relevant today as they were in 1974. 
One interesting concept proposed by Barnet and Müller was cross-
subsidization. When the corporate planning system becomes global, they 
argued, “the parent company can shift profits through transfer pricing, ‘profit-
loan swaps’ and other accounting miracles on a worldwide scale, cross-
subsidizing its various operations with the profits of others.” This was an 
important conceptual opening that went mostly unnoticed by their 
contemporaries and present-day researchers working in this area. Its 
importance lay especially in the realization that, if faced with non-market 
phenomena, relying on market-based terms in analyzing them can often divert 
attention to the wrong questions. There were many similarities in the thinking 
of Barnet, Müller and Galbraith. In line with Galbraith’s The New Industrial 
State, Barnet and Müller noted that “the key element in determining the 
relative bargaining power of foreign corporations and political leaders in poor 
countries is knowledge” (1974, p. 193). In an important passage (1974, p. 214), 
they argued that the world was witnessing: 
 
“... a new concentration of political power in what are, in legal and 
political terms, private hands. […] The principal source of their power 
is their control of knowledge of three specific kinds: the technology of 
production and organization—i.e., how to make, package, and 
transport; the technology of obtaining and managing finance capital—
i.e., how to create their own private global economy insulated from the 
vicissitudes of national economies by means of shifting profits and 
avoiding taxes; the technology of marketing—i.e., how to create and 
satisfy a demand for their goods by diffusing a consumption ideology.” 
 
While this analysis focused largely on vertically integrated corporations of the 
1970s, it touched upon several important developments in the global political 
economy that reached their full bloom only in the decades following the 
publication of Global Reach. Importantly, Barnet and Müller saw that states 
are not only disadvantaged because of disparities in technical expertise. 
Rather, the global corporate planning system distorts entire statistical and 
accounting systems that are supposed to help states to regulate corporations. 
Specifically, the intensification of global corporate planning turns corporate 
balance sheets into “less and less accurate reflections of real economic activity” 
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(1974, p. 256). As a consequence, “skilled obfuscation” becomes an essential 
accounting tool (1974, p. 263) and the government loses “the relatively little 
power it has had to regulate with reasonable effectiveness because it does not 
know what it is regulating” (1974, p. 261). 
Barnet and Müller also touched upon the relationship between global 
corporate planning systems and economic theory. Noting that “under 
traditional capitalist theory, private greed was supposed to lead to public good 
because of the character of the market,” the authors stated that this 
assumption did not hold true in the emerging global corporate planning 
framework. “The global corporation, essentially because it does most of its 
trading with itself, has delivered the coup de grâce to the market” (Barnet & 
Müller, 1974, p. 229). They maintained that “the power accumulated by giant 
oligopolies by the late 1950s to control supplies, set prices, and create demand 
had made an anachronism of the classic concept of the market even before Big 
Business became global,” but it was corporate-driven “globalization” that 
“completed the process” (1974, p. 229). Finally, one of the important points 
raised in Global Reach was that “large corporations plan centrally and act 
globally, and nation-states do not.” In contrast to most accounts of economic 
globalization, the merit of this approach was that it allowed for a meaningful 
analysis of how states had lost some of their powers and what types of societal 
powers large corporations had consequently gained. 
Global Reach was a product of its time and its authors could not have 
predicted the major transformations of global capitalism that would occur in 
the decades following its publication. For example, Barnet and Müller 
maintained that the global corporation was “transforming the world political 
economy through its increasing control over three fundamental resources of 
life: the technology of production, finance capital, and marketing.” In the 
current millennium, this analysis has become somewhat outdated with the 
increasing overall financialization of economies, the growing importance of 
global value chains in MNEs’ operational models, and so on. Despite its far-
sighted analyses, Barnet and Müller’s book failed to make a lasting impact and 
there are several possible reasons for this. First, like many classics of 
evolutionary economics, Global Reach was sparingly referenced, despite the 
obvious intellectual debts the book owed to Galbraith, Means, Berle and 
others. Moreover, it neither mentioned nor discussed the United Nations 
policy initiatives intended to address corporate planning (Ylönen, 2016). 
Lastly, the work was written in an occasionally provocative and controversial 
style. 
Ultimately, Barnet and Müller’s contributions were largely forgotten. 
Within IPE scholarship, this relative absence of reflection on earlier works and 
ongoing research downplayed the importance of political aspects of corporate 
planning, There was also a lack of textbooks that could have focused on this 
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particular theme.9 The scholarly community pointed out certain factual errors 
in Barnet and Müller’s book that were thought to erode its argument generally 
(Bowman, 1996). Of course, many canonical books have contained errors, but 
if history has proved their main thesis correct, these lapses have commonly 
been overlooked. Related to the previous point, Barnet and Müller’s thesis on 
why and how enterprises transnationalize differed markedly from mainstream 
analyses in the nascent body of literature in this field at the time, which was 
focused on mapping the determinants of foreign direct investment. This 
became evident in the polemic exchange between Barnet and Müller and 
Vernon in Foreign Policy, following an issue in which the three had each 
elaborated on their views on transnational corporations in separate articles 
(Vernon, Barnet, & Müller, 1974). Specifically, Vernon saw Barnet’s article as 
“an advocate’s brief” directed at least partly against his own views. In response, 
Vernon accused Barnet and Müller of neglecting evidence that would have 
supported a more positive view of transnational corporations’ role in 
developing countries. As an example of this bias, he correctly pointed out the 
difficulties that corporations face in determining market prices.  
In his response to Vernon’s claims, Barnet criticized Vernon for focusing 
on a single case (exports from Columbia) and using it to conclude 
(unconvincingly, in Barnet’s view) that Barnet and Müller’s analysis was not 
based on sound data. Müller’s rejoinder followed similar lines. Vernon seemed 
to have the final word in this heated exchange by repeating his earlier critique 
that Barnet and Müller had bypassed contrary evidence and important 
qualifications when reporting their results. I believe that the tone and focus of 
this and other similar debates hampered the development of the theory of the 
tax planning aspects of the multinational enterprise. Any normative 
conclusions or framings that Barnet and Müller proposed in their book should 
not have negated its contributions to understanding the global corporate 
planning framework. After all, Vernon himself did not deny the existence of 
the phenomena that Barnet and Müller described; rather, he doubted whether 
Barnet and Müller had correctly estimated the scale of corporate planning, and 
he criticized them for neglecting the positive results that direct investments 
brought to developing countries. 
The absence of genuine dialogue between the theorists of corporate 
planning and researchers focusing on determinants of FDI was in many ways 
unfortunate. Whereas Hymer, Vernon and other pioneers of IB research 
conducted important studies on the patterns and drivers of FDI, they did not 
pay sufficient attention to the question of “whether exports benefit a poor 
economy depends critically on the price” and other similar issues that had 
relevance to the balance of power in the world economy (Barnet & Müller, 
                                               9	One	attempt	to	address	this	issue	was	the	body	of	training	and	textbook	material	that	the	United	Nations	Centre	on	Transnational	Corporations	produced	 in	 the	1970s.	However,	 these	documents	are	little	known	and	less	utilized	today,	and	they	have	even	been	removed	from	the	UN	website’s	archives	(Ylönen,	2016).	
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1974, p. 37). This was a major theme among dependency theorists and Marxist 
scholars, whose work I discuss later. The mainstream IB scholarship paid too 
little attention to global companies buying from and selling to their own 
subsidiaries with “prices that often have little connection to the market price” 
(Barnet & Müller, 1974, p. 157). 
Broadly speaking, there are currently two mainstream theoretical strands 
that aim to explain why corporations internationalize. The first is 
internalization theory, which is based on the transaction cost approach. The 
second is John Dunning’s theory, which centers on ownership, locational and 
internationalization (OLI) advantages. Both orientations aim to explain 
international production as an extension to the theory of the firm (Dunning, 
1979, p. 274). Consequently, the evolution of these theoretical frameworks has 
led International Business research to become increasingly closely aligned 
with mainstream economic research (Dunning, 1979, p. 274). One of the key 
books was by Buckley and Casson (1976) and some further key contributions 
include Teece (1977) and Rugman (2006). Acting as a background to these 
efforts were Coase’s analyses of the importance of transaction costs in 
understanding corporations (1937), which Williamson helped bring to the 
wider readership (1975, 1981). 
In their important book The Future of the Multinational Enterprise, 
Buckley and Casson extended the Coasian framework and asserted that their 
new internationalization framework could include the contributions of Hymer 
and Vernon as special cases. In the words of the authors, “it is little 
exaggeration to say that at present there is no established theory of the 
multinational enterprise,” because previous studies allegedly lacked “a 
comprehensive theoretical basis” (Buckley & Casson, 1976, p. 32). Specifically, 
the authors maintained that the two key assumptions of orthodox economic 
theory were profit maximization and perfect competition. According to them, 
previous theories of the MNE had attempted to replace this orthodoxy either 
by allowing for the pursuit of alternative managerial goals or by relaxing the 
expectation of perfect competition “to allow for the exercise of monopoly or 
oligopoly power” (Buckley & Casson, 1976, p. 32). In their framework, Buckley 
and Casson embraced the latter condition more heartily than the former, while 
also providing an array of motives that can prompt MNEs to internalize 
production. These motives are the creation of internal futures markets given 
significant time lags in interdependent activities, imposing a discriminatory 
pricing system, avoiding costs related to bilateral bargaining, eliminating 
buyer uncertainty, and “the ability to minimize the impact of government 
interventions through transfer pricing” (Buckley & Casson, 1976, p. 44). In the 
words of Casson (Casson, 1979, p. 84), this “minimisation of tax and tariff 
payments redistributes income from the public to the private sector.” In other 
words, Buckley and Casson acknowledged the importance of intra-firm tax 
planning, even though they discussed it in different terms than some of their 
contemporaries. 
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One particular flavor of the internalization perspective is that of Rugman, 
who aptly noted in his book that was originally published in 1981 (2006) that 
the “need for an internal market always remains in the valuation of 
information, and transfer prices for this intermediate product are justified,” 
even though “so-called arm’s length prices do not exist” (2006, p. 65). 
Therefore, MNEs create their own internal “markets” out of necessity. Such an 
internal market “becomes an integral part of the firm,” making it difficult to 
distinguish the “firm’s organizational structure from its internal pricing” 
(2006, p. 22).10 Both this statement and Rugman’s were at least somewhat far-
sighted when they were written, and it is striking that neither Rugman’s nor 
Buckley and Casson’s frameworks have generated much research on the tax-
motivated use of transfer pricing in international business studies. One reason 
for this may be that Rugman very clearly excluded tax-driven transfer pricing 
from his analysis by stating that “the internal pricing of knowledge advantages 
by the MNE is merely a response to the lack of a market. It is not a suspicious 
action but a rational one by an efficient business organization, the MNE” 
(2006, p. 65). He also argued that “multinationals have a relatively restricted 
scope for transfer price manipulation” and that the MNE “should be allowed 
to use whatever transfer prices it cares to” (2006, p. 67). In other words, 
Rugman’s version of the internalization framework deliberately excluded 
concerns related to the harmful effects of intra-company transfer pricing. 
Curiously, no data were introduced to back up this claim. 
John Dunning built his renowned framework around OLI advantages. 
Dunning pursued a diverse career, acting, for example, as an advisor for 
several of the UNCTAD’s World Investment Reports, in addition to 
participating actively in the UNCTC’s work. He paid respect not only to the 
work of Veblen but also to that of Commons, noting the latter scholar’s role in 
forcibly taking “the neoclassical economists to task for neglecting non-market 
transactions” (Dunning, Cantwell, & Corley, 1987, p. 33). In Dunning’s 
framework, ownership advantages are specific to a particular enterprise, 
constituting competitive advantages over rivals and enabling the company to 
take advantage of investment opportunities wherever they arise. This set of 
advantages links Dunning’s theory to Hymer’s. Locational advantages are 
those advantages specific to a country, which are likely to make it attractive for 
foreign investors. Internalization advantages are those benefits that derive 
from producing internally. They allow the firm to bypass external markets and 
the transaction costs associated with them. They are, essentially, benefits of 
operating within hierarchies rather than markets. This set of advantages links 
Dunning’s theory to internalization theory and to Coase’s theory of the firm. 
In some of his earlier key texts, Dunning (1977, 1979) argued that “the 
market mechanism may be replaced by administrative fiat for six possible 
                                               10	 However,	 Rugman	 speaks	 somewhat	 confusingly	 about	 intra-firm	 “markets”	 when	describing	more-or-less	 hierarchical	 transactions	 that	 often	 do	 not	 reflect	 any	market	 prices	(Ylönen	&	Teivainen,	2017).	
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reasons” (Dunning, 1979, p. 277), namely to reduce transaction and 
negotiation costs; to exploit asymmetric knowledge; to control the supply of 
inputs, product, or production strategies and access to markets; to exploit 
advantages of size; to protect property rights; and to exploit or protect oneself 
against government interventions. Regarding the last point, Dunning noted 
(1977, p. 405) that “how far MNEs actually do manipulate intragroup prices to 
transfer income across national boundaries is still a matter of empirical 
research.”  
As can be seen from the above, Hymer, Vernon, Dunning and other first-
generation International Business scholars engaged with historical data 
employed a variety of different methods and engaged in scholarly debates 
across disciplinary borders. Jones and Khanna note that Vernon “produced a 
cohort of graduate students” whose work drew on economic history, including 
John Stopford, Larry Franko and Lou Wells (Jones & Khanna, 2006, p. 454). 
While their work did not discuss corporate planning power or related issues as 
such, they did engage with ideas advocated by scholars and popular non-
fiction authors who discussed corporate power, such as Jean-Jacques Servan-
Schreiber (Franko, 1974; Stopford, 1974) and others.  
Corporate power was also discussed by early American business historians. 
Even though corporate power was not a central focus of the early studies of 
these historians, they did contribute important insights to this topic. To 
highlight one example, in his 1959 article “The Beginnings of ‘Big Business’ in 
American Industry,” Alfred Chandler discusses the “bureaucratization” of 
large companies and, more generally, the oligopolistic tendencies in the U.S. 
economy of the time. With the emergence of vertically integrated, centralized 
and departmentalized industrial organizations, “costs, rather than interfirm 
competition, began to determine prices” (Chandler, 1959, p. 28). 
However, as IB studies matured, most of this methodological and 
disciplinary diversity was lost. According to Jones and Khanna (2006, p. 454), 
a growing pressure emerged “for a standardized social science methodology, 
especially multiple regressions,” which became the de facto standard for 
articles published in the Journal of International Business Studies and other 
prominent IB journals. As part of this development, qualitative research came 
to be seen as “non-rigorous” and the “general pressure for quantification did 
not encourage deeper engagement with the often patchy or partial data 
available historically” (Jones & Khanna, 2006, pp. 454–455). Qualitative 
studies were often published in book format and “their sheer size and 
approach make access to non-specialists difficult, especially as many IB 
scholars — along with other management scholars — were increasingly 
disinclined to read book-length studies” (Jones & Khanna, 2006, p. 455). 
Crossing disciplinary boundaries became as hard “in this field as elsewhere” 
(Jones & Khanna, 2006, p. 455; see also Toyne & Nigh, 1997a). Today, the IB 
literature “is remarkable for its absence of discourse on such central questions 
as: What is IB? What kinds of phenomena are appropriately termed IB 
phenomena? How do IB activities and relationships differ from non-IB 
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activities?” (Toyne & Nigh, 1997b, p. 27). As Jones and Khanna put it (2006, 
p. 453): 
 
“International business scholars know that 'history matters’, AIB 
meetings have had a 'business history' track, or else included business 
history as a subcategory in a thematic track, since 1998. A simple search 
showed that the word 'history' was mentioned in articles and notes – or 
at least one-third the total – published in JIBS since 1990. Yet not a 
single article was either explicitly devoted to the history of IB, or 
employed historical data to explore an issue.” 
 
The consequences of this diminishing disciplinary interaction went beyond 
methodological issues. One particular area of research that suffered from the 
evolution of IB scholarship was the political economy of developing countries. 
Whereas the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) 
and researchers associated with it emphasized the importance of regulating 
large MNEs, in the late 1970s, development-oriented IB researchers started to 
pay increasing attention to the emerging research agenda in economics around 
the concept of rent seeking (Stein, 2008). One exception to this general decline 
was Constantine Vaitsos, who produced particularly farsighted analyses on the 
impacts of MNEs in developing countries in the mid-1970s. In contrast to 
some other critical scholars, his works were also read by many mainstream 
researchers in the evolving IB research community (Droucopoulos, 1976). In 
his book Intracountry Income Distribution and Transnational Enterprises, 
Vaitsos researched non-market practices in five industries, namely chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, rubber, textiles and electronics.  
Showing the strategies firms use to siphon profits from developing 
countries in order to maintain and strengthen their market positions, Vaitsos 
argued that initial technological monopolies are frequently transformed into 
institutional ones because of the unequal relationship between MNEs and 
their host states. This gives MNEs the upper hand in both the negotiation of 
licensing and other agreements, and their internal pricing. In Vaitsos’s words, 
the concentration in the supply of FDI and the market structures has led to a 
situation where sector-oligopoly situations are much more representative than 
market-based frameworks (Vaitsos, 1974, p. 28). Other factors that 
contributed to these situations were the “size of firms undertaking foreign 
direct investments, their acquisition and merger processes” and “their 
managerial and other performance” (Vaitsos, 1974, p. 28). As a consequence, 
“viewed in this light the product cycle theory is seen as a theory of monopoly 
cycles” (Vaitsos, 1974, p. 18, emphasis in the original). 
One reason that Vaitsos managed to incorporate so many fresh ideas into 
his framework may have been related to his research material and 
methodologies. In particular, he used a variety of novel methods to obtain 
information on the actual prices MNEs used in their intra-firm trade, ranging 
from customs data to industry publications. This body of data was 
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complemented by in-depth analyses of individual financial accounts, various 
licensing contracts and the minutes of governmental committee meetings 
(Vaitsos, 1974, pp. 31–41). However, this kind of approach has never been a 
commonly used framework in IB studies, and Vaitsos’s book failed to make a 
lasting impact in either IB studies or development research. In fact, financial 
accounts research has only very recently emerged as a promising tool for 
critical corporate research (Finér & Ylönen, 2017). 
In contrast, two particularly important scholars who were successful in 
steering the development-related debate into the more conventional 
international business mainstream were Anne Krueger (1974) and Jagdish 
Bhagwati (1982). Much of their work focused on developing mathematical 
hypotheses regarding the impacts of the rent-seeking behavior of politicians 
and civil servants. Building on ideas originally developed by Tullock (1967) 
and others (for a review, see Tollison, 1982), Krueger argued that in an ideal 
world “with no restrictions, entrepreneurs would seek to achieve windfall 
gains by adopting new technology, anticipating market shifts correctly.” 
However, this is hampered by a non-functioning market system characterized 
by competitive rent seeking between politicians and civil servants. As the ideas 
spread, a consensus emerged in IB research “that business groups, often 
controlled by families, existed to rent-seek, and therefore did not serve any 
socially useful purpose” (Jones & Khanna, 2006, p. 455).  
As demonstrated by the above review, the early theorists of the corporation 
and transnationalization theory — namely, Hymer, Galbraith, and Barnet and 
Müller — shared striking similarities in their analyses of corporate power. 
They were also undoubtedly helped by the even earlier work on the 
corporation conducted by Thorsten Veblen, John R. Commons, Adolf Berle, 
and Gardiner Means. This body of research could have formed the basis for an 
evolving research agenda on corporate power, taking into account its 
interactions with offshore finance and overall financialization tendencies. 
However, in the 1970s and early 1980s, theoretical developments took a 
different path. In conjunction with broader developments, which saw many 
countries revise their policies toward MNEs either voluntarily or under 
pressure from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the discussion on monopoly power and other strands that addressed the non-
market power of MNEs lost much of their appeal. Consequently, the empirical 
debates on the scale and magnitude of non-market corporate planning were 
gradually consigned to oblivion. Moreover, when similar concerns about 
corporate tax avoidance and other related phenomena began to emerge in the 
late 1990s, many of the earlier participants in these debates were no longer 
there to revitalize and reform their earlier analyses. 
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3 THE BIRTH OF THE IPE 
International political economy was born in the early 1970s in a situation 
characterized by the disentanglement of the Bretton Woods monetary system, 
the growing internationalization of large businesses, steady growth in world 
trade, and increasing concerns about corporate misconduct in developing 
countries (Cohen, 2008). In just a few years, several international relations 
(IR) scholars and economists began publishing books and articles highlighting 
the importance of developments in the international economy as one 
determinant of an international political system. These efforts partly 
overlapped with similar developments in other disciplines, such as Marxist 
studies and development economics (see previous section), as well as 
economic history (see also Cohen, 2008, p. 21; Keohane, 2009).  
While many of these developmentalist and Marxist scholars were also well 
known in IR circles, their ideas did not garner much attention in IR 
scholarship prior to the emergence of the IPE. Towards the end of the 1970s, 
IPE studies began to emerge in greater numbers and since then, IPE research 
has progressed rapidly (Denemark & O’Brien, 1997, p. 214). I will show how 
during the formative years of the IPE, there was constant interaction and 
exchange of ideas between scholars of IPE, International Business and other 
disciplines, as well as with policy-makers within the United Nations 
organizations. However, as the IPE matured, many of these  conncections were 
lost. I will firstly discuss each of the strands of research that influenced this 
emerging IPE scholarship and then focus on the emergence of IPE. 
 
  
3.1 INFLUENCES OF MARXISTS, DEPENDENCY 
THEORISTS AND WORLD-SYSTEM SCHOLARS 
Early Marxist research on corporate power centered on the concept of 
imperialism, most notably articulated in Lenin’s 1917 book Imperialism, the 
Highest Stage of Capitalism (1965), but also in the works by Hilferding (1981), 
Luxemburg and Bukharin in the first decades of the 20th century (Palma, 
1978, p. 889). The term “imperialism” was first applied to the relationship 
between “backward” and “advanced” countries within the capitalist system 
and later to the totality of the monopolistic phase of capitalism (Palma, 1978, 
p. 884). Lenin’s Imperialism contained many themes that were discussed by 
the evolutionary economists of the time and that later recurred in other 
disciplines. For example, commenting on cartelization tendencies, Lenin 
quoted the German scholar Vogelstein, who had stated that “while at that time 
it appeared to be something novel, now the general public takes it for granted 
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that large spheres of economic life have been, as a general rule, removed from 
the realm of free competition” (Lenin, 1965, p. 20). 
Moreover, Lenin argued that the “holding [company] system,” to which I 
have already referred in Section 2, “should be made the cornerstone” of 
understanding the new stage of capitalism, given that it enabled capitalists to 
gain a controlling interest in more companies with less capital than ever before 
(1965, p. 54). Citing the example of an off-balance-sheet loan from a German 
steel company to its subsidiary, Lenin maintained that “the ‘holding system’ 
not only serves enormously to increase the power of the monopolists; it also 
enables them to resort with impunity to all sorts of shady and dirty tricks to 
cheat the public, for the directors of the ‘mother company’ are not legally 
responsible for the ‘daughter company,’ which is supposed to be ‘independent,’ 
and through the medium of which they can ‘pull off’ anything” (1965, p. 55, 
emphasis in the original). Quoting a text by Eschwege from 1914, Lenin 
maintained that “this typical example of balance-sheet jugglery, quite common 
in joint-stock companies, explains why their Boards of Directors are willing 
with a far lighter heart to undertake risky transactions than individual 
businessmen” (Lenin, 1965, p. 56, emphasis in the original). 
Lenin was greatly influenced by Rudolf Hilferding’s book The Finance 
Capital and by many bourgeois economists who studied monopolization 
tendencies at the time. Marxist scholars also influenced Thorsten Veblen, even 
though he was not a Marxist himself (Sweezy, 1986, p. 31). The two most 
prominent scholars in Marxist studies were Paul A. Baran and Paul Sweezy, 
whose book The Monopoly Capital was later deemed “the leading attempt to 
bring Marx’s Capital up to date” (Foster, 2014). Baran and Sweezy saw that 
much of the “stagnation of Marxian social science” was caused by the fact that 
“the Marxian analysis of capitalism still rests in the final analysis on the 
assumption of a competitive economy” (1966), notwithstanding the 
contributions of Lenin and Hilferding. Monopoly Capital was thus essentially 
an attempt to explain the “strong tendency toward secular stagnation under 
advanced capitalism” (Foster, 2014), which was driven by increasing 
monopolization in many industries, both nationally and internationally. This, 
Baran and Sweezy argued, had led to a situation in which the “tendency of the 
surplus to rise” had replaced the traditional Marxist law of the tendency of 
profit rates to fall — an idea that Kalecki also discussed in his work.  
Baran and Sweezy’s core thesis was that large MNEs were “turning most 
modern industries into a variant of the neoclassical model of monopoly.” 
Hymer had essentially reached a very similar conclusion from a different 
direction. Given that the most heated scholarly debates are often fought 
between scholars and groups who disagree more on details than on broader 
outlines of research topics, it is no wonder that in the 1962 introduction to his 
Political Economy of Growth, Baran admonished Galbraith and other “liberal 
critics” by saying that “nothing is further from their minds (or at least their 
public utterances) than ‘touching deeply’ the giant corporation. What can be 
expected from their recommending various regulatory boards and even their 
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possible appointment to Distinguished Citizens Committees?” (Baran, 1973, p. 
xiv).  
Another key Marxist theoretician of the corporation, Hugo Radice, called 
Vernon and Dunning “apologetics” of large corporations (Radice, 1975). What 
is more, in a chapter that was originally omitted from Monopoly Capital 
because of the death of Paul Baran in 1964, the authors distanced themselves 
from Galbraith and Berle. In particular, Baran and Sweezy criticized these 
scholars for advocating the concept of “workable competition” and “a 
pragmatic, piecemeal approach to problems of monopoly and Big Business”, 
and for confining “themselves to more or less realistic proposals” for 
improving the system (Baran & Sweezy, 2012).  
Baran was a trailblazer in this field, given that some of his ideas preceded 
those of Hymer. Comparing the changes seen in the 1900s to the transition 
from feudalism to competitive capitalism, Baran (1973, pp. 60–61) noted that 
“the transition from competitive to monopolistic capitalism has resulted 
likewise in a tremendous increase of the absolute volume of the economic 
surplus and in the shift of the control over it from the relatively small capitalist 
to a few giant corporations.” With the growth and propagation of large-scale 
enterprises, monopolies and oligopolies greatly influenced the distribution of 
the economic surplus and “the resulting concentration of assets and profits in 
the hands of a small group of giant concerns (and a small circle of the 
capitalists who control them) assumes… major significance when we consider 
our remaining ‘classical’ conditions for growth” (Baran, 1973, p. 61). Baran 
criticized mainstream economists for firing at monopolies with ammunition 
“drawn from the arsenal of the theory of perfect competition — the perfect 
ideology of petty business.” As a result, “the evil effects of large-scale 
enterprise were seen primarily in the distortion of ‘optimal’ arrangements that 
were expected to emerge from the reign of free markets” (Baran, 1973, p. 63). 
Keynesian economists also came in for criticism from Baran because “the 
relation between the process of investment (and economic development) and 
the growing role of large-scale enterprise and monopoly… received only spotty 
and sporadic attention” from them (1973, pp. 63–64). Specifically, since 
Keynesian economists treated the bulk of investment as an exogenously 
determined “autonomous” factor, with little attention paid to its composition, 
Baran accused their theory of income and employment of bypassing “the 
problem of the impact of monopoly and oligopoly on the volume and the long-
run effect of investment” (1973, p. 64). Galbraith also addressed this in his 
work. However, Galbraith’s ideas were difficult to systematize into the 
Keynesian framework and, perhaps for this reason, they have had little impact 
on its later development. 
Significantly, Baran anticipated some of the early ideas of Hymer’s 
internationalization thesis. Baran maintained that in monopolistic capitalism, 
oligopolistic and monopolistic firms that operate under conditions of rapidly 
decreasing costs are even more anxious than their competitive predecessors to 
expand their sales abroad. Even if the prices in foreign markets are lower than 
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those at home, companies may find it profitable to push their exports and 
engage in price discrimination, because discriminatory price reductions will 
not affect their positions in domestic markets (1973, p. 111). Writing some 35 
years before the outbreak of the Latin American debt crisis, Baran also drew 
attention to large MNEs’ opportunities to encourage their host governments 
to open up new business opportunities abroad via either military or economic 
means. A loan granted to a company investing in a country with a tight market 
situation by an “oligopolist government may be tied to conditions that 
decisively shift the competitive balance in favor of that oligopolistic firm” 
(Baran, 1973, p. 114). 
Some scholars later accused Baran and Sweezy of basing their analysis on 
the neoclassical conception of “imperfect competition” and overstating the 
empirical evidence regarding monopolization (Foster, 2014). However, the 
main Marxist criticism of the Baran–Sweezy thesis, specifically the notion that 
“oligopolistic pricing can lead to an increasing share of gross profits to 
income,” came from scholars associated with the “internationalization of 
capital” school (Pitelis, 2000), as suggested by Jenkins (1987) and in a book 
edited by Radice (1975). In their view, Baran and Sweezy relied too heavily on 
the neoclassical “quantity theory of competition” model, which regards 
“competition and monopoly as polar opposite types of market structure” 
(Pitelis, 2000, p. 202). However, the scholars associated with the 
internationalization of capital school argued that “competition should be 
viewed as a process which dialectically links competition and monopoly, as 
Marx had proposed. Accordingly, increasing concentration need not imply 
monopoly power, given actual and potential competition by rival firms” 
(Pitelis, 2000, p. 202). 
The Marxist body of theory on large enterprises developed in close 
interaction with dependency theorists, who were concerned with the factors 
restraining much of the southern hemisphere from enjoying the benefits of 
economic progress and integration into the world economy. Gabriel Palma has 
argued that we can broadly divide development theorists into three major 
approaches. The first approach built on the writings of Paul Baran, centered 
on Andre Gunder Frank and continued with the CESO School (Centro de 
Estudios Sociales of the University of Chile), particularly Brazilian Marxist 
economist Theotônio dos Santos. This school was characterized by an attempt 
to construct “a theory of Latin American underdevelopment” (Palma, 1978, p. 
898). To highlight one significant example of how this school approached the 
power of MNEs, in 1970 Dos Santos noted how the postwar period saw the 
development of a new kind of dependence, one “based on multinational 
corporations which began to invest in industries geared to the internal market 
of underdeveloped countries” (Dos Santos, 1970, p. 232). He labeled this 
dependency technological-industrial dependence because he saw industrial 
development as being strongly conditioned by the technological monopoly 
secured and maintained by imperialist powers. 
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The second approach built on work conducted by the Economic 
Commission on Latin America (ECLA), which the United Nations established 
in 1948 as one of its regional commissions. This approach became known for 
its analyses of Latin American development “from the perspective of a critique 
of the obstacles to ‘national development’” (Palma, 1978, p. 898). In an 
illustrative example of this strand, Chilean development economist Osvaldo 
Sunkel criticized many of the conventional accounts in development 
economics for analyzing “the national economy in isolation, treated as if it 
existed in an international vacuum” (1972, p. 519). Specifically, Sunkel noted 
how dependency theorists had only recently begun to notice how their vast 
resources had enabled MNEs to “plan the development of consumption” and 
how these “institutional developments in the United States are reflected 
abroad as the new multinational corporations spread throughout the 
international economy” (Sunkel, 1972, p. 521). These MNEs’ activities follow 
an established pattern, starting with exporting finished products; proceeding 
to establish sales organizations abroad; continuing by allowing foreign 
producers to use licenses and patents to manufacture products locally; and 
finally, buying out the local producer and establishing a partially or wholly 
owned subsidiary. Through this process, a new structure of international 
economic relations emerges, one “where trade between national firm Z of 
country A and national firm Y of country B is replaced by the internal transfers 
of firm Z to countries A and B, while firm Y vanishes from the picture” (1972, 
p. 521). 
The third approach identified by Palma focuses on an attempt to develop 
“a mechanic-formal theory of dependency — and to a lesser extent, a 
mechanic-formal theory of Latin American underdevelopment based on its 
dependent character — by focusing on ‘concrete situations of dependency’” 
(Palma, 1978, p. 898). In addition to the orientations highlighted by Palma, 
one further strand of studies that drew partly from the work of Andre Gunder 
Frank and his successors was the world-system theory, championed by 
Immanuel Wallerstein and his colleagues, especially Terence K. Hopkins 
(Wallerstein, 1974). According to Hopkins and Wallerstein, the world 
economy should be analyzed as a system experiencing an “ever-present 
division of centers and hinterlands, or as we shall say ‘cores’ and ‘peripheries’” 
(Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1977, p. 112), with various countries having distinct 
roles in global production chains.  
The ultimate beneficiaries of these chains are, Hopkins and Wallerstein 
argued, transnational corporations and their rich host countries. Many 
scholars built on these ideas, providing detailed analyses of the core-periphery 
relationships and imperial structures that hindered Southern countries’ 
attempts to follow the developmental paths that rich northern countries had 
taken. Even though Wallerstein and Hopkins discussed corporate power only 
as part of their wider framework for the world economy, their work laid the 
foundations for the later emergence of bodies of literature on global value 
chains and, very recently, the framework of global wealth chains (see Section 
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5.1). These frameworks have also been influential in providing direction for 
IPE research on corporate power. 
One remarkable scholar whose work drew on evolutionary economics, 
internationalization theories and dependency theories was Gunnar Myrdal, 
who is better known for his analyses of social policies and Keynesian 
economics. However, in some of his lesser-known works, Myrdal developed 
his ideas about combining the corporate planning framework with 
development viewpoints. Myrdal argued that underdevelopment was not an 
isolated phenomenon. For him, it was a part of a world process in which 
powerful nations have impoverishing effects on other parts of the world. 
Myrdal described these debilitating upshots of world economic relations as 
“backwash effects.” He pointed out that in the absence of counteracting 
measures, trade will not move toward an equalization of world incomes. 
Rather, it strengthens rich and progressive countries, whose manufacturing 
industries have taken the lead and fortified themselves against the 
surrounding economies. At the same time, underdeveloped countries are in 
constant danger of seeing even what they have in terms of industry, 
particularly small-scale industry and handicrafts, priced out by cheap imports 
from industrialized countries (Long, 1981, p. 24). 
In a little-known section in Myrdal’s book Economic Theory and 
Underdeveloped Regions (1964, p. 49), he notes how in highly integrated 
states, all prices are essentially manipulated. They “are not the outcome only 
of the forces in the market; they are in a sense ‘political prices’, depending also 
on the regulating activity of the state, of quasi-public and private organizations 
and of private businesses.” Therefore, a “pure” price system is nowhere to be 
found, because it is shaped by the legislation and administration of the state. 
In this regard, the prices “correspond to the valuations and objectives which 
emerge from the democratic political process” (1964, p. 49). Unfortunately, 
Myrdal did not develop his ideas on “political prices” any further. 
The 1980s saw a decline in Marxist and dependency scholarship on the 
power of MNEs (Lall, 1993, p. 122), but there were some exceptions. In 
particular, the work conducted by Cowling and Sugden — jointly and 
separately — deserves to be mentioned. In his 1982 book Monopoly Capitalism 
(Cowling, 1982), Cowling discussed several of the key ideas introduced by 
Baran and Sweezy and other Marxist scholars. Drawing partly on Keynesian 
economist Kalecki, Cowling attempted to give a more rigorous form to the 
concept of monopoly capital, connecting it to broader Marxist and Keynesian 
ideas. In his opinion, “no attempt [had] been made to provide an exhaustive 
treatment of monopoly capitalism” (Cowling, 1982, p. 3). However, for the 
purposes of this project, Transnational Monopoly Capitalism, which Cowling 
published five years later with Sugden, is of greater interest (Cowling & 
Sugden, 1987). Citing mainly earlier Marxist and Keynesian research, Cowling 
and Sugden argued (1987, p. 2) that the growth of dominant transnational 
corporations “leads to monopolisation tendencies within such a system, which 
in turn imply a potential for a rising profit share, but the consequences of this 
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for the level of aggregate expenditure will imply a secular stagnation 
tendency.” 
Mirroring (but not directly referring to) some of the ideas put forward by 
Galbraith, Barnet and Müller, and Vaitsos, Cowling and Sugden challenged the 
Coasian view of the corporation, which was based on a strict division between 
market and non-market transactions. Reflecting some of the ideas I discuss in 
subsequent articles, Cowling and Sugden called for a move “away from an 
obsession with market versus non-market exchange” in order “to explore the 
very nature of exchanges” (1987, p. 10). In order to overcome these 
distinctions, which did not truly apply to the everyday realities inside MNEs, 
Cowling and Sugden called for more attention to the literature on decision-
making structures within MNEs, highlighting especially a framework 
developed by Zeitlin (1974). Cowling and Sugden argued that in MNEs, 
“control implies the ability to determine broad corporate objectives despite 
resistance from others,” or, in other words, decisions about strategic issues, 
such as “a firm’s relationship with its rivals, nation-states and workers, its rate 
and direction of capital accumulation, its sources of raw materials, and its 
geographical orientation” (Cowling & Sugden, 1987, pp. 11–12). These 
strategic decisions are fundamental because, ultimately, they determine the 
direction of an MNE. 
Cowling and Sugden went on to define an MNE as “the means of 
coordinating production from one centre of strategic decision-making when 
this coordination takes a firm across national boundaries” (1987, p. 12). 
Usually, firms transnationalize “either to consolidate or to improve their 
retaliatory power — i.e. to defend against or to try to attack rivals” (1987, p. 
47). Cowling and Sugden point out that their definition covers Coasian firms 
that internalize market transactions under central coordination, as well as, for 
example, a clothing production firm that subcontracts part of the assemblage 
to “housewives looking for additional money” (1987, p. 13). This would fall 
within Cowling and Sugden’s definition of an MNE, but not within the Coasian 
definition. It is fair to say that after the 1980s, Marxist and developmentalist 
debates on international monopoly capital and corporate planning have been 
few and far between, even though some articles have been published on these 
themes (Foster & McChesney, 2009; Foster, McChesney, & Jonna, 2011). 
Below, I argue that this demise of critical thinking on the corporation also 
fostered the withering of these ideas as part of the IPE/GPE agenda. 
3.2 THE EVOLUTION OF IPE: FROM A DIVERSE AND 
EVOLVING FIELD TO OPEN ECONOMY POLITICS 
The dominant realist school of IR had focused on a different set of questions 
than those posed by development theorists and Marxists who questioned the 
rigid separation of economics and politics. In the words of Murphy and Tooze 
(1991b, p. 4), “the IR community first approached the ‘new’ problems of the 
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world economy in a way that preserved as much of the economics/politics and 
domestic/international distinctions” as possible. Hence, the dominant 
research paradigm left little room for any discussions of corporate power. 
Illustratively, in his iconic neo-realist book Theory of International Politics, 
Kenneth Waltz (Waltz, 1979, p. 94) qualified Charles P. Kindlegerger’s then-
famous statement that “the nation-state is just about through as an economic 
unit” by stating that while some states may be “nearly washed up as economic 
entities,” others are not, and that this “poses no problem for international-
political theory since international politics is mostly about inequalities 
anyway.” 
The evolution of IPE research into a distinct school of thought was marked 
by rivalries and disagreements between the more positivist mainstream 
tradition and the more social scientifically oriented scholars who emphasized 
the structural aspects of international capital. The key books and articles from 
the formative years of IPE demonstrate how the scholars associated with the 
positivist IPE tradition based their analysis of MNEs largely on the works of 
the nascent corporate transnationalization school, particularly those of 
Raymond Vernon, John Dunning and, to a lesser extent, Stephen Hymer. As 
argued in the previous section, Vernon advocated a relatively optimistic view 
of the potential of MNEs, with little focus on the potential threats arising from 
corporate tax avoidance or other forms of corporate power. The influence of 
Vernon and Dunning extended far beyond academia. Vernon’s Sovereignty at 
Bay became a long-lasting bestseller and both researchers also influenced later 
research in these areas within the United Nations Conference for Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). In contrast, more critical (often European) IPE 
scholars were typically influenced by the works of a broader group of scholars 
who often had a more pessimistic view of MNEs. These influences included, 
for example, French journalist Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber (1968), 
Canadian economist Kari Polanyi-Levitt (2003), and the above-mentioned 
political economists Richard J. Barnett and Ronald Müller. Eventually, the 
more social scientifically oriented strands of research faded into the 
background as product-cycle theory and other major frameworks prevailed. 
Attempts to understand the ideological factors affecting the UN-centered 
New International Economic Order (NIEO) movement played a major role in 
the birth of IPE (Murphy & Tooze, 1991a, p. 22). One common source of 
substantial information for both the American and European IPE schools was 
the body of analysis conducted by UN agencies, such as the UNCTAD and 
especially the UNCTC and its subgroups. The UNCTC based its analyses on 
three sources. First, practitioners and experts in accounting, tax law, and 
beyond prepared much of the important technical content that the UNCTC 
produced in the 1970s. The second strand of influence came from Raymond 
Vernon and other scholars of corporate transnationalization. The third distinct 
group included evolutionary economists such as Barnett and Müller, who 
owed intellectual debts to a diverse group of scholars, such as Galbraith, Berle 
and Means. 
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The scholars of international political economy employed the UNCTC’s 
analyses selectively. Both mainstream and more critical IPE scholars relied on 
the empirical materials prepared by the UNCTAD and UNCTC, but 
mainstream scholars rarely referred to the more political proposals and 
analyses that featured prominently in the critical European IPE tradition. The 
importance of this distinction became obvious in the 1980s, when the Reagan 
Administration withdrew much of the UNCTC’s funding and effectively 
blocked its work on a code of conduct for transnational corporations. Critical 
IPE scholars lost an important source of technical expertise and analysis, while 
the research agenda for corporate tax avoidance lost much of its steam. This 
decline was further accelerated by a more general turn toward research on the 
role of states in critical IPE studies. 
When the decline of the UNCTC began, the transnationalization school 
started to attract growing interest from economists and it developed into a 
distinct research orientation under International Business studies. The 
foundations of this school lay in the doctoral thesis of Stephen Hymer, who 
noticed that the mainstream economic theory of the 1960s offered no plausible 
explanations for why companies internationalize. In his thesis, Hymer 
provided the first framework for explaining this phenomenon, followed by 
many others from the 1960s onward. Even though Hymer’s own background 
was in Marxist studies, the subsequent research typically drew on positivist 
economics more than on social scientific research traditions. Illustratively, up 
to this day, no major IB journal has published an article with “tax havens” in 
its title, despite the mounting evidence of the importance of tax havens in the 
locational decisions of multinational enterprises (Cobham, Jones, Temouri, & 
Ylönen, 2017).  
The key early accounts that contributed to the birth of the IPE project 
derived from a wide variety of sources. In the United Kingdom, Susan Strange 
published her influential article “International Economics and International 
Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect” in the 1970s, arguing from her own 
standpoint within the IR community that the “unequal pace of change in the 
international political system and in the international economic system, and 
the effects of this unequal rate of change on the international society, and on 
the relations of states with one another” had “gone very largely unnoticed” by 
researchers. In the U.S., Richard Cooper had published The Economics of 
Interdependence two years earlier (1968), and Charles Kindleberger’s Power 
and Money was published around the same time as Strange’s manifesto 
(1970). 
Benjamin Cohen has noted that Strange’s article was published at a time 
when “both the politics and economics of global affairs were mutating, calling 
for new understandings of how things work and how they might be studied” 
(Cohen, 2008, p. 21). Strange provided the first building blocks of an 
explanatory framework, but in criticizing the realist and state-centric IR 
theories of the time, paradoxically, she ultimately replicated some of their 
underlying assumptions. To bridge the apparent gap between politics and 
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economics, Strange and likeminded researchers called for a research agenda 
centered on IPE. While no single definition of IPE exists, according to Strange, 
it concerns “the social, political and economic arrangements affecting the 
global systems of production, exchange and distribution, and the mix of values 
reflected therein” (Strange, 1994, p. 18). Strange’s aim to combine 
international politics and economics omitted accounting, legal sciences and 
related disciplines that are important for understanding the role that 
corporations play in world politics. 
The power of MNEs did feature prominently in many of these early 
publications, even though this attention failed to generate a lasting research 
agenda around corporate power. Kindleberger, for one, devoted a lengthy 
chapter to issues related to corporate power, including tax avoidance and 
monopolistic behavior (1970). (Economic historians have been one of the few 
groups building and maintaining a research orientation focusing on the 
societal aspects of modern corporations for more than a century.) 
Furthermore, in an early key IPE textbook, Joan Spero noted that “the special 
characteristics of multinational corporations have placed them in potential 
conflict with states, and their international scope has been known to create 
political problems” (Spero, 1977, p. 90). This international scope is facilitated 
by a “centralized, integrated organizational structure,” which “reinforces the 
tendency of multinational corporations to make decisions with concern for the 
firm and the international environment and not with concern for the particular 
states in which it is operating” (Spero, 1977, p. 90). However, Spero’s main 
focus was on how politics shape international economic relations, not the 
other way around (Gill & Law, 1988, p. xvii). 
In another influential early IPE textbook published a year before Spero’s 
The Politics of International Economic Relations, David H. Blake and Robert 
S. Walters (1976) discussed the role of MNEs in the politics of global economic 
relations. Noting that “a number of recent developments have focused 
attention on the multinational corporation as an international actor having 
important consequences for domestic as well as international politics and 
economics” (Blake & Walters, 1976, p. 83), Blake and Walters stated that 
several host-state governments and, particularly, labor officials were 
“frightened” by “the mobility and flexibility of the corporation, as opposed to 
the immobility of the state and its work force” (Blake & Walters, 1976, p. 95). 
Referring to Servan-Schreiber’s best-selling book The American Challenge, 
Blake and Walters (1976, p. 95) stated that “the foreign agent-of-change nature 
of the enterprise may be considered quite threatening.” Other issues they 
brought up included the aggressive marketing of products that were not 
necessary for “the primary tasks involved in modernization and development;” 
the widening gap between elites and other citizens, who did not enjoy the 
benefits of the international economy; and so on. However, Blake and Walters 
also highlighted the benefits of MNEs, such as employment opportunities and 
tax revenues. 
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Especially in the United States., much of the early mainstream IPE 
literature built on the work of Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. In their 
landmark 1977 book Power and Interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 2012, p. 
31), they stated that “the fact that a particular activity is characterized by 
nonpolitical behavior — for instance, transactions carried on through a 
competitive price system — does not imply that political power is 
unimportant.” For example, “a departure from perfect competition always 
introduces political factors into the analysis. Once firms can exercise some 
control over their environments, problems of bargaining, strategy, influence 
and leadership immediately arise” (ibid., p. 33). However, this was an isolated 
remark that was not developed much further in the book. This comes as 
something of a surprise given that in their well-known 1971 editorial 
“Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction,” Keohane and 
Nye called for more attention to transnational actors and their connections to 
the interstate system. Referring, for example, to the work that Raymond 
Vernon and Stephen Hymer had done on the transnationalization of large 
enterprises, Keohane and Nye maintained that there was a “control gap” 
between aspirations for control and the capability of achieving it (Nye & 
Keohane, 1971, p. 343). This particular special issue of the International 
Organization journal also included a chapter by Raymond Vernon (1971a) 
based on his famous book Sovereignty at Bay (Vernon, 1971b). While Vernon’s 
article was largely descriptive in its focus on the ongoing trends in the growth 
of large enterprises, its inclusion in the special issue signified that MNEs were 
taken seriously in early IPE accounts in the American tradition. 
Together with Van Doorn Ooms, Keohane also addressed the issue of 
“multinational firm and international regulation” in a book titled 
Transnational Relations and World Politics. In one chapter, Keohane and 
Ooms (1975) distanced themselves from Richard J. Barnet, whom they 
referred to as an academic “scribbler” (1975, p. 170) because of his normative 
approach to the regulation of MNEs — and possibly also his fame as the co-
founder of the left-leaning think tank Institute for Policy Studies (Holley, 
2004). In other words, Keohane and Ooms clearly distanced themselves from 
the research agenda surrounding corporate tax avoidance that Barnet and 
Müller so clairvoyantly built in their seminal 1974 book Global Reach. At the 
same time, corporate transnationalization theorists such as Raymond Vernon 
and John Dunning received positive remarks from Keohane and Ooms. When 
the evolutionary economic orientation favored by Barnet and Müller began to 
fall out of fashion and the corporate transnationalization school began to gain 
steam in the 1980s, it was evident that the latter had the support of 
mainstream IPE scholarship. Among mainstream American IPE scholars, 
Robert Gilpin has also acknowledged his intellectual debts to Raymond 
Vernon’s understanding of the role of large enterprises in IPE, while tellingly 
noting that Susan Strange did not have “a general impact on US thinking” 
(International Relations, 2005, p. 367).  
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Academic discussions on corporate power fed into the research agenda of 
the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), which 
began operating in 1974. Early IPE scholars followed these discussions closely, 
and the contributions of the UNCTC were discussed in key IPE textbooks and 
other canonical texts (Blake & Walters, 1976; Spero, 1977; Strange, 1970, 1998, 
p. 103). The UNCTC community included a diverse group of scholars and 
practitioners that had begun to address the areas that Strange identified as 
gaps in the social scientific scholarship. Early IPE research benefited from the 
analyses associated with the UNCTC. However, the relationship was largely 
one-directional. Even though textbooks recognized that MNEs had great 
power to decide where and how much tax they paid, the key IPE scholars of 
the time did not have the necessary expertise in accounting and tax law to 
begin building a research agenda around these issues. Genuine efforts toward 
trans-disciplinary cooperation between IPE scholars and experts in corporate 
tax avoidance were few and far between. The research agenda on corporate 
power thus relied very heavily on input from the UNCTC. The tenuous nature 
of this situation became evident in the 1980s, when the Reagan Administration 
cut off resources to the UNCTC, and its project to develop a code of conduct 
for MNEs came to a halt. The former employees of the UNCTC had to seek 
employment elsewhere, such as at international consultancy firms.11 From the 
viewpoint of the IPE project, this expertise was permanently lost. 
Consequently, 20 years after her original manifesto, Strange lamented that 
very little attention had “been given in the standard literature to the external 
relations of firms with other hierarchies, whether with other economic 
enterprises or with political hierarchies like parties, governments, or 
international organizations” (Strange, 1991, p. 46). However, her own 
approach was closer to IR studies than any branch of economics — mainstream 
or not — because it was largely rooted in the framework of states, markets and 
the international system (Patomäki, 2003). This was evident, for example, in 
her calls for a “general political study of international loans and debts” and 
economic warfare (1970, p. 309). Indeed, traditionally, much of the IPE 
literature related to MNEs has been written in terms of states versus markets. 
However, this is not a very useful dichotomy, “because the market is a 
structure, not an actor, and hence a poor counterpoint to the state” (Strange, 
1970, p. 309). In fact, a better counterpoint to the state is actually the MNE 
(Eden, 1993, p. 26). 
These biases and omissions persisted as GPE research developed and 
matured. At some universities, GPE research evolved with a strong positivistic 
tone, employing primarily quantitative methods and aiming for “scientific” 
precision — not least because a majority of publications were American and 
shared this orientation (Gill & Law, 1988, p. 7). Many of these studies 
borrowed from mainstream economics and positivist strands of IR studies. As 
Murphy and Tooze argued nearly three decades ago (1991a, p. 19), “orthodox 
                                               11	Source:	email	correspondence	with	Professor	Craig	N.	Murphy,	20	December	2016.	
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IPE scholarship displays a clear, if often unstated commitment to explaining 
events in terms of the rational action of individuals or of state actors treated 
as individuals — a commitment to a relatively radical form of methodological 
individualism that denies ultimate validity to contextually bound explanations 
as well as explanations in terms of concrete social wholes.” 
Especially in the 1990s, IPE research was thought to have branches, namely 
liberalism, nationalism (or neo-mercantilism) and Marxism. In her 1993 book 
chapter, Lorraine Eden argued that each of these branches had a somewhat 
distinctive view of the MNE. According to her, the liberal viewpoint takes 
MNEs to be an integrating force for progress and thus “generally beneficial in 
their role as promoters of a more integrated world order, offsetting the 
mercantilist tendencies of nation-states” (Eden, 1993, p. 27). The neo-
mercantilist approach, on the other hand, argued that MNEs “need to be 
regulated, both by national governments and internationally, according to the 
nationalist perspective, to ensure that state autonomy and sovereignty are 
maintained” (Eden, 1993, p. 27). Moreover, Eden argued that Marxist 
scholars, and Latin American dependency researchers in particular, “view 
MNEs as oligopolistic transnational capitalists that systemically exploit and 
promote underdevelopment in the periphery and semiperiphery, […] 
enhancing imperialism and permanently creating global income inequalities” 
(ibid.). Finally, Eden argued that the liberalist and nationalist perspectives 
were largely captured by Vernon’s theories (the product lifecycle, sovereignty 
at bay, and the obsolescing bargain arguments), whereas Hymer’s theses 
captured the gist of the Marxist and dependency theorists. 
Eden also argued that even though international business studies scholars 
have been aware of Marxist arguments, only contributions from the more 
mainstream strands of IPE scholarship are carried over into IB studies (Eden, 
1993, p. 34). Moreover, IPE scholars typically know the canonical 
international business texts from Vernon and Dunning, as well as the most 
iconic business history accounts. However, in spite of these kinds of 
crossovers, it is clear that the IB focus on multinationals “differs from that of 
the IPE scholars, with IPE scholars generally taking the more critical view” 
(ibid.). Additionally, Eden argued that the IPE literature had lagged behind IB 
studies in research on global multinationals (ibid.). It must be noted that these 
arguments were advanced in the late 1990s and that many things are different 
today — both for good and for ill. To begin with, apart from some very recent 
advances in tax avoidance research, there is arguably less interaction between 
these two schools today than there was in the 1990s.  
Until the late 1980s, IPE research covered a broad array of theoretical 
approaches, from dependency theory to Marxism and beyond. However, by 
the 1980s, a new school of IPE research known as Open Economy Politics 
(OEP) emerged from this cacophony as other approaches gradually fell out of 
favor (Lake, 2009, p. 49). Open Economy Politics shared several assumptions 
with mainstream economics. For example, it granted international trade a 
privileged position as a research topic and presented a “particular hierarchy of 
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other, less-valued, issues” (Murphy & Tooze, 1991a, p. 26). More specifically, 
OEP departs from the view that sets of individuals, be they firms, sectors or 
factors affecting production, share almost identical interests. These interests, 
in turn, are derived from economic theory. After OEP specified the interests of 
various entities, it “turn[ed] to how these interests are aggregated through 
domestic political institutions” (Lake, 2009, p. 50). Even though some 
scholars focus on one step or another in this process, much of the current 
mainstream IPE research has the same underlying logic (Lake, 2009, p. 51). 
As a consequence, today, the largest disciplinary sub-section within IPE 
scholarship consists of several variations of neoclassical economics (Palan, 
2013, p. 2). Recently, mainstream IR research has expanded toward behavioral 
economics (Hafner-Burton, Haggard, Lake, & Victor, 2017), which is in line 
with the growing prevalence of this orientation within mainstream economics, 
but this has not altered the underlying situation. 
Open Economy Politics has been more popular in the United States but 
slightly less popular in Europe. This has inspired many scholars to refer to 
American and British schools of IPE, a distinction made famous in IR circles 
by the intellectual history of IPE written by Benjamin Cohen (2008, pp. 3–4). 
The American school is closely aligned with OEP and “deeply embedded in the 
standard methodology of the social sciences which, stripped to its bare bones, 
simply means stating a proposition and testing it against external evidence” 
(Krasner, 1996, pp. 108–109). However, as Higgott and Watson have argued 
(2007), this bipolar categorization is not only inaccurate but also detrimental 
to any serious efforts to bridge the gaps between various schools of IPE, 
which appears to be the opposite of Cohen’s intentions.  
Higgott and Watson compare Cohen’s characterization with Thomas 
Kuhn’s notion of competing paradigms in science (Kuhn, 2012). However, for 
Kuhn, the contesting paradigms are never clearly defined, unlike the clear 
distinction between American and British IPE that Cohen advocates. 
According to Higgott and Watson (2007, p. 1), Cohen’s own work would place 
him more on the British than the American side of IPE (even though he is 
American). Moreover, Higgott and Watson point out that while Cohen calls for 
a dialogue between the two orientations, his way of picturing “very different 
notions of both the goals and the methods of social scientific research” would 
not allow for genuine dialogue should each of these methods be an accurate 
portrayal of reality (2007, p. 4). Even more worrying for Higgott and Watson 
is the idea that “by aligning this presentation with arguably the prime 
international relations metaphor of inter-state competition, [Cohen] threatens 
to reinvent for IPE a systematic struggle over methods which has occurred 
before in other subject fields and which has had attendant adverse effects on 
the subsequent breadth of scholarship” (Higgott & Watson, 2007, p. 8). 
Given its focus on a positivist state-centered system, the OEP strand of IPE 
has provided few tools for analyzing the political aspects of large enterprises. 
This has been accompanied by a more general shift in attitudes towards MNEs. 
As Lall argued in 1998 (Lall, 1993, p. 122), “the heat of the debate surrounding 
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the role of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) in developing countries has 
subsided considerably in recent years,” because the closing years of the 1980s 
“witnessed a general warming of attitudes to foreign direct investments, not 
just in the development literature, but also on the part of the national 
governments that were traditionally strongly hostile to multinationals.” 
It could be questioned whether the more structuralist accounts of IPE could 
be more helpful for analyzing corporate power. Earlier, it was noted that the 
emergence of IPE was predated by various schools of Marxist and 
developmentalist scholars, from Wallerstein to Baran and Sweezy. These 
structuralist theories contributed to the birth of the neo-Gramscian theoretical 
framework, which emerged in the early 1980s, especially through the work of 
Robert Cox (1981, 1983). Cox’s original contribution was influenced by 
Wallerstein’s world-system analysis, which he saw as one of the building 
blocks for a more comprehensive theory (Cox, 1981, p. 127; Patomäki, 2003, 
p. 197). Wallerstein’s (1974) main argument was that a single, capitalist world-
economy had existed for five centuries, characterized by unequal power 
relations between the core and the periphery of the world economy. Cox 
criticized this approach for its apparent structural determinism and 
“developed more thoroughly historicist concepts such as relations of 
production, social classes and forces, forms of state, world orders, and 
hegemony” (Patomäki, 2003, p. 197). 
A few years later, Stephen Gill and David Law (1988) introduced their own 
neo-Gramscian vision for the global political economy. Like Cox, “Gill and Law 
argued that a political economy analysis should not be narrowly limited to 
examining diplomatic relations between governments of modern nation-
states, which are taken as given, and a few additional actors such as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and other international organisations” 
(Patomäki, 2003, p. 197). Instead, the focus should be on the underlying 
historical processes (particularly in production) that shape the forms of world 
orders and states (Gill & Law, 1988). In line with the burgeoning globalization 
literature and in contrast to Wallerstein, Gill and Law also argued that the 
economic globalization of the time was of a different nature than the centuries-
old world economy described by Wallerstein. However, Gill and Law also 
framed the political economy quite conventionally as an integrated field 
encompassing “the specialised disciplines of politics, economics and 
international relations,” excluding accounting and other business studies (Gill 
& Law, 1988, p. xviii; Gilpin, 1987, p. 5). Regarding MNEs, Gill and Law 
introduced a wide range of viewpoints, from those of corporate 
transnationalization theorists to those of Richard Barnet and Ronald Müller. 
The approach was mostly descriptive. Gill and Law did not go very far in tying 
corporate power to the broader frameworks of global political economy. 
This garnered Susan Strange’s attention in her later major works, especially 
States and Markets and The Retreat of the State. In the introduction to States 
and Markets, Strange (1994, p. 12) noted that contemporary international 
political economy has “been too much dominated by the American academics 
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and has therefore been permeated by many hidden and even unconscious 
value-judgments and assumptions based on American experience.” Strange 
called for a synthesis of politics and economics “by means of structural analysis 
of the effects of states — or more properly of any kind of political authority — 
on markets and, conversely, of market forces on states” (1994, pp. 13–14). Her 
own proposal for a theory that could take into account states, corporations, 
and other actors centered on the concepts of structural and relational power 
that Strange saw as the four key dimensions: production, security, finance and 
knowledge (1994). Acknowledging the importance of structural power and 
expanding the framework of analysis used in traditional IR theories was a clear 
achievement, but one cannot find the elements of a comprehensive framework 
for analyzing MNEs in her work. Whatever merits she had as a theorist, her 
work was driven by empirics (Palan, 2000). This is particularly evident in her 
discussion of the power of MNEs, a theme present in Strange’s 1970 manifesto. 
One point that emerges from this brief review is that none of the strands of 
the IPE project paid sufficient attention to developments in studies of political 
economy that were conducted outside of mainstream economic and 
international relations research. This is unfortunate, because several 
important analyses regarding corporate power and its manifestations emerged 
in the 1970s. These studies either went unnoticed in the IPE literature or were 
merely referred to without further theoretical discussion or development. 
Eventually, the 1980s saw the demise of many of these strands of research, and 
it took a lot of time and effort for IPE scholarship to reach the level of analysis 
championed by the earlier generations of researchers, especially the level of 
knowledge about the legal and accounting aspects of corporate power. While 
multinationals have been studied in the IPE literature, “their presence is often 
implicit rather than explicit, or segregated from other questions” (Eden, 1993, 
p. 26).  
This demise of the research agenda regarding corporate power resulted 
from many overlapping factors, as described in the first article of this 
dissertation. One factor was the defunding of the UNCTC by the Reagan 
Administration. A second factor was the rapid change in the logic of 
international business in the 1970s. The oil crisis was a major blow to the big 
oil companies, which many people had thought were invincible. This created a 
sense that perhaps big business was not as powerful as had been thought 
(Gilpin, 1987, p. 232). As Robert Gilpin noted in his textbook The Political 
Economy of International Relations (1987, p. 232), “within a relatively short 
period of time, the gigantic oil companies — previously the quintessential 
international corporations — had had many of their foreign subsidiaries 
nationalized and had become subservient to states earlier considered 
powerless and servile.” Gilpin noted that the geographical changes involved in 
the spread of international business began in the 1970s, when rapidly growing 
rivals from Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere challenged the American 
military industrial complex that John Kenneth Galbraith and others had 
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described. The increase in chained forms of production was also already 
evident in the late 1980s, when Gilpin wrote his book (1987, pp. 254–256). 
Whatever connections there had been with the corporate theorists of the 
early 1970s, and with heterodox developmentalist economists, were either lost 
or marginalized. When the World Bank and the IMF began designing their far-
reaching structural adjustment programs after the emergence of the Latin 
American debt crisis in 1982, no viable research community existed to focus 
on the dangers of corporate power. This facilitated the growth of the research 
and policy agenda around rent seeking, which is most famously associated 
with the 1983 World Bank working paper Price distortions and growth in 
developing countries by Ramgopal Agarwala (Stein, 2008). During the 1980s 
and 1990s, these ideas evolved into a much broader and almost universally 
shared anti-corruption narrative that focused on state failures in the global 
South. The research agenda on corporate power was in tatters. 
There were other factors involved in the demise of the research agenda on 
corporations within IPE. Above, it was noted how, within Marxist literature, 
Baran, Sweezy, and others had inspired a group of scholars to conduct research 
on the monopoly power of large MNEs. However, much of this moderate 
interest (Sweezy & Magdoff, 1968, p. 1) within Marxist studies waned as labor 
process studies gained increasing popularity from the mid-1970s onward 
within this field. In the words of one prominent Marxist theoretician of MNEs, 
Hugo Radice, “those of us who had been studying TNCs [transnational 
corporations] were quickly drawn into these new areas of study” (Radice, 
2014, p. 24). Moreover, in the “real world,” the Friedmanian revolution started 
by Reagan, Thatcher and their advocates shifted the focus of trade unions, 
parties, and “a considerable part of the intelligentsia” to “local struggles, 
fighting rearguard actions against the tide of free-market ideology and 
policies” (Radice, 2014, p. 26). As a part of this development, Marxist 
scholarship retreated, and the “trench warfare against the neoliberal 
onslaught was not conducive to grand theorizing” (Radice, 2014, p. 27). 
These changes in world politics and international political economy 
contributed to the decline of interest in corporate power as a research subject, 
even though the study of MNEs “certainly enjoyed a renaissance during these 
two decades, as part of the ‘grand narrative’ of globalization” (Radice, 2014, p. 
27). The gaps in the understanding of the history of these ideas were most 
likely deepened by a broader development in which economists, political 
scientists and legal scholars began to take the demarcation lines and fields of 
their respective disciplines for granted (Strange, 1994, pp. 15–16). However, 
the underlying problems did not disappear. The corporate planning 
mechanisms that Barnett and Müller described so eloquently in Global Reach 
were still exploited by MNEs regardless of whether they were based in the 
United States, Europe or Japan. Additionally, the rapid growth of the offshore 
economy of tax havens began during this period, furthering these 
developments. Unfortunately, researching the drivers, characteristics and 
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consequences of these transformations did not play a major role within IPE 
and IR scholarship for a long time. 
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4 TOWARD CONTEMPORARY THEORIES IN 
IPE 
In the 1990s, calls started to emerge for a “new political economy” that would 
draw on a wider range of theoretical and methodological orientations than the 
mainstream OEP-focused IPE could offer. The structuralist theories discussed 
above can be seen as a part of that movement, but the movement also included 
scholars from backgrounds other than IR or economics. Some of the key calls 
for action in this regard were the founding of two new journals, namely Review 
of International Political Economy in 1994 (RIPE Editors, 1994) and New 
Political Economy in 1996 (Gamble et al., 1996). According to the first 
editorial of the former journal, the end of the Cold War had “seriously shaken 
the orthodoxies, thus providing a window of opportunity to bring together 
analyses of former opposed positions … [through] genuine exploration of the 
possibilities of epistemological convergences” (RIPE Editors, 1994, p. 2).  
The first editorial of New Political Economy, on the other hand, argued 
that the “methodology of the new political economy rejects the old dichotomy 
between agency and structure, and states and markets, which fragmented 
classical political economy into separate disciplines,” seeking instead “to build 
on those approaches in social science which have tried to develop an integrated 
analysis, by combining parsimonious theories which analyse agency in terms 
of a conception of rationality with contextual theories which analyse structures 
institutionally and historically” (Gamble et al., 1996, pp. 5–6). Similar calls 
were made a few years earlier in the important book New International 
Political Economy (Murphy & Tooze, 1991c). As part of this broader 
development, IPE scholarship also began to slowly catch up with the 
challenges posed by corporate tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax havens. 
However, the process has been a long one. For example, in identifying the gaps 
and omissions in the IPE literature in the late 1990s, Denemark and O’Brien 
(1997, p. 232) mention only feminist concerns, environment and labor, but not 
the lack of attention to MNEs and offshore finance. 
Since the 1990s, several strands of studies on these topics have emerged 
and I introduce and discuss these studies using a three-fold categorization. In 
line with the focus on IPE/GPE, my focus is on studies that aim to understand 
the mechanisms, structures and actors behind offshore finance.12 Regarding 
                                               12	However,	 it	 should	be	noted	 that	much	of	 the	 research	on	corporate	 tax	avoidance	has	traditionally	 been	 conducted	 within	 business	 studies	 and	 related	 disciplines.	 Most	 of	 these	studies	 have	 employed	 quantitative	 mechanisms,	 utilizing	 large	 datasets,	 for	 example	 for	comparing	the	effective	tax	rates	of	large	multinationals	to	other	factors,	such	as	the	number	of	subsidiaries	in	certain	tax	haven	jurisdictions	(for	reviews,	see	Dharmapala,	2014;	Heckemeyer	&	Overesch,	2013;	OECD,	2015a).	This	research	has	provided	knowledge	on	the	magnitudes	of	various	tax-driven	wealth	flows,	but	it	is	not	without	problems.	For	example,	the	databases	these	
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the strands of research that aim to understand the offshore economy and how 
it benefits MNEs, the first group of studies can be labeled as structural, as they 
aim to understand these phenomena as an important and permanent feature 
of contemporary capitalism. The second category of studies focuses on the 
political and social aspects of actors, in particular MNEs, but also individual 
investors and facilitators such as the Big 4 accounting firms. The third group 
of studies focuses on the ways that the offshore economy is governed, 
incorporating research that falls under the more traditional IR frameworks, as 
well as studies that focus on more unconventional means of governance. All of 
these partly overlapping groups of studies are relevant for my inquiry, 
although the first and the last groups are the most interesting ones. In what 
follows I introduce each of these categories in turn and discuss how my 
dissertation contributes to the accumulation of knowledge in these fields. 
 
4.1 STRUCTURAL THEORIES OF OFFSHORE FINANCE 
 
After a decade of relative inaction during the 1980s and early 1990s (with some 
exceptions such as Johns, 1983; Murray, 1981), the societal and political power 
of MNEs started to make a gradual comeback in the IPE literature toward the 
end of the 1990s. However, the new wave of scholars approached this issue 
from a slightly different angle. Instead of taking MNEs as such as their focal 
point of analysis, the new body of research focused more on the structures of 
the world economy and its governance as it enables corporate tax planning and 
related phenomena. The Offshore Interface by Mark Hampton (1996) and 
Offshore Finance Centers and Tax Havens: The Rise of Global Capital 
(Abbott & Hampton, 1999) were two key early attempts to (re)introduce these 
themes into GPE. In particular, Hampton (1996, p. 69) laid the foundation for 
later conceptual advances by arguing that quasi-independent tax havens “are 
‘within and yet without’ the mainland, having autonomy in some domestic 
areas but maintaining close ties in other areas such as monetary union, 
external affairs, education, language and culture, and, perhaps equally 
importantly, being seen by the rest of the world as regulated by a competent 
and honest jurisdiction.” “The ambiguity of these relationships,” Hampton 
and Levi (1999, p. 651) argued, “provides the offshore interface, which renders 
these micro-states extremely useful to international financial capital.” 
In addition to these publications, Ronen Palan made seminal advances in 
the theoretical understanding of this “offshore interface,” which facilitated a 
                                               studies	 rely	 on	 seldom	 have	 comprehensive	 information	 from	 tax	 havens,	 whose	 entire	operational	logic	relies	on	maintaining	high	levels	of	secrecy.	Moreover,	aggressive	corporate	tax	avoidance	strategies	often	rely	on	jurisdictions	that	do	not	feature	in	the	most	common	lists	of	tax	havens,	such	as	the	Netherlands.	
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strand of studies that aim to understand and analyze offshore finance as a 
central feature of contemporary capitalism. Palan had published about the 
political economy of offshore finance in the late 1990s (Palan, 1998), but his 
most important contribution was the book Offshore World (2003). In this 
book, Palan expanded the scope of inquiry by analyzing the historical 
development of offshore finance as a symptom and consequence of broader 
developments of capitalism. Moreover, he argued that the existing research on 
offshore finance aimed “to isolate the subject at hand from a complex and 
confusing mass of extraneous information, to delineate its boundaries, and to 
work within those boundaries in order to understand the essential 
characteristics and processes at work.” Instead of this, offshore finance should 
be analyzed “within the context of a changing capitalist world economy” 
(Palan, 2003, p. 9).  
Palan’s most important theoretical contribution was the introduction of the 
concept of commercialized sovereignty, in which states routinely employ their 
sovereign right to make laws and issue citizenships for commercial purposes 
(Palan, 2003, p. 148). Theoretically, Offshore World drew mostly on the 
French post-structuralist tradition, with limited engagement with the earlier 
IPE theories, mainstream or not. I comment on and extend Palan’s concept on 
the “Panama and the WTO” article, which discusses how the 
commercialization of sovereignty impacted another significant phenomenon 
in the world economy, namely neo-constitutionalism in economic governance 
(see below). 
After Palan’s groundbreaking book, the scholarly focus of social scientific 
studies shifted from systemic-theoretical considerations to matters related to 
more specific issues of global tax governance and, to a lesser extent, 
development and taxation. Major theoretical advances in understanding the 
offshore interface or commercialized sovereignty have been rare. Recently, 
however, the Global Wealth Chain (GWC) framework developed by Seabrooke 
and Wigan (Seabrooke & Wigan, 2014b, 2017) has emerged as a potential 
building block for a more comprehensive research agenda. Building on the 
well-established concepts of global value chains (Gereffi, Humphrey, & 
Sturgeon, 2005; Gereffi, Korzeniewicz, & Korzeniewicz, 1994) and global 
production networks (Henderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe, & Yeung, 2002), the 
GWC approach calls attention to how “wealth chains hide, obscure and 
relocate wealth to the extent that they break loose from the location of value 
creation” (Seabrooke & Wigan, 2014a, p. 257). This also reflects the notion by 
Sikka and Willmot (2010, p. 353) of how accounting techniques “alter the 
statistics that governments use to manage economies.”  
Seabrooke and Wigan called wealth chains “the yin to the yang of value 
chains” (2014a, p. 257). While value chains and production networks are 
characterized by relative transparency and coordination, actors in wealth 
chains thrive on the secrecy of the arrangements. Therefore, Seabrooke and 
Wigan argue for a need for “a clearer picture of how wealth chains have an 
impact on developed and developing countries” and on the role of financial 
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innovations in these wealth chains (2014a, p. 261). Noting how value chain 
research has focused on the disaggregation of production processes across 
space, Seabrooke and Wigan (2017) have suggested that in the era of the 
“decentred corporation” (Desai, 2009), the legal and financial disaggregation 
of the firm merits more attention. In contrast to Palan’s commercialized 
sovereignty framework, which relied more on post-structuralist researchers, 
the GWC concept can be seen as part of the continuum of world systems and 
dependency theories that influenced the early development of IPE.  
I contribute to these studies first by providing a historical background to 
many of these ideas, and second by engaging with two different theoretical 
frameworks that are relevant for understanding the offshore economy: global 
wealth chains and neo-constitutionalism. Regarding the historical 
background, the first of my articles is titled “Back from Oblivion? The Rise and 
Fall of the Early Initiatives against Corporate Tax Avoidance” from the 1960s 
to the 1980s. The article focuses on the aforementioned analytical and policy 
work on corporate tax avoidance and tax havens conducted within the United 
Nations and the UNCTC primarily during the 1970s. Many analyses of 
corporate tax avoidance and tax havens have much older roots than is 
commonly understood. Based on a content analysis of the relevant reports 
UNCTC published between its inception and closure, I demonstrate how the 
weakening policy community in the UN and the failure of the OECD to take 
into account the earlier discussions on corporate power and tax avoidance 
contributed to the neglect of these discussions. Other factors were the 
reframing of the UN’s work on multinational enterprises to address human 
rights abuses instead of tax avoidance and the transformation of the academic 
theories of the firm.  
Even though these developments took place during the formative years of 
GPE, the GPE literature published in this era largely omitted these 
developments apart from occasional references to some UNCTC reports (e.g. 
Strange, 1994, p. 247). This is unfortunate, not least because UNCTC’s 
analyses were surprisingly mature for their time, often bearing a striking 
resemblance to today’s discussions on tax avoidance and corporate power 
within the GPE and world politics literature. However, the key authors of these 
reports were typically not scholars of IR or mainstream economics. Many of 
them were practitioners and those with an academic background often seemed 
to associate themselves with international business, accounting or similar 
orientations. I believe that the heterogeneity of orientations and the 
consequent lack of a coherent theoretical school contributed to the limited 
interest and understanding of the issues discussed in the UN (and partially 
also in the OECD and within the U.S. government) among economists and IR 
scholars. Even though evolutionary economics has recently made some 
inroads into the GPE literature (Palan, 2013), the long-neglected status of this 
tradition is apparent in review that Denemark and O’Brien published on the 
development of the IPE studies within the IR scholarship. They mention only 
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the imperialism studies of the early 20th century as an example of early studies 
on IPE (Denemark & O’Brien, 1997, p. 231). 
This first historical article is followed by a paper titled “Tax-driven wealth 
chains: A multiple case study of tax avoidance in the Finnish mining sector,” 
which enriches many of the discussions introduced in the previous article with 
more empirics and a broader conceptual framework. Written together with 
Lauri Finér, the article begins with a review of the tax practices of 10 
companies mining metal ores in Finland. The setting is then narrowed down 
to three mines operated by two Canadian mining companies. The article makes 
theoretical inroads in a discussion of how the global wealth chains framework 
could be utilized in the studies of corporate power and global capitalism. 
My third article, “Panama and the WTO: New constitutionalism of trade 
policy and global tax governance,” written together with Teppo Eskelinen, 
analyzes how the conceptual framework of commercialized sovereignty can be 
combined with the long-standing research orientation of new 
constitutionalism. The new constitutionalism framework has been popular, 
especially in the research of international trade and investment policies. 
Specifically, we demonstrate how the tax haven Panama has effectively 
resisted attempts to sanction secrecy structures by invoking World Trade 
Organization (WTO) rules. Consequently, we argue that the way trade treaties 
“lock in” policies can thus have a far-reaching impact on tax regulation: trade 
policy not only restricts the policy space but also provides tools for 
commercialized sovereignty (Palan, 2003) to maneuver against anti-tax 
evasion measures. We point out that any future trade agreements or revisions 
of old agreements could pose a threat to ongoing attempts to improve global 
tax governance. Effective global tax governance often requires the use of 
means that are not foreseeable when stipulating exceptions to trade 
agreements with typically rather wide policy scopes.  
Another area in which interesting theoretical developments have taken 
place in recent years is in the study of MNEs as societal or political actors 
through facilitators and enablers of offshore finance. In the next section, I 
discuss some of the key studies in this field and my contribution to them. 
 
 
4.2 THE FACILITATORS AND BENEFICIARIES OF 
OFFSHORE FINANCE 
 
Recent years have seen a growing — yet fragmented — body of research on the 
nature of the corporation and its societal impacts (e.g. Biondi, Canziani, & 
Kirat, 2009). Drawing on a variety of disciplines and research conducted over 
a century, these studies have provided important insights into the dominant 
understanding of the corporation in both national and domestic arenas 
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(Bowman, 1996, p. 14). In addition, important contributions have been made 
regarding the legal foundations of the modern corporation (e.g. Avi-Yonah, 
1995; Biondi et al., 2009). Complementing this conceptual research, several 
strands of empirical studies on the non-market power of corporations have 
added to the more theoretically oriented scholarship. As early as the 1930s, 
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means used extensive sets of statistical data on the 
concentration of American industries to develop their theoretical thesis on the 
separation of ownership and control in large corporations in their already 
mentioned landmark book The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
(Berle & Means, 1934).13  
I contribute to this field with an article titled “The Politics of Intra-Firm 
Trade: Corporate Price Planning and the Double Role of the Arm’s Length 
Principle.” Written together with Teivo Teivainen, the article notes that 
transactions planned in corporate headquarters constitute a significant 
proportion of global trade. This intra-firm trade deviates from the basic ideals 
of the market economy as it takes place between units of the same corporate 
entity. States have addressed the mismatch between the theory of markets and 
the reality of price planning by agreeing on national and international norms 
for facilitating market-based transactions within big corporations, namely the 
separate entity principle and the arm’s length principle. The former states that 
companies belonging to the same enterprise are separate entities before the 
law. The arm’s length principle dictates that whenever two parts of the same 
corporate entity trade with each other, they should set the prices as if they were 
at arm’s length from each other (Eden, 2016).  
Key scholars within tax law scholarship have addressed the legal and 
institutional aspects of corporate tax avoidance (e.g. Avi-Yonah, 1995, 2001, 
2016; Christians, 2005; Durst & Culbertson, 2014; Eden, 2003; Kudrle & 
Eden, 2003; Picciotto, 1992, 2011). While not confined solely to tax law, these 
studies have been especially helpful in increasing our understanding of the 
legal environment that enables and facilitates corporate tax avoidance. In 
particular, legal scholars have pointed out how the separate-entity principle 
(i.e. that companies belonging to one group are treated as separate entities for 
tax purposes), and the arm’s length principle associated with it, have been 
dysfunctional almost from their inception in the 1920s. The underlying 
problems of these principles have only worsened with the growth of 
international trade in the subsequent decades. 
However, a body of empirical research has shown that comparable prices 
are typically very difficult if not impossible to find. As a result, states have 
allowed multinational corporations to resort to various formulas when 
                                               13	It	should	be	noted	that	some	of	their	interpretations	of	the	data	were	skewed	and	this	error	has	since	been	repeated	in	other	studies	that	draw	on	Berle	and	Means	(Zeitlin,	1974).	However,	the	basic	thesis	of	business	concentration	in	the	United	States	is	still	relevant,	and	the	theoretical	framework	that	Berle	and	Means	developed	was	of	even	more	lasting	importance,	a	theme	that	I	discuss	further	in	the	subsequent	sections.		
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determining their intra-firm prices. In the article, we argue that the arm’s 
length principle has played a double role in world trade: its first, explicit 
purpose is to establish markets within multinational corporations. Based on 
decades of practical results, we argue that it has failed in this goal. The 
principle also helps in maintaining the current dysfunctional system of global 
tax governance and we note that the existing research has not acknowledged 
this ideological role. In conclusion, we argue that there are grounds for 
crossing the disciplinary border between politics and economics, and that 
intra-firm trade could also be analyzed as a political phenomenon inside the 
economic sphere. 
 
4.3 THE (NON-)GOVERNANCE OF OFFSHORE FINANCE 
 
The governance of offshore finance has been a natural field of research in IPE. 
After a period of very little activity in the 1980s and early 1990s, the OECD’s 
1998 initiative against harmful tax practices was a definite milestone in 
answering the call for research that the G7 group had issued in 1995. The 
report was instrumental not only in igniting the still ongoing wave of action 
against tax havens, but also for sparking a number of IPE-related articles and 
books in the subsequent years. The 1998 report included far-reaching 
suggestions such as sanctions for capital flows entering tax haven 
jurisdictions. Jason Sharman (2006) documented the demise of this initiative 
in his seminal book Havens in a Storm. Around the same time, research 
started to emerge analyzing the OECD’s 1998 initiative, its failure and other 
areas of international tax governance (e.g. Eccleston, 2012; Emmenegger, 
2015; Sharman, 2008, 2011, 2012; Vlcek, 2013). As a result, international tax 
governance began to gradually emerge as a viable research topic in World 
Politics. While Thomas Rixen was right to argue in 2011 that “the causes of tax 
competition have received no attention” in the international political economy 
literature (Rixen, 2011, p. 3), the situation has improved markedly since then. 
Rixen himself has addressed the causes and consequences of corporate tax 
avoidance and tax competition — or “tax wars,” as Christensen and Shaxson 
(2016) recently labeled this phenomenon — in several articles (Dietsch & 
Rixen, 2016).  
Thus, the international political economy of tax havens, corporate tax 
avoidance and tax evasion has evolved into a distinct, interdisciplinary 
research area. It has largely been developed as a joint effort between scholars 
of international relations, international tax law, accounting, development 
studies, and so on. However, the aforementioned studies have focused 
predominantly on governance frameworks of tax avoidance and less on the 
corporate power over the states behind these phenomena. The recent lack of 
analyses of corporate power has been striking, given that the new millennium 
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has already seen a torrent of exposés and scandals related to corporate tax 
avoidance, tax havens and accounting frauds (e.g. Hearson & Brooks, 2010; 
Ting, 2014; Ylönen & Laine, 2015). These revelations have produced much 
research, but often from narrow, sector-specific viewpoints. Despite some 
interesting theoretical developments (e.g. May, 2006, 2015a, 2015b; 
Seabrooke & Wigan, 2017), attempts to develop broader frameworks of 
analysis have been few and far between.  
Understanding tax avoidance, tax evasion, tax havens and corporate power 
calls for inter-disciplinary approaches. Tax arrangements are often based on 
complex accounting techniques. The national and international legal 
frameworks that aim to regulate corporate tax arrangements also need to be 
taken into account. National, international and global politics can shape both 
accounting rules and the legal environment. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
accounting and legal scholars have also been most active in researching tax 
avoidance. However, most of the research in accounting has focused on large 
datasets instead of aiming to understand in detail how corporate tax avoidance 
operates in the real world.  
Governance is a broad field, and in some respects all of the articles of this 
dissertation contribute to these studies, including the aforementioned article 
on Panama and the WTO. Trade policy is not the only policy field that can 
impact efforts to enforce tax regulations. During the past 35 years, the loan 
conditionalities imposed by the IMF and the World Bank have played a major 
role in determining tax policies in low-income countries around the world. 
Around the turn of the millennium, several scholars noted the generic, one-
size-fits-all nature of the IMF’s tax policy recommendations, labeling them as 
the “global tax consensus.” Among other things, this consensus focused on 
lowering corporate income tax rates, the introduction of or increasing reliance 
on value added taxation, and structural reforms of tax administrations. In the 
current millennium, the use of loan conditionalities has somewhat diminished 
in IMF loans and the issue has become less salient. Through an analysis of IMF 
country reports from several sub-Saharan African countries, I revisit the global 
tax consensus debate in a UNU-WIDER working paper titled “Policy diffusion 
within international organizations: A bottom-up analysis of International 
Monetary Fund tax work in Panama, Seychelles, and the Netherlands” 
(Ylönen, 2017). 
The final article focuses on the “spill-over effects” of the increasing salience 
of tax issues in global policy forums. The article Cities as world-political 
actors? “The “tax haven-free” cities initiative and the politics of public 
procurement” analyzes recent efforts to introduce tax-related criteria to public 
procurement tenders in Helsinki and Malmö. Comparing the “tax haven-free 
cities” initiative with the established “Fair Trade Cities” movement, the article 
illustrates how cities can utilize public procurement to promote world-political 
goals. I also show how the increasing complexity of the required procurement 
criteria can make the success contingent upon help from “emergent 
entrepreneurs” of social movements (Seabrooke & Wigan, 2013). These 
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developments highlight the contradictory and complex effects of the 
“economization” and “marketization” of the political sphere (Çaliskan & 
Callon, 2009, 2010). While economization isolates many societal issues from 
political control, it can also allow for politicizing local and global issues in ways 
that were hitherto unthinkable. 
Finally, regarding the societal aspects of corporate tax avoidance, the body 
of research produced by critical accounting scholars such as Prem Sikka needs 
to be highlighted. While Sikka and his colleagues have published 
predominantly in accounting journals, their work has had a crucial role in 
bringing these questions to scholarly attention beyond their own discipline. 
Together with Hugh Willmott and others, Sikka has analyzed the role of 
accountants in facilitating tax avoidance in several studies in the 1980s and 
the 1990s (Sikka, 2008; Sikka & Willmott, 2010; Sikka, Willmott, & Lowe, 
1989). While these studies focused mostly on the societal power of the 
accountancy profession within the United Kingdom, later studies expanded 
the focus to include the role of the Big 4 auditing firms in facilitating tax haven-
related flows (e.g. Sikka & Hampton, 2005). 
By the mid-2010s, corporate tax avoidance research had become a broad, 
inter-disciplinary and methodologically diverse field. Even though the 
research agendas in individual disciplines may still be in their infancy (Rixen, 
2011, p. 3), there is a significant number of recent studies on corporate tax 
avoidance and its impacts. To give a few examples, recent years have seen 
emerging research agendas on the relationship between tax avoidance and 
corporate social responsibility (e.g. Hasseldine & Morris, 2013; Sikka, 2013; 
Ylönen & Laine, 2015), on why corporate tax avoidance is an issue for 
developing countries (e.g. Bräutigam, Fjeldstad, & Moore, 2008; Durst, 2016), 
and on the philosophical and ethical aspects of tax avoidance (e.g. Dietsch & 
Rixen, 2014; Pogge & Mehta, 2016). Given the inter-disciplinary nature of 
these issues on the one hand, and the disciplinary gaps between various groups 
of corporate tax scholars on the other, there is clearly a need for more 
comprehensive approaches. Much of the research on tax havens has focused 
on state strategy, which “can be highly misleading” because we may end up 
missing “a crucial aspect of tax havens unless we pay close attention to the 
commercial firms that service them” (Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2013, p. 
12). The studies on corporate tax avoidance and offshore finance have also 
paved the way for an IPE/GPE research agenda on corporate power, but this 
has not yet fully emerged. What gaps and omissions remain? I conclude by 
focusing on this question in the final section below. 
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5 WAYS FORWARD 
“The	[global]	company	views	the	world	as	a	single	entity.	Its	perspectives	transcend	all	national	boundaries.	Decisions	are	made	not	in	terms	of	what	is	best	for	the	home	country	or	any	particular	product	group,	but	in	terms	of	what	is	best	for	the	corporation	as	a	whole	on	an	international	basis.”	(Business	International	1967	in	Adám,	1975,	p.	90)	
 
Compared to the traditional strands of IR, World Politics does not start “within 
a distinct body of literature; it is one that draws a broad range of literatures 
around its subject instead” (Albert, 2016, p. 5). In recent years, scholarship in 
World Politics and GPE has finally started to pay serious attention to the 
societal powers that MNEs harness through their tax-avoidance opportunities. 
As demonstrated by the preceding analysis, this development has been far 
from straightforward. The societal and political powers of MNEs have emerged 
as a research topic in various phases of the development of IPE and GPE. 
Moreover, these advances have been highly contingent upon developments in 
related disciplines, such as evolutionary economics, development studies and 
critical legal scholarship. Overall, this research has been scattered. 
Researchers have often paid insufficient attention to advances in related 
disciplines, resulting in major gaps both in institutional memory and in the 
quality of analyses. This recurring loss of institutional memory has been 
accentuated by the lack of comprehensive, inter-disciplinary textbooks in this 
area. 
In a development culminating in Kenneth Waltz’s iconic 1979 book Theory 
of International Relations, much of the IR research in America and many 
other countries has been concentrated around the neo-realist school of IR. The 
neorealist research agenda focuses on the power-political interests behind 
state actions and the effects this has on the “anarchical” system of 
international relations. Consequently, it is ill-equipped to provide tools for 
understanding the political nature of corporations in the global economy. The 
mainstream IPE is largely concerned with states, or at most with the interest 
groups that affect state policies. This rigid market-politics separation hinders 
attempts to understand the corporate-driven offshore economy. If one agrees 
with the presumption that the economic decisions of corporations can have 
political impacts that could be compared to those of some smaller states, we 
need to reconsider many of the key assumptions present in the traditional 
theoretical debates in IR and IPE. Especially within IR, a great majority of the 
theoretical debates have focused on the role of state interests in shaping 
international relations or other forms of international/global governance.  
Neo-realism’s chief intellectual rival in some academic circles, 
constructivism, is potentially slightly more useful in its focus on the social and 
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historical construction of international relations. It is evident that various 
historical and socially constructed ideas play a major role in sustaining the 
juridical-political structures that support the current corporate interests in the 
world economy. However, much of the constructivist research also focuses on 
the role of various expert groups and advocacy organizations in shaping the 
alignments of individual states in international relations. These studies have 
been useful in highlighting the role of corporate interest in policy-making, but 
they are not as helpful in addressing the political aspects of the economic 
power of large MNEs. 
However, as this introductory chapter and other articles of my dissertation 
demonstrate, World Politics needs to extend beyond these conceptions that 
focus on ideas or state-centric power politics. Specifically, there is a need for a 
research agenda that pays respect to the role that MNEs play in the global 
political economy, which would draw on various disciplines, ranging from 
critical legal scholarship to evolutionary economics. This way, we can achieve 
a nuanced and comprehensive picture of the role of corporations in the world’s 
power structures, and pave the way for better frameworks for understanding 
how the global political economy actually works. 
With the torrent of recent research within the GPE scholarship, a research 
agenda has now been established around corporate tax avoidance, its 
governance, and to some extent on the role that corporations play in these 
dynamics. Yet as the articles of my dissertation demonstrate, there are still 
several major gaps and omissions that require attention. Naturally, social 
reality is too complex for a full explanation and a selection must be made. But 
in the absence of the laws of natural science, the social sciences need to start 
from the individualities that form the social phenomena in their unique 
configurations. We need theories to “explain some aspect of the international 
system that is not easily explained by common sense” (Strange, 1994, p. 11) 
and there has certainly been a lack of frameworks for understanding the 
power-related aspects of MNEs. I agree with Patomäki (Patomäki, 2002, p. 14) 
that “instead of armchair philosophising,” most meaningful research should 
be “about encountering, collecting and analysing empirical evidence.”  
Very recently, a research agenda has started to emerge around MNEs, again 
combining elements from various earlier strands of research. Spearheaded by 
scholars of global political economy, as well as critical legal scholars, 
accounting researchers, and beyond, these studies have taken the IPE/GPE 
project closer to its initial foundations. As I have argued in this overview, IPE 
was not merely a marriage of international economics and international 
relations, as textbooks often portray it to be. Rather, the new research agenda 
around IPE arose from a variety of sources, including critical accounting and 
legal scholarship conducted within the UNCTC and other groups. During the 
formative years of IPE, there was also frequent interaction between 
International Business studies and IPE studies. Both these disciplines debated 
ideas put forward by Hymer, Vernon and others. Today, this linkage has been 
largely broken. 
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Spearheaded by scholars of GPE, tax law and other disciplines, a group of 
scholars have recently started to create new theoretical openings around 
companies as nationally-based accounting entities on the one hand, and as 
centrally managed and coordinated real entities on the other (Avi-Yonah & 
Sivan, 2007; Biondi et al., 2009; Robé, Lyon-Caen, & Vernac, 2016). Drawing 
on the early evolutionary economics of John Commons and other sources, this 
approach currently has the best potential for providing a bridge between the 
IPE research on offshore finance and corporate tax avoidance on the one hand, 
and the active political agency of the MNEs on the other hand. This theme is 
also discussed in depth in the article I wrote with Teivo Teivainen (Ylönen & 
Teivainen, 2017). However, it remains to be seen how well these approaches 
will be integrated with the mainstream IPE/GPE literature. 
Max Weber has said that “the social science that we want to concern 
ourselves with is a science of actuality … of the life in which we are placed—on 
one hand, the coherence and cultural significance of individual occurrences in 
their contemporary configuration, and on the other hand, the reasons for those 
occurrences being historically so and not otherwise” (Weber 1999, pp. 170–
171, quoted in Jackson, 2011, pp. 20–21). In other words, there “is no 
fundamental opposition between ‘explaining’ and ‘understanding,’ as both are 
equally scientific” (Jackson, 2011, pp. 20–21). It is impossible to understand 
corporate tax avoidance in its broader societal context by focusing on only one 
aspect — say, tax avoidance arrangements or the political efforts to address 
them. Therefore, there is a need for a variety of research settings as well as 
methodological diversity.  
In the field of international business studies, Jones and Khanna have 
argued that scholarship “should evolve its rhetoric of the relatively 
uncontroversial idea that 'history matters' to exploring how [it] matters” 
(Jones & Khanna, 2006, p. 453). This is something I have attempted to do by 
exploring how the scholarship of the societal powers of MNEs has developed 
within various disciplines. There is an urgent need for this kind of research not 
only in World Politics, but also in IB circles, as “it is fair to assert that 
systematic investigation of historical evidence has disappeared from the 
research agenda of most IB scholars, in parallel with a decline in the teaching 
of history in US business schools (Van Fleet & Wren, 2005). This may reflect 
the growing strength of the disciplines, especially in US institutions, at the 
expense of multidisciplinary, topic-based departments such as IB”(Jones & 
Khanna, 2006, p. 454). As Jones and Khanna (2006, p. 465) have argued, 
“current IB scholars are generally not trained to use rigorous methods suited 
to small-sample and qualitative data.” 
The key pillar of the corporate planning system is the modern corporation, 
with its separate legal personality and right to own other companies. Without 
these properties, the other pillars of the corporate planning system would not 
survive. As has been demonstrated, from a legal viewpoint, corporations are 
created by states. However, as Berle and Means discussed as early as the 
1930s, in everyday business activities, modern corporations operate as 
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enterprise entities (Biondi et al., 2009) that essentially plan their businesses 
in order to advance the broader goals of the firm and use whatever legal means 
and forms they find necessary to achieve their targets. As Biondi argues, an 
enterprise entity is “a comprehensive approach to the firm that integrates 
accounting, economics, and law, thus improving on the received 
understanding of the firm” (Biondi, 2013, p. 394). This approach departs from 
a realization that in order to navigate in contemporary markets, management 
cannot rely merely on outside market pricing. Instead, management must 
maintain accounting systems “that are modes of looking inside the ongoing 
enterprise” (Biondi, 2013, p. 402). These accounting systems enable key actors 
— management, regulators and stakeholders — to understand and govern 
corporations. 
One additional concept needed to understand the international 
foundations of the contemporary corporate planning system is new 
constitutionalism, which becomes important when shifting the analytical 
focus from the national to the international level. Originally introduced by 
Stephen Gill (1998, 2008), new constitutionalism refers to the various ways in 
which the rules of the international economy become locked into international 
treaties through a process whose outcome shares similarities with the role of 
constitutions at the national level. In other words, these international treaties 
create a strong, binding legal framework for the world economy. As is the case 
with state-level constitutions, changing these international rules has been 
made intentionally very difficult. The result has been an increase in the power 
of MNEs and investors over citizens and states. In Gill’s words, the outcome 
“confers privileged rights of citizenship and representation to corporate 
capital, whilst constraining the democratization process that has involved 
struggles for representation for hundreds of years” (Gill, 2008, p. 139). 
The guidelines and bilateral tax treaties that govern intra-firm trade 
perform this kind of new constitutionalist function for the international 
corporate planning system. Specifically, the arm’s length principle and the 
guidelines and treaties to which it has been codified essentially lock in the 
regulatory system that gives MNEs disproportionate rights to decide where 
they want to book their profits. Tax treaties stipulate the ways in which the 
undersigning states decide to divide the taxing rights for different types of 
income streams regarding individuals and corporations. While the original 
intention of bilateral tax treaties has been the prevention of double taxation, 
these treaties can also be designed with the specific purpose of granting MNEs 
or individuals opportunities to escape taxes in both countries. This is 
especially the case with some tax havens whose development or industrial 
policy model relies on attracting disproportionate flows of investment or 
corporate wealth. This dynamic facilitates the growth of the financial sector 
and generates income through, for example, registration fees and indirect 
taxes. 
The most powerful OECD countries determine the rules for this transfer of 
power from states to MNEs. The specific ways in which this new 
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constitutionalism of intra-firm trade erodes state sovereignty differ across 
countries. Generally, larger countries are best equipped to mitigate the 
harmful effects of the current arm’s length principle because these countries 
have greater administrative resources and various sources of power that allow 
them to engage in direct negotiations with MNEs and even make outright 
threats to make business more difficult. On the other hand, smaller and less-
developed countries are most likely to suffer. In general terms, large MNEs 
operating in small countries are more likely to engage in the use of political, 
non-market pricing power than small MNEs in large countries. 
The decision that the League of Nations made in the 1920s to abstain from 
the use of unitary taxation in dividing the rights to tax MNEs’ different income 
streams from different states essentially created one crucial component of the 
international corporate planning system. By embracing the seemingly market-
based arm’s length principle and the separate entity principle, states 
effectively gave private actors the power to decide on an important aspect of 
the international distribution of wealth flows. It was this power that also 
facilitated the development of the phenomenon of “commercialized 
sovereignty,” a term coined by Ronen Palan in his articles and 2003 book The 
Offshore World (Palan, 1998, 2003). Essentially, Palan argues that 
acknowledging the importance of tax havens as mediators and facilitators of 
global capital requires re-evaluating the conventional understanding of the 
relationship between the state and globalization, as well as the notions of 
agency and change in international forums (Palan, 1998, p. 627). 
In contrast to the body of literature claiming that globalization has eroded 
sovereignty, Palan argues that the growth of the offshore tax economy has 
resulted in a radical redrawing of sovereignty. Essentially, tax havens have 
managed to turn their sovereignty into a tradable asset by tailoring their tax 
laws, transparency requirements and other regulations to best serve the needs 
of international investors, large MNEs and even organized crime. In respect of 
international finance, this development began in the 1950s with the 
emergence of the Eurodollar market in London in a juridical process in which 
the British courts declared that British laws did not apply to the trade of dollars 
conducted by foreigners in London. As Eurodollar trade falls outside of British 
jurisdiction while taking place within British borders, it essentially happens in 
a juridical vacuum (Burn, 2006). 
Other juridical innovations that enabled the emergence and growth of 
commercialized sovereignty are early holding company laws in the United 
States and the institutionalization of modern banking secrecy in Switzerland 
in the early 1900s (Fehrenbach, 1966), although the latter invention was more 
relevant for investors than MNEs. The holding company laws gave companies 
the right to own other companies, and enabled the birth of the large holding 
companies that were registered in Delaware and other U.S. states that offered 
them generous benefits, even though they had little or no actual presence 
there. The Swiss invention of banking secrecy, on the other hand, brought the 
violations of the old professional secrecy practices under criminal law. 
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The offshore world of tax havens centers around large financial hubs 
(especially London), but equally important are smaller tax havens such as the 
Cayman Islands, Jersey, and the Netherlands Antilles. As the development of 
the offshore economy progressed, some of these tax havens benefited from tax 
treaties with “onshore” states that enabled easy repatriation of profits, while 
others began to specialize in tailoring different industries and customer 
groups. 
As can be seen from this overview, tax havens’ operating models are 
actually supported by two main drivers: investor capital and corporate holding 
company structures. These drivers have been labeled as “sink” and “conduit” 
jurisdictions. “Sinks” refer to places that specialize in offering investment 
products, whereas “conduit” countries include jurisdictions, such as the 
Netherlands or the British Virgin Islands, whose holding company regimes are 
often used by MNEs to channel investments (Garcia-Bernardo, Fichtner, 
Takes, & Heemskerk, 2017). Essentially, the tax treaty network of these 
conduit countries enables MNEs to repatriate profits from other offshore 
jurisdictions to their headquarters in Europe, America or elsewhere in the 
world with little or no tax. The corporate planning system is more connected 
to conduit jurisdictions that play a central role in the international corporate 
planning system. In many cases, these conduit jurisdictions are not tax havens 
in a sense that they would offer stringent bank secrecy or other forms of 
confidentiality for investors. On the other hand, the aggressive APAs that some 
key conduit countries supply offer equally important non-disclosure of 
artificial intra-firm pricing policies. 
A further point of interest is the dynamics between the non-market aspects 
of the arm’s length principle and commercialized sovereignty. Without the 
non-market planning power that the dysfunctional arm’s length principles 
provides, MNEs would find it significantly more difficult to benefit from the 
commercialized sovereignty of tax havens. However, the glaring loopholes in 
the current international tax governance — most notably the arm’s length 
principle — have enabled MNEs both to exploit commercialized sovereignty 
and to increasingly operate in close cooperation with both lawmakers in 
conduit countries and the Big Four tax advisory companies to design 
legislation that facilitates the growth of the international corporate planning 
system (Sikka, 2008; Sikka & Hampton, 2005). 
While the exact definitions applied to power vary, there is currently a broad 
consensus in social sciences that power is more of a process than something 
that takes place in particular venues. This is exactly how this concept should 
be understood also in relation to corporations. Since the 1980s, this view has 
been further solidified by the work of feminist researchers (Butler, 1990), 
scholars of social movements (Teivainen, 2005), and the body of scholarship 
produced on private forms of decision-making (Nölke, 2011) — to highlight 
just a few significant examples. 
By mapping the evolution of the research agenda on corporate tax 
avoidance and corporate power, I have aimed to provide building blocks for a 
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more holistic understanding of the role of corporations in the global political 
economy and world politics. The articles that are an integral part of this 
dissertation serve the same purpose by looking at corporate tax avoidance and 
the political power of corporations from various angles, including the broader 
structures in which tax avoidance takes place. Therefore, these articles also 
provide building blocks for developing more comprehensive theories of the 
corporation. As Pieterse (2013, p. 178) has noted, theories are contextual in a 
sense that “a careful look at practice can generate new theory, and theory or 
theoretical praxis can inspire new practice.” Moreover, while “theories react to 
other theories and often emphasize differences rather than 
complementarities, the complexities encountered in reality are such that we 
usually need to combine several analytical approaches” (ibid.). 
Finally, one thing that connects many of the following articles is their call 
for methodological diversity in the research of MNEs and their governance in 
general and corporate power in particular. Specifically, when studying 
complex entities such as MNEs, it is of crucial importance that methodological 
choices are firmly grounded in the research questions and research material. 
While one could think that this is a self-evident point when doing research, too 
often researchers in, say, International Business studies, tend to employ 
statistical and econometrial methods whereas IPE scholars focus more on 
qualitative methods. There are similar biases in the research on the 
governance of MNEs and tax havens. In order to address these issues, the 
subsequent articles also explore paths for developing new kinds of 
methodologies. In particular, the Tax-Driven Wealth Chains article develops 
a methodological approach around qualitative financial accounts research. 
Apart from some exceptions (Ylönen & Laine, 2015), this approach has barely 
been utilized when researching corporate tax avoidance, despite its merits. 
Moreover, Policy Diffusion within International Organizations takes a fresh 
approach to the study of the IMF through its qualitative research on the IMF’s 
country reports. 
All articles in the dissertation have been published in double-blind peer-
reviewed journals, with the exception of the working paper Policy Diffusion 
within International Organizations. While this particular paper has not 
undergone double-blind peer review, it was researched and written under the 
close supervision of Dr. Pia Rattenhuber from UNU-WIDER and it was also 
subject to approval by UNU-WIDER’s working paper acceptance process.  
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Back from oblivion? The rise and 
fall of the early initiatives against 
corporate tax avoidance from the 
1960s to the 1980s
Matti Ylönen*1
Tax havens and tax avoidance have gathered much interest, e.g., in the 
United Nations (UN) negotiations on the post-2015 development goals. 
The analyses of initiatives against corporate tax avoidance typically focus 
on developments from the mid-1990s onward. This article shows that 
contrary to the common perception, the country-by-country reporting 
initiative and many of the other contemporary policy responses had 
already been developed and discussed in the 1970s by the United Nations 
Commission and Centre for Transnational Corporations. I demonstrate 
how the weakening of the policy community of the UN and the failure of 
the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
to refer to the earlier discussions, not only in the UN but also in the 
OECD, contributed to the passing into oblivion of these ideas. Other 
factors were the reframing of the UN work on multinational enterprises 
to human rights issues and the transformation of academic theories of 
the firm. The examples demonstrate how ideas shape world politics 
and how the oblivion of certain ideas can have concrete impacts on the 
power relations between its actors. The oblivion of the earlier debates 
paved the way for the triumph of more business-friendly discourses 
centred on the anti-corruption and corporate social responsibility 
arguments.
Keywords: United Nations, transnational corporations, development, 
transfer pricing, country-by-country reporting, accounting
1*DĂƫzůƂŶĞŶŝƐĂĚŽĐƚŽƌĂůƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌĂƚƚŚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨWŽůŝƟĐĂůĂŶĚĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ
;tŽƌůĚWŽůŝƟĐƐͿ͕hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨ,ĞůƐŝŶŬŝ͖ĂŶĚĂůƚŽhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ^ĐŚŽŽůŽĨƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ͖ĂŶĚĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇ
ĂůƐŽĂWŚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚEĂƟŽŶƐhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇtŽƌůĚ/ŶƐƟƚƵƚĞĨŽƌĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ
ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚhEhͲt/Z͘ŽŶƚĂĐƚ͗ƚĞů͘нϯϱϴϰϬϳϮϯϭϭϭϴ͖ĞͲŵĂŝů͘ŵĂƫ͘ǇůŽŶĞŶΛĂĂůƚŽ͘Į
dŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌǁŝƐŚĞƐƚŽĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚŚĞŚĞůƉŽĨdĞŝǀŽdĞŝǀĂŝŶĞŶ͕ǁŚŽƐĞŝŶƉƵƚǁĂƐĞƐƐĞŶƟĂů
ĨŽƌƚŚŝƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚ͘DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ͕ ƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐŐƌĂƚĞĨƵůĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƟǀĞĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďǇ
ĂǀŝĚƌŝĐ^ƉĞŶĐĞƌ͕ ,ĞŝŬŬŝWĂƚŽŵćŬŝĂŶĚ^ŝůŬĞdƌŽŵŵĞƌ͕ ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉĂƌƟĐŝƉĂŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ
͟/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂů dĂǆ ǀŽŝĚĂŶĐĞ͕ dĂǆ ǀĂƐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ dĂǆ :ƵƐƟĐĞ͟ ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ŽĨ
ĂƌĐĞůŽŶĂĂŶĚƚŚĞdĂǆ:ƵƐƟĐĞEĞƚǁŽƌŬ͕KĐƚŽďĞƌϮϬϭϰ͘
1. Introduction
Transnational corporations should/shall not, contrary to the laws 
and regulations of the countries in which they operate, use their corporate 
structure and modes of operation, such as the use of intra-corporate 
pricing which is not based on the arm’s length principle, or other means, 
to modify the tax base on which their entities are assessed. – Draft United 
Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 1983
Exchanges of information between tax administrations through 
the application of tax agreements could not be regarded as a very 
effective method of putting an end to the flight of capital, and more 
comprehensive international co-operation was therefore required in that 
field. – United Nations Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Tax Treaties between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 1970
/Ŷ ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ϮϬϭϯ͕ ƚŚĞ 'ϮϬ ŐƌŽƵƉ ŵĂŶĚĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
ƐƚĂƌƚƚŚĞĂƐĞƌŽƐŝŽŶĂŶĚWƌŽĨŝƚ^ ŚŝĨƚŝŶŐ;W^ͿƉƌŽũĞĐƚ͕ǁŚŝĐŚĂŝŵĞĚƚŽ
produce international tax rules that would tax transnational companies 
(TNCs) where economic activities take place and where value is created. 
This marked the start of an intensive two-year negotiating process, 
with the outcome documents agreed upon and published in October 
2015. The rules that govern intracompany trade received some fixes 
and improvements, and a few pressing initiatives, such as country-by-
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ͕ƐĂǁƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐĨĂŝůĞĚ
to impress critical observers, as much of the present corporate tax 
ĂǀŽŝĚĂŶĐĞǁŝůůĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƵŶĂďĂƚĞĚĞǀĞŶĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞW^ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐƚĂŬĞ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚ;W^DŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ'ƌŽƵƉ͕ϮϬϭϱͿ͘
ĞƐƉŝƚĞ ŝƚƐ ĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐŝĞƐ͕ ƚŚĞ W^ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ
culmination of the OECD-led efforts to champion the international tax 
regime (Ring, 2007: 598), especially since the publication of the OECD’s 
Harmful Tax Practices report in 1998 (OECD, 1998). The report was an 
ĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŽƚŚĞϭϵϵϲĐĂůůĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ'ϳĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƚŽ
counter the distorting effects of harmful tax competition on investment 
and financing decisions and the consequences for national tax bases.1
1 ^ƉĞĐŝĮĐĂůůǇ͕  ƚŚĞϭϵϵϴ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ƐĞƚŽƵƚĂƉƌŽƉŽƐĂů ƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŐƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐŽŶ ƚŚĞ
ŝĚĞŶƟĮĐĂƟŽŶŽĨŚĂƌŵĨƵůƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶƟĂůƚĂǆƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ͕ĐĂůůĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƟŽŶŽĨĂĨŽƌƵŵŽŶ
ŚĂƌŵĨƵůƚĂǆƉƌĂĐƟĐĞƐ͕ĐĂůůĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĂůŝƐƚŽĨƚĂǆŚĂǀĞŶƐĂŶĚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ
ĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƟŽŶƐĨŽƌĂĐƟŽŶĂƚƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨŶĂƟŽŶĂůůĞŐŝƐůĂƟŽŶĂŶĚŝŶƚĂǆ
ƚƌĞĂƟĞƐ͘
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^ŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞŶ͕ ƚŚĞ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ŽĨ ĂŶƚŝͲƚĂǆ ŚĂǀĞŶ ĂŶĚ ĂŶƚŝͲƚĂǆ ĂǀŽŝĚĂŶĐĞ
initiatives has usually begun with reference to that 1998 report, which 
had the bold subtitle of An Emerging Global Issue;K͕ϭϵϵϴ͖ƐĞĞĂůƐŽ
ĐĐůĞƐƚŽŶ͕ϮϬϭϮ͗ϭϬϬ͖ĚĞŶĂŶĚ<ƵĚƌůĞ͕ϮϬϬϱ͗ϭϬϳʹϭϬϴ͖,ĂŵƉƚŽŶĂŶĚ
ŚƌŝƐƚĞŶƐĞŶ͕ϮϬϬϮ͗ϭϲϱϵ͖tĞŝŶĞƌĂŶĚƵůƚ͕ϭϵϵϴ͗ϲϬϭͿ͘
This is not a big surprise, as the 1998 report made no reference to 
any studies published prior to the 1980s. Illustratively, the first sentence 
of the introduction set the general tone, stating that “historically, tax 
policies have been developed primarily to address domestic economic 
and social concerns” (OECD, 1998: 13). Ironically, the OECD even failed 
to refer to some its own earlier work to counter tax avoidance and tax 
ĞǀĂƐŝŽŶ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕  ƚŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽ ůŽŽŬ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ
back in history in order to understand both the origins of the policy 
discussions on tax havens and the initiatives to tackle the international 
ƚĂǆĨůŝŐŚƚ͘^ƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ͕ ƚŚĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞŝůůƵŵŝŶĂƚĞƐƚŚĞƌŝĐŚďŽĚǇŽĨĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐ
and policy initiatives produced by the various agencies and groups 
under the United Nations (UN) umbrella. I show how the UN and its 
Centre for Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) originally developed, 
considered and promoted many of the initiatives that have gained 
prominence especially in the post-financial crisis era.
With this exercise, I provide new information for the intensifying 
policy-focused and analytical debates on tax havens, tax evasion and 
ƚĂǆĂǀŽŝĚĂŶĐĞ;Ğ͘Ő͘ŚƌŝƐƚĞŶƐĞŶĂŶĚDƵƌƉŚǇ͕ ϮϬϬϰ͖ŚƌŝƐƚĞŶƐĞŶ͕ϮϬϭϭ͖
ŝĞƚƐĐŚ ĂŶĚ ZŝǆĞŶ͕ ϮϬϭϲ͖ WĂůĂŶ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ϮϬϭϯ͖ WŝĐĐŝŽƚƚŽ͕ ϮϬϭϭ͖ WŽŐŐĞ
ĂŶĚ DĞŚƚĂ͕ ϮϬϭϲ͖ ^ůĞŵƌŽĚ ĂŶĚ tŝůƐŽŶ͕ ϮϬϬϵͿ͘ DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ͕  / Ăŝŵ ƚŽ
provide historical context for research on the initiatives that tackle the 
problems caused by tax havens, international tax evasion and corporate 
ƚĂǆĂǀŽŝĚĂŶĐĞ ;ĚĞŶĂŶĚ<ƵĚƌůĞ͕ϮϬϬϱ͖,ĂƐƐĞůĚŝŶĞĂŶĚDŽƌƌŝƐ͕ϮϬϭϯ͖
DƵƌƉŚǇ͕  ϮϬϬϳ͖ DƵƌƉŚǇ͕  ϮϬϬϵ͖ WƌĞƵƐƐ͕ ϮϬϭϬ͖ ^ĞĂďƌŽŽŬĞ ĂŶĚ tŝŐĂŶ͕
ϮϬϭϯ͖ ^ŚĂƌŵĂŶ͕ ϮϬϬϲ͖ ^ŝŬŬĂ͕ ϮϬϭϬ͖ ^ŝŬŬĂ͕ ϮϬϭϯ͖ ^ƉĞŶĐĞƌ͕  ϮϬϭϰͿ͘
Indeed, a common feature of many of these analyses has been that 
they discuss the growth of tax havens and corporate tax avoidance in 
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƌĞĐĞŶƚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŐůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ͘&ŝŶĂůůǇ͕ ƚŚĞ
article contributes to the discussions about the epistemic communities, 
emergent entrepreneurs and the role of ideas and memory in the 
studies of international relations and international political economy.
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The demise of theoretical work on the societal powers of 
corporations in past decades has most likely reinforced these 
ƚĞŶĚĞŶĐŝĞƐ͘^ŽŵĞŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞůǇƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞĚǁŽƌŬĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚďǇhEd
notwithstanding, the UN had effectively withdrawn from working 
on the political and power aspects of TNCs in 1998. Moreover, the 
UN abandoned its work on the United Nations Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations (CoC) in the early 1990s, rebuilding its work 
in this field with a less controversial angle on business and human rights 
ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚĞ ϭϵϵϬƐ͘ ŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚŝƐ ďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ͕ ŝƚ ŝƐ ŶŽ ƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ
late 1990s and early 2000s saw a rediscovery of some of the initiatives 
developed in the 1970s, but this time in the context of human rights, 
good governance and anti-corruption efforts. It took the global financial 
ĐƌŝƐŝƐ ŽĨ ϮϬϬϳʹϮϬϬϵ ƚŽ ƉƵƐŚ ǁŽƌůĚ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ƚŽ ŐĞĂƌ ƵƉ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
policy work to a level distantly comparable with the UN efforts, but this 
time steered especially by the OECD. In addition to these findings, this 
article contributes also to the discussion on private global governance. 
/ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ^ ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ;/^Ϳ
has had an important role in providing an excuse for scaling down the 
UN work on regulation of international accounting. 
This study draws on a large body of research. The material includes 
the key academic publications and UN policy documents from the late 
1960s to the early 1980s. I selected the policy-related material by 
reviewing all the relevant material issued by the UN and the UNCTC and 
the reports and documents that preceded its creation. Not all UNCTC 
publications were used, as I focused the analysis on those reports with 
the most significance for the subject.2 The documents were fetched 
from the website archive.org, as the UNCTC website (unctc.unctad.org) 
ŽĨhEdǁĂƐŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů͘&ŝŶĂůůǇ͕ ĂƐďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚǁŽƌŬĨŽƌ
ƚŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞ͕ / ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚƐĞŵŝͲƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐŽĨ<ůĂƵƐ^ĂŚůŐƌĞŶ
and Kari Tapiola in the summer of 20153 ŝŶ&ŝŶůĂŶĚ͘Dƌ͘ ^ĂŚůŐƌĞŶǁĂƐ
ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨƚŚĞhEd;ϭϵϳϱʹϭϵϴϯͿ͕ĂŶĚDƌ͘ dĂƉŝŽůĂ
ǁĂƐƚŚĞ^ ƉĞĐŝĂůƐƐŝƐƚĂŶƚƚŽƚŚĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨƚŚĞhEd;ϭϵϳϲʹ
1978).
2dŚĞhEdƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚϮϲϱĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐĚƵƌŝŶŐŝƚƐĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ;,ĂŵĚĂŶŝĂŶĚZƵĸŶŐ͕
ϮϬϭϱ͗ϰϵͿ͘dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇŐĂƉƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚŝƐĂƌƟĐůĞ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ĞŶŽƵŐŚ
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƟŽŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĂƌĞǀĞůĂƚŽƌǇ;zŝŶ͕ϮϬϬϯ͗ϰϮͿĐĂƐĞƐƚƵĚǇƚŚĂƚ
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĞŶŽƵŐŚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƚŽƋƵĞƐƟŽŶƚŚĞĞĂƌůŝĞƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ
that is being researched.
3^ĂŚůŐƌĞŶǁĂƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚŝŶ<ŽƌƉƉŽŽĂŶĚdĂƉŝŽůĂŝŶ,ĞůƐŝŶŬŝ͘
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The early discussions on international tax avoidance and tax 
evasion emerged from three main sources in the late 1960s and during 
the 1970s. Of these, the most important were material produced by 
international agencies, especially the UN, as well as some notable work 
ďǇƚŚĞh͘^͘ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐ͘DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ͕ ƚŚĞƐĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ
ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĚĞďĂƚĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ
ďǇ ƚŚĞ <ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h͘^͘ ^ĞŶĂƚĞ
ŽŶƚŚĞƐĞƚŽƉŝĐƐ;ZŝǆĞŶ͕ϮϬϭϬ͗ϭϳ͖tĞďƐƚĞƌ͕ ϭϵϲϭͿ͘^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞϭϵϭϬƐ͕ƚŚĞ
international community had been addressing the phenomenon of 
double taxation in the League of Nations, the International Chamber 
ŽĨŽŵŵĞƌĐĞĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐƵƉƌĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůďŽĚŝĞƐ;ZŝǆĞŶ͕ϮϬϬϴ͗ϴϴ͖ZŝǆĞŶ͕
2010). Only after the problem of double taxation had been at least 
somewhat resolved did the issue of undertaxation became relevant 
(Rixen, 2010: 4).
In the 1960s and 1970s, the most important policy initiatives 
focused on the accounting rules of TNCs and on model tax treaties. 
/ ƐƚĂƌƚ ďǇƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐŽĨ ƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ
to develop an international anti-tax avoidance regime and then review 
ƚŚĞ ŬĞǇĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚďǇ ƚŚĞhEŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
and the OECD. These documents were significant in providing far-
reaching analyses of tax havens, tax avoidance and tax evasion, and in 
advocating various reforms to the international corporate tax systems, 
including the initiative for country-by-country reporting as well as the 
proposal for unitary taxation and discussion on automatic, multilateral 
ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ͘ůůŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐĂƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ
in various international bodies without proper awareness of their 
history. I contrast the early UN discussions with the aims of the OECD’s 
W^ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ͕ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŽƚŚĞϭϵϵϴHarmful Tax Practices report. I argue 
that although the UN efforts related to regulating TNCs are relatively 
well known within the scholarship on development studies and global 
political economy studies, there has been a lack of substantial analysis 
of the UN proposals that would have benefited later research on tax 
avoidance and evasion. 
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2. The organizational setting and the work on 
exchange of tax information
ĨƚĞƌ ŚĞĂƚĞĚ ĂŶĚ ƵŶƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ hE Ɛ͛ ŶĞǁůǇ
ĨŽƌŵĞĚĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚ^ŽĐŝĂůŽƵŶĐŝů;K^KͿ͕ƚŚĞƉŽƐƚͲtŽƌůĚtĂƌ//
work on international taxation became an OECD-led initiative with an 
ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ĨŽĐƵƐŽŶĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŶŐĚŽƵďůĞ ƚĂǆĂƚŝŽŶ ;WŝĐĐŝŽƚƚŽ͕ϭϵϵϮ͗ϰϴʹϱϭ͖
ZŝǆĞŶ͕ϮϬϬϴ͗ϵϲʹϵϳͿ͘ /ŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ<ĞǇŶĞƐŝĂŶŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ƚŝŵĞ͕ ƚŚĞK ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞĚ ůĂŝƐƐĞǌͲĨĂŝƌĞ ƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ŝŶŵƵĐŚ ŽĨ
ŝƚƐ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽůŝĐǇ ;tŝůůŝĂŵƐ͕ϮϬϬϴ͗ϭϭϴͿ͘ /Ŷϭϵϱϲ͕ ƚŚĞK Ɛ͛ &ŝƐĐĂů
Committee, made up of government officials and tax experts, began 
to elaborate a draft convention with the aim of providing solutions to 
the problem of double taxation among OECD member countries. The 
ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ Ɛ͛ǁŽƌŬǁĂƐĂĚŽƉƚĞĚŝŶ:ƵůǇϭϵϲϯƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ
title Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital. While 
focusing on double-taxation issues, the convention also contained 
articles regarding the elimination of discriminatory tax provisions in 
internal laws and the reduction of international tax avoidance through 
the exchange of information between national tax administrations 
;^ƵƌƌĞǇ͕ ϭϵϳϴĂ͖ZŝǆĞŶ͕ϮϬϬϴͿ͘
In addition, the OECD also briefly addressed tax and development 
issues in its report titled Fiscal Incentives for Private Investment in 
Developing Countries;K͕ϭϵϲϱͿ͘ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŵŽƐƚůǇĨĂŝƚŚĨƵůƚŽŝƚƐƚŝƚůĞ͕
the report also noted how it is of major importance for a capital importing 
country to adopt provisions which would keep it from becoming a tax 
ƐŚĞůƚĞƌĨŽƌŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐĨƌŽŵŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŝǌĞĚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͘DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ͕ ƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚ
highlighted the problems caused by round-tripping capital: capital that 
is first transferred out from and then back to the country of origin in 
order to gain tax benefits (OECD, 1965: 55). What is more, it also noted 
the importance of establishing tax treaties with developed countries 
;K͕ϭϵϲϱ͗ϱϴͿ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĚŝĚŶŽƚƉƌŽǀŽŬĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ
by the OECD at the time. With the exception of the OECD work on 
tax treaties, the UN soon took the lead in developing analyses of and 
initiatives against corporate tax avoidance and evasion.
The UN work occurred in two partially overlapping processes. 
dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŽƌŝŐŝŶĂƚĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚ^ŽĐŝĂůŽƵŶĐŝů Ɛ͛ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ
ϭϮϳϯ ;y>///Ϳ ŝŶ ƵŐƵƐƚ ϭϵϲϳ͕ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇͲ'ĞŶĞƌĂů
to set up an ad hoc working group consisting of experts and tax 
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administrators to explore ways and means for facilitating the conclusion 
of tax treaties between developed and developing countries. Made 
up of representatives nominated by governments, this working group 
published several reports in the 1970s. The second strand of the UN 
work arose from the UN efforts to regulate the operations of TNCs and 
was in part directed to addressing accounting issues. Establishing new 
international accounting standards was one of the priorities for dealing 
with the challenges created by TNCs. This process fed into the UN Code 
of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, which was negotiated for 
several years but finally abandoned in the early 1990s.
dŚĞĚ,ŽĐ'ƌŽƵƉŽĨǆƉĞƌƚƐŽŶdĂǆdƌĞĂƚŝĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ
and Developing Countries was composed of 20 tax officials and 
experts nominated in their personal capacity.4 dŚĞ 'ƌŽƵƉ ĐŽŶǀĞŶĞĚ
in 11 meetings from 1968 to 1977 to pursue the task of exploring 
ways and means for facilitating tax treaties between developing and 
developed countries “including the formulation, as appropriate, of 
possible guidelines and techniques for use in such tax treaties which 
ǁŽƵůĚďĞĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞƚŽďŽƚŚŐƌŽƵƉƐŽĨĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͟;ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚ^ŽĐŝĂů
ŽƵŶĐŝů ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ϭϮϳϯ ;y>///Ϳ͕ ƵŐƵƐƚ ϭϵϲϳ͕ ƋƵŽƚĞĚ ŝŶ hE͕ ϭϵϳϵͿ͘
^ƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ͕  ŝŶϭϵϳϰ͕K^KĞŵŝƚƚĞĚĂ ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ
ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ'ƌŽƵƉŚĂĚďĞĞŶǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŽŶ͞ĐŽƵůĚďĞƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŝǌĞĚ͕
with only a small number of clauses to be negotiated in particular cases, 
they would in fact amount to an international agreement on taxation, 
which ... [would be] the final objective”. The work then culminated in 
the draft model double-taxation treaty accompanied with a manual for 
ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ͕ ĨŝƌƐƚƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ ŝŶϭϵϴϬ͘ĂƐĞĚŽŶ ƚŚŝƐĚƌĂĨƚ͕ ƚŚĞhE
secretariat then produced the model convention that reproduced the 
Ě,ŽĐ'ƌŽƵƉ Ɛ͛ǁŽƌŬ͕ǁŚŝĐŚŝƚƐĞůĨǁĂƐďƵŝůƚƉĂƌƚŝĂůůǇŽŶƚŚĞĚŽƵďůĞͲƚĂǆ
ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞKŚĂĚƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ;^ƵƌƌĞǇ͕ ϭϵϳϴĂͿ͘
Ǉ ŝƚƐ ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ϭϵϴϬͬϭϯ ŽĨ Ϯϴ Ɖƌŝů ϭϵϴϬ͕ K^K ƌĞŶĂŵĞĚ
ƚŚĞ'ƌŽƵƉŽĨǆƉĞƌƚƐĂƐƚŚĞĚ,ŽĐ'ƌŽƵƉŽĨǆƉĞƌƚƐŽŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ dĂǆ DĂƚƚĞƌƐ͘ ĨƚĞƌ Ă ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ŽĨ ŝŶĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ͕  ƚŚĞ ŐƌŽƵƉ
reconvened in 1997 and was renamed again in 2004 as the Committee 
ŽĨ ǆƉĞƌƚƐ ŽŶ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ dĂǆDĂƚƚĞƌƐ ʹ ĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇ
4 dŚĞƐĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŝŶŝƟĂůůǇ ƌŐĞŶƟŶĂ͕ ŚŝůĞ͕ &ƌĂŶĐĞ͕ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͕  'ŚĂŶĂ͕
/ŶĚŝĂ͕ /ƐƌĂĞů͕ :ĂƉĂŶ͕ ƚŚĞ EĞƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚƐ͕ EŽƌǁĂǇ͕  WĂŬŝƐƚĂŶ͕ ƚŚĞ WŚŝůŝƉƉŝŶĞƐ͕ ƚŚĞ ^ƵĚĂŶ͕
^ǁŝƚǌĞƌůĂŶĚ͕dƵŶŝƐŝĂ͕dƵƌŬĞǇ͕ ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵĂŶĚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘/ŶůĂƚĞƌǇĞĂƌƐ͕
the membership varied and was expanded further.
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ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐƚŚĞhEƚĂǆĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ;ZŝǆĞŶ͕ϮϬϬϴ͗ϭϰϳʹϭϰϴ͖hE͕ϮϬϬϮͿ͘
Though inadequately resourced and relatively poorly known outside 
tax policy circles, the UN Tax Committee still updates the Model Tax 
Treaty. The UN version gives more taxing rights to source countries, 
whereas the OECD’s treaty leans more towards the residence principle 
;^ƵƌƌĞǇ͕ ϭϵϳϴĂͿ͘/ŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇ͕ ƚŚĞhEDŽĚĞůdƌĞĂƚǇŝƐŵŽƌĞĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞĨŽƌ
ŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͘&ƌŽŵĞĂƌůǇŽŶ͕ƚŚĞ'ƌŽƵƉƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚ
many of the concerns that are familiar from the contemporary debates 
(UN, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1979). Even though the 
group had a special focus on tax information exchange, it touched upon 
ŵĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌŝƐƐƵĞƐʹĨƌŽŵƚĂǆŚĂǀĞŶƐƚŽƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƉƌŝĐŝŶŐ͕ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐƚŚĞ
special concern of the 1975 report (UN, 1975: 14).
ƚƚŚĞ:ƵůǇϭϵϳϮŵĞĞƚŝŶŐŽĨK^K͕ƚŚĞŚŝůĞĂŶƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ
required the UN to appoint a high-ranking expert commission to 
ƐƚƵĚǇ ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ ŵƵůƚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ;ZĂŚŵĂŶ ϭϵϵϴ͗ ϱϵϱ͖
^ĂŐĂĨŝͲEĞũĂĚĞƚĂů͕͘ϮϬϬϴ͗ϰϯʹϰϳͿ͘dŚĞĐĂůůǁĂƐ ŝŐŶŝƚĞĚďǇĂϭϵϳϭh͘^͘
^ĞŶĂƚĞƐƵďĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƌĞƉŽƌƚ ƚŚĂƚĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚƚŚĞĂůůĞŐĞĚ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ
of the International Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (ITT) in 
ĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽĨ^ĂůǀĂĚŽƌůůĞŶĚĞ ŝŶŚŝůĞ
;ZĂŚŵĂŶ͕ ϭϵϵϴ͗ ϱϵϱ͖ ^ĂŐĂĨŝͲEĞũĂĚ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ϮϬϬϴ͗ ϰϮʹϰϯ͖,ĂŵĚĂŶŝ ĂŶĚ
ZƵĨĨŝŶŐ͕ ϮϬϭϱͿ͘ dŚĞ K^K ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ƐƚĂƚĞĚ͕ ͞dŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
community has yet to formulate a positive policy and establish effective 
machinery for dealing with the issues raised by the activities of these 
ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͟;K^K͕ϭϵϳϮ͗ϯͿ͘,ĞŶĐĞ͕K^KĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŽĂƉƉŽŝŶƚ
ƚŚĞϮϬͲŵĞŵďĞƌ'ƌŽƵƉŽĨŵŝŶĞŶƚWĞƌƐŽŶƐ ;'WͿ ŝŶϭϵϳϮ͘dŚĞŐƌŽƵƉ
included nine members from the public sector, six from academe, and 
five from public and private enterprises and on a broad geographical 
ďĂƐŝƐ;^ĂŐĂĨŝͲEĞũĂĚĞƚĂů͕͘ϮϬϬϴ͗ϱϳͿ͘dŚĞŐƌŽƵƉǁĂƐĂƐƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽƐƚƵĚǇ
the role of multinational corporations and their impact on the process 
ŽĨĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ;K^K͕ϭϵϳϮ͗ϰͿ͘dŚŝƐŵĂƌŬĞĚƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ
other strand of the UN work on anti-tax avoidance initiatives.
dŚĞ'WĨŝŶŝƐŚĞĚ ŝƚƐƌĞƉŽƌƚ ŝŶϭϵϳϰĂŶĚƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĞĚ͕ĂŵŽŶŐ
other things, that a Commission for Transnational Corporations and 
an Information and Research Centre on Transnational Corporations be 
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚƵŶĚĞƌK^K;ZĂŚŵĂŶ͕ϭϵϵϴ͗ϱϵϵ͖,ĂŵĚĂŶŝĂŶĚZƵĨĨŝŶŐ͕
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2015).5ǇĞĂƌĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞ'WƌĞƉŽƌƚ͕ ŝŶϭϵϳϱ͕ƚŚĞhEdǁĂƐĨŽƌŵĞĚ
ĂƐ ĂŶ ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵŽƵƐ ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞhE ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌŝĂƚ ŝŶEĞǁzŽƌŬ͕ǁŚĞƌĞ
ŝƚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞĚ ƵŶƚŝů ϭϵϵϯ ;^ĂŐĂĨŝͲEĞũĂĚ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ϮϬϬϴ͗ ϲ͖ ^ĂƵǀĂŶƚ͕ ϮϬϭϱͿ͘
dŚĞhEDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂůƐŽĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŽĨŽƌŵƐĞǀĞƌĂůƐƵďŐƌŽƵƉƐƵŶĚĞƌ
the UNCTC. One of these subgroups was the UN group of accounting 
ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ;'/^ZͿƚŚĂƚĐŽŶǀĞŶĞĚŝŶϭϵϳϲ;ZĂŚŵĂŶ͕ϭϵϵϴ͗ϱϵϴͿ͘6 It was 
ƚŚĞϭϵϳϳ'/^ZƌĞƉŽƌƚƚŚĂƚŵŽǀĞĚƚŚĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐͲƌĞůĂƚĞĚ
ŝƐƐƵĞƐĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ͕ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŐƌŽƵƉƐƵĨĨĞƌĞĚĨƌŽŵƐŽŵĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ŵŝƐĨŽƌƚƵŶĞƐ;zŽƐŚŝĚĂ͕ϭϵϴϳ͗ϮϱϴʹϮϱϵͿ͘7ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞhE Ɛ͛ƌŽůĞŝŶĞĂƌůǇ
attempts to establish international regulation of accounting has been 
ŶŽƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ŽŶ ŐůŽďĂů ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ;Ğ͘Ő͘ EƂůŬĞ͕
ϮϬϭϭ͗ ϲϳ͖DĐ^ǁĞĞŶĞǇ͕  ϮϬϭϬ͗ ϭϬͿ͕ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ŚĂǀĞ ŶŽƚ ĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚ
the UN’s substantial contributions towards broader financial reporting 
;ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ^ƵƌƌĞǇ͕ ϭϵϳϴĂ͖^ƵƌƌĞǇ͕ ϭϵϳϴď͖ĂŶĚ,ĂŵĚĂŶŝĂŶĚ
Ruffing, 2015). Owing to the strong emphasis on accounting issues, 
ƚŚĞ'/^Z ŐƌŽƵƉŵĂĚĞ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƐ͕ ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ŝŶ ŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ
financial transparency.
3. The UN contributions in analysing international 
corporate tax avoidance and its impacts
This section looks at the substantial contributions of the various 
UNCTC groups and reports analysing international corporate tax 
avoidance and evasion, highlighting some of the key insights that the 
UNCTC documents provide on corporate tax avoidance and its effects. 
ĨƚĞƌƚŚŝƐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ͕/ƚƵƌŶƚŽĂŶĂůǇƐĞƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇƚŚĞŬĞǇƉŽůŝĐǇƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ͘'ĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ͕ ŝƚĐĂŶďĞƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
early UNCTC reports portrayed a surprisingly clairvoyant and even far-
sighted analysis of the key loopholes in international corporate tax 
governance. This was especially valuable as the theme was severely 
underresearched at the time, which made the work of the rapporteurs 
highly challenging. 
5 /Ŷ ϭϵϳϯ͕ ƚŚĞ hE ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĂŶĚ ^ŽĐŝĂů īĂŝƌƐ ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ Ă
ďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ͕ DƵůƟŶĂƟŽŶĂů ŽƌƉŽƌĂƟŽŶƐ ŝŶ ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ͕ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ 'W͘ DĂŶǇ
ŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƟŽŶƐĂŶĚĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ'WĚƌĞǁŚĞĂǀŝůǇĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐϭϵϳϯƌĞƉŽƌƚ
;^ĂŐĂĮͲEĞũĂĚĞƚĂů͕͘ϮϬϬϴ͗ϱϵͿ͘
6 /ŶĂĚĚŝƟŽŶ͕ĂtŽƌŬŝŶŐ'ƌŽƵƉŽŶ ƚŚĞŽĚĞŽĨŽŶĚƵĐƚǁĂƐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ
hEd;^ĂƵǀĂŶƚ͕ϮϬϭϱ͗ϮϬͿ͘
7zŽƐŚŝĚĂŶŽƚĞƐŚŽǁƚŚĞĮƌƐƚƌĞƉŽƌƚǁĂƐŶŽƚĨŽƌŵĂůůǇĂĚŽƉƚĞĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐ
ŽĨƚŚĞ'ƌŽƵƉǁĞƌĞŶŽƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƟǀĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƟǀĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͘
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dŚĞ'WŵĂĚĞƐĞǀĞƌĂůŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐ͘/ŶŝƚƐϭϵϳϰƌĞƉŽƌƚ͕
it noted how “advances in communications technology allow many 
multinational corporations to pursue global strategies which, rather 
ƚŚĂŶŵĂǆŝŵŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽĨŝƚƐŽƌŐƌŽǁƚŚŽĨ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĂĨĨŝůŝĂƚĞƐ͕ƐĞĞŬƚŽ
advance the interest of the enterprise as a whole” (UN, 1974: 30). These 
ƉƌŽĨŝƚŵĂǆŝŵŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐǁĞƌĞŚĞůƉĞĚďǇĂ͞ůĂĐŬŽĨŚĂƌŵŽŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ
of policies among countries, in monetary or tax fields for example”, 
which allows transnationally mobile multinational corporations to 
“circumvent national policies or render them ineffective” (UN, 1974: 
30). This circumvention is usually conducted “by corporate planning 
mechanisms situated in a few industrial countries” (UN, 1974: 30), 
resulting in a situation where “the ‘invisible hand’ of the market is far 
from the only force guiding economic decisions” (UN, 1974: 41). 
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ͕ ƚŚĞ 'W ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ƐƚĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĐŽƵůĚ
engage in price discrimination and (abusive) transfer pricing, among 
other market-distorting acts8 (UN, 1974: 30). The report argued that 
“a policy framework which may be adequate for dealing with national 
corporations needs to be modified when dealing with multinational 
ones” (UN, 1974: 31), since national attempts to raise taxes “can 
ďĞ ŶĞŐĂƚĞĚ ďǇ ǀĞƌƚŝĐĂůůǇ Žƌ ŚŽƌŝǌŽŶƚĂůůǇ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ ŵƵůƚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
corporations through transfer pricing and the use of tax havens” 
(UN, 1974: 35). This analysis on transfer pricing and tax havens was 
surprisingly mature, given that it was formulated in the mid-1970s. 
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ 'W ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ƐŽŵĞ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ͕ ŝƚƐŵĂũŽƌ
policy contribution was to pave the way for further UN work on TNCs. 
In addition, it is worth noting that the report demanded larger taxing 
rights and help in tax-related capacity building for developing countries. 
ŶĚƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůǇ͕ ďŽƚŚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĚĞŵĂŶĚƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐŝƐƐƵĞƐŝŶ
the financing for development discussions in the current millennium.
dŚĞ ϭϵϳϰ 'W ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ hEd ƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚ ƚŚĞ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌ ƉƌŝĐŝŶŐͲƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ƚĂǆ ĂǀŽŝĚĂŶĐĞ͘ 
year earlier, the Multinational Corporations in World Development
report addressed this issue at length. The report noted that the 
“large incidence of inter-affiliate transactions and attendant transfer 
pricing can distort the real picture, as can other practices involving 
8 It should be noted that transfer pricing is a necessary feature of intracompany 
ƚƌĂĚĞŝŶĂŶǇĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƟŽŶ͘dƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƉƌŝĐŝŶŐĐĂŶĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞƚĂǆĂǀŽŝĚĂŶĐĞǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞƐ
ƵƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚƌĂĮƌŵƉƌŝĐĞĂƌĞďĞŝŶŐĚŝƐƚŽƌƚĞĚ͘
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ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ͕ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ͕ĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨůŽĐĂůƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ͕͟ 
and that this distortion takes place by charging prices for imports that 
are “far above prevailing ‘world’ prices, and [that] conversely those for 
exports have been below world prices” (UN, 1973: 32). The UNCTC also 
noted that many goods and service trades within firms do not involve 
Ăƌŵ Ɛ͛ůĞŶŐƚŚƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ͘,ĞŶĐĞ͕͞ƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŝĐĞƐĂƌĞŶŽƚĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚďǇ
the market mechanism but by the corporations themselves” (UN, 1973: 
33). This resonates with the contemporary research on this issue (e.g. 
ǀŝͲzŽŶĂŚ͕ϮϬϬϰ͗ϰϵϵ͕ϭϵϵϱ͖ĚĞŶ͕ϮϬϭϲ͖zůƂŶĞŶĂŶĚdĞŝǀĂŝŶĞŶ͕ϮϬϭϱͿ͘
DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ͕  ŝŶ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽĂ ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚďǇ ƚŚĞhEd^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇͲ
'ĞŶĞƌĂů͕ƚŚĞϭϵϳϮƌĞƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĚ,ŽĐ'ƌŽƵƉŽĨǆƉĞƌƚƐŽŶdĂǆdƌĞĂƚŝĞƐ
between Developed and Developing Countries dedicated a chapter to 
addressing tax avoidance and evasion. These topics were addressed 
frequently in subsequent reports as well. The 1972 report noted the 
difficulties that developing countries face in auditing intrafirm transfer 
prices. In addition, the report noted how “international tax evasion 
was viewed as a serious problem by developing countries substantially 
engaged in world commerce” (UN, 1972: 54). Representatives of 
developing countries highlighted the problems created by tax avoidance, 
especially in relation to dividends and loans, as well as through “the use 
of favourable legal forms, tax havens, abuse of certain tax incentives, 
ĂŶĚƚĂǆƚƌĞĂƚŝĞƐĂƐǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐĨŽƌƚĂǆĂǀŽŝĚĂŶĐĞ͟;hE͕ϭϵϳϮ͗ϱϰͿ͘&ŝŶĂůůǇ͕ 
ƚŚĞϭϵϳϵDĂŶƵĂůĨŽƌƚŚĞEĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝůĂƚĞƌĂůdĂǆdƌĞĂƚŝĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
ĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĂŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ƐƵŵŵĂƌŝǌĞĚŵƵĐŚŽĨ ƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ
ŽĨĞĂƌůŝĞƌƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ;hE͕ϭϵϳϵͿ͘ƐǁŝƚŚŵĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌhEƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶ
these themes, however, its substantial inputs were later forgotten.
The UN’s insights on corporate tax avoidance were not limited 
ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŝƐƐƵĞ ŽĨ ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌ ƉƌŝĐŝŶŐ͘ Ɛ ĂŶ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕ ƚŚĞ ϭϵϳϲ hEd
report that viewed corporate accounting and reporting issues from 
the developing country perspective drew attention to the problems 
ŽĨƚŚŝŶĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ͘dŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĐĂƐĞƐ ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ
“capital expenditures by subsidiaries are financed by the parent 
company by means of loans at relatively high rates of interest rather 
ƚŚĂŶďǇĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶƚŚĞƐƵďƐŝĚŝĂƌǇ Ɛ͛ĞƋƵŝƚǇ͟;hE͕ϭϵϳϲ͗ϰ͖ƐĞĞĂůƐŽ
^ƵƌƌĞǇ͕ ϭϵϳϴďͿ͘DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ͕ ĚŝǀŝĚĞŶĚƐĂŶĚƌŽǇĂůƚǇƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐĐĂŶďĞƵƐĞĚ
ƚŽ ǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁ ƉƌŽĨŝƚƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƐƵďƐŝĚŝĂƌŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ďǇ Ă ĐĂƌĞĨƵů ƵƚŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
ŚŽůĚŝŶŐĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ;hE͕ϭϵϳϯ͕ϯϮ͖ ƐĞĞĂůƐŽ^ƵƌƌĞǇ͕ ϭϵϳϴĂ͗ϯϮʹϰϭͿ͘ /Ŷ
other words, the publications presented a fairly concise and detailed 
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picture of tax avoidance practices, even though the information was 
scattered among several reports.
What is more, the UN reports offered a sophisticated analysis 
of the role of royalties in international tax avoidance. The 1973 report 
on the role of MNCs in world development noted how estimates of 
royalties can distort the true payments for know-how in various ways. 
In particular, the “distortion may take the form of overpricing of 
intermediate products and capital goods, which are tied to the imports 
of technology, or the underpricing of exports to the suppliers of the 
ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ŬŶŽǁͲŚŽǁ͟ ;hE͕ ϭϵϳϯ͗ ϱϬͿ͘ Ɛ Ă ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ͕ ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ŝŶ
royalty payments may not reflect changes in real prices but simply “a 
readjustment in the distribution of returns among the different channels 
ŽĨŝŶĐŽŵĞƌĞŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ͟;hE͕ϭϵϳϯ͗ϱϬͿ͘hEdƌĞƉŽƌƚƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚĂǇĞĂƌ
later stressed the importance of arbitrary pricing of services, patents or 
ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐŽĨŬŶŽǁͲŚŽǁŝŶŝŶƚƌĂĨŝƌŵƚƌĂĚĞ;^ŚŽƵƉ͕ϭϵϳϰ͗ϴͿ͘dŚĞϭϵϳϲ
report touched upon this same theme by noting how the key question 
in the pricing of overhead expenses is not one of pricing but of where 
ƚŚĞƉƌŽĨŝƚƐĂƌĞƚŚĞĂůůŽĐĂƚĞĚʹĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŽĨƚĞŶŶŽƚĨĂŝƌ
(UN, 1976: 4).
4. The UN proposals for reforming the international 
tax system: A contemporary angle
This section looks at the substantial policy proposals made 
ďǇ ƚŚĞĚ,ŽĐ'ƌŽƵƉŽĨǆƉĞƌƚƐŽŶdĂǆdƌĞĂƚŝĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ
and Developing Countries, the UNCTC, and its subgroups. The 
UNCTC’s work on accounting standards and the Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations have already gathered scholarly attention 
;,ĂŵĚĂŶŝĂŶĚZƵĨĨŝŶŐ͕ϮϬϭϱͿ͖ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ŵǇĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĚŝĨĨĞƌƐŵĂƌŬĞĚůǇ
ĨƌŽŵĞĂƌůŝĞƌĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ͘^ƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ͕ /ůŽŽŬĂƚƚŚĞhE Ɛ͛ĂŶĚƚŚĞhEd Ɛ͛
policy contributions in light of contemporary discussions on tackling 
international tax avoidance, especially in the context of the OECD’s 1998 
Harmful Tax CompetitionŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƚŚĞW^ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ͘/ďĞŐŝŶǁŝƚŚ
what seems to be one of the most obvious contributions, namely the 
ǁŽƌŬŽŶĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞŽĨ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ͘ĨƚĞƌƚŚŝƐ͕ /ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞďǇĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞ hE ǁŽƌŬ ŽŶ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ͘ ,ĞƌĞ / ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚ ƚŚĞ ƐŽͲĨĂƌ
ŶĞŐůĞĐƚĞĚĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ'/^Z Ɛ͛ǁŽƌŬ͕ŶĂŵĞůǇƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐĨŽƌŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ
country-level and segmented reporting that arose alongside similar 
developments in academia. Third, I highlight the UNCTC’s discussions 
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ŽŶĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ͕ ŚŝŐŚůǇƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞʹƵŶŝƚĂƌǇƚĂǆĂƚŝŽŶ͘
&ŝŶĂůůǇ͕  / ĐŽǀĞƌ ƐŽŵĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĞƌĞ ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
UNCTC’s publications, such as the proposal for the International Tax 
Court and greater regional tax cooperation, an initiative that is currently 
ďĞŝŶŐĚĞďĂƚĞĚ͕ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕ŝŶƚŚĞĨƌŝĐĂŶdĂǆĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌƐ&ŽƌƵŵ͘
ůƌĞĂĚǇ ŝŶ ϭϵϲϵ͕ ƚŚĞĚ,ŽĐ'ƌŽƵƉŽĨ ǆƉĞƌƚƐ ŽŶ dĂǆ dƌĞĂƚŝĞƐ
between Developed and Developing Countries had noted how 
developing countries may not benefit from the tax information 
ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ;hE͕ϭϵϲϵ͗ϭϵͿ͘dŚŝƐ ůĞĚ ƚŚĞ'ƌŽƵƉƚŽĚĞŵĂŶĚ
stronger wording on the exchange of information than in the OECD’s 
approach, with a special emphasis on preventing fraud and tax evasion, 
and stress on the affirmative obligation of competent authorities to 
ĨƵůůǇŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĞĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ;^ƵƌƌĞǇ͕ ϭϵϳϴĂ͗ϰͿ͘/Ŷϭϵϳϭ͕
the issue of automatic exchange of information was brought up in the 
'ƌŽƵƉ͕ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞŽďƐƚĂĐůĞƐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚďǇďĂŶŬŝŶŐƐĞĐƌĞĐǇůĂǁƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ƵƐĞŽĨŚŽůĚŝŶŐĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ͘^ ƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ͕ ƚŚĞ'ƌŽƵƉŶŽƚĞĚŚŽǁ͞ ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ
of information between tax administrations through the application 
of tax agreements, could not be regarded as a very effective method 
of putting an end to the flight of capital, and more comprehensive 
international co-operation was therefore required in that field” (UN, 
ϭϵϳϬ͗ ϭϵͿ͘  ǇĞĂƌ ůĂƚĞƌ͕  ŵƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂů ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ŽĨ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ
highlighted as a possible solution to these problems (UN, 1972: 55), 
ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ'ƌŽƵƉƌĞƉŽƌƚƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚƐŝǆǇĞĂƌƐůĂƚĞƌĨŽƵŶĚƚŚŝƐŝĚĞĂƚŽ
be “premature” (UN, 1978: 59). Nearly four decades later, multilateral 
exchange of information has finally made a breakthrough in global 
governance, with several recent initiatives put forward by the OECD, 
ƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ;hͿĂŶĚƚŚĞ'ϮϬ͘
ƵŝůĚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞĂĨŽƌĞŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞϭϵϳϰZĞƉŽƌƚŽĨ
ƚŚĞŵŝŶĞŶƚWĞƌƐŽŶƐ͕ƚŚĞ'/^ZŐƌŽƵƉǁĂƐƚŚĞŵĂŝŶĨŽƌƵŵĂƚǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ
UNCTC developed its inputs for international accounting regulation. The 
ĨŝƌƐƚ'/^ZƌĞƉŽƌƚŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶŶƵĂůƌĞƉŽƌƚƐĂƌĞŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚƚŽ
the information needs of shareholders and creditors and that there is a 
ŶĞĞĚĨŽƌďƌŽĂĚĞƌ͕ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚ͕ĂŶĚŵŽƌĞŚĂƌŵŽŶŝǌĞĚĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ
(UN, 1977: 2). The report also made a detailed proposal for the items 
that should be furnished in the future accounting standards. The 
ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚĂƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽŶ&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽŶŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨĂ
transnational corporation group (UN, 1977: 20) and another section on 
Reporting on segments of a transnational corporation (UN, 1977: 21). 
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The following information was proposed for reporting under the first 
ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ;hE͕ϭϵϳϳ͕ŶŶĞǆƉ͘ϴͿ͗
1. List of significant subsidiaries and percentage ownership 
(by geographical area of operation), justify exclusion of any such 
subsidiaries from consolidation. Carry excluded subsidiaries at 
equity or disclose equity in the footnotes.
2. List of associated companies and nature of relationship 
ǁŝƚŚƉĂƌĞŶƚĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ;ďǇŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůĂƌĞĂŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶͿ͘:ƵƐƚŝĨǇ
carrying such investments at other than equity and disclose 
equity in the footnotes.
3. Disclosure of identity of parent company in reports of 
subsidiaries.
4. Disclosure of information on the following (eliminated 
in consolidated statements)
(a) Intercompany sales
(b) Intercompany charges for interest, royalties, license 
fees, rental for use of tangible property and other intangibles
(c) Intercompany charges for research and development, 
advertising, management services and other allocated expenses
(d) Net increase (decrease) in intercompany investments
(e) Net increase (decrease) in intercompany loans
/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ͕ƚŚĞ'/^ZƌĞƉŽƌƚĚĞŵĂŶĚĞĚƐĞŐŵĞŶƚĞĚƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐĨŽƌ
assets or net assets, revenues, earnings, exposure to exceptional risks, 
principal activities in each area, new capital investments, identifiable 
assets by industries, other assets, revenue and sales by industries, and 
one or more of the following: profit contribution, operating profit, 
profit before taxes and net profit. Effectively, these measures would 
have resulted in a significant broadening of the corporate reporting 
requirements. 
^ŝŵŝůĂƌ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĂůƐŽ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ K͕ ďƵƚ ǁŝƚŚ ůĞƐƐ
ĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐ ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘dŚĞϭϵϳϲK'ƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐ ĨŽƌDƵůƚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
Enterprises stated that companies should publish annually the structure 
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of the enterprise, the geographical areas where the company operates, 
sales by geographic area and by major lines of business, significant new 
capital investments, the sources and uses of funds of the company as 
a whole, the average number of employees and the R&D expenditures 
in each geographical area, the policies followed for intragroup pricing 
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ;^ƵƌƌĞǇ͕  ϭϵϳϴď͗ ϰϯϰʹϰϯϱͿ͘ /ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐůǇ͕ 
ƚŚĞK Ɛ͛ϭϵϳϲ'ƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐĂůƐŽƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐƐŚŽƵůĚ͞ƌĞĨƌĂŝŶ
from making use of the particular facilities available to them, such as 
transfer pricing which does not conform to an arm’s length standard” 
;^ƵƌƌĞǇ͕ ϭϵϳϴď͗ϰϯϳͿ͘9
The OECD’s early contribution to the tax and corporate 
responsibility discussions is a notable opening, especially as this 
theme has started to attract scholarly attention only in recent years 
;,ĂƐƐĞůĚŝŶĞ ĂŶĚDŽƌƌŝƐ͕ ϮϬϭϯ͖ ^ŝŬŬĂ͕ ϮϬϭϬ͖ ^ŝŬŬĂ͕ ϮϬϭϯ͖ zůƂŶĞŶ ĂŶĚ
>ĂŝŶĞ͕ϮϬϭϱͿ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕  ŝŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽƚŚĞhE Ɛ͛ŐƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐ͕ƚŚĞK Ɛ͛
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽƌĞŵĂŝŶǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇ͘ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ
a consensus that the UN’s Code of Conduct was to be not compulsory 
ŝŶ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌďǇ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŝŵĞĞŝƚŚĞƌ͕  ƚŚĞ'WďĞůŝĞǀĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ
ǁŽƵůĚŚĞůƉƚŽƌĞĂůŝǌĞƚŚĞŝƌĂŝŵƐ;hE͕ϭϵϳϰď͗ϱϱͿ͘/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ͕ƚŚĞůŽŶŐͲ
term goal was to come up with a “general agreement on multinational 
corporations having a force of an international treaty and containing 
ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐĨŽƌŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƌǇĂŶĚƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ͟;,ĂŵĚĂŶŝĂŶĚZƵĨĨŝŶŐ͕ϮϬϭϱ͗
ϴϬͿ͘ dŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨ ƚŚĞ'/^Z ŐƌŽƵƉ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ŝŶ ƐĞǀĞƌĂů ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ
reports. In the 1980 interim report, the group noted, 
Transnational corporations should make available to the 
public in the countries in which they operate clear, full and 
comprehensible information designed to improve understanding 
of the structure, activities, and policies of the transnational 
corporation as a whole. The information should include financial 
as well as non-financial items and should be made available on a 
regular annual basis … information provided for the transnational 
corporation as a whole should be broken down by geographical 
9/ŶƚŚĞϮϬϬϬƵƉĚĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞK Ɛ͛'ƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐ͕ƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶŵŽĚŝĮĞĚƚŽ
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐƐŚŽƵůĚĐŽŵƉůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚĂǆůĂǁƐĂŶĚƌĞŐƵůĂƟŽŶƐďǇĐŽŶĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ
ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƉƌŝĐŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƟĐĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞĂƌŵ Ɛ͛ ůĞŶŐƚŚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ;K͕ϮϬϬϭ͗ϭϯϱͿ͘dŚĞƐĂŵĞ
ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƟŽŶ ŝƐ ƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ƌĞĐĞŶƚ ϮϬϭϭ ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ K Ɛ͛ ŐƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐ
(OECD, 2011).
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area or country, as appropriate, with regard to activities of its 
ĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ͕ƐĂůĞƐ͕ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐƌĞƐƵůƚƐĂŶĚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŶĞǁŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ͖
ĂŶĚďǇŵĂũŽƌůŝŶĞŽĨďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ͘;hE͕ϭϵϴϬ͕ŶŶĞǆ///Ϳ
&ŝŶĂůůǇ͕  ƚŚĞ'/^ZƌĞƉŽƌƚƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĚƌĂĨƚǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐŽĨ
the CoC, and drafting the CoC was the established highest-priority task 
of the UNCTC. They were submitted to the UNCTC at its eighth session 
in 1982. The negotiations were entrusted to a special session of the 
Commission that began deliberations in 1983 and was open to the 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂůůDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ;hE͕ϭϵϴϯͿ͘dŚĞϭϵϴϯĚƌĂĨƚŶŽƚĞĚ
ƚŚĂƚ͞ƚƌĂŶƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƐŚĂůůͬƐŚŽƵůĚĐĂƌƌǇŽŶƚŚĞŝƌĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŝŶ
conformity with the development policies, objectives and priorities set 
ŽƵƚďǇƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ͟;ƉĂƌĂ
9). Moreover, the draft CoC also had subsections dedicated to transfer 
pricing and corporate taxation. On the latter issue, the document stated 
ƚŚĂƚĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƐŚŽƵůĚͬƐŚĂůůŶŽƚ͞ƵƐĞƚŚĞŝƌĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚ
modes of operation, such as the use of intra-corporate pricing which 
is not based on the arm’s length principle, or other means, to modify 
ƚŚĞ ƚĂǆ ďĂƐĞ ŽŶǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ĂƌĞ ĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚ͟ ;ƉĂƌĂ ϯϰͿ͘ &ŝŶĂůůǇ͕ 
the draft document also noted that “in respect of their intra-corporate 
ƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ͕ ƚƌĂŶƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ ƐŚŽƵůĚͬƐŚĂůů ŶŽƚƵƐĞƉƌŝĐŝŶŐ
policies that are not based on relevant market prices, or, in the absence 
of such prices, the arm’s length principle, which have the effect 
of modifying the tax base on which their entities are assessed or of 
evading exchange control measures [or customs valuation regulations] 
[or which [contrary to national laws and regulations] adversely affect 
economic and social conditions] of the countries in which they operate” 
(UN, 1983, para 33, brackets in the original negotiation’s draft text).
These words ended up being the most important demands of the 
UN machinery for tackling corporate tax flight. Then the atmosphere 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ͘ƐĂƐǇŵƉƚŽŵŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ͕'/^ZƐǁŝƚĐŚĞĚƚŽĂŵŽƌĞĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐ
tone in its analysis in 1984, and its mission was significantly narrowed. 
Instead of pursuing the development of new accounting standards, 
the group’s mandate changed “to review material from international 
accountancy bodies and other interested groups” (UN, 1984: 3). 
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽZĂŚŵĂŶ;ϭϵϵϴͿ͕ƚŚŝƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶĐĞŽĨ
ƚŚĞƐĞůĨͲƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇ/^ĂƐƚŚĞŵĂŝŶďŽĚǇĨŽƌĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐŽŶƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
of international accounting. In addition, the group “considered it 
necessary to take account of the need of transnational corporations to 
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maintain business confidentiality in sensitive areas, in particular so as 
ŶŽƚ ƚŽ ũĞŽƉĂƌĚŝǌĞƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ͟ ;hE͕ϭϵϴϰ͗ϱͿ͘dŚĞŐŽĂů
ǁĂƐƚŚĞŶƌĞǀŝƐĞĚ͖ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚĂƌŵŽŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŶŽǁƚŚĞůŽŶŐͲƚĞƌŵ
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ;hE͕ϭϵϴϰ͗ϱͿ͘Ɛ,ĂŵĚĂŶŝĂŶĚZƵĨĨŝŶŐ;ϮϬϭϱ͗ϴϬͿŶŽƚĞ͕ƚŚĞ
“proponents overreached for a general agreement and failed in their 
primary task to complete a code of conduct”.
The new rhetoric resonated well with the concerns that some 
ĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇŚĂĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ'/^ZƌĞƉŽƌƚ͕ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇĐĂůůĞĚ
“overly ambitious” (UN, 1984: 5). The ambition level was significantly 
reduced as a distinction was made between general purpose and special 
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ͘ WƵďůŝĐ ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ
might be permitted only by mutual agreement instead of mandatory 
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚ ;hE͕ ϭϵϴϰ͗ ϱͿ͘ &ŝŶĂůůǇ͕  ŝŶ ϭϵϴϴ͕ ƚŚĞ hE ƌĞůĞĂƐĞĚ ŝƚƐ
ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐŽŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐĂŶĚƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐďǇdEƐ;hE͕ϭϵϴϴͿ͘ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ
ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐƐƚŝůů ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ'/^Z
report, it became clear that the UN had been sidelined in the discussions 
ŽŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ;,ĂŵĚĂŶŝĂŶĚZƵĨĨŝŶŐϮϬϭϱ͗ϭϴͿ͘
The group was ultimately unable to ratify an agreeable code owing to 
various disagreements between developed and developing countries, 
and the group was finally dissolved in 1994, after the abolition of the 
hEdŝŶϭϵϵϮ;ĞǀĂ͕ϮϬϭϮ͖,ĂŵĚĂŶŝĂŶĚZƵĨĨŝŶŐ͕ϮϬϭϱͿ͘ŚĂƉƚĞƌyŽĨ
the 1993 World Investment Report (UN 1993) ended up being one of 
the last manifestations of the old UN paradigm, in regard to its analyses 
of the possibilities of unitary taxation and the use of advance pricing 
agreements for fixing the underlying problems of the arm’s length 
principle.10 Eventually, public pressures led the UN to re-establish 
its work on TNCs in the late 1990s, but this time in the much less 
controversial context of business and human rights.
10 Most of the other World Investment Reports published during the 1990s and 
ϮϬϬϬƐĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚƚŚĞŐƌŽǁƚŚĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨďŝůĂƚĞƌĂůƚĂǆƚƌĞĂƟĞƐ͕ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂůůǇĂůƐŽ
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐŝƐƐƵĞƐƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽĞ͘Ő͘ƚĂǆŚĂǀĞŶƐĂŶĚŝŶƚƌĂĮƌŵƚĂǆĂǀŽŝĚĂŶĐĞ͘/ůůƵƐƚƌĂƟǀĞůǇ͕ 
in 2000, the report noted how “Concern about transfer pricing, greatest in the 1960s 
ĂŶĚϭϵϳϬƐ͕ŚĂƐĚĞĐůŝŶĞĚĂƐƚĂǆĚŝīĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŚĂǀĞŶĂƌƌŽǁĞĚ͕ĚŽƵďůĞͲƚĂǆĂƟŽŶĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ
ŚĂǀĞƉƌŽůŝĨĞƌĂƚĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĂƩƌĂĐƚ&/ŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚ͟;hE͕ϮϬϬϬ͗ϭϲϱͿ͘
The World Investment Report 2005 ǁĂƐƚŚĞĮƌƐƚŶŽƚƚŽĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇŵĞŶƟŽŶƚŚĞhEdŝŶ
its foreword note, referring instead to the UN’s 30 years of experience in these areas 
;hE͕ϮϬϬϱ͗ŝŝͿ͘ZĞĐĞŶƚůǇ͕ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƚŚĞŵĞƐŚĂƐƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚ͖Ğ͘Ő͘ƚŚĞϮϬϭϱWorld 
Investment Report ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚĂĐŚĂƉƚĞƌĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŽ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂů ƚĂǆĂŶĚ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ
policy coherence (UN, 2015).
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dŚĞ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůůǇ ƉƵƚ ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ďǇ '/^Z ĂŶĚ ƐŽŵĞ
ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ;ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇZĂůƉŚEĂĚĞƌ͕ DĂƌŬ'ƌĞĞŶĂŶĚ:ŽƐĞƉŚ^ĞůŝŐŵĂŶ͕
who explicitly discussed country-by-country reporting in the 1970s11) 
bore great resemblance to the country-by-country reporting initiatives 
;DƵƌƉŚǇ͕ ϮϬϬϳ͖DƵƌƉŚǇ͕ ϮϬϬϵͿƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ
ŵŝůůĞŶŶŝƵŵ͘ ŽƚŚ ƐƚƌĂŶĚƐ ŽĨ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ ĐĂůů ĨŽƌ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ
corporate transparency and share an analysis of the problems created 
by the lack of disclosure. Moreover, they proposed similar measures for 
addressing these problems. Recently, the extended country-by-country 
reporting requirements for TNCs have been praised as the single most 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ W^ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ʹ ĞǀĞŶ ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ
will be accessible only for authorities and the new system will not be 
accompanied by an effective exchange of information on the reports 
;W^DŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ'ƌŽƵƉ͕ϮϬϭϱͿ͘
Unitary taxation is another major corporate tax-related initiative 
that has been discussed for a long time, recently for example in the 
h͘ ĂƐŝĐĂůůǇ͕  ƵŶŝƚĂƌǇ ƚĂǆĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ Ă ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
prevailing arm’s length principle in the regulation of intracompany 
trade. In contrast to the arm’s length principle, which treats subsidiaries 
of a TNC as separate entities, unitary taxation taxes companies as a 
single entity, with tax revenues distributed to states by a commonly 
ĂŐƌĞĞĚĨŽƌŵƵůĂ;ĚĞŶ͕ϮϬϬϳ͗ϲϭϮ͖ƐĞĞĂůƐŽǀŝͲzŽŶĂŚ͕ϮϬϭϲͿ͘dŚŝƐŬŝŶĚŽĨ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƐƵƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĨŽƌĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŶŐƚĂǆƌĞǀĞŶƵĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
the individual states. The EU had already presented a first draft for 
ŝƚƐ ƐŽͲĐĂůůĞĚ ŽŵŵŽŶ ŽŶƐŽůŝĚĂƚĞĚ ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ dĂǆ ĂƐĞ ;dͿ ŝŶ
ϮϬϭϭ ;ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ͕ ϮϬϭϭͿ͕ ĂŶĚ ŝŶ :ƵŶĞϮϬϭϱ ƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĞdĂƐĂĐĞŶƚƌĂůŐŽĂůŝŶŝƚƐĨŝǀĞͲƉŽŝŶƚĂĐƚŝŽŶ
plan on corporate taxation (European Commission, 2015).
dŚĞhǁĂƐŶŽƚ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶďǇ ĨĂƌ ƚŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐƵŶŝƚĂƌǇ
taxation. Indeed, the initiative was brought up in the negotiations 
of the League of Nations, but it was found too politically difficult to 
ĂĚŽƉƚ͘ dŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞhEd ƐŚŽƵůĚ ĂůƐŽďĞŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚ͘ &Žƌ
example, the UNCTC’s 1974 technical paper on taxation noted how 
11^ƉĞĐŝĮĐĂůůǇ͕ EĂĚĞƌĞƚĂů͘;ϭϵϳϳͿŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚƚƌĂĚĞƐĞĐƌĞĐǇŚĂĚďĞĐŽŵĞĂŶ
ĂůůͲƉƵƌƉŽƐĞĞǆĐƵƐĞĨŽƌĚĞĐůŝŶŝŶŐĂŶŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƟŽŶƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ͕ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůƚƌĂĚĞ
secrecy privilege is quite narrow (p. 138). Moreover, they suggested that statements 
ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞďƌŽŬĞŶĚŽǁŶŽŶ Ă ͚h͘^͛͘  ĂŶĚ ͚Ăůů ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ͛ ďĂƐŝƐ͕ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ
ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĮŶĂŶĐŝĂůƌĞƉŽƌƚƐĨƵƌŶŝƐŚĞĚŽŶĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͲďǇͲĐŽƵŶƚƌǇďĂƐŝƐ;Ɖ͘ϭϳϲͿ͘
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“a radical change in the taxation of multinational corporation profits 
ǁŽƵůĚďĞ ƚŚĞĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ĨĂĐƚŽƌͲĨŽƌŵƵůĂ ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞ͟ ;^ŚŽƵƉ͕ϭϵϳϰ͗
ϯϯͿ͘ŶŽƚŚĞƌĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŽƌŽĨƚŚŝƐƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐŽŶŽƚĞĚŚŽǁĂŶ͞ŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚ
justification for formula apportionment is essentially that profits should 
be apportioned among the states in proportion to the contribution to 
ƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞĂĚĚĞĚ͟;DĐ>ƵƌĞ:ƌ͘ ͕ϭϵϳϰ͗ϲϵͿ͘
Unitary taxation was also discussed in the 1974 Report of the 
ŵŝŶĞŶƚWĞƌƐŽŶƐ͘EŽƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŶŝƚĂƌǇ ƚĂǆĂƚŝŽŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
hŶŝƚĞĚ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĂŶĂŐƌĞĞĚƉƌŽ ƌĂƚĂ ĨŽƌŵƵůĂ
would be an ambitious approach to tax TNCs (p. 93). Moreover, the 
authors of the report noted that taxing the worldwide profits on an 
accrual basis would help in tackling tax havens. The report even 
discussed the possibility of denying the right of establishment in 
countries that would not adhere to the unitary system (UN, 1974: 
ϵϯͿ͘ ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƵŶŝƚĂƌǇ ƚĂǆĂƚŝŽŶ ŶĞǀĞƌ ĨŽƵŶĚ ŝƚƐ ǁĂǇ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝĐǇ
ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐŽĨ'/^ZĂŶĚƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ'WƌĞƉŽƌƚǁĂƐĂůƐŽŶŽŶͲ
confirmative, it is clear that the major UNCTC bodies understood the 
ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŽĨƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ;hEϭϵϳϰ͕ƉƉ͘ϵϯʹϵϰͿ͘
&ŝŶĂůůǇ͕  ƚŚĞ hEd ƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ ƐŽŵĞ ůĞƐƐĞƌͲŬŶŽǁŶ
ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ƌĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƐƚ ǇĞĂƌƐ͘ Ɛ Ă ŽŶĞ
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕ ƚŚĞ ϭϵϳϰ ZĞƉŽƌƚ ŽĨ ŵŝŶĞŶƚ WĞƌƐŽŶƐ ĐĂůůĞĚ ƚŚĞ
governments to “disclose the principal terms of agreements between 
them and multinational corporations” (p. 96), a call that has been raised 
several times after the LuxLeaks scandal, which involved some 30,000 
tax-related pricing agreements that the government of Luxembourg had 
conducted with multinational companies. Moreover, recent years have 
ƐĞĞŶƐĞǀĞƌĂůĐĂůůƐĂŶĚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐĨŽƌŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ^ŽƵƚŚͲ^ŽƵƚŚĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ
in international tax matters. The need for and potential benefits of this 
kind of cooperation had already been noticed in the 1974 Report of 
ƚŚĞŵŝŶĞŶƚWĞƌƐŽŶƐ;hE͕ϭϵϳϰͿ͘&ŝŶĂůůǇ͕ ƚŚĞϭϵϳϰƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůƉĂƉĞƌŽŶ
taxation also discussed the possibility of “setting up an international 
tax court…to obviate intercountry inconsistencies in transfer pricing” 
;^ŚŽƵƉ͕ϭϵϳϰ͗ϯϮͿ͕ƌĞƐĞŵďůŝŶŐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐŽŶĂŶŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĚŝƐƉƵƚĞͲ
settlement body or arbitration mechanism in recent proposals for a 
ŶĞǁŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚĂǆĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ;ZŝǆĞŶ͕ϮϬϭϲ͖dĂŶǌŝ͕ϮϬϭϲͿ͘dŚĞůŝƐƚĐŽƵůĚ
be continued.
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ůů ŝŶ Ăůů͕ ƚŚĞ ƚĂǆ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ hEd ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞĚ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ
directly through its conduct or more indecisively in its reports have 
proven to be surprisingly relevant even today. The automatic exchange 
of tax information has progressed quickly in the post-financial crisis 
era. The country-specific and sector-specific financial reporting for 
corporations was extended first in the early 2000s with voluntary 
initiatives in the extractive industries, and then with mandatory 
legislation in the financial sector and extractive industries. Moreover, 
ƚŚĞ K Ɛ͛ W^ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ŵĂŶĚĂƚŽƌǇ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͲďǇͲĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ
reporting for TNCs in all sectors, even though this information will not 
be public and therefore it remains to be seen how well the information 
exchange between countries on this information will work. Many of 
the other overall concerns discussed in the UNCTC remain also highly 
relevant.
5.  Looking back: why were the UNCTC’s proposals 
forgotten?
In recent decades, the constructivist turn in international 
relations and other social sciences has drawn much attention to the 
role of ideas in shaping politics on all levels. Robert Cox (1983, 1986), 
<ĞĐŬĂŶĚ^ŝŬŬŝŶŬ;ϭϵϵϵͿ͕ĂŶĚŵĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌƐƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚĂǀĞŵĂĚĞĂƐƚƌŽŶŐ
case that policy experts, the transnational classes that they form and 
the ideas they convey have a much bigger impact on world politics than 
had been commonly understood earlier. The collective amnesia about 
the UN’s early work in the field of international corporate taxation is a 
prime example of this. The oblivion of the proposals that the UN (and 
to a lesser extent the OECD) advocated for between 1960s and 1980s 
not only made rediscovering many of these initiatives a painful and 
prolonged process, but also facilitated the emergence of alternative 
conceptual frameworks for understanding the role of large corporations 
ŝŶƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ͘dŚĞKͲĚƌŝǀĞŶůĂƚĞͲϭϵϵϬƐƚĂǆĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ;,ĂĂƐ͕ϭϵϵϮͿ
failed to pay attention to the earlier work of the UN, which paved the 
way for the OECD’s triumphant re-entry in this field in the late 1990s.
The 1990s saw the parallel emergence of the corporate social 
responsibility agenda and the OECD’s work on tax havens. These 
initiatives represented a comeback of calls for better regulation and 
transparency of TNCs, but in a form that had little in common with the 
earlier UN efforts. The UN had restarted its own work on corporations, 
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ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ^ƵďͲŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ WƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ WƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,ƵŵĂŶ
ZŝŐŚƚƐ ĨŽƵŶĚĞĚ Ă tŽƌŬŝŶŐ 'ƌŽƵƉ ŽŶ dƌĂŶƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ
ϭϵϵϴ͘ dŚƌĞĞ ǇĞĂƌƐ ůĂƚĞƌ͕  ƚŚĞ 'ƌŽƵƉ ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĂů ĚƌĂĨƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƐǁŝƚŚZĞŐĂƌĚƚŽ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐ͕ǁŚŝĐŚƐĞƌǀĞĚĂƐĂ
ďĂƐŝƐĨŽƌƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐ'ƵŝĚŝŶŐWƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽŶƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĂŶĚ,ƵŵĂŶ
Rights. Commonly known as the Ruggie principles, their approach to 
TNCs was based on the concept of corporate responsibilities, which 
resonated well with the rising corporate social responsibility agenda of 
ƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ͘/ŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚůǇ͕ ŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝǌŝŶŐ
the dominant world powers also embraced the human rights and anti-
corruption agendas. In the early 2000s, the multi-stakeholder Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative gathered much attention with its 
rather modest anti-corruption aim of demanding greater voluntary 
ƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐƚŽŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ͘ĨĞǁǇĞĂƌƐďĞĨŽƌĞ
ƚŚŝƐ͕ Ă ŐƌŽƵƉ ŽĨ ŶŽŶͲŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂů ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌŵĞĚ ƚŚĞ WƵďůŝƐŚ
tŚĂƚzŽƵWĂǇŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞǁŝƚŚĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌĂŐĞŶĚĂ;^ĞĂďƌŽŽŬĞĂŶĚtŝŐĂŶ͕
2015). The norms of the time had become so widely shared that they 
ǁĞƌĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŝǌĞĚďǇĂĐƚŽƌƐĂŶĚĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚĂ ƚĂŬĞŶ ĨŽƌŐƌĂŶƚĞĚƋƵĂůŝƚǇ
and conformity, which is a powerful building block for ideational power 
;&ŝŶŶĞŵŽƌĞĂŶĚ^ŝŬŬŝŶŬ͕ϭϵϵϴ͗ϵϬϰͿ͘
Earlier I noted how the OECD’s landmark report Harmful Tax 
Practices: An Emerging Global Issue (OECD, 1998) failed to cite any 
reference published before the early 1980s. In subsequent years, several 
ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽĂŶĂůǇƐĞƚŚĞ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ;Ğ͘Ő͘ŝĞƚƐĐŚ͕ϮϬϭϲ͖DĞŝŶǌĞƌ͕ 
ϮϬϭϲ͖^ŚĂƌŵĂŶ͕ϮϬϬϲͿ͕ďƵƚŵŽƐƚůǇĨƌŽŵĂĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇĂŶŐůĞ͘ǇƚŚĞ
late 1990s the earlier UN agenda had been discarded on all fronts. In 
ƚŚĞ ĨŝĞůĚŽĨĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ͕ ƚŚĞ /^ǁĂƐ ĨŽƌŵĞĚ ŝŶϭϵϳϯĂŶĚ
the OECD geared up its work on accounting and international taxation 
(see below). Even though it has been argued that until the 1980s, the 
/^ ͞ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚ ĂŶ ŽďƐĐƵƌĞ ďŽĚǇ ǁŝƚŚ ůŝƚƚůĞ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽŶ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ͟ ;DĂƌƚŝŶĞǌͲŝĂƐ͕ ϮϬϬϱ͗ ϭͿ͕ ŝƚ ƐĞĞŵƐ ƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚƐ
foundation strengthened the calls to scale down the accounting-related 
ǁŽƌŬŽĨ'/^ZĂŶĚƚŚĞhEd;,ĂŵĚĂŶŝĂŶĚZƵĨĨŝŶŐϮϬϭϱ͗ϭϯϯʹϭϯϲͿ͘
ƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚĞĂƌůŝĞƌ͕ ŝŶϭϵϴϰƚŚĞ'/^ZŐƌŽƵƉ Ɛ͛ŵĂŶĚĂƚĞǁĂƐƌĞĚƵĐĞĚ
“to review material from international accountancy bodies and other 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŐƌŽƵƉƐ͟;hE͕ϭϵϴϰ͗ϯͿ͘ƚƚŚĂƚƚŝŵĞ͕ƚŚĞ/^ǁĂƐƚŚĞŽŶůǇ
ŽƚŚĞƌ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂŶĐǇ ďŽĚǇ͘ dŚƵƐ͕ ƚŚĞ /^ Ɛ͛ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ
has been larger than sometimes perceived right from its beginnings. 
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This development is a prime example of forum shifting, which refers 
to a tendency of prevailing superpowers to shift discussions from one 
forum to another to avoid resistance and losses in forums that they do 
ŶŽƚĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞůǇĐŽŶƚƌŽů;ƌĂŝƚŚǁĂŝƚĞĂŶĚƌĂŚŽƐ͕ϮϬϬϬ͗ϮϴʹϮϵͿ͘
ĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ /^͕ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ ŶŽ ƌŽŽŵ ůĞĨƚ ĨŽƌ
genuinely influential policy work for the UNCTC, as the major players 
ŝŶ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐďĂĐŬĞĚ ƚŚĞ /^͘ /ŶĂǁĂǇ͕  ƚŚĞhEďĞĐĂŵĞĂ
victim of its own success, as its major progress was achieved in the field 
of accounting regulation. Little was left after the mandate to work on 
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐŝƐƐƵĞƐǁĂƐƚĂŬĞŶĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhE͘dŚĞ/^ Ɛ͛ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽƌ͕ 
ƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐŽĂƌĚ;/^Ϳ͕ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂƚůĞĂƐƚ
as disinclined to initiatives that would enhance corporate financial 
ƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ /^ǁĂƐ ;>ĞƐĂŐĞ ĂŶĚ <ĂĕĂƌ͕  ϮϬϭϯͿ͘ ŽŶƚƌĂƌǇ ƚŽ
the situation in the 1970s and 1980s, however, one self-regulatory 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐŽŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
accounting regulation, not even with a mandate that greatly exceeds 
ƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞ/^͘ƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞ͕ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ
on corporations shifted from analyses of power to more apolitical 
theories arising from transaction costs theory and conducted within 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵĞƚƌŝĐŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ͘ĨƚĞƌĂůů͕ŵĂŶǇŽĨ ƚŚĞhEd Ɛ͛ĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐǁĞƌĞ
either drafted by prominent academic researchers of the time or 
heavily influenced by them. Consequently, as the international policy 
community rediscovered the powers exerted by TNCs in the late 1990s, 
neither analytical tools nor policy networks were available for analysing 
them.
Moreover, the OECD also geared up its work on international tax 
ŝƐƐƵĞƐŝŶƚĂŶĚĞŵǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨŽƌƵŵƐŚŝĨƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhEƚŽƚŚĞ/^͘/Ŷϭϵϳϱ͕
the OECD established the Committee on International Investment 
and Multinational Enterprises, “almost certainly in response to the 
ĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌŝĂůĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞŽĨŵĂŶǇĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐƚŽdEĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ͟;^ĂŐĂĨŝͲEĞũĂĚ
et al., 2008: 111). One of the tasks of this committee was to elaborate 
ŝƚƐŽǁŶƐĞƚŽĨŐƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐʹĂĚŽƉƚĞĚ ŝŶ :ƵŶĞϭϵϳϱʹĂŵŽǀĞ ƚŚĂƚǁĂƐ
ĂƚůĞĂƐƚƉĂƌƚůǇƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞhEƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨϭϵϳϲ;,ĂŵĚĂŶŝĂŶĚ
ZƵĨĨŝŶŐ͕ ϮϬϭϱ͗ ϴϯͿ͘ DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ͕  ƚŚĞ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů >ĂďŽƵƌ KƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ
also started a similar initiative for creating its own guidelines for TNCs 
;dĂƉŝŽůĂ͕ ϮϬϭϱ͗ ϭϭϬͿ͘ ŶĚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ĐŽŵŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ hEd
faded, the OECD’s earlier views on including transfer-pricing issues in 
the scope of corporate code of conduct were also forgotten.
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In addition, the conclusion of bilateral tax treaties for the 
elimination of double taxation emerged from the 1960s onward as a 
ƐĂůŝĞŶƚĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŝŶƚĞƌͲ^ƚĂƚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ;hE͕ϮϬϬϯ͗ϯ͖ƐĞĞĂůƐŽ,ĞĂƌƐŽŶ͕
2015). Earlier I noted that the OECD published its first draft model treaty 
for bilateral treaties in 1963 and that finally the OECD Model Double 
Tax Convention on Income and on Capital was published in 1977 (UN, 
2003: 3). The rules for dividing corporate tax incomes between states 
were thus developed in the same period that the UN was discussing 
the rules for financial disclosure of these activities, thus downplaying 
ƚŚĞhEĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ͘ǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞKŚĂĚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ
developing-country concerns as early as in 1965, the OECD’s solutions 
ǁĞƌĞĐůĞĂƌůǇŵŽƌĞĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͘ůƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ͕ 
these factors helped the OECD to secure its leading position in what has 
been called the international tax regime (Eden, 2007: 598).
Last but definitely not least, several developments in the global 
political economy favoured the demise of the UN and the UNCTC and 
ƚŚĞƐŚŝĨƚƚŽůĞƐƐĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐĨŽƌƵŵƐ͘^ĂŐĂĨŝͲEĞũĂĚĞƚĂů͘;ϮϬϬϴ͗ϭϭϵͿŶŽƚĞĚ
that by “the mid-1980s, many developing countries were in the throes 
of structural adjustment policies to cope with deficits in their balance 
of payments, the aftermath of recession, and the huge debts that 
arose from the energy crises of 1973-1974 and 1979-1980” (see also 
,ĂŵĚĂŶŝ ĂŶĚZƵĨĨŝŶŐ͕ϮϬϭϱ͗ϭϴͿ͘ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ͕  ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ
were desperate for capital and technology. This led many countries to 
revise their attitudes toward TNCs, either voluntarily or forced by the 
structural adjustment programs. The UNCTC was dissolved in 1993, 
ǁŝƚŚŝƚƐƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŽhEd͘^ ĂŐĂĨŝͲEĞũĂĚĞƚĂů͘
;ϮϬϬϴ͗ϮϵͿĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŚŽǁ͞ ŶĂƚŝŽŶͲƐƚĂƚĞƐďĞĐĂŵĞĨƌŝĞŶĚůŝĞƌƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ&/͕
competing over who would give more generous incentives to attract 
companies”. Consequently, the focus of the UN shifted. The emphasis 
on a code of conduct, not to speak of a more binding version of it in the 
ĨƵƚƵƌĞ͕ǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƌĞƚŚĞŬĞǇŐŽĂůƐŽĨƚŚĞhEd͕ǁĞƌĞĚĞͲƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝǌĞĚĂŶĚ
eventually faded into oblivion. 
ĨƚĞƌƚŚĞhEdǁĂƐĚŝƐŵĂŶƚůĞĚ͕hEdŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂůůǇƚŽƵĐŚĞĚ
upon tax and accounting issues in some of its seminars, mostly from 
ƚŚĞƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ĨŽƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ;^ĂŐĂĨŝͲ
Nejad et al.͕ ϮϬϬϴ͗ ϭϯϳͿ͘ ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞhEd Ɛ͛ǁŽƌŬ ŽŶ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ
continued to receive some coverage (e.g. Cobham and McNair, 2012: 
44), the early UNCTC proposals were largely forgotten. In addition, 
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the poorly resourced UN Tax Committee has never managed to 
become a serious competitor to the OECD, despite the interest by civil 
society in stepping up its resources and mandate in the 2000s. In this 
ŵŝůůĞŶŶŝƵŵ͕ĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞdĂǆ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞEĞƚǁŽƌŬ
ĂŶĚ 'ůŽďĂů &ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů /ŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇ ŚĂǀĞ ŚĂĚ Ă ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐ
initiatives such as automatic exchange of information and country-by-
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƚŚĞǇƐĞĞŵƚŽŚĂǀĞŚĂĚĂŵŽƌĞ
ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĞŝƐƐƵĞƐ;^ĞĂďƌŽŽŬĞ͕ϮϬϭϰ͗ϱϬͿ͘/ŶƚŚŝƐ
decade, however, tax-related themes have made a real breakthrough 
onto the international policy agenda in UN and other forums (e.g., UN 
2015).
The experience of the UN and the OECD in tackling international 
corporate tax avoidance highlights the interlinkages between so-
called epistemic communities that include the key policymakers in 
one policy area, and their collective memory. Langenbacher (2010: 
33) has noted how power stems from the degree of dominance that 
a memory achieves in a political culture and the importance of how 
many memories circulate, how widely a specific memory is held 
and how deep the attachment is.12 In the late 1990s, the memories 
circulating about the earlier UN work were few and far between. The 
backgrounds and shared knowledge of the emergent entrepreneurs 
;^ĞĂďƌŽŽŬĞĂŶĚtŝŐĂŶ͕ϮϬϭϯͿǁŚŽŚĂǀĞƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇƉƌŽŵŽƚĞĚƚŚĞƐĞŝƐƐƵĞƐ
ŝŶĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞĚŵĂƌŬĞĚůǇĨƌŽŵ
that of the specialists whose knowledge the UN had employed in the 
ϭϵϳϬƐ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞŵŝƐŐƵŝĚĞĚƚŽƐĞĞƚŚŝƐƐŚŝĨƚĂƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ
ĂŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞƚŚŝŶŐ͘ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞŽďůŝǀŝŽŶŚĞůƉĞĚƚŚĞKƚŽ
ŐĂƚŚĞƌ ƉƵďůŝĐŝƚǇ ĨŽƌ ŝƚƐ ϭϵϵϴ,ĂƌŵĨƵů dĂǆ ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ
newborn role in this field, it may have also helped critics of the OECD 
to attach a sense of novelty to policy ideas that went beyond those 
advocated by the OECD.
In summary, the project for regulating corporate planning and 
bring more transparency to it in the 1970s was institutionally conducted 
in a winner-takes-all situation. The UN made major headway with the 
ǁŽƌŬĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĚ,ŽĐ'ƌŽƵƉ͕ƚŚĞhEdĂŶĚŝƚƐ'/^ZŐƌŽƵƉ͕
12>ĂŶŐĞŶďĂĐŚĞƌĂŶĚ^ŚĂŝŶŚĂǀĞĂůƐŽŶŽƚĞĚŚŽǁƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂůƉŽůŝĐǇŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨ
ĐŽůůĞĐƟǀĞŵĞŵŽƌǇŚĂƐŶŽƚƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƟĐĂƩĞŶƟŽŶŝŶĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵǇŽƌ
the policy arena that it deserves (2010: 1). It is easy to agree with this statement in light 
ŽĨƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƐƚƵĚŝĞƐƉƵƚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚŝŶƚŚŝƐĂƌƟĐůĞ͘
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but its influence faded as the balance of power shifted in favour of 
ƚŚĞ/^ĂŶĚƚŚĞK͘dŚĞƐĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞĂĐĐĞŶƚƵĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
lack of additional forces (civil society, media, and other international 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐͿ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ͘
Recalling how the transnational legal order on international corporate 
taxation developed in the 1920s as an expert-driven process with only 
Ă ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ŐůŽďĂů ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ;'ĞŶƐĐŚĞů ĂŶĚ ZŝǆĞŶ͕ ϮϬϭϰͿ͕ ŝƚ ĐĂŶ
be seen that the 1970s permitted the birth of a similar exercise in the 
ĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŝĐ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ;ƌĂŝƚŚǁĂŝƚĞ ĂŶĚƌĂŚŽƐ͕ ϮϬϬϬ͖,ĂĂƐ͕ ϭϵϵϮͿŽĨ
ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƚĂǆĂǀŽŝĚĂŶĐĞĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞϭϵϮϬƐ͕
this consolidation period was a short one, as the OECD and other 
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŚĞhEƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ͘dŚŝƐŝƐĂŶ
important reminder that even if the emergent entrepreneurs manage 
ƚŽƐĞŝǌĞƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚŝĚĞĂƐǁĞůůƐƵŝƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŵŽŽĚƐŽĨƚŚĞ
time, a sudden shift in the international balance of power can quickly 
derail such attempts.
In comparison, today’s emergent entrepreneurs benefit from 
the fact that the current international political situation is much 
more diverse with regard to both ideas and institutions. This enables 
Đŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐĂŶĚ
even investors to gain small but repeated political victories in pushing 
initiatives against tax avoidance and tax havens despite powerful 
ƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ /^ ĂŶĚ ĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ͘ dŚĞ ĚŝƐĞŵƉŽǁĞƌŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ
consequent dismantling of the UNCTC and parts of the other UN 
ǁŽƌŬƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƉŽůŝĐǇĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇʹŽƌĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŝĐ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇʹƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚĂŶĚƐƉƌĞĂĚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ǁĂǇƐƚŽŽƉĞŶƵƉĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ;ƌĂŝƚŚǁĂŝƚĞĂŶĚƌĂŚŽƐ͕ϮϬϬϬ͗ϮϵͿ͘
The epistemic community of accounting companies was strengthened 
instead.
The example of the development of broader disclosure 
requirements in the UNCTC and the calls for other ways to tackle tax 
flight and tax havens show how difficult it is to create a lasting political 
initiative when its success depends on the political will and resources 
ŽĨĂ ƐŝŶŐůĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƵŶĚĞƌ ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚ ƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨ ůŽƐŝŶŐ
its legitimacy in the eyes of the prevailing powers. The results of the 
UNCTC’s loss of legitimacy and power, coupled with the ideological turn 
ŽĨƚŚĞůĂƚĞϭϵϳϬƐĂŶĚƚŚĞh͘^͘^ĞŶĂƚĞ Ɛ͛ ůŽƐƐŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶŐ
the political power of the corporation were so devastating that the 
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substantial inputs proposed by the UNCTC and the scholars of that 
time seem to have been forgotten by academe, policymakers, and civil 
society. In contrast, compared with the 1970s, there is a much broader 
consensus today between northern and southern countries on the 
issues and problems at stake. Therefore, playing down the proposed 
initiatives is and likely will be more difficult for their opponents than in 
the earlier decades.
Despite their eventual failure, the early UN proposals were 
surprisingly clairvoyant in their analysis of the problem at hand and the 
policy measures the UN proposed. One key reason for this was probably 
that the UNCTC put great effort into recruiting the best-skilled people 
available for drafting the substantial material. Many of these people 
were from academia and were hired on a consultancy basis, in case 
they were unwilling to sign a longer contract or the UNCTC was unable 
ƚŽĂĨĨŽƌĚ ƚŚĞŵ ;ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚ<ůĂƵƐ^ĂŚůŐƌĞŶͿ͘dŚŝƐ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞ
contrasted with the corporate transparency initiatives developed 
ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ϭϵϵϬƐ ŽŶǁĂƌĚ͘  ďŝŐ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
these two historical waves in calls for corporate transparency was in 
their underlying analysis of corporate power. The early proposals for 
corporate financial transparency saw the corporate planning as a major 
problem for the functioning of markets and well-functioning state 
governance. In contrast, the 1990s calls for corporate transparency 
were framed more in the context of corporate social responsibility and 
tackling of corruption. In this sense, they were partly products of the 
anti-state tenets of the 1980s that played a role in the abandonment of 
the earlier initiatives.
6. Final words
/Ŷ ƵŐƵƐƚ ϮϬϭϱ͕ ƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬĞƌƐ͕ Đŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ͕  ĂŶĚ hE ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů
ĨƌŽŵĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚŐĂƚŚĞƌĞĚŝŶĚĚŝƐďĂďĂ͕ƚŚŝŽƉŝĂ͕ĨŽƌƚŚĞdŚŝƌĚ
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ &ŝŶĂŶĐŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ͘ WƌĞĐĞĚĞĚ
by the high-profile Monterrey conference in 2002 and the follow-up 
ĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŝŶŽŚĂ ŝŶϮϬϬϴ͕ƚŚĞĚĚŝƐďĂďĂĞǀĞŶƚƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽƌĞŶĞǁ
international commitments for development financing in a difficult 
global political environment. One of the key goals of civil society 
representatives was to strengthen and upgrade the UN Tax Committee. 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕  ƚŚĞĐĂůůƐ ĨŽƌŵŽƌĞ ŝŶĐůƵƐŝǀĞŐůŽďĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŽĨ ƚĂǆ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ
were not answered. In a way, history is repeating itself. The urge to 
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ƌĞǀĞƌƐĞ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌƵŵƐŚŝĨƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ /^ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞKŵĂŶĂŐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
1970s is there, but the opposing forces have been too strong, at least 
for the time being.
 ďĞƚƚĞƌ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƚĂǆ
governance may help in formulating better strategies and substantial 
arguments. This article has contributed to the political economy 
ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞŽŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇĂŶĚƉŽǁĞƌ ŝŶƐŝǆ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƐ͘&ŝƌƐƚ͕
it provided new information on and analysis of the early history of the 
anti-tax avoidance and evasion initiatives, thus contributing to and in 
parts challenging some earlier accounts on this topic: as examples, 
I showed how the histories of the automatic exchange of information 
ĂŶĚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͲďǇͲĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ ʹ ďŽƚŚ ŬĞǇ ƚŽƉŝĐƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
ƌĞĐĞŶƚƚĂǆƉŽůŝĐǇĂŐĞŶĚĂʹĂƌĞůŽŶŐĞƌƚŚĂŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ͘^ĞĐŽŶĚ͕
it demonstrated how the early UN publications discussed also other 
ŝƐƐƵĞƐŽĨĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞ͕ƐƵĐŚĂƐ^ ŽƵƚŚͲ^ŽƵƚŚƚĂǆĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͘
Third, it hinted that we should look further back to understand also the 
ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨ ƚŚĞ /^͕ǁŚŽƐĞĞĂƌůǇ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞŵĂǇŶŽƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ
ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ͘&ŽƵƌƚŚ͕ŝƚŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĂŵŝĚƐƚƚŚĞƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ
from the UN, even the OECD promoted some far-reaching stances in 
linking tax payment with corporate social responsibility.
&ŝĨƚŚ͕ƚŚĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞϭϵϳϬƐĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐŽĨĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ
tax avoidance drew also from the rich academic discussions of the 
ƚŝŵĞ ŽŶ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ͘ ^ŝǆƚŚ͕ ŝƚ ƐŚŽǁĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ
put forward in this article can be helpful in illustrating the role of 
epistemic communities, emergent entrepreneurs and the politics of 
memory in recent social scientific research. This last may have been 
one explanation for why the policy community of the time was able 
to develop far-sighted analyses of and policy proposals for tackling 
corporate tax avoidance some 30 years before the contemporary 
discussions on these topics began. 
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A B S T R A C T
This paper contributes to recent discussions of corporate tax avoidance and global wealth
chains. Drawing on multiple case studies, we outline the key strategies adopted by Finnish
mining companies as they seek to lower their tax burden. After screening the accounts of
the companies mining metallic ores in Finland, we provide an in-depth analysis of the tax
avoidance arrangements at three of these mines. The mines were operated by two Canadian
enterprises that utilized seven different tax avoidance arrangements. The multiple case
study approach adopted in this paper is helpful in developing both quantitative and
qualitative tax avoidance research, since our ﬁndings highlight major deﬁciencies of
datasets commonly used in the dominant quantitative tax avoidance research. Our
qualitative approach helps tackle some of the limitations imposed on tax researchers as a
result of the considerable secrecy surrounding tax matters. In particular, we argue that the
existing tax avoidance research has focused too much on statutory corporate income tax
rates even though today, tax minimization relies mostly on speciﬁc tax incentives and other
loopholes in tax laws. We argue that the arrangements we describe mirror a wider
phenomenon where multinational enterprises exert societal power commonly associated
with sovereign states. Crossing the disciplinary boundaries of accounting, political
economy and tax law, we also contribute to the emerging research agenda on global wealth
chains. We call for more attention to the intersections between accounting and tax law for
understanding how enterprises can separate their value chains from the intra-ﬁrm ﬂows of
wealth.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The system of prices is like the system of words or the system of numbers. Words, prices and numbers are nominal and
not real. They are signs and symbols needed for the operation of working rules. . . . Words are deceptive if they do not
convey the meaning intended; numbers are liars if they do not indicate the actual quantities; prices are inﬂated or
deﬂated if they do not reﬂect the course of real value.
– John C. Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism, 1957 [1924]: 9
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Corporate tax avoidance is an emerging academic topic (e.g., Dallyn, in press; Jenkins & Newell, 2013: 381; Sikka &
Willmott, 2010; Sikka, in press).1 Tax has long been marginalized in political science, law, and social policy, and it has not
received the ‘intellectual attention it deserves from accounting scholars’ (Boden, Killian, Mulligan, & Oats, 2010: 541–544).
This obscurity has gradually changed. Tax avoidance has gathered increasing attention in academia, among inter- and non-
governmental organizations and the media (for example Oxfam, 2016). Tax policies are no longer an isolated enclave within
enterprises; rather, they are discussed ‘in the boardroom’ (KPMG, 2005). These tensions have resulted in calls for research of
‘transfer pricing in broader social, political and organizational contexts’ in order to understand how accounting techniques
re-allocate wealth (Sikka & Willmott, 2010: 353).
This, however, is easier said than done. Graham and Tucker (2006: 2, 22) note that ‘information about tax shelters is
notoriously hard to ﬁnd’, suggesting that scholars should ‘creatively obviate this lack of information’ in order to understand
tax shelters better (Lisowsky, 2010). Hanlon and Heitzman (2010: 157) also suggest the use of ‘some other’ data sources. We
answer to these calls by providing a multiple case study (Yin, 2003) of mining industry tax planning. Cognizant that
enterprises in most major mining countries are not obliged to disclose ﬁnancial accounts of their subsidiaries, we turned our
attention to thin capitalization related tax avoidance in an extractive-rich country where local ﬁnancial accounts were
available – Finland. The Finnish mining industry has developed signiﬁcantly in the past decade, while still being of a
reasonable size for an industry-wide analysis (see Section 3.2). In addition, Finland is a member of the EU and the OECD, and
its corporate income taxation system is similar to most countries (see Section 3.2). Therefore, the ﬁndings can be used to
assess the deﬁciencies of the global tax system in general. Moreover, our analysis on three different thin capitalization
structures can be useful, not only in understanding the speciﬁc rules are needed to tackle them, but also in illustrating the
underlying problems in the current international corporate taxation regime.
The literature on corporate tax avoidance has typically relied on two categories: intra-ﬁrm transfer pricing and thin
capitalization (e.g., Becker, Fuest, & Riedel, 2012). These categories are occasionally supplemented by a third category of
intellectual property rights (IPR) related tax avoidance (e.g., Corrick, 2016; Dischinger & Riedel, 2011). Of these, thin
capitalization is typically understood as a practice whereby subsidiaries based in low-tax countries grant loans to
subsidiaries in high-tax countries where the interest costs are tax-deductible (Becker et al., 2012; Buettner & Wamser, 2007;
Bartelsman & Beetsma, 2003; Clausing, 2003; Desai, Foley, & Hines, 2005). For reasons discussed later, for the most part
multinationals can select their capital structure in each country independent of the external funding needs of individual
investments (Ting, 2014). Furthermore, IPR-related tax avoidance is usually discussed in the context of patents, copyrights
and other products of the knowledge economy (e.g., Dischinger & Riedel, 2011). We contrast these generalizations by
analyzing seven different types of tax avoidance arrangements we discovered in our case studies. In addition to thin
capitalization we also discuss other arrangements such as the use of immaterial mining concessions in tax planning. This is
the ﬁrst contribution of this article.
Second, and related to the previous point, we argue that a better understanding of the cash ﬂows and proﬁt shifting
arrangements can be helpful in developing the research methodologies that assess the effects of corporate tax avoidance.
Since the mid-1990s, a lacunae of statistical research has emerged focusing on the factors and drivers of corporate tax
planning. Based on the ﬁndings from our case studies, we maintain that many of the approaches and variables typically
employed by econometric studies on corporate tax avoidance are too straightforward. As for an example, the statutory
corporate income tax rates – a very common variable in the statistical research on corporate tax avoidance – play very little
role in our case studies. We found that the low tax rates derived largely from speciﬁc tax incentives and questionable advance
tax rulings while statutory tax rates had only a minimal role. The LuxLeaks tax deals (Marian, 2016a) and multiple famous
cases discussed in the media related to American technology corporations such as Apple have previously highlighted this
phenomena (European Commission, 2016a; Vleggeert, 2016). Many academics and the OECD (2015a) have also noted that
the data used in quantitative tax avoidance studies is poor, which seriously impacts its use in the analysis of tax avoidance.
We are able to tackle this problem by using multiple data sources and show that the databases used in econometric studies
do not include the tax avoidance structures we discover. We discuss the deﬁciencies of quantitative tax avoidance research
more in Section 2.1.
Third, drawing from the tradition of evolutionary economics as well as from contemporary research on the global political
economy, we maintain that much world trade has little to do with market mechanisms as the prices are planned in corporate
headquarters (Ylönen & Teivainen, 2015). The dominant quantitative approach in tax research offers few tools for analyzing
this phenomenon because it operates on an aggregate statistical level, thus framing the phenomenon in a way that provides
little information on the speciﬁcs of tax avoidance policies. We criticize some of the taken-for-granted assumptions behind
the existing studies (Golden-Bibble & Locke, 2007: 6) and provide suggestions on how to improve their research
methodologies. Contributing to the nascent literature on wealth chains, we argue that the artiﬁcial corporate price planning
mechanisms thrive on two pillars of the international tax system, namely the separate entity doctrine and the arm’s length
principle. According to these principles, individual companies belonging to the same group are separately liable for their
taxes and use of the arm’s length prices in their mutual transactions. The separate entity doctrine not only facilitates tax
1 When using concepts such as ’tax avoidance’ or ’tax planning’, we do not judge the legality of the arrangements, since aggressive tax planning structures
are often legal (OECD, 2013). The national tax authorities and ultimately courts assess the legality of certain arrangements based on local legislation,
obtaining also conﬁdential corporate information not available for research purposes (for further discussion, see for example Otusanya, 2011).
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avoidance arrangements (Eden & Kudrle, 2005) but is also a key concept in understanding the rupture between value
creation and places of production (Ting, 2014: 71). Separate entities are ﬁctional in a world where enterprises plan their
operations as a single economical unit (Biondi, 2013; Biondi, Canziani, & Kirat, 2007; Graham, 2003). This facilitates artiﬁcial
wealth creation in locations that attract multinational enterprises with tax incentives (Palan, 2002).
This multidisciplinary paper also answers to a call by O’Dwyer and Unerman (2014: 1227) for greater integration ‘of
theoretical framings drawn from multiple disciplines’. The remainder of this article progresses as follows. In the next section,
we will review the key literature on tax avoidance and global wealth chains. In Section 3, we introduce principles of mining
taxation and the characteristics of the Finnish metal ore mining industry and its regulation. Section 4 describes our research
materials and methodology, and Section 5 is devoted to the case studies. The penultimate section discusses the case studies
in light of the questions posed in this introduction. We conclude by discussing the implications of this study in the context of
wider developments in corporate taxation.
2. Review of earlier research
2.1. Quantitative and qualitative research on tax avoidance
The impact of tax avoidance has been mostly studied quantitatively with econometric methods.2 The branch of
quantitative studies began with a study by Hines and Rice (1994), who disentangled proﬁt shifting from real economic proﬁts
and analyzed the ‘semi-elasticity of reported income with respect to the tax rate differential across countries’ (Dharmapala,
2014: 2; for other recent summaries of these studies, see Heckemeyer & Overesch, 2013; OECD, 2015a).3 These studies have
focused on tax planning at an aggregate level, and the lack of publicly available data impacts the use of the methods
(Lisowsky, 2010; OECD, 2015a). The vast majority of the European and global studies is based on the ﬁnancial data of the
Orbis database4 (OECD, 2015a: 94–95). In the United States, researchers have also used conﬁdential data collected by the
United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) from U.S. based multinational enterprises (OECD, 2015a: 33). Both
databases have severe deﬁciencies that we discuss later in this section. The poor quality of aggregate source data has meant
that while most of these studies document the existence of tax avoidance, they do not reliably address the magnitude of its
effects for economies or the types of arrangements used (Dharmapala, 2014). The OECD (2015a: 17) has also criticized
econometric studies on tax avoidance for failures ‘to disentangle real economic effects from the effects of BEPS-related
behaviours’ (see also Killian, 2006).
The most severe deﬁciency on the Orbis database is that it includes information from only a very few countries that are
used in corporate tax avoidance. The database is not exhaustive, because it is based on public ﬁnancial statements (Weyzig,
2014: 151). These are generally available only in Europe and a few other countries. Even in Europe, the database lacks crucial
information from corporate tax havens such as Luxembourg and Switzerland (Huizinga & Laeven, 2008: 1170; Lohse &
Riedel, 2013: 19). Therefore, the database fails to include a vast part of corporate tax avoidance, since it utilizes non-
transparent tax havens (Dharmapala, 2014: 441). The absence of data from tax havens heightens the risk that these studies
fail to illustrate the true magnitude and impact of tax avoidance. We tackle this obstacle by complementing our research
material with original ﬁnancial statements and consolidated annual returns that include information on cash ﬂows to tax
shelters (see Section 4).
The U.S. BEA database does not have a similar shortage of information from non-transparent hubs of tax avoidance, but it
is limited because it only includes information on MNEs headquartered in the United States. This leaves out most of the
global MNEs. Additionally, the generalizability of research based on the BEA database is limited, since the U.S. worldwide
corporate tax system is exceptional (Kleinbard, 2011). Practically all other developed countries have a territorial tax system;
i.e., they only tax the proﬁts generated within their jurisdiction. Together with the fact that the 35% statutory corporate tax
rate in the United States is by far highest in the OECD countries, this means that tax avoidance techniques of U.S. based
multinationals as well as their effects are unique and differ from those employed by Canadian or European MNEs. The tax
avoidance techniques of Canadian MNEs highlighted in our case studies could however be employed within most territorial
tax regimes.
Another shortcoming of previous quantitative research is its focus on statutory corporate tax rates. Due to the lack of
information from corporate tax havens and countrywide effective tax rates, many studies compare pre-tax proﬁts with
statutory tax rates (OECD, 2015a: 94–95). Controlled foreign company (CFC) rules and other anti-tax avoidance measures
restrain the use of tax havens with low or no corporate taxation (see Section 3.2). Because of this, tax avoidance especially in
the EU relies usually on speciﬁc tax incentives and tax rulings granted by jurisdictions that often have above average
2 E.g., Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003; Becker et al., 2012; Buettner and Wamser, 2007; Clausing, 2003; Clausing, 2016; Desai et al., 2005; Dischinger and
Riedel, 2011; Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Kosi and Valentincic, 2013; Markle and Shackelford, 2009.
3 According to Dharmapala (2014), ”A representative consensus estimate from the literature, based on a metaregression study by Heckemeyer and
Overesch (2013), is a semi-elasticity of reported income with respect to the tax rate differential across countries of 0.8. This entails that a 10 percentage point
increase in the tax rate difference between an afﬁliate and its parent (e.g., because the tax rate in the afﬁliate’s country falls from 35% to 25%) would increase
the pretax income reported by the afﬁliate by 8% (for example, from $100,000 to $108,000).”
4 Bureau van Dijk’s database contains ﬁnancial information on over 170 million companies worldwide. Some studies are also based on Bureau van Dijk’s
Amadeus database that has similar information only on European companies.
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statutory tax rates (Marian, 2016a; OECD, 2013). Our case studies are illustrative examples of this, since the tax avoidance
arrangements we analyze rely on speciﬁc tax incentives granted for example by Luxembourg.
Moreover, publicly available raw data in ﬁnancial statements included in the Orbis database often fails to give
unequivocal information on tax costs and thus requires further interpretation (Hanlon, 2003: 850–852). Due to the fact that
Orbis does not include explicit information on tax residence, statistical studies generally presume that the formal
registration jurisdiction is also the residence jurisdiction for tax purposes. However, relying on this presumption could
signiﬁcantly warp the data as tax jurisdiction differs from registration jurisdiction speciﬁcally in tax avoidance cases. First,
the permanent establishments that are taxable parts of entities are often employed in tax avoidance (OECD, 2015c).
However, they are not included in databases, since they do not ﬁle their separate ﬁnancial statements to public registries.
Second, some countries do not necessarily tax all entities registered in there, which is a feature that is a common tool for tax
avoidance. As for example, Ireland has not taxed the Irish subsidiaries of Apple and many other American MNEs in cases
where their business has been effectively managed outside Ireland (Ting, 2014). These MNEs have been able to avoid billions
of euros of taxes by shifting a large share of their proﬁts to the Irish subsidiaries that are not tax resident in Ireland, but in a
tax haven such as Bermuda. Another disturbing factor in the previous statistical studies is the rough classiﬁcation of ﬁnancial
data in Orbis. The taxable income often differs from the pre-tax proﬁts presented in Orbis for other reasons than tax
avoidance. As for example, the intra-group dividends accounted in proﬁts are usually wholly or partially tax exempt.5 We are
able to take into account these deﬁciencies of raw data or at least analyze their possible impact when we discuss the
limitations of our research (see Section 6.5).
The few earlier tax avoidance case studies have used material from public hearings (Otusanya, 2011; Ting, 2014), court
decisions (Bal, 2016; Otusanya, 2011; Sikka & Willmot, 2010; Waris, 2016), research reports from non-governmental
organizations (Wu, 2015), public ﬁnancial account data (Ylönen & Laine, 2015) and information acquired directly from
enterprises (Ali-Yrkkö & Rouvinen, 2015). These studies suggest that a qualitative approach can help to understand tax
avoidance structures, their underlying reasons (Ting, 2014; Ylönen & Laine, 2015) and the global division of value added
between MNE functions as they show tax planning is decisive in determining where proﬁts are accounted (Ali-Yrkkö &
Rouvinen, 2015). The case studies also highlight the deﬁciencies of a quantitative approach using aggregate data from
ﬁnancial account databases as it fails to include information on the discovered high-proﬁle tax avoidance affairs (OECD,
2015a: 19).
While the case studies provide ‘a rich and emerging source of evidence’ on BEPS arrangements (OECDa, 2015: 17), their
small number and incidental nature limits their usability for broader analysis. Our systematic industry-wide multiple case
study approach described in Section 4 improves the generalizability of the ﬁndings signiﬁcantly.
2.2. From value chains to wealth chains
The dominant quantitative research on corporate tax avoidance has demonstrated the blatant gap between the places
where MNEs book their proﬁts and where the actual value is created. However, other tools are needed to assess the impact
that this discrepancy has on the balance of power between MNEs and states. The global wealth chain approach that draws
from the studies on global value chains can be useful in conceptualizing how MNEs exert power over states with their tax
planning capabilities.
The global value chain research agenda emerged from the economic dependency research within the studies of
international development, and its main focus was on the relationship between the core and the periphery of the world-
economy. Known especially from the works of Immanuel Wallerstein and his colleagues (Hopkins & Wallerstein,1977), these
ideas were later turned into a new research agenda under the title global commodity chains (Gerefﬁ & Korzeniewicz, 1994).
Consequently, this resulted in a large body of empirical research on intra-ﬁrm and inter-ﬁrm value chains (e.g., Daviron &
Ponte, 2005; Ponte & Gibbon, 2005; Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck, & Gerefﬁ 2008). The value chains research agenda gained
popularity as it was realized that the core-periphery approach was not sufﬁcient to describe the globalized economy where
MNEs are able to outsource much of the activities that were conducted before within the MNEs themselves to almost any
place in the world. Wallerstein’s framework was based on the capitalist world-economy as it had existed for some 500 years
before the economic globalization that has dramatically changed the economy in the past few decades (Patomäki, 2003). The
revolution of the global economy was also noted in international business research, where the work of Michael Porter (1985)
played a key role in steering the research agenda of corporate value chains. Consequently, many researchers began to study
the commodity and value chains involving several enterprises, and the increased understanding of the role of the service
economy shifted the focus from commodities to more general value chains.
More recently, research on ﬁnancialization and the offshore economy (Palan, 2002) has underlined that the value chain
framework alone cannot explain where the proﬁts of international business are booked and for what reasons. A number of
scholars have pointed out how ‘decentered corporations’ (Desai, 2008) utilize power over states that attempt to design and
impose effective tax laws on corporations (Genschel and Rixen, 2014). There is a need for more research into how enterprises
are able to design ﬁctional wealth chains that ‘hide, obscure and relocate wealth to the extent that they break loose from the
5 This is meant to relieve economic double taxation within MNEs, since usually the entity paying out the dividend has already paid income tax for its
proﬁts. The dividends are paid out of accumulated after-tax proﬁts.
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location of value creation’ (Seabrooke & Wigan, 2014a: 7; see also Seabrooke & Wigan, forthcoming). The wealth chains
within MNEs are in many ways ﬁctional as the arm’s length transfer prices are determined by methods not used in the
business-to-business markets where the prices are generally based on supply, demand and negotiations.
Statistical studies on corporate tax avoidance (see Section 2.1) have highlighted the fact that much wealth is being
relocated within large corporations in ways that break from the location of actual value creation. However, global wealth
chains thrive in secrecy and complex ﬁnancial arrangements that undermine some of the key assumptions in quantitative
strain of tax research. As for an example, our case studies show that the statutory corporate income tax levels – a common
variable in the quantitative studies – played a relatively minor role in the tax arrangements we analyzed. Moreover, much of
the econometric research on corporate tax avoidance departs from the notion of the arm’s length principle However, the
concept is only a theoretical principle, i.e., the in-practice price setting of intra-group transactions is part of a tax planning
policy rather than actual arm’s length pricing (Ylönen & Teivainen, 2015). The scarce critical literature on the arm’s length
principle usually discusses its abuse in the context of the mispriced trade of services and goods within enterprises (Ylönen &
Teivainen, 2015). However, the same principle also applies to intra-group interests (Heckemeyer & Overesch, 2013). These
deﬁciencies of the international tax system give multinational enterprises an increasing ‘autonomy with the absence of
constrained choice or limits to choice or behavior’ (Samuels, 1972: 277).
Global wealth chains cannot be fully analyzed and understood without in-depth ﬁrm-level research. The case study
approach, we utilize in this article, not only allows a detailed analysis on the nuances of the tax planning arrangements
commonly employed by the MNEs (i.e., how wealth chains are structured), but is also helpful in understanding how MNEs
and their front groups are able to lobby and maintain legislation that facilitates tax avoidance even in highly developed
countries such as Finland.
3. Mining taxation and the metal ore mining industry in Finland
3.1. Taxing the mining industry: concepts, developments, and challenges
Mining is a peculiar industry. Some of the central characteristics highlighted in mining studies are the ﬁnite and immobile
nature of ores, and the major environmental and social effects and risks created by their extraction (Otto et al., 2006: 19).
Mineral resources are typically considered to be a part of national wealth, and the resource rights are owned by the state
(Guj, 2012: 3; Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 2010: 2). These factors give weight to demands for charging ‘rent’
from mining enterprises (Baunsgaard, 2001: 5). The rent is a compensation for the mine’s location jurisdiction and is usually
charged in the form of a tax. Mining policies typically aim to manage the exploitation of extractives for the beneﬁt of the
communities involved, maximizing the revenues in the long term (Guj, 2012: 5–7). Other objectives should also be taken into
account, such as revenue stability, equity between taxpayers, transparency, and administrative efﬁciency (Guj, 2012).
Corporate income tax (CIT) is only paid from taxable proﬁts; therefore, it is not an adequate tool for charging rents from
mining enterprises (Boadway & Keen, 2010: 32–44). Consequently, there is a myriad of mining-speciﬁc taxes (Guj, 2012: 4–
5). Exploration and mining are risky but can also result in high rewards. In order to be effective, mineral taxes should be
sufﬁciently low to enable the initial high capital investment and exploration costs. However, the rents should be sufﬁciently
high to compensate for the right to exploit national resources and for the potential damages. As a result, most countries have
resorted to a regular CIT supplemented with a royalty system. Governments often mix instruments in order to achieve a
balance between economic efﬁciency and effectiveness in raising revenues (Barma, Kaiser, & Le, 2012: 123; see also Otto
et al., 2006: 278).
Early mining royalty systems were typically based on the amount of production. However, since the 1950s, value-based
royalty systems (ad valorem) have gained popularity as production-based royalties can tilt the production path by reducing
initial output (Baunsgaard, 2001). Mining royalties are usually project-based, and a few countries aim to secure CIT revenues
from the natural resources industry with a ‘ring fencing’ system that prohibits offsetting proﬁts from one mine with losses to
another mine belonging to the same enterprise (Guj, 2012: 4; Barma et al., 2012: 125).6 In addition to the CIT and ad valorem
royalty systems, presumptive income taxes, resource rent taxes, and property taxes are also common as well as other taxes
such as value-added tax and import and export duties (Barma et al., 2012: 125).
3.2. The Finnish mining industry and its regulation
Finland has a notably long mining industry history, as the ﬁrst mines were established in the sixteenth century
(Puustinen, 2003). Since then, minerals have been extracted from over 1000 mine sites. After a surge in new mines in the
post-war decades, the signiﬁcance of the mining industry declined in the 1980s. In the following decade, the training of
mining professionals was downsized (Lindborg, 1996: 180). Technical development and the commodity price boom of the
early 2000s led to the revival of mine exploration and the opening of 10 new metallic ore mines in this millennium (Kaldany,
2006: xi). There were 12 operational metallic ore mines at the end of 2013 (Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency, 2013). In
addition, there was extraction of other minerals at 34 mines. The industry’s total turnover was around s1.5 billion in 2013,
6 Finland does not have a ring fencing system.
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out of which metal ore mines accounted for s1.1 billion, and the mines employed approximately 3000 people directly, with
some 27,000 indirectly employed (Kokko, 2014; Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 2014). Notwithstanding, the GDP
share of the mining industry in Finland was estimated at only 0.3% in 2014 (Ofﬁcial Statistics of Finland, 2016). With falling
market prices, six mines were closed in 2014. In the beginning of 2016, there were no pending mine projects. Investments in
mine exploration slumped to s40 million in 2014 from nearly s90 million in the peak year of 2012, and the downward trend
is expected to continue (Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency, 2015).
Finland began revising its mining legislation in 2009. The government proposal brieﬂy discussed different mining royalty
systems (Government of Finland, 2009). However, the idea of introducing speciﬁc mining taxes was abandoned.7 The new
Mining Act (621/2011) came into effect in 2011. It allowed exploration without a permit in most cases and granted the
explorer an exclusive right to exploit deposits. The required exploration permits are relatively cheap and are denoted to cover
only the immediate costs of the authorities (Government of Finland, 2009). Moreover, whereas in the past compensation was
negotiable, the mining company must now compensate the landowner 0.15% of the value of the extracted minerals annually.
The National Geological Survey of Finland (GTK) has also been involved in exploration. The Finnish government sells the
rights to mine sites discovered by the GTK. In at least one case, the sale has resulted in a royalty agreement (see Section 5.3).
These royalties are not taxes since they are contract-based. According to the Finland State Budget, the total amount of
royalties is expected to be s3 million in the year 2015, which accounts for less than half percent of the value of all ores mined
in Finland.
In general, the structure of the Finnish corporate tax regime is similar to most developed countries and Finland is not
involved in harmful tax competition that would attract proﬁt shifting from abroad (European Commission, 2015b).8 Mining
companies pay the statutory CIT for their taxable proﬁts.9 In 2014, the tax rate was reduced from 24.5 to 20%, which is
relatively low,10 but still considerably higher than effective tax rates in the countries engaged in harmful tax competition
(Marian, 2016a). Tax competition in developed countries is usually in form of speciﬁc tax incentives or rulings that provide a
low effective tax rate for proﬁts generated for example by intra-group interests or intellectual property (Zammit, 2015).11
Our cases demonstrate that even with the relatively competitive statutory CIT rate proﬁts are shifted away from Finland due
to the special tax treatment in Barbados and Luxembourg.
As in other OECD countries, all intra-group transactions in Finland should be at arm’s length and the OECD (2010) Transfer
Pricing Guidelines are used to interpret the arm’s length principle (Finnish Tax Administration, 2009, Act on Assessment
Procedure, 1558/1995, x31). However, there are a few exceptions to the general principle that facilitate tax avoidance.
According to case law (KHO:2014:119), the general anti-avoidance rule (Act on Assessment Procedure, x28) provides the only
legal basis for the authorities to re-classify interest-carrying loans as equity, which signiﬁcantly reduces the possibilities for
re-characterizing tax-deductible interests as non-deductible dividends. Due to this, it is unlikely that the Finnish tax
authorities would challenge the thin capitalization arrangements described in this article. The Finnish group relief system
also allows intra-border group contributions that enable local subsidiaries and permanent establishments to offset proﬁts
and losses (Contributions between Afﬁliated Companies Act, 21.11.1986/825). We show how this enables restructurings that
create huge tax-deductible interests not related to any real investments (see Sections 5.2 and 5.3) Mining companies are also
able to offset their mining proﬁts with losses from other activities (see Sections 5.2–5.4). Losses can be carried forward for
ten years (The Income Tax Act, 30.12.1992/1535, Section V), which allows deferred tax savings from excess interest costs in
the starting phase of a mine, when the business is generally loss-making and there is no tax on proﬁts to be paid (see
Section 5.2). With certain limitations, companies can exploit previous losses after mergers and acquisitions (see Section 5.4).
There is no withholding tax for interest paid abroad, and generally, all intra-group payments to other EU countries are
exempt from withholding tax (see directives 2011/96/EU and 2003/49/EC).
The lack of withholding tax on interest allows the full beneﬁt of interest tax deductions in thin capitalization structures.
The tax exemption of intra group dividends in the EU enables using holding companies registered in the EU for avoiding the
Finnish withholding tax on payments to third countries. All three case enterprises used Swedish holding companies to avoid
the Finnish withholding tax (Sections 5.2–5.4). The tax treaties Finland has with most developed third countries dictate that
withholding tax on dividends paid directly outside the EU is usually ﬁve percent (Finnish Tax Administration, 2014b).12
Most countries limit cross-border tax avoidance with speciﬁc regulations such as CFC rules, thin capitalization rules and
the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR). Finland has GAAR and CFC legislation in place, but the EU case law limits their
application on low-tax subsidiaries registered in the EU area (Finnish Tax Administration, 2014a; C-196/04 – Cadbury
7 In 2012, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy commissioned a consultancy study from a Swedish private consulting ﬁrm to review a large
number of tax regimes. This study concluded that regions with a large market share and other stable regions (e.g., South Africa) were increasing their
resource taxes while mainly developing countries with unstable regimes were looking to expand their market share with lower tax rates (Ericsson &
Farooki, 2012). Curiously, the study was never published. We were only able to obtain the study after submitting an ofﬁcial information request.
8 For an in-depth study on international corporate taxation in Finland, see Helminen (2015).
9 Taxable income is calculated according to the Business Tax Act (360/1968). Calculations are based on ﬁnancial statements prepared according to the
Finnish Accounting Act (1336/1997).
10 The sixth lowest among OECD countries (OECD, 2016).
11 The LuxLeaks documents showed that Luxembourg has given advance tax rulings to MNEs that often provided effective tax rate below one percent in a
country where the statutory corporate income tax rate has remained relatively high at 29%. The intellectual property tax incentives usually offer a tax rate
between 5 and 10% (European Commission, 2014).
12 If there was no tax treaty between Finland and the resident country of the dividend recipient, the withholding tax rate would be 30%.
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Table 1
Collected ﬁgures from all Finnish mines 2011–2014 (s million).
Mine/Parent
company
(country)
Mining company
and other Finnish
subsiadiariesa
First year
of
production
Total
ore
revenue
Aggregate
operating
result
Total
CIT
costs
Finlandb
Equity
(2014)c
Liabilities
(2014)d
Equity
ratioe
Thin
capitalized
(yes/no)f
Main
ore
Additional information
Hitura/
Belvedere
Resources
Ltd (Canada)
Belvedere Mining
Oy
1970 54.3 !1.6 0.0 !0.8 3.9 negative no nickel Production shutdown
since 2013 due to low
nickel price. Two other
subsidiaries in Finland.
Negative equity due to
losses.
Jokisivu and
Orivesi/
Dragon
Mining Ltd
(Australia)
Dragon Mining Oy 2009/2007 103.7 !27.6 0.0 !17.6 32.5 negative no gold Same company
operates two mines and
also a processing plant
in Sastamala. Negative
equity due to losses.
Kemi/
Outokumpu
Plc (Finland)
Outokumpu
Chrome Oy
1966 1213.7 195.0 0.0 120.7 534.3 18% no chrome Has offset proﬁts with
loss-making group
companies in Finland.
Stainless steel
production is
Outokumpu Plc's main
business.
Kevitsa/First
Quantum
FQM KH No. 1 Oy 2012 379.3 7.5 2.6 !133.9 954.3 negative yes copper See section 5.2 and
Table 2.
Minerals Ltd
(Canada)
Kevitsa Mining Oy !0.3 36.2
Kylylahti/
Altona
Mining Ltd
(Australia)
Kylylahti Copper
Oyg
2010 115.8 22.2 0.0 !27.4 95.7 negative yes copper Swedish Boliden AB
acquired the mine in
2014. Four other
subsidiaries in Finland.
Former Boliden
subsidiaries not
accounted.
Laiva/Nordic
Mines AB
(Sweden)
Nordic Mines Oy 2011 81.4 !111.4 0.0 12.7 30.7 29% no gold Production shutdown
since 2014 due to low
proﬁtability. Negative
equity due to losses.
Pahtavaara/
Lapland
Goldminers
AB (Sweden)
Lappland
Goldminers Oy
2008 61.1 n/a 0.0 n/a n/a n/a no gold Figures from the
Finnish subsidiary
missing, because of
bankruptcy early in
2014. Sales based on
parent company annual
reports 2011–2013.
Pampalo/
Endomines
AB (Sweden)
Endomines Oy 2011 82.0 !3.5 0.0 17.4 14.5 55% no gold One other subsidiary in
Finland.
Pyhäsalmi
(First
Quantum
Pyhäsalmi Mine
Oy
2001 629.7 303.7 71.5 118.5 49.8 70% yes copper See Section 5.3 and
Table 3.
Minerals Ltd
(Canada)
Inmet Finland Oy 614.1 179.9 77%
Suurikuusikko/
Agnico-
Eagle Mines
Ltd (Canada)
Agnico-Eagle
Finland Oy
2009 676.2 244.9 18.1 181.8 365.8 33% yes gold See Section 5.4 and
Table 4.
Talvivaara/
Talvivaaran
Kaivosos. Plc
(Finland)
Talvivaaran
Kaivososakeyhtiö
Plc
2008 464.1 !895.4 0.0 !729.9 741.2 negative no nickel Figures are based on
consolidated IFRS
accounts. The group has
one additional
company in Finland.
Bankrupt in 2014.
Total sales 3861.4 Total CIT 92.2 Total
CIT/
Sales
2.4 %
The ﬁgures are based on ﬁnancial accounts according to the Finnish GAAP with an exception of Talvivaara. The data is sourced from Orbis, ﬁnancial
statements and the Finnish Tax Administration.
a Only signiﬁcant subsidiaries listed.
b Includes all Finnish subsidiaries. Figures based on the Finnish tax administration ﬁgures. Kevitsa has paid no tax according to its ﬁnancial statements.
c Total additional depreciations are included in equity.
d Provisions are included in liabilities.
e The ratio was calculated by dividing the equity with the total liabilities and equity.
f Thin capitalized due to tax planning. Some companies were thin capitalized at least partially due to losses. See Section 5.4.
g Kylylahti Copper Oy's accounting period ends in June. Its name was changed to Boliden Kylylahti Oy in 2014.
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Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas). In 2014, the government also introduced a new rule limiting the intra-group
interest deductions (Business Tax Act x18a). Despite its proportional coverage, a study commissioned by the EU Commission
pointed out 12 loopholes in the Finnish tax legislation that facilitate tax avoidance (European Commission, 2016b). Our case
studies in Section 5 demonstrate how these loopholes are exploited in an interplay with the tax regimes of other countries
(see also e.g Altshuler and Grubert, 2005; Killian, 2006).13
4. Research methodology and the selection of the case enterprises
In contrast to the mainstream quantitative approach described in Section 2.1, we combined an industry-wide analysis of
ﬁnancial accounts accompanied with a multiple case study of MNEs that were particularly interesting in the light of our
research questions. The qualitative approach is useful in increasing understanding of complex social phenomena such as tax
planning and in allowing access to previously unknown observations (Yin, 2003). Moreover, the multiple case study
approach allows for highlighting the societal and legal factors behind tax-driven wealth chains in ways that quantitative
methods would not. The central idea of the multiple case study method is to constantly compare theory to the research
ﬁndings arising from the cases (Eisenhardt, 1989: 541).
Our approach differs from previous case studies (see Section 2.1) as we chose multiple enterprises based on a systematic
industry-wide screening instead of analyzing just a single case enterprise based on earlier media coverage or public inquiries
that have revealed the tax avoidance structures (Ting, 2014; Ylönen & Laine, 2015). The material consisted of both
consolidated and subsidiary level numeric ﬁnancial accounts and we complemented this with information from annual
reports. Our industry-wide approach accompanied with the three critical and revelatory cases (Yin, 2003: 42) provide
generalizable information (Yin, 2003: 53–54) on the difﬁculties that Finland faces in taxing its mining sector enterprises in
the sense that ‘if it happens there, it will happen everywhere’ (Patton, 1990: 174). By doing this, we open up new avenues for
qualitative generalization, which has received too little attention in the accounting research (Parker & Northcott, 2014).
The availability of the ﬁnancial statements of local subsidiaries in most European countries as well as that on taxable
income and taxes paid in Finland provided the starting point for the systematic selection of case studies. First, we acquired
publicly available ﬁnancial data of 2011–2013 from all enterprises mining metallic ores at the 12 mines operating in Finland
in 2013 (see Table 1). This data included not only the ﬁnancial statements of local subsidiaries but also stock exchange data,
such as the consolidated annual reports and a number of ﬁnancial statements of non-Finnish subsidiaries that were relevant
for the operations in Finland. We also utilized data from corporate websites and the Orbis database. To improve the validity of
our ﬁndings, we consequently also included ﬁnancial data from 2014 as it became available during the research process.
A preliminary screening of this data enabled us to obtain a reliable overall picture of the business models, corporate
structures, and the proﬁtability of the 12 mines. We chose the mines for case studies speciﬁcally based on two criteria. First,
we looked for companies whose actual business operations had been highly proﬁtable in Finland and therefore the
enterprise had an incentive to shift taxable proﬁts abroad.14 Second, we were interested in companies that appeared to have
thin capitalization arrangements based on the initial screening.15 This criteria allowed us to assess the external and internal
validity of the case studies so that they would provide relevant information on tax avoidance and its impact on wealth chains
(Yin, 2003: 34–35).
The screening revealed that six out of the eleven companies operating the mines failed to generate tax revenues because
they were unproﬁtable during the period and were therefore not interesting cases for in-depth studies16 (see Table 1). Two
have ﬁled for bankruptcy since then. Three out of the ﬁve proﬁtable mines (Kevitsa, Pyhäsalmi and Suurikuusikko, discussed
in Section 5) have generated corporate income tax (CIT) with Kevitsa doing so for the ﬁrst time in 2014. The Kylylahti mine
has been proﬁtable but generated no income tax due to high interest costs and being in the start-up phase. Based on this and
the fact that the mine was signiﬁcantly smaller compared to the other four proﬁtable mines we left it out of the ﬁnal sample.
We assume that the Kylylahti mine will pay income tax in the future. The ﬁfth proﬁtable mine (Kemi) was operated by the
loss-making Outokumpu Plc that was able to consolidate its mining proﬁts with the losses of other Finnish group companies.
As a result, Outokumpu lacked the motivation for cross-border proﬁt shifting and we excluded the mine from the case
studies.
Based on the screening of the ﬁnancial statements, we could preliminarily identify that the three remaining companies
were thinly capitalized due to tax planning (see Table 1) and therefore suitable for closer scrutiny.17 The three mines were
13 In June 2016, the Council of the EU adopted an anti-avoidance directive (EU/2016/1164) that incorporates rules proposed in the OECD BEPS action plan
for the legislation of the EU member states. In addition to the rules discussed above, the directive includes a switch-over clause to prevent double non-
taxation of certain income, an exit taxation rule to prevent companies from avoiding taxation when re-locating assets and a hybrid rule to prevent
companies from exploiting national mismatches to avoid taxation. These rules were not previously incorporated in the Finnish legislation, but other rules
such as the GAAR might have limited the use of such arrangements in some cases. Adoption of the directive would set a minimum legislation standard that
would close a few of the loopholes deliberately offered by some member states.
14 Operating margin positive.
15 High intra-group loans and/or interest costs.
16 The Orivesi and Jokisivu mines were both operated by a single company.
17 In addition to these three, we considered the Kylylahti mine to be thin capitalized due to tax planning reasons. These four thinly capitalized companies
belonged to either a Canadian or Australian MNE. Of the seven other mining companies, ﬁve had lost their equity at least partially due to losses and not only
because of tax planning. The last two companies that did not appear to be thinly capitalized belonged to a Finnish and Swedish mining enterprise.
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operated by two enterprises, Agnico Eagle Mines Ltd (AE) and First Quantum Minerals Ltd (FQM). A further justiﬁcation for
the case study selection was that the mines operated by AE and FQM had been operational for several years before 2014,
which enabled the assessment of tax implications over the lifetime of the mines with sufﬁcient data for the research. The
mines are the three largest metallic ore mines operated by foreign-based MNEs in Finland in terms of production as well as
proﬁts.
In undertaking the case studies, we analyzed the business activities at the three mines and the associated corporate
structures from the exploration phases until the end of 2014. We acquired the relevant ﬁnancial statements and annual
reports from 2001 when mining began at the ﬁrst of the three mines, the Pyhäsalmi mine. Based on this information, we
analyzed all acquisitions and restructurings related to the mines from a tax avoidance perspective. Therefore, the case
studies also involve enterprises that owned the mining rights earlier. The material revealed a number of foreign holding
companies and other subsidiaries related to the structures. We acquired the ﬁnancial statements of these subsidiaries as
well, when they were available. After completing the draft versions of the case studies, we strengthened their reliability by
sending the key ﬁndings to AE and FQM, which both veriﬁed the ﬁndings described in the next section.18
We discovered that the case enterprises thrived on tax savings using seven different types of arrangements that erode the
Finnish tax base. They were:
1. Using thin capitalization and intra-group loans to ﬁnance the local mining business (Sections 5.2–5.4)
2. Setting up a holding company that uses intra-group loans to purchase shares in the mining business in an intra-group
restructuring (Sections 5.2 and 5.3)
3. Using intra-group loans to ﬁnance separate investments abroad (Section 5.3)
4. Acquiring mining rights in an intra-group arrangement to gain tax-deductible depreciations and amortizations19
(Section 5.2)
5. Using a Swedish holding company to avoid the Finnish dividend tax at source and the transfer tax (Sections 5.2–5.4)
6. Offsetting proﬁts from one mine with losses from another mine or business using the Finnish group contribution system
(Sections 5.2–5.4)
7. Avoiding Finnish capital gains tax by entitling Finnish mining concessions to a foreign subsidiary (Section 5.2)
In the next section, we will discuss the case studies and tax avoidance arrangements in detail.
5. The case studies
5.1. How to read the case studies
The following sections discuss each of the case studies in three parts. We begin discussing each case by describing the
history of the operations at the mines, treating the MNE as a single unit (Biondi et al., 2007; Biondi, 2013). After this, we
discuss those arrangements that had tax effects. Finally, we proceed to analyze how these arrangements impacted tax
liabilities. Our main focus is on the CIT losses of the Finnish government as these ores are sourced from Finland. However, we
also brieﬂy discuss how the tax arrangements affect subsidiaries in countries where proﬁts are shifted, namely Barbados,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Unless otherwise stated, all ﬁnancial information and information on activities
are from consolidated annual reports (AR), annual information forms (AIF),20 and public ﬁnancial statements (FS) of the local
subsidiaries at issue. The complete list of the research material and other data used in the screening and research is in
Appendix A. Depending on the currency in the original source, the ﬁnancial ﬁgures are presented in either euros (s) or
United States dollars ($). The local ﬁnancial statements including those from Finland have been prepared according to local
accounting laws and the consolidated accounts according to the IFRS standard.
5.2. The FQM Kevitsa mine: tax planning by intra-group loans and holdings companies
5.2.1. Description of FQM and the Kevitsa mine
FQM is a Canadian mining and metals enterprise producing copper, nickel, gold, zinc, and platinum group elements.
Incorporated in 1983, the enterprise is publicly listed on the Toronto, London, and Lusaka stock exchanges. The parent
company, First Quantum Minerals Ltd, is incorporated in the Canadian province of British Columbia and has headquarters in
18 This was done while preparing a separate report published by a Finnish corporate responsibility research NGO Finnwatch. In the report, we presented
some of our factual ﬁndings on the tax arrangements. The original responses are available in full as annexes of the report (Finnwatch, 2016: 36–40).
19 Depreciations are regular decreases in tangible asset value, in contrast to amortizations that result in the decrease in value of intangibles. Both are costs
that decrease proﬁts and are usually deductible from taxable income. They are usually made schematically in relation to elapsed time in contrast to value
adjustments based on the observed value difference between the balance sheet and real asset value. The posterior write downs are also often tax-
deductible, but deferred compared to accounting.
20 Canadian publicly listed enterprises are required to submit speciﬁc annual information forms in addition to their annual reports.
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Vancouver. At the end of 2013, it directly or indirectly owned around 100 subsidiaries (FQM, AIF 2013).21 FQM operates the
Pyhäsalmi and Kevitsa mines in Finland. Its ﬁve other mines are located in Zambia, Mauritania, Spain, Australia, and Turkey.
In addition, FQM has four mine development projects in South America and Africa (FQM, AR 2015).
Kevitsa is an open-pit mine in northern Finland with large deposits of nickel, copper, cobalt, and platinum group
elements. The National Geological Survey of Finland ﬁrst discovered the deposits in 1987. After a short-lived development
attempt by the Finnish-based Outokumpu Plc., the Canadian-based Scandinavian Minerals Ltd.22 claimed the deposit in July
2000. In June 2008, FQM bought the mine development project by acquiring Scandinavian Minerals for a total purchase price
of $278 million (FQM AR, 2008). FQM then launched commercial ore production in August 2012. The mine employed 345
people in December 2014, and the total sales revenue for 2014 was s164 million. The mine is expected to deplete by 2042
(FQM, AR 2014).
5.2.2. Tax planning arrangements
When FQM acquired the mining concessions in 2008, they were held by Kevitsa Mining AB,23 a Swedish holding company
with no employees, directly owned by Scandinavian Minerals Ltd (see Fig. 1). In 2010, FQM transferred the concessions,
assets, and loans related to the mining business to a newfound Finnish subsidiary, FQM Kevitsa Mining Oy. Kevitsa Mining AB
received shares from FQM Kevitsa Mining Oy in return but paid no income tax in Sweden for the capital gains of s285 million
(Kevitsa Mining AB, FS 2010).24 Around the same time, FQM rearranged the corporate structure of Kevitsa business by adding
three holding companies to the group structure. Under the new structure, the Swedish-based FQM Kevitsa Sweden Holdings
AB was made the owner of the Finnish-based FQM Kevitsa Holding No.1 Oy, which owned the shares of FQM Kevitsa Holding
No. 2 Oy, which subsequently owned Kevitsa Mining AB. The Finnish exploration company, FQM FinnEx Oy, was also set up
(see Fig. 2).
5.2.3. The impact of the arrangements
The arrangement generated three types of future tax beneﬁts in Finland. First, FQM Kevitsa Mining Oy was entitled to
deduct the depreciations and amortizations of transferred assets from its taxable income. These assets amounted to a total of
s379 million at the end of 2010, out of which s287 million came from mining concessions. However, it is impossible to
estimate the total beneﬁt deriving from the depreciation and amortization because the ﬁnancial statements do not specify
their tax-deductible proportion.25 Second, FQM inserted a Swedish holding company, FQM Kevitsa Sweden Holdings AB,
between its Finnish subsidiaries and the Canadian parent. This created tax consequences as well, demonstrating the ability of
Fig. 1. The corporate structure of FQM Kevitsa mine before the restructurings as of December 31, 2008 (FQM, AIF 2008).
21 Of these, 20 were fully owned subsidiaries incorporated in traditional tax havens (IMF, 2000), such as the British Virgin Islands, where FQM has no
signiﬁcant business activity.
22 Then named Scandinavian Gold Ltd.
23 Named Scandinavian Gold Prospecting AB before the acquisition.
24 The EU Merger Directive (90/434/EEC) may provide a legal basis for this, as it exempts certain intra-group restructurings from tax. However, we were not
able conﬁrm this from the public accounts.
25 The mining concession depreciations may not be entirely tax-deductible if the transfer of assets to FQM Kevitsa Mining Oy was performed according to
the EU Merger Directive (90/434/EEC). In that case, the appreciation of the assets’ realized worth of approximately s287 would not be deductible as the
principle of continuity would be applied on a tax-deductible depreciation basis (The Business Tax Act, x52d).
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FQM to exploit the separate entity doctrine of corporate taxation (see Section 6). Had a Canadian company become the direct
owner of the Finnish subsidiaries, Finland would have levied a ﬁve percent withholding tax on the dividends paid to the
Canadian parent company (Finnish Tax Administration, 2014b). However, both Finland and Sweden are members of the EU,
and intra-group dividends paid to other EU member states are tax-exempt. The dividends paid from Sweden to Canada could
again be free from the Swedish withholding tax if they qualify for the Swedish participation exemption regime (Deloitte,
2014: 6).26 The use of a Swedish holding company could mean an exemption from the Finnish transfer tax in the event the
business is sold to a new owner (Finnish Tax Administration, 2015a).
Third, FQM was able to thin capitalize, or more precisely un-capitalize, the capital structure of its Finnish subsidiaries
with intra-group loans. There were two reasons for this. First, FQM Kevitsa Mining Oy received not only assets but also debts
in the rearrangement, most of them from intra-group companies. These were worth s87 million at the end of 2010. Since
then, the company has ﬁnanced its mining investments with similar loans, thus increasing the total amount of loans to s547
million in 2014. Second, FQM Kevitsa Holding No. 1 Oy used intra-group loans of s275 million to purchase shares in its
subsidiary FQM Kevitsa Holding No. 2 Oy in the intra-group restructuring. The interest costs have increased these debts to
s394 million by the end of 2014, with the company assuming a consolidated negative equity of s134 million with its Finnish
subsidiaries (see next paragraph). These un-capitalization arrangements exemplify the separation of ﬁctional intra-ﬁrm
wealth chains from the actual value chains, as well as the ways MNEs can reorganize their property for withstanding
demands from the governments of the countries where they operate (see Section 6.3).
FQM has had ﬁve subsidiaries in Finland, four of which are related to the Kevitsa mine, with the ﬁfth engaged in
unproﬁtable exploration activities. Considering that the Finnish group contribution system allows FQM to consolidate the
taxable results of the subsidiaries, we considered them together as a sub-group when analyzing their capital structure and
tax implications.27 Moreover, FQM Kevitsa Holding No. 1 Oy consolidates its sub-group accounts in its ﬁnancial statements.
These consolidated accounts include all the other Finnish subsidiaries with the exception of Kevitsa Mining Oy (see Fig. 2).
The consolidated accounts also include the Swedish-based Kevitsa Mining AB, but this has no signiﬁcant impact on the
consolidated ﬁgures as it is essentially a sub-group holding company with no signiﬁcant transactions or assets outside the
group. Both the FQM Kevitsa Holding No. 1 Oy sub-group and the Kevitsa Mining Oy have had negative equity in the period
2011–2014. Both of them are also ﬁnanced entirely by intra-group loans. The loans of the FQM Kevitsa Holding No. 1 Oy sub-
group totaled at s924 million at the end of 2014, and s36 million for Kevitsa Mining Oy. In comparison, the FQM group relied
much less on debt ﬁnancing, with a rather high equity ratio between 50 and 71% in the same period.28
While it seems evident that the Finnish subsidiaries were un-capitalized, the great annual variation in the intra-group
ﬁnancing costs of Kevitsa Holding No. 1 Oy complicates the assessment of the tax losses (see Table 2). Moreover, some
subsidiaries have substantial intra-group ﬁnancial income with no ﬁnancial assets. We were unable to ﬁnd an explanation
for this from the ﬁnancial statements, but the net effect of varying ﬁnancial costs and income appears to stabilize over time.
Acknowledging the limitations, we estimate that Kevitsa’s thin capitalization arrangements has resulted in a CIT loss of s13
million for Finland by the end of 2014 (see Table 2 for calculations). We also maintain that the arrangements have
signiﬁcantly decreased the overall tax costs for FQM.29 At the time of writing, Kevitsa had not generated any tax income for
Finland even though the consolidated accounts show that the business has been proﬁtable from the beginning of commercial
production in 2012. In 2014, sales revenue from Kevitsa increased to $271.4 million from $197.6 the year before. Meanwhile,
earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization increased from $56 million to $93 million (FQM, AR 2013–
2014). Should the Kevitsa operations remain proﬁtable, the total net tax effects of the arrangement could mean dozens or
even hundreds of millions of euros over the mine’s lifetime. The future tax decrease is naturally subject to any major changes
in the tax legislation.
The mining concessions were initially entitled to a Swedish subsidiary and were classiﬁed as intangible rights for tax
purposes. Therefore, the Finnish Income Tax Act (x9 & x10) and the Nordic Tax Convention (Art. 6 & 13) would have most
likely restrained Finland from taxing the capital gains of roughly s287 million from the immaterial rights even though the
gains arose from the mine development in Finland.30 The conclusion is subject to the condition that the rights did not belong
to a permanent establishment in Finland, which seems unlikely in the given situation.
5.2.4. Summary of tax avoidance arrangements
FQM employed four different tax planning techniques at the Kevitsa mine. First, it made two separate arrangements to
un-capitalize the Finnish mining business. (1) It used intra-group loans to ﬁnance the mining investments; and (2) it set up a
26 The participation exemption is generally meant to exempt intra-group payments from withholding tax to prevent the economic and judicial double
taxation of corporate groups.
27 Finland has limited the deductibility of certain intra-group interests from 2014 onwards (The Business Tax Act, x18a). This might have resulted in a
corporate restructuring as four of FQM’s subsidiaries in Finland merged into one at the end of 2014. The economic effects of the limitation are included in the
2014 ﬁgures.
28 The ratio was calculated with balance sheet ﬁgures by dividing the total shareholder equity with the total liabilities and equity.
29 Shifting proﬁts abroad with interests will consequently lower the effective tax rate for FQM as a whole in case the interests are paid to a lower tax
jurisdiction. We were not able to track the recipient company of the intra-group interests. However, the ﬁnance company closest in the group structure is
incorporated in Barbados, which offers 0.25–2.5% tax rate for some MNEs (Deloitte, 2015).
30 See footnote 24 on the merger directive.
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Table 2
Essential Kevitsa ﬁgures 2011 –2014.
FQM Finnish
subsidiary
Revenue Mining rights
depreciation
Operating
proﬁt/lossa
Intra-gr.
ﬁnancial
incomeb
Intra-group
ﬁnancial costs
Other
ﬁnancial
costs
Group
contribution
CIT
costs
Proﬁt/
loss
Financial
liabilities
Intra-group
ﬁnancial
liabilities
Total
equity
Total
liabilities
Finnish tax
loss estimatec
FQM Group
equity ratiod
2011 (s million)
Kevitsa Mining
Oy
3.7 0.0 2.0 1.7 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 34.3 34.3 !1.4 34.6 0.1 69%
FQM Kevitsa
Holding No 1
Oy
(consolidated)e
0.0 0.0 !13.8 37.1 60.9 35.0 0.0 0.0 !56.1 653.9 653.9 !59.7 696.8 3.3
2012 (s million)
Kevitsa Mining
Oy
1.3 0.0 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 34.7 34.7 !0.2 34.8 !0.1 71%
FQM Kevitsa
Holding No 1
Oy
(consolidated)e
84.3 4.5 6.6 13.5 30.9 1.5 0.0 0.0 !16.8 837.2 837.2 !76.5 867.9 2.5
2013 (s million)
Kevitsa Mining
Oy
1.2 0.0 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.0 !0.8 0.0 !0.2 33.5 33.5 !0.3 33.8 0.0 52%
FQM Kevitsa
Holding No 1
Oy
(consolidated)e
130.6 9.3 2.5 50.6 38.8 5.7 0.8 0.0 2.1 865.7 865.7 !74.5 897.7 !1.2
2014 (s million)
Kevitsa Mining
Oy
1.2 0.0 0.5 0.0 2.6 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.1 30.1 30.1 !0.3 36.2 0.3 50%
FQM Kevitsa
Holding No 1
Oy
(consolidated)e
164.4 11.7 37.7 67.7 148.8 2.1 !2.2 0.0 !59.4 924.1 924.1 !133.9 954.3 8.1
Total 386.8 36.8 171.7 284.9 44.3 0.0 0.0 !127.7 12.9
The ﬁgures are based on the Finnish ﬁnancial accounts prepared according to the Finnish GAAP (but see "d"). The Finnish CIT is calculated according to the Finnish GAAP.
a Mining rights depreciation not included, since it is not necessarily tax deductible (see Section 5.2.2).
b The source of the ﬁnancial income is not speciﬁed on the accounts. There are no ﬁnancial assets in Finland, which indicates the income should not be interest. Nearly all of the ﬁnancial income is intra-group since
2012. FQM Kevitsa Holding No 1 Oy other ﬁnancial income s16.5 million in 2011.
c Includes only estimated tax losses due to thin capitalization due to the difﬁculties in the estimation of other tax effects (see Section 5.2.2). The estimate is based on net intra-group ﬁnance costs, Finnish 20% tax
rate in 2014 and the difference between equity ratio (negative each year = 0%) in Finland and the FQM’s consolidated equity ratio. The 2014 tax rate is used for all years since FQMwas not liable for tax before 2014.
Formula: intra-group ﬁnancial costs less ﬁnancial income x equity ratio diffence (%) x Finnish CIT rate 2014 (20%).
d The ratio was calculated based on the FQM's consolidated annual reports' ﬁgures by dividing the total shareholder’s equity with total liabilities and equity.
e FQM Kevitsa Holding No 1 Oy ﬁgures are based on consolidated sub-group accounts (see Fig. 2). They include Finnish FQM Kevitsa Holding No 1 Oy, FQM Kevitsa Holding No 2 Oy, FQM Kevitsa Mining Oy, FQM
FinnEX Oy and a Swedish Kevitsa Mining AB. The Swedish subsidiary has no signiﬁcant effect on the consolidated ﬁgures as it is a sub-group holding company with no signiﬁcant transactions or assets outside the
group. The revenue represents ore sales of Kevitsa. Commercial production began only in August 2012. FQMKevitsa Holding No 1Oy income taxs2,6million according to the Finnish Tax Administration data base. No
income tax costs on ﬁnancial statements.
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holding company that used intra-group loans to purchase shares in the mining business in an intra-group restructuring. The
latter structure was made possible by the Finnish group contribution regime, which allowed FQM to offset the losses of the
holding company with the proﬁts of mining business. (3) In addition, FQM acquired mining rights to Finnish subsidiary in an
intra-group arrangement where it gained tax-deductible depreciations and amortizations. The Swedish subsidiary that sold
the rights also avoided capital gains tax in Finland. (4) Finally, FQM used a Swedish holding company to avoid the Finnish
dividend tax at source and the transfer tax if the mine is sold.
5.3. The FQM (Inmet) Pyhäsalmi mine: tax planning by structuring foreign investments
5.3.1. Description of the Pyhäsalmi mine
Located in central Finland, Pyhäsalmi is a copper and zinc mine originally founded by Outokumpu Plc, which had
exploited the upper part of the deposit from 1962 until its depletion in 2001. In 1996, Outokumpu discovered another deeper
deposit and began mining operations there in July 2001. The lower part is expected to deplete by 2019. In March 2002,
Outokumpu sold the mine to the Canadian Inmet Mining Corporation (Inmet) for s63 million. Out of this sum, s45 million
was paid in cash, s14 million with a promissory note, and s4 million in Inmet shares (Inmet, AR 2002). Finally, FQM acquired
Inmet in a hostile takeover in March 2013. With a total purchase price of $4818 million, FQM also gained ownership of two
other mines in Spain and Turkey and a mine development project in Panama (FQM, AR 2013). After the acquisition, FQM is
able to offset losses in Kevitsa against the proﬁts in Pyhäsalmi. The Pyhäsalmi mine employed 232 people in 2014, and the
total sales revenue for the year was s148 million. The operating proﬁt varied between s56 and s98 million, with an
operating margin of 38–57% in 2011–2014. The annual ore production and sales have remained relatively stable (see Table 3).
5.3.2. Tax planning arrangements
In July 2001, when Outokumpu began exploiting the lower deposit, the operations started under a newly established
subsidiary, Pyhäsalmi Mine Oy. When Inmet acquired the mine in March 2002, the shares of Pyhäsalmi Mine Oy were
entitled to FQM’s new Finnish subsidiary, Inmet Finland Oy, directly owned by the Canadian parent company (see Fig. 3).
Pyhäsalmi Mine Oy’s shares were valued at s33 million on the 2002 balance sheet of Inmet Finland Oy. Initially, most of the
ﬁnancing needs of Inmet Finland Oy were served by an intra-group loan worth s46 million. The annual intra-group interest
costs were s3–6 million until 2005 (see Table 3). Moreover, in August 2005, Inmet acquired a 70% interest in the Spanish
Cobre las Cruces mining project from MK Resources Company (Inmet Finland, FS 2006). From a business perspective, the
acquisition was separate from the Pyhäsalmi project. However, the way in which Inmet structured the acquisitions had
signiﬁcant effects on the Finnish CIT paid for the Pyhäsalmi’s mining proﬁts (see Fig. 4).
5.3.3. The impact of arrangements
First, Inmet incorporated a Swedish holding company, Inmet Sweden Holdings AB, which then acquired Inmet Finland
Oy’s shares from its Canadian parent in 2006. The Swedish participation exemption regime allows Inmet to repatriate the
Finnish mining proﬁts to Canada with no withholding tax (see Section 5.2). Second, the Finnish interest costs rose
dramatically as the shares of the Cobre las Cruces project were transferred to Inmet Finland Oy. This was done indirectly
through two Dutch subsidiaries in 2005 and 2006, respectively (Inmet Finland Oy, AR 2006). Again, the acquisitions were
funded primarily with intra-group loans. As a result, the total amount of Inmet Finland Oy’s loans increased to s116 million
in 2006, which generated yearly tax-deductible intra-group interest costs in Finland up to s10–15 million between 2006 and
2010 (see Table 3).
In the meantime, the mining operations at Pyhäsalmi remained extremely proﬁtable, and Pyhäsalmi Mine Oy transferred
these proﬁts to Inmet Finland Oy as group contributions (see Table 3). However, the proﬁts were not used for investments or
loan repayments. Instead, each year, Inmet Finland Oy paid out nearly all proﬁts as dividends, thus maintaining its poor
solvency and high tax-deductible interest costs. Between 2006 and 2010, the total amount of dividends was s204 million,
almost twice as much as the value of the intra-group loans (see Table 3). The Inmet group as a whole was mostly funded with
equity instead of loans. The group’s year-end equity ratio was between 56 and 90% in 2002–2012. In December 2010, Inmet
acquired the remaining 30% of shares in the Cobre las Cruces project from MK Resources. The shares were initially assets of
Inmet Sweden Holdings AB through a Dutch holding company. In early 2011, the shares were again sold to a newly
established Finnish subsidiary, CLC Holdings Oy. The restructuring doubled Inmet Finland Oy’s intra-group loans to s268
million (Inmet Finland Oy, AR 2011).
All intra-group loans after 2011 were issued by a Luxembourgian ﬁnance company, Inmet Finance Company S.à.r.l., which
received a total of s37 million in interest income from Inmet Finland Oy in 2011–2014. The interest costs have been declining
because of partial loan repayments and decreasing interest rates.31 Inmet Finance Company S.à.r.l. was also used to ﬁnance
the Cobre las Cruces project in Spain with loans arranged through two Dutch holding companies. The interest income helped
the company generate a total proﬁt of s116 million in 2010–2013, and it paid no income tax for these proﬁts. Inmet Finance
Company S.à.r.l. is in ﬁscal unity with a Luxembourgian branch of Inmet called Inmet Luxembourg, which has no signiﬁcant
business activity. Its total corporate income tax expenses were below s1 million in 2010–2013. Therefore, Inmet paid less
31 The interest rate was ﬁxed to Euribor for 3 months.
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than one percent income tax for the proﬁts it generated in Luxembourg. What is more, Inmet managed to gain these tax
beneﬁts with no employees in the country (Inmet Finance Company S.à.r.l., FS 2010–2013; Inmet Luxembourg, FS 2010–
2013).
The acquisition of the Pyhäsalmi mine turned out to be a major success. In 2002–2014, its sales were s1554 million, with
an operating proﬁt of s764 million, which can be compared to the acquisition cost of less than s70 million (see Table 3).
During the same period, Inmet Finland Oy paid out s594 million in dividends and s116 million in intra-group interests that
reduced the CIT. The interest costs reduced Finland’s tax income by roughly s20 million, which accounted for 12% of the
s170 million total CIT paid in Finland (see Table 3). Moreover, Finland received no withholding tax income from the
dividends since these were paid through the Swedish holding company. Had the dividends been paid directly to the Canadian
parent instead, Finland would have received a withholding tax income of s30 million according to the ﬁve percent rate in the
tax convention (Art. 10) between the two countries (see Table 3).
We maintain that the majority of the tax losses resulted from artiﬁcial arrangements since Inmet had no employees in
Sweden and the cash ﬂow from mineral sales would have sufﬁced to ﬁnance the Pyhäsalmi mining operations. Because of the
interest expenses, the aggregated effective tax rate from the Pyhäsalmi operations was just 22% in 2002–2014, a period
during which the Finnish tax rate was gradually lowered from 29% to 20% in 2014 (see Table 3). Inmet’s 2011 Annual Report
(p. 31) supports this observation by stating that in Pyhäsalmi, ‘tax recovery from intergroup loans’ has lowered its effective
tax rate to three percent below the Finnish statutory rate in 2010 and 2011. Similar arrangements at the Cobre las Cruces mine
have resulted in even more dramatic results as the effective tax rate in Spain decreased by 15% in 2011 and by 22% in the
previous year. Out of the variety of tax arrangements employed by FQM, the thin capitalization structure at the Pyhäsalmi
mine is the closest to a textbook example on how large enterprises are able to differentiate their value chains from their
wealth chains, not least because the questionable tax incentives granted by Luxembourg (European Commission, 2015a;
Marian, 2016b).
5.3.4. Summary of the tax avoidance arrangements
Inmet employed ﬁve tax planning techniques at the Pyhäsalmi mine. First, it made three separate arrangements to thin
capitalize the Finnish mining business. (1) It used intra-group loans to ﬁnance the mining investments; (2) it set up a holding
company, which used intra-group loans to purchase shares in the mining business in an intra-group restructuring; and (3) it
used intra-group loans to ﬁnance separate investment in Spain. The Finnish group contribution regime allowed it to offset
the losses of the holding company with the proﬁts of the mining business. (4) Moreover, Inmet acquired the mining rights to
Finnish subsidiary in an intra-group arrangement where it gained tax-deductible depreciations and amortizations. The
Table 3
Essential Pyhäsalmi ﬁgures 2002 –2014 (s million).
Year Revenue
(PM Oy)
Operating
proﬁt (PM
Oy)
Group
contribution
to Inmet
Finland Oy
(PM Oy)
CIT
costs
Finland
(PM Oy)
Net
proﬁt
(PM
Oy)a
Intra
group
interest
costs (IF
Oy)b
CIT
costs
Finland
(IF Oy)
Net
proﬁt/
loss
(IF
Oy)c
Dividend
paid (IF
Oy)
Finnish
tax loss
due to
interest
costsd
Finnish tax
loss due to
no
witholding
tax on
dividende
CIT/
Revenue
(%)
CIT/PM
Oy
operating
proﬁt (%)
Equity
ratio of
Inmet/
FQMf
CIT rate
Finland
2002 51.8 8.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 3.5 0.0 !1.2 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.5% 3.2% 69% 29.0%
2003 54.7 11.4 4.9 1.0 2.4 4.3 1.4 4.7 0.0 0.8 0.0 4.4% 21.2% 64% 29.0%
2004 72.1 26.2 19.6 0.1 0.6 4.3 5.3 12.9 1.9 0.7 0.1 7.5% 20.6% 59% 29.0%
2005 87.9 43.3 36.0 0.6 1.1 5.7 8.7 24.7 0.0 1.0 0.0 10.5% 21.4% 67% 26.0%
2006 146.6 96.8 91.0 0.5 1.0 12.2 21.3 60.5 28.0 2.2 1.4 14.9% 22.5% 70% 26.0%
2007 143.7 93.3 92.0 0.5 0.8 15.1 20.1 57.2 70.0 2.7 3.5 14.3% 22.1% 68% 26.0%
2008 121.1 58.5 55.0 1.4 3.4 13.5 10.8 30.5 58.0 2.3 2.9 10.1% 20.8% 66% 26.0%
2009 93.5 36.5 32.0 1.0 2.4 10.5 5.4 15.4 30.0 2.1 1.5 6.9% 17.6% 77% 26.0%
2010 152.5 86.4 82.0 0.9 1.9 9.2 18.7 53.3 16.7 2.0 0.8 12.8% 22.7% 84% 26.0%
2011 169.9 97.1 95.0 2.5 2.9 13.6 21.0 59.7 53.3 3.2 2.7 13.8% 24.2% 90% 26.0%
2012 159.4 82.9 79.0 1.9 2.3 10.3 17.0 52.3 25.0 1.4 1.3 11.8% 22.8% 56% 24.5%
2013 152.9 67.1 63.0 1.9 2.1 6.8 13.9 42.8 181.4 0.9 9.1 10.3% 23.5% 52% 24.5%
2014 147.6 56.6 65.0 1.5 2.3 6.7 12.2 48.8 129.9 0.7 6.5 9.3% 24.2% 50% 20.0%
Total 1553.8 764.2 714.5 14.0 23.3 115.6 155.7 461.6 594.2 20.7 29.7 10.9% 22.2%
The ﬁgures of Pyhäsalmi Mine Oy (PM Oy) and Inmet Finland Oy (IF Oy) are based on Finnish ﬁnancial accounts prepared according to the Finnish GAAP. The
ﬁgures from 2002 to 2003 are from the original ﬁnancial statemements. Other ﬁgures are fetched from the Orbis database. Inmet/FQM has had a third
subsidiary called CLC Holdings Oy in Finland since 2011. The subsidiary has not had signiﬁcant income or costs.
a Total net ﬁnance costs of PM Oy in 2002–2014 were s9.4 million. There are also minor differences between tax and accounting depreciations.
b Most of the ﬁnancial costs are intra-group interests. No signiﬁcant ﬁnancial income.
c IF Oy was a holding company with no operating business activity (total net operating proﬁt s0.1 million in 2011–2014).
d The formula for calculating the tax losses: IF Oy intra-group interest costs x Finnish CIT% x Inmet/FQM equity ratio.
e The witholding tax had been ﬁve percent, if it had been paid directly to a Canadian parent company (see Section 5.3.3).
f The ratio was calculated by dividing the total shareholder’s equity with total liabilities and equity. The 2003–2012 ﬁgures are based on the Orbis
database. The 2002 ﬁgure was calculated based on Inmet annual report and the ﬁgures for 2013–2014 are based on the FQM's annual report as FQM acquired
Inmet in 2013.
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Swedish subsidiary that sold the rights also avoided capital gains tax in Finland. Related to this, (5) Inmet used a Swedish
holding company to avoid the Finnish dividend tax at source and the transfer tax, which is payable if the mine is sold.
5.4. The AE Suurikuusikko mine: tax planning by thin capitalization and a Swedish holding company
5.4.1. Description of AE and the Suurikuusikko mine
Agnico Eagle Mines Ltd. (AE) is a Canadian gold and silver company listed in the Toronto and New York stock exchanges. It
operates eight mines in Canada, Finland, and Mexico. The Suurikuusikko gold deposit was discovered in 1986 by the National
Geological Survey of Finland, which began developing the project. In 1997, the Finnish government held an auction for the
mining rights. Riddarhyttan Resources AB, a newly established exploration company listed in the Stockholm stock exchange,
won the auction and continued developing the project. The sale price was s0.2 million, and Riddarhyttan Resources AB
agreed to pay a two percent royalty based on the revenue less processing costs (AE, AR 2013). The royalty agreement also
binds Riddarhyttan Resources AB’s successors in Suurikuusikko after the ﬁrst year of production. Suurikuusikko was the only
signiﬁcant asset of Riddarhyttan Resources AB when AE purchased a 14% minority share in the company in 2004. In 2005 and
2006, AE completed its ﬁrst foreign acquisition by acquiring the remainder of the Riddarhyttan Resources AB shares with
10,023,882 of its own shares and $5 million in cash. AE ﬁnalized the development and began commercial production at
Suurikuusikko in 2009. The mine is expected to operate until 2036.
5.4.2. The tax planning arrangements
The Canadian parent company initially owned the shares in Riddarhyttan Resources. However, in November 2005, AE set
up a Swedish holding company, Agnico-Eagle Sweden AB, which purchased the shares from its parent for SEK 1335 million
(s145 million). Simultaneously, Riddarhyttan was delisted from the Stockholm stock exchange. At the time of the
acquisition, Riddarhyttan Resources AB’s Swedish subsidiary Agnico-Eagle AB owned the Suurikuusikko mining rights, and
its permanent establishment in Finland began the mining activities in 2009. In early 2010, AE transferred the mining
business to a new Finnish subsidiary called Agnico-Eagle Finland Oy. Moreover, the corporate and ﬁnance structures went
through a major reorganization (see Fig. 5). Agnico-Eagle Sweden AB’s shares were transferred to a Dutch cooperative,
Agnico-Eagle Mines Sweden Coöperatie U.A., which was founded in late 2009. Since then, the cooperative has granted intra-
group loans to fund mining investments in Finland. In addition, AE established a ﬁnance subsidiary in Barbados, which lends
the cooperative funds for ﬁnancing business in Finland (Agnico-Eagle Mines Sweden Coöperatie U.A., FS 2011–2013). These
restructurings created two tax consequences.
5.4.3. The impact of the arrangements
The Swedish participation exemption regime enables AE to repatriate proﬁts from Finland to Canada without paying any
withholding tax (see Section 5.2). Because of this, AE was able to avoid s3 million of dividend withholding tax in Finland.
Since 2010, Agnico-Eagle Finland Oy has been ﬁnanced primarily with loans from the Dutch cooperative. The loans totaled
s224 million at the end of 2010 and increased to s318 million by 2014. In the same year, Agnico-Eagle Finland Oy paid out
s46 million in dividends. In the period 2011–2014, the yearly intra-group interest costs amounted to s18–22 million
(Agnico-Eagle Finland Oy, FS 2011–2014).32 According to Dutch law, cooperatives are not entitled to pay taxes on interest
income (Blom & Viëtor, 2009). The equity ratio of Agnico-Eagle Finland Oy was 32% at the end of 2014. In comparison, the AE
group relied on equity ﬁnancing with a rather high consolidated equity ratio of 59% at the end of 2014 (AE, AR 2013). The
situation has remained similar since 2009 (see Table 4). Therefore, we maintain that the arrangement aimed to lower AE’s tax
burden. We estimate that the thin capitalization-related tax savings totaled s10 million in the period 2009–2014. Without
ﬁnancial records from Barbados, we could not assess whether AE paid taxes there. However, in the case it has paid any taxes
in Barbados, the tax rate has likely been low due to tax incentives.30
Since the beginning of 2009, Agnico-Eagle Finland Oy’s operations in Suurikuusikko have been highly proﬁtable. The total
sales revenue was at it its peak, s190 million, in 2013, decreasing to s138 million a year later. In 2011–2014, the operating
proﬁt varied between s14–96 million while the operating margin was 10–42%. However, loan arrangements, depreciations
and amortizations from initial investments exempted the company from paying taxes in Finland until 2012. Altogether, AE
has paid a CIT of s18 million in Finland out of an operating proﬁt of s265 million in the period 2010–2014 (see Table 4).
The separate entity doctrine grants MNEs much freedom to design the capital structure of their individual investments.
They can do this regardless of their external funding needs and consolidated group capital structure by using internal ﬁnance
companies to channel the funding (Feld, Heckemeyer, & Overesch, 2013). Instead of using external debt funding AE used a
low tax Dutch cooperative and a Barbadian ﬁnance company to fund the Finnish operations. Nevertheless, the AE group
companies were in joint liability for the group’s external funding (e.g., Agnico-Eagle Finland Oy, FS 2011–2013), but the
equity ratio in Finland was approximately half compared to the ratio of the AE group in the period 2009–2014.
32 The interest rate of the loans has been ﬁxed at 7.42%, which can be compared to the rates of 4.87–6.67% in unsecured bonds that the AE group has offered
to third parties.
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5.4.4. Summary of the tax avoidance arrangements
AE employed two different tax planning techniques at the Suurikuusikko mine. First, it used intra-group loans to ﬁnance
the mining investments. Second, AE used a Swedish holding company to avoid the Finnish dividend tax at source and the
transfer tax, which is payable if the mine is sold.
6. Discussion and implications for further research
6.1. Tax avoidance strategies
Having introduced the three case studies, in this section we discuss their signiﬁcance. By combining ﬁnancial data from
various sources, we have answered calls to overcome the lack of information on tax shelters (Graham & Tucker, 2006: 565)
and to incorporate a creative use of data sources (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010: 157) in order to examine how accounting
techniques re-allocate wealth (Sikka & Willmott, 2010: 353). Our article presents the ﬁrst multiple case study on corporate
tax planning that draws from a systematic industry-wide screening to select speciﬁc MNEs for closer examination. Moreover,
we believe the ﬁndings open up new avenues for further research. The initial screening of ﬁnancial statements of all mining
companies operating in Finland gave us a clear indication for choosing the mines for closer examination.
The analysis of the three Finnish mines operated by First Quantum Minerals Ltd and Agnico Eagle Ltd revealed seven
different tax arrangements that the Canadian MNEs utilized to lower their taxes in Finland (see Sections 4 and 5). Both of the
enterprises resorted to thin capitalization with three different techniques. AE ﬁnanced its investments in the Suurikuusikko
mine with a rather typical intra-group debt arrangement from a low-tax jurisdiction. FQM employed a similar structure in its
Kevitsa mine but was also able to un-capitalize its Finnish subsidiaries with a holding company that used intra-group debts
to purchase shares in the mining business. In the Pyhäsalmi mine, Inmet and FQM were able to shift proﬁts abroad by using a
Finnish holding company for a separate mine investment in Spain.
Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber, and Wamser (2012: 930) maintain that the lack of studies on the effectiveness of thin
capitalization rules is surprising. We share this sentiment and believe that our case studies can help to steer future research
on thin capitalization.33 Analyzing the nuances of thin capitalization arrangements is important from a tax policy
perspective, as tackling different types of arrangements call for different types of legal measures. Traditional thin
capitalization rules limiting the tax-deductible share of interest are generally sufﬁcient to intervene with the traditional thin
capitalization that AE used, which purely resorts to the excess use of debt funding for local investments (Blouin, Huizinga,
Laeven, & Nicodéme, 2014). However, FQM used also two different techniques to artiﬁcially create debt and consequently
tax-deductible interests by (1) intra-group acquisitions and (2) shifting debts that ﬁnanced separate investments in Spain to
Finland. In these cases, the whole interest cost could be considered excess, since the debt was not used to ﬁnance the
investment in Finland even though the interest costs reduced taxable proﬁt there. Therefore, traditional thin capitalization
rules that usually allow a deductible share of interest should be complemented with speciﬁc legislation to tackle these
arrangements. One option for this would be disallowing the use of group relief in situations where it is used to exploit
artiﬁcially created interest costs.
The importance of understanding the nuances also applies to intellectual property rights, which have been discussed in
the context of ‘research and development activity’ (Dharmapala, 2008: 667) in the form of patents (Graham & Tucker, 2006:
573), trademarks (Rixen, 2010: 18), and other R&D related rights (Grubert, 2003) – but to the best of our knowledge not in
relation to extractive industries. We were able to identify how mining concessions can be used to shift proﬁts away from the
location country of a mine (see Section 5.2.3). We also showed how the EU Parent-Subsidiary directive, which is meant to
prevent economic double taxation within EU, in fact facilitates tax avoidance as it can also be used to channel proﬁts outside
the EU without paying a withholding tax by using Swedish holding companies.34 Both of the Canadian enterprises used this
technique.
Another striking feature regarding the tax avoidance arrangements in our case studies was the unimportance of low
statutory corporate income tax rates in proﬁt shifting destinations. Speciﬁc tax incentives in both Luxembourg and Sweden
were used to minimize taxes as the statutory tax rates in these countries were close to the global average or even higher.35
This ﬁnding is particularly important given that the dominant quantitative research tradition has largely relied on the
presumption that differences in statutory corporate income tax rates are the driving force of tax avoidance. In next
subsection we discuss how this brings into question the reliability of the empirical data in the quantitative tax avoidance
research (see also Section 2.1).
The territorial tax system in Canada allowed AE and FQM to beneﬁt from their tax avoidance abroad. If they had been
based instead in the United States, the beneﬁt would have diminished when the proﬁts had been repatriated since the lower
33 As for example, we believe that Finland would be an interesting case for quantitative studies as it introduced limitations on the deductibility of intra-
group interests in 2014 (Business Tax Act, x18a).
34 Similar ’participation exemption shopping’ has been previously discussed in relation to the German tax regime (Broemel, 2016).
35 The statutory rate in Luxembourg was 29.22% in 2014 and 22% in Sweden (KPMG, 2016). According to KPMG, the global average was 23.87%.
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taxes abroad would mutually result in a lower tax credit from the taxes paid out from the dividends in the United States.36 In
a territorial system, such as that in Canada and all other developed countries, the proﬁts of foreign subsidiaries and dividends
paid out from them would be generally tax exempt. Previous quantitative tax research has not paid enough attention to the
impact of the differences between the U.S. worldwide tax regime and the territorial tax regimes elsewhere.
6.2. Methodological issues
For the most part, the impact of tax avoidance has been studied quantitatively, using econometric methods. Our cases
studies highlight several problems related to data and to the presumptions of these studies, bringing into question the
reliability of the approach (see Section 2.1).37 Much of this research makes presumptions about the role of statutory tax rates
in tax avoidance, but we show that this is not the only consideration that matters within the ﬁeld. We also suggest that the
reliability of the data used in the studies is often questionable. Due to the lack of public data, quantitative research has tended
to rely on databases that do not include information from many of the countries used in tax avoidance. In our case studies, we
discovered that subsidiaries registered in countries such as Barbados and Luxembourg were used as proﬁt shifting
destinations. The ﬁnancial statements of these subsidiaries were not included in the Orbis database, as is generally the case
for any ﬁnancial statements of local subsidiaries in these countries. The lack of data in this most widely used database for
quantitative corporate tax research is not limited to secrecy jurisdictions, as ﬁnancial statements of separate entities are
usually not available anywhere outside Europe.38 We could not retrieve the accounts of parent entities in Canada even when
the enterprises were listed on the stock exchange there, because Canada only requires the publication of consolidated
accounts. This lack of data was just one of the issues we discussed in Section 2.1, which reduces the reliability of research
based on Orbis and other databases widely used in tax avoidance research.
In order to conduct generalizable research on tax avoidance, systematic selection of the research material and questions is
of paramount importance. Previous qualitative case studies that have only covered individual enterprises and have drawn
from sporadic datasets based on court cases or exposures in the media give very little grounds for generalization. We believe
our approach helps to form a new methodological terrain, as this is the ﬁrst qualitative case study on corporate tax avoidance
that has been based on a systematic, industry-wide analysis of ﬁnancial accounts. As such, we hope that the article paves way
for further similar studies, and that it also helps to develope quantitative methodological approaches as we argued in the
previous subsection.
6.3. Global wealth chains
Our qualitative research method provided detailed information on tax avoidance arrangements and allowed us to
research tax avoidance it in the context of the broader global political economy. Mine exploration is often conducted by
separate enterprises that sell the rights to mining enterprises for further development, as demonstrated by our case studies.
The location country of the mine might not tax the capital gain if the ownership of the mining rights has been entitled to a
foreign company.39 However, for example in Finland the purchasing enterprise is usually able to deduct the amortizations of
the rights, if they are entitled to a Finnish subsidiary (OECD, 2014; Model Tax Convention, Art. 9; Business Tax Act, x24). This
was evident in the Kevitsa case study, where we demonstrated how FQM could avoid Finnish capital gains tax by entitling the
immaterial mining rights to a foreign subsidiary. This issue has not received sufﬁcient attention in the legislation or tax
treaties. Effectively, mining rights allow mining companies to separate their production chains (i.e., the mining and
processing activities) from their wealth chains (i.e., where the concessions are booked).
This ﬁnding questions the traditional commodity-chain approaches where the ‘relative distribution of wealth within a
commodity chain often has been portrayed in the social sciences as reﬂective of levels in a hierarchy of production’ (Gerefﬁ &
Korzeniewicz, 1994: 4). According to the commodity- and value-chain research tradition, production hierarchies became
outdated with the rise of the new export-oriented and technology-intensive forms of production (Gerefﬁ & Korzeniewicz,
1994: 4). However, our case studies illustrate a very traditional extractive industry operation where the ‘value’ seemingly
produced in Finland was transferred artiﬁcially to Barbados, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden. This had little or
nothing to do with the production process or other value creation which was illustrated by the fact that in some cases the
36 However, the U.S. multinationals might receive a ﬁnal tax beneﬁt from tax avoidance abroad if the repatriated dividends would be temporarily
exempted from U.S. income tax as Donald Trump promised during his presidential campaign. A similar ‘repatriation holiday’ was last enacted in 2004 during
the George W. Bush administration (Gravelle, 2015).
37 The reliability could also be questioned by the exceptional range of average semi-elasticities between tax rates and proﬁts in individual countries.
According to an extensive review by Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013: 29) this range of average semi-elasticities in previous studies has been 0.31–12.29.
This means that a one percentage increase in the (statutory) tax rate difference between a subsidiary and its parent would increase the pretax proﬁt of the
subsidiary by 0.31–12.29%. Despite the huge range the sign of semi-elasticities has remained the same in dozens of studies, which denotes that lower tax
rate increases pretax proﬁts.
38 E.g., Australia, India, Singapore and some others being exception to the rule.
39 See Section 5.2 concerning Finland and the Nordic Tax Convention. However, a tax convention based on the OECD Model Tax Convention (Art. 6 & 13)
could grant the taxing right to the location country, assuming that its national legislation permits this (Du Toit, 1999: 37).
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case study enterprises did not have any employees in these countries.40 As such, our case studies support the nascent
research agenda around wealth chains within the ‘decentralized corporations’ (Desai, 2008) that can have separate ‘homes’
for their talent, ﬁnancial operations and legal headquarters.
While value chains and production networks are characterized by relative transparency and coordination, actors in
wealth chains thrive by the secrecy of the arrangements (Seabrooke & Wigan, 2014a: 257). Seabrooke and Wigan (2014a:
261) have called for ‘a clearer picture of how wealth chains have an impact on developed and developing countries’ and have
similarly pressed for investigations into how far ﬁnancial innovations characterize transfers through wealth chains. Noting
how value chain research has focused on the disaggregation of production processes across countries, Seabrooke and Wigan
(2014b) have called for more attention to the legal and ﬁnancial disaggregation of enterprises. Our case studies are a prime
example of this. A traditional value chain analysis of the Finnish mining industry would fail to highlight the important role
played by Barbados, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Sweden in channeling proﬁts.
Seabrooke and Wigan have noted how tax avoidance ‘occurs at the intersection between variegated national tax systems’
(2014a: 258). While agreeing on the importance of these intersections, we propose more attention should be paid to the
general principles behind international tax legislation, namely the arm’s length principle and the separate entity doctrine.
These principles play key roles as the underlying structure enabling multinational enterprises to beneﬁt from
commercialized sovereignty, which allows tax havens to facilitate tax avoidance (Avi-Yonah, 1995; Durst & Culbertson,
2003; Eden, 2016; Fichtner, 2016; Palan, 2002; Picciotto, 1992; Rixen, 2010).
Many of the tax-avoidance related distortions in the global wealth chains can be traced back to the conﬂict between the
separate entity doctrine on the one hand and the unitary nature of the business operations of MNEs on the other (Picciotto,
2016a). We argue that the power to apply the doctrine enables corporate tax avoidance. Indeed, all of the tax arrangements
we described in our case studies were made possible by the separate entity doctrine that allows a MNE to use its individual
subsidiaries as tax avoidance vehicles (Ting, 2014: 71; see also Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2011; Cockﬁeld, 2004). However, we
also highlighted how enterprises can offset one subsidiary’s proﬁts with losses from another by using group reliefs, thus
effectively overriding the separate entity principle for their own purposes.41 These different applications result in very
different divisions in tax revenues. In other words, the enterprises have excessive powers to operate as separate entities
when it suits them for tax purposes, while planning their operational supply chains as an integrated entity.
Separate entities within an MNE are ﬁctional, underlined by the fact that professional investors or analysts view a
corporate group under one parent company as a single enterprise (Commons, 1957; Graham, 2003).42 To illustrate this, all
Finnish subsidiaries analyzed in the case studies were in joint liability for debts that foreign group companies had taken from
outside lenders (see, e.g., FQM Kevitsa Holding No. 1 Oy, FS 2013; Agnico-Eagle Finland Oy, FS 2013; Pyhäsalmi Mine Oy, FS
2013). We argue that the main reason for this was that these arrangements reduced the MNEs’ overall ﬁnancial costs. Many of
these group companies were holding companies with no real business activity.
The role of holding companies has mostly been discussed in the context of tax havens (e.g., Desai et al., 2005). However,
we illustrated how Sweden is used as a hub for repatriating proﬁts to avoid dividend tax at source. This also illustrates how
global wealth chains often differ signiﬁcantly from global value chains or production networks. The key discrepancy that
gives MNEs this power is that whereas a legal corporation exists only in formally, ‘an economic going concerning existing
wherever it does business’ (Commons, 1934: 55).
In the introduction, we noted how the separate entity principle is closely connected to another key principle of
international tax governance, namely the arm’s length principle. The concept is highly ideological (Ylönen & Teivainen,
2015), because of the false impression it conveys on the possibilities of ﬁnding ‘markets’ inside large enterprises. Our case
studies highlight how the application of the arm’s length principle in the pricing of ﬁnance and intangible mining rights can
result in substantially different portioning of proﬁts even in an industry where the business itself is highly tangible.
The case studies also allowed us to analyze ways corporations exert power over states in the global economy (Dillard &
Vinnari, in press: 14). This growth of corporate power can be conceptualized using the distinction between voluntary and
volitional freedom. Originally developed by the evolutionary economist and legal scholar John Lee Hale in the early 20th
century (Fried,1998; Hale, 1935; Hale, 1952; Samuels, 1972: 277), the voluntary-volitional continuum distinguishes between
the circumstantially limited exercise of choice between alternatives or behavior (i.e., voluntary freedom) and complete
autonomy with the absence of constrained choice or limits to choice or behavior (i.e., volitional freedom). While volitional
freedom is commonly associated with governmental use of power, Hale noted already in the 1920s how private enterprises
could also enjoy this kind of freedom. Our case studies are illustrative examples of this. Viewed from this angle, property can
be conceptualized as something that ‘provides the capacity to exercise coercive43 impact upon others and the correlative
40 These ﬁndings also undermine the simplistic ideas of efﬁcient international allocation of resources by reducing national and international regulation
(Dorn, 1993). While this sort of ‘trickle-down economics’ is no longer in the academic mainstream, it still has a considerable inﬂuence in public discussion.
41 An obverse example is the ‘ring fencing’ legislation adopted in some other jurisdictions that restricts offsetting the proﬁts and losses of separate mines
even within an entity. Essentially, this legislation extends the state’s capability to tax separate businesses separately.
42 Another factor behind the failure of the separate entity doctrine is more methodological. There are no methods to determine equivocal transfer prices
because there are no decent benchmarks available. Business-to-business transactions are dealt in conﬁdence and are not usually available for benchmark
purposes. Intra-group transactions are also often performed in conditions that do not occur between independent enterprises, and therefore, benchmarks
could not exist even theoretically (see also Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2011: 378–380; Ylönen & Teivainen, 2015).
43 Hale and Samuels use the word ’coercive’ in a non-pejorative sense.
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ability to withstand the coercive capacity of others’ (Hale, 1935: 150; Samuels, 1972: 305). This can be illustrated, for
instance, with the case where FQM was able to treat the mining concessions in Finland as immaterial rights and transfer
them to Sweden, effectively withstanding the capacity of Finland to tax its future income.
6.4. Other issues
Our case studies point to the institutional factors behind tax avoidance. The aggregated data collected from the 12 Finnish
metallic ore mines showed that the mines generated only s92 million of tax income for Finland in the period 2011–2014, all
of which was paid by the Kevitsa, Pyhäsalmi and Suurikuusikko mines, the focus of the case studies (see Table 1). This
amounted to 0.5 of the total CIT revenue of s18.5 billion (Finnish Tax Administration, 2015b). Alternatively, the taxes
accounted for 2.4% of the companies’ total mineral ore sales of s3861 million in 2011–2014. Conversely, the direct state
support to the mining enterprises was s22 million in the period 2000–2011. In the same period, government agencies also
invested roughly s300 million in the mining business (Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 2012: 34–35).44
As a conclusion of these ﬁgures, subsidizing the mining industry with a favorable legislation has generated only negligible
revenues for Finland despite the substantial ore volumes worth billions of euros. While it is difﬁcult to pinpoint the exact
reasons for this failure, it is evident that Finland failed to ensure contributions to local communities when it amended its
mining laws in 2011. Tax avoidance concerns were not discussed during the legislative process. Moreover, we noted how the
Ministry of Employment and the Economy commissioned a consultancy study that was favorable toward introducing a
mining royalty legislation, but the study was curiously never published. As a result of these factors, the decision to abstain
from establishing mining royalties likened Finland to developing countries that aim to compensate for their unstable
business environment by lowering their mining taxes (Ericsson & Farooki, 2012). We ﬁnd three possible, but not necessarily
mutually exclusive, reasons for this failure. First, the new Mining Act clearly favored the mining industry (Frazer Institute,
2015), and even the minister responsible for the drafting process admitted the strong impact of corporate lobbying on the
ﬁnal wordings of the law (Yle, 2009). This factor calls for additional interdisciplinary research on the politics of tax planning
(Sikka & Willmott, 2010: 353).
Second, the corporate sector attracts some of the best tax professionals, giving the lobbyists an upper hand over civil
servants and politicians. Speciﬁcally, the ‘complexity of the calculative practices that institutions undertake to enable
transformative action’ enables mining enterprises to inﬂuence the tax system, especially when the parliamentarians
generally have limited knowledge on accounting details and the fundamentals of an individual industry (Stoianoff &
Kaidonis, 2005: 50). This factor requires more research on the role of professionals in facilitating tax-driven wealth chains
(Seabrooke & Wigan, 2014a). The accounting and tax systems should serve society, but in practice some tend to beneﬁt over
others (Johnston, 2015: 99). Third, the general lack of research on best practices in mining tax policy also hinders fact-based
discussions on how to design mining sector taxes. As Clausing and Durst (2015: 13) have noted, ‘there appears to be no
literature comparing the administrative success of different kinds of ﬁscal regimes in practice’ (see also Laporte & De
Quatrebarbes, 2015: 11–12).
All of these factors highlight the need to question straightforward comparisons between governments resources and
capabilities when it comes to taxing multinationals. They illustrate how the low mining sector taxes resulted from legislative
deﬁciencies and not from inadequate administrative resources. This challenges the idea that adequate resources would
ensure the appropriate collection of taxes and hints that there is much potential in the recent turn from the Washington
Consensus policies toward a renewed ‘resource nationalism’ in many developing countries (Bakir, 2015; Haslam & Heidrich,
2016). Indeed, Finland was ranked as the most attractive jurisdiction for mining investment in the world in 2014 precisely
because of its mineral policy and political climate, which placed it ahead of more mineral-rich nations (Frazer Institute, 2015:
8–13).
Turning to more policy-related recommendations, we argue that the main tax attraction of Finland for mining enterprises
is not a low corporate tax rate but the opportunities for avoiding taxes. This avoidance is facilitated not only by the interplay
between the legislation of Finland and the MNEs host countries, but also by third countries that offer incentives for holding
and ﬁnance subsidiaries.45 Introducing a mining royalty regime would be the most straightforward option since individual
countries have to secure their rents when ores are being mined (Guj, 2012). Ad valorem mining royalties are generally
regarded as effective to administer as they are based on sales prices, and there is no need to calculate and attribute costs (Guj,
2012: 14). A royalty legislation would also encourage companies to favor potentially more proﬁtable projects, thus
decreasing the risk of loss-making projects where ores are mined without any CIT left in the country (for further discussion,
see, e.g., Guj, 2012).
6.5. Limitations and pathways for future research
This article is not without limitations. Much of the details about corporate tax practices are outside of the public domain,
both because of commonly accepted business secrecy as well as the fact that much of tax planning thrives from additional
44 Since then, the troubles of the now bankrupt Talvivaara mine have accounted for a few hundred million euros owing to the government (Kankare, 2015).
45 E.g., Altshuler and Grubert (2003) and Killian (2006) have discussed the interplay between the laws of home and host governments.
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layers of secrecy granted by tax havens. For an example, we were not able to obtain ﬁnancial accounts from Barbados.
Moreover, the gap between taxable and ﬁnancial income is not explicitly expressed in Finnish ﬁnancial statements, which
made assessing the exact tax implications impossible. This limitation mainly involved depreciations and amortizations that
are often calculated differently in taxation and accounting in Finland (Business Tax Act, Section 3). Furthermore, the mines
were at different stages of production, which limited possibilities to assess tax planning. Estimating the impact of tax
planning for the Kevitsa mine was particularly difﬁcult as it had not generated any CIT before 2014. In contrast, Pyhäsalmi
was already in a stable phase of production, which made it relatively easy to calculate the impact of tax planning.46
While we were able to create a rather reliable picture of the tax structures employed at Finnish mines, we could not assess
the division of risk between the related companies and other contractual provisions. These factors affect the arm’s length
transfer prices that could have been used in proﬁt-shifting since there were substantial intra-group ore sales and interest
costs (OECD, 2010). However, information of this kind is conﬁdential and was therefore out of the scope of this study.
There are also two broader issues that weaken the reliability of the research data, thus potentially affecting the
conclusions made. First, we do not know for sure whether the Finnish Tax Administration has challenged the legality of the
arrangements.47 However, we found no evidence of this, and major disputes would have been reported in the ﬁnancial
accounts (See for example FQM, AIF 2014: 117–119). Second, a third country could have taxed the income discussed in the
case studies when resident or source countries failed at this, based for example on the parent company’s resident country’s
controlled foreign company regime (see, e.g., Lang, Scheuerle & Stefaner, 2004). Alternatively, a subsidiary registered in,
Luxembourg or some other country could be deemed a resident in another country for CIT purposes (OECD, 2014; Model Tax
Convention, Art. 4). However, there was not sufﬁcient ﬁnancial information available to assess this because only consolidated
accounts of listed companies were available from Canada.
These limitations highlight the need for the provision of more transparent and comprehensive ﬁnancial information. One
solution for this would be requiring enterprises to publish their key ﬁnancial items on country-by-country basis (Australia
Senate Economics References Committee, 2015: 80; Murphy, 2016). Moreover, considering the considerable freedoms that
large enterprises enjoy in designing their wealth chains, there is a need for a wider discussion on the role of corporate secrecy
in 21st century capitalism. Corporations exert ﬁnancial power over states with their tax planning arrangements, and both
governments and large enterprises should be transparent on the details of these arrangements. Despite the recent policy-
level interest toward tackling corporate tax avoidance, these considerations have not received sufﬁcient attention.
Table 4
The essential ﬁgures of the Suurikuusikko mine 2009 –2014 (s million).
Year Revenue Operating
proﬁt
Additional
depreciationa
Net
ﬁnance
costsb
Group
contribution
to Oijärvi
Resources
Oyc
CIT
costs
Finland
Net
proﬁt
Dividend
paid
Finnish
tax loss
due to
interest
costsd
Finnish tax
loss due to
no
witholding
tax on
dividende
CIT/
Revenue
(%)
CIT/
Operating
proﬁt (%)
Equity
ratio
Finlandf
Equity
ratio of
AEg
CIT rate
Finland
2009 44.0 0.9 10.6 10.4 0.0 0.0 !20.1 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0% 0.0% 28% 65% 26.0%
2010 68.8 19.6 12.9 8.8 0.0 0.0 !2.1 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0% 0.0% 30% 67% 26.0%
2011 163.2 57.2 18.6 18.3 0.0 0.0 20.3 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0% 0.0% 34% 64% 26.0%
2012 184.4 96.3 20.3 18.8 4.3 6.5 46.4 0.0 2.0 0.0 3.5% 6.7% 38% 65% 24.5%
2013 190.2 76.9 13.9 16.7 0.0 11.7 34.5 46.0 1.4 2.3 6.2% 15.2% 39% 60% 24.5%
2014 138.3 14.5 22.9 21.9 0.0 !0.1 !30.2 8.9 1.7 0.4 !0.1% !0.7% 32% 59% 20.0%
Total 788.7 265.4 99.3 94.9 4.3 18.1 48.8 54.9 10.0 2.7 2.3% 6.8%
The ﬁgures from 2010 to 2014 are based on the ﬁnancial accounts of the Agnico-Eagle Finland Oy prepared according to the Finnish GAAP. The ﬁgures from
2009 are based on the ﬁnancial account of theAgnico-Eagle AB as the Swedish company began the mining operations in 2009. (see Section 5.4) The original
ﬁgures in SEK have been converted to EUR according to the year-end average exchange rate (1 EUR = 10.2520 SEK).
a The additional depreciation to accounting depreciation is made according to the Finnish tax legislation.
b Finance costs less ﬁnance income. Most of the costs are intra-group interests.
c Oijärvi Resources Oy offset its losses from exploration activities against Agnico-Eagle Finland Oy taxable mining proﬁts before the companies merged in
2013.
d Tax losses calculated based on net ﬁnance costs, Finnish tax rate and difference between the AE's equity ratio in Finland and the AE's consolidated equity
ratio.
e The witholding tax had been ﬁve percent, if it had been paid directly to a Canadian parent company (see Section 5.3.3).
f The ratio was calculated by dividing total shareholder’s equity with total liabilities and equity. The total additional depreciations were included in equity.
g The ratio was calculated by dividing the total shareholder’s equity with total liabilities and equity. The ﬁgures are based on AE’s consoidated annual
reports.
46 With Pyhäsalmi and Suurikuusikko, we were also able to double-check our calculations as the total amount of taxable income and tax are public
information in Finland. This does not reﬂect the tax losses.
47 The tax administration could challenge arrangements within six years after the ﬁnancial year, if it is considered that they were not conducted on an
arm’s length basis or that they should be classiﬁed as tax avoidance as deﬁned in the Finnish general anti-avoidance rule (Act on Assessment Procedure,
18.12.1995/1558, x28, 31 and 55–56).
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7. Concluding remarks
Our article has made a step in analyzing wealth chains and their underlying principles ‘in the real world’, thus addressing
gaps in the existing body of literature on mining taxation, corporate tax avoidance and its societal impact. Regarding further
research along these lines, we maintain that information leaks, such as the ‘Lux Leaks’, could provide useful material for tax
and accounting research (e.g. Marian, 2016a). Another option might be to turn to enterprises or tax authorities and ask them
to provide conﬁdential, anonymized data (see, e.g., Ali-Yrkkö & Rouvinen, 2015). The separate entity principle based on arm’s
length transfer pricing is broken and needs to be ﬁxed. We doubt that the ongoing policy efforts by the OECD will be able to
ﬁx the underlying problems as they continue to rely on the arm’s length principle and the separate entity doctrine (OECD,
2015b). A well-designed formulary approach could help remedy these problems (Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2011; Picciotto,
2016b; Siu, Picciotto, Mintz & Sawyerr, 2015), as the European Commission (EC) has suggested in its Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base directive proposals (COM(2016) 685 ﬁnal; Cerioni, 2016).48
We want to underline that the division of potential tax incomes is one of the most fundamental questions in
contemporary capitalism. The governments of countries where value creation actually takes place should be in the position
Fig. 2. The corporate structure of FQM Kevitsa mine as of March 31, 2011 (FQM, AIF 2010).49
48 According to the EC proposal, the consolidated taxable proﬁts of a corporate group would be split between countries based on the location of its assets,
labor and sales.
49 FQM had over 50 other subsidiaries related to mines in other countries in 2011. The above structure of Kevitsa was again amended at the end of 2014
when the number of subsidiaries in Sweden and Finland was reduced to three due to mergers (FQM, AIF 2014).
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to decide how much taxes corporations pay for the business conducted there. The adoption of a common formula would
subordinate much of the power currently enjoyed by MNEs to intergovernmental negotiations whose results would
necessarily be some kind of a political compromise. Moreover, it should be noted that all the existing models of international
corporate taxation already rely more or less on the use of formulas (Avi-Yonah, 1995; Ylönen & Teivainen, 2015). As John
Commons noted in the opening quote of this article, the ‘system of prices is like the system of words or the system of
numbers’, and just like words, ‘prices and numbers are nominal and not real’. Therefore, the rules that dictate these prices
Fig. 3. The corporate structure of Inmet Pyhäsalmi mine before the restructurings in 2005 (Inmet Finland Oy, FS 2005; Inmet, AR 2002).
Fig. 4. The corporate structure of Inmet Pyhäsalmi mine after the restructurings as of December 31, 2011 (Inmet Sweden Holdings AB, FS 2011; Inmet
Luxembourg, FS 2011).50
50 The structure remained unchanged for two years after FQM’s acquisition (FQM, AIF 2014). Inmet Sweden Holdings AB also held shares in the Çayeli mine
in Turkey through a Spanish holding company. Inmet’s consolidated accounts did not provide information on the total number of subsidiaries in 2011.
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and their geographical division in corporate wealth chains are of utmost importance to any scholar of accounting,
international political economy or tax law.
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Appendix A. List of ﬁnancial data used in the research
Kevitsa case study
First Quantum Minerals Limited (consolidated), Canada
Annual information form (CSA), 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014
Annual report (CSA), 2008, 2012, 2013, 2014
FQM Finnex Oy (2345662-5), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2010–2014
FQM Kevitsa Holding No 1 Oy (2345699-1), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2010–2014
FQM Kevitsa Holding No 2 Oy (2345706-2), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2010–2014
FQM Kevitsa Mining Oy (2345703-8), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2010–2014
FQM Kevitsa Sweden Holdings AB (556814-4041), Sweden
Financial statements (EBR), 2011, 2013
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2010–2014
Kevitsa Mining AB (556530-2717), Sweden
Financial statements (EBR), 2002, 2008, 2010, 2013
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2004–2014
Kevitsa Mining Oy (2062575-3), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
Pyhäsalmi case study
Inmet Mining Corporation (consolidated), Canada
Annual information form (CSA), 2010, 2011, 2012
Annual report (CSA), 2001, 2002, 2011
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2003–2012
CLC Copper I B.V. (34241191), the Netherlands
Financial statements (EBR), 2011, 2012
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2004–2013
CLC Copper II B.V. (34129494), the Netherlands
Financial statements (EBR), 2011, 2012
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2004–2013
CLC Holdings Oy (2389092-3), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
Cobre las Cruces SA (ESA28814135)
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2004–2013
Inmet Finance Company S.à.r.l. (155174), Luxembourg
Financial statements (RCSL), 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013
Inmet Finland Oy (1635992-3), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2004–2014
Inmet Luxembourg (155271), Luxembourg (branch of Inmet Mining Corporation)
Financial statements (RCSL), 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013
Inmet Mining Sweden AB (556588-3179), Sweden
Financial statements (EBR), 2002, 2006, 2013
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2004–2013
Inmet Sweden Holdings AB (556693-7131), Sweden
Financial statements (EBR), 2006, 2011, 2013
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2006–2013
Pyhäsalmi Mine Oy (1712341-0), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2001, 2002, 2003, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2004–2014
Scandinavian Minerals Limited
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Annual information form (CSA), 2007
Annual report (CSA), 2007
Suurikuusikko case study
Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited, Canada
Annual report (SEC), 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
Form 20-F (SEC), 2005, 2006, 2009, 2011
Form 40-F (SEC), 2014
Agnico-Eagle AB (556599-9751), Sweden
Financial statements (EBR), 2005, 2009
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2004–2011
Agnico-Eagle Finland Oy (2311020-2), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2010–2014
Agnico Eagle Mines Sweden Coöperatie U.A. (34361868), the Netherlands
Financial statements (EBR), 2011, 2012, 2013
Agnico-Eagle Sweden AB (226690-6185), Sweden
Financial statements (EBR), 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013
Oijärvi Resources Oy (1648603-3), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013
Riddarhyttan Resources AB (556534-7639), Sweden
Financial statements (EBR), 2006, 2007, 2009
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2005–2011
Other Finnish mines
Altona Mining Limited, Australia
Annual report (ASIC), 2014
Belvedere Mining Oy (2312246-5), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2010–2014
Belvedere Resources B.V. (34161550), the Netherlands
Financial statements (EBR), 2013
Belvedere Resources Finland Oy (1044963-7), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2010–2013
Belvedere Resources Limited, Canada
Annual report (CSA), 2013
Boliden AB, Sweden
Annual report (FI), 2014
Boliden B.V. (3418048775), the Netherlands
Financial statements (EBR), 2011
Boliden Harjavalta Oy, Finland
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2005–2014
Boliden Kokkola Oy, Finland
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2005–2014
BR Gold Mining Oy (2414435-9), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2011, 2012, 2013
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2011–2013
Dragon Mining Limited, Australia
Annual report (ASIC), 2014
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2005–2013
Dragon Mining Oy (1509120-8), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2004–2014
Dragon Mining (Sweden) AB (556465-5339), Sweden
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2005–2013
Endomines AB, Sweden
Annual Report (FI), 2012, 2013
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2003–2013
Endomines Oy (1061211-5), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2003–2014
Hyena Holding AB (556708-2994), Sweden
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Financial statements (EBR), 2011
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2007–2013
Kalvinit Oy (1005935-6), Finland
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2004–2013
Kuhmo Metals Oy (1925450-2), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2012, 2014
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2005–2013
Kuhmo Nickel Limited (05311516), United Kingdom
Financial statements (EBR), 2012, 2014
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2006–2014
Kylylahti Copper Oy (Boliden Kylylahti Oy), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2010, 2013, 2014
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2005–2014
Lapland Goldminers AB, Sweden
Annual Report (FI), 2011
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2005–2014
Lappland Goldminers Oy (1907114-0), Finland
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2005–2013
Nordic Mines AB, Sweden
Annual Report (FI), 2013–2014
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2009–2013
Nordic Mines Marknad AB (556767-4980), Sweden
Financial statements (EBR), 2012
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2009–2013
Nordic Mines Oy (2296579-4), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2012
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2010–2014
Outokumpu Chrome Oy (0772768-3), Finland
Financial statements (PRH), 2013
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2005–2014
Outokumpu Oyj (0215254-2), Finland
Annual Report (FIN-FSA), 2014
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2005–2013
Talvivaaran Kaivososakeyhtiö Oyj (1847894-2), Finland
Annual Report (FIN-FSA), 2013
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2006–2014
Talvivaara Sotkamo Oy (1852002-0), Finland
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2004–2014
Vulcan Exploration B.V. (34639562), the Netherlands
Financial statements (EBR), 2012
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2010–2014
Vulcan Hautalampi Oy (2300988-4), Finland
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2010–2014
Vulcan Kotalahti Oy (2300990-5), Finland
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2010–2014
Vulcan SW Finland (2300986-8), Finland
Orbis ﬁnancial data, 2010–2014
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ABSTRACT
Tax havens and tax flight have lately received increasing attention, while
interest toward multilateral trade policies has somewhat diminished. We
argue that more attention needs to be paid exactly to the interrelations
between trade and tax policies. Drawing from two case studies on
Panama’s trade disputes, we show how World Trade Organization (WTO)
rules can be used both to resist attempts to sanction secrecy structures and
to promote measures against tax flight. The theory of new
constitutionalism can help to explain how trade treaties can ‘lock in’ tax
policies. However, our case studies show that trade policy not only ‘locks
in’ democratic policy-making, but also enables tax havens to use their
commercialized sovereignty to resists anti-secrecy measures. What is being
‘locked in’ are the policy tools, not necessarily the policies. The changing
relationship between trade and tax policies can also create new and
unexpected tools for tackling tax evasion, underlining the importance of
epistemic arbitrage in the context of new constitutionalism. In principle,
political actors with sufficient technical and juridical knowledge can shape
global tax governance to various directions regardless of their formal
position in the world political hierarchies. This should be taken into
account when trade treaties are being negotiated or revised.
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1. INTRODUCTION: TAXATION AND TAX HAVENS ON
THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA
In this article, we analyze the policy implications of the increasing con-
vergence and overlap of trade policy and tax policy. Specifically, we
show how trade policy tools can be used to resist initiatives against tax
evasion. This will be done by analyzing two case studies on trade dis-
putes initiated by Panama, in the context of other recent changes in the
international tax and trade policies. We argue that, first, there is a need
for a more detailed analysis of the trade-tax nexus, and second, that a
given position of international capital can be ‘locked in’ by the active use
of trade policy tools than enable tax havens to resist tax policy initiatives.
Third, this convergence of trade and tax governance not only locks in pol-
icies but can also open up new and unintended avenues to challenge the
power of global capital. This highlights the importance of epistemic arbi-
trage of policy professionals. Moreover, it shows that it is a more complex
phenomenon than is sometimes thought. We will use the theory of ‘new
constitutionalism’ as a starting point and further show how our findings
lead to some implications on the need to reconsider the theory.
Tax havens and tax evasion have indeed become topical fields within
global policy. In April 2016, the International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists began publishing expos"es on 11.5 million leaked documents
containing information on more than 214,000 offshore companies
founded with the help of a Panamanian law firm and corporate service
provider, Mossack Fonseca. In addition to individual investors, the scan-
dal involved a great number of major banks from every part of the world.
These banks had received assistance from Mossack Fonseca in opening
tax haven accounts for their clients. Several politicians in different coun-
tries had to resign. Far from being an isolated event, the Panama papers
leak was a continuation in a series of recent tax information leaks from
Liechtenstein, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Public debates and pres-
sure (Dallyn 2016) have been followed by increased academic attention,
which in turn has significantly improved understanding of the mecha-
nisms, actors and structures of tax avoidance and tax evasion.
The nascent literature on global tax governance has focused mostly on
tax-specific initiatives, and until very recently, the causes of tax competi-
tion have been neglected in the international political economy literature
(Rixen 2011, 3). The 1998 OECD Harmful Tax Competition initiative has
been the most important single event for generating global tax gover-
nance research (e.g. Kudrle 2008; Sanders 2002; Sharman 2006; Webb
2004). Since then, several other initiatives have followed, most notably
the OECD-led Base Erosion, Profit Shifting (BEPS) project that began in
2013 (OECD 2013; see also Eccleston and Smith 2016). Subsequent anti-
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tax haven and transparency initiatives launched by the G20 group, Euro-
pean Union (EU) and the United States have also generated interest.
These include the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act by the United
States, the OECD-led template for Automatic Information Exchange in
tax matters, and several recent EU directives, such as the directive for the
exchange of information on national tax agreements negotiated by states
with large corporations (Grinberg 2016).1 Typically, the existing
governance research covering this field has provided analyses on policy
efforts in the framework of tax-specific work of OECD, EU and the
United States. A key question is whether it pays sufficient attention to the
major institutional and structural interdependencies: trade policies in
particular.
The recent EU state aid cases against tax incentives granted by Ireland
and the Netherlands to Apple and Starbucks (EC 2014a, EC 2014b) have
drawn some public attention to the overlaps between trade-related goals
and tax policies in the field of subsidies. This theme generated attention
in the international tax law scholarship around the turn of the millen-
nium (Bratton and McCahery, 2001; Pinto 1998; Sch€on 1999) but less so
within the tax governance literature. In addition, in the early 2000s, the
Harmful Tax Competition initiative provided inspiration for a body of aca-
demic literature discussing international tax regulation also from the
viewpoint of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and
World Trade Organization (WTO) treaties (Avi-Yonah 2001; Brauner
2005; McDaniel 2000; 2004; Slemrod and Avi-Yonah 2001; see also Killian
2006, 1085). These studies found that trade treaties both fostered and hin-
dered policy options for curbing harmful tax exemptions and tax
competition.
However, the aforementioned studies did not seem to provoke further
research as the general interest toward trade policy issues waned. This
neglect of trade-tax policy linkages has also been highlighted in the after-
math of Panama Papers. While there has been at least some policy-level
discussion on tax-related aspects in the US–Panama Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA) of 2007 (Kessier 2016), similar developments have not been
seen in the academia. This is unfortunate, as the dynamics between trade
policies and tax policies have undergone significant changes since the
early 2000s. With the notable exceptions of Farrell (2013) and Bastin
(2014), we have not been able to find meaningful analyses from recent
years on how trade policy affects anti-tax avoidance initiatives. This is
hardly surprising, however, since global tax governance only emerged as
a serious research topic in international relations about ten years ago
(Dietsch and Rixen 2016, 1). Moreover, the latest research on the interrela-
tions between trade and taxation focuses often on the effects of trade pol-
icy on domestic taxes such as the VAT (Seelkopf, Lierse and Schmitt
2016), rather than on tax avoidance.
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Here we aim to show how trade treaties and related arbitration proce-
dures can affect the efforts to tackle international tax flight. We begin in
Section 2 with a discussion on the expansion of trade policy to include
policy fields beyond its historical scope. Section 3 focuses on the rise of
international tax avoidance and tax evasion to the global governance
agenda, and how the existing academic literature has addressed trade
policy related preconditions for tackling tax flight. We then proceed to
our case study of Panama in Section 4. The case study discusses the FTA
and its potential impact on the international and United States led efforts
to tackle tax evasion, and it also analyses Panama’s use of trade dispute
settlements to protect its secrecy. Finally, the penultimate Section 5
discusses theoretical contributions related to the trade-tax nexus. We
conclude by analyzing how these analytical frameworks should
be updated, and to what extent can the conclusions from the case studies
be generalized.
2. THE EXPANSION OF TRADE POLICY AND THE
POLITICS OF ‘CONSTITUTIONALISM’
The recent history of trade policy has been a history of expansion, reori-
entation and constant negotiation of the political scope of ‘trade’ and
‘trade-related’. The GATT focused almost entirely on tariff issues for
most of its history before the inception of the WTO. Yet already the 1980s
saw the development of new areas of negotiation as intellectual property
issues emerged to the trade policy field. After the inception of the WTO,
new policy issues have been recurrently pushed into the trade policy
frame. In several cases, the linkages to traditional trade policies are ques-
tionable: procurement, public services, competition, investment protec-
tion and so on have no immediate link to tariff policy. Such thematic
expansion leads unavoidably to overlap of policy fields, which was very
visible already with trade in services, which includes financial services.
This expansion has never occurred without opposition (Deere 2008;
Verger and Bonal 2006). Even so, trade policy has evidently become
something of a general global policy field. Indeed, with the notorious
exception of agriculture, the most heated debates in trade policy during
the WTO era have dealt with issues that do not directly involve tariffs on
goods. Furthermore, the key political struggles have often been fought
over the inclusion of particular issues to the trade policy field rather than
the actual content of agreements, with intellectual property rights being a
case in point (Borowiak 2004; Sell 2001). The outcomes of the negotiations
between trade policy and other policy fields are twofold. First, new
extensions of trade policy often means that trade policy overrules exist-
ing policies in other policy areas. Second, policy lock-ins generated by
trade agreements can affect policy efforts in ways that were
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unforeseeable when the agreements were originally negotiated. In some
areas, this negotiation with other policy fields has received considerable
attention (such as, again, intellectual property), yet other important
fields, such as tax policy, have received insufficient attention.
The expansion of trade policy can be seen as an outcome of ad hoc
‘forum shifting’ (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Sell 2010): when given
political players push for given political goals, they seek arenas in which
the existing practices, rules of conduct and power relations are most suit-
able for advancing the desired policy goals, given that it is in their power
to influence the choice of arena.2 Trade and tax policies are particularly
vulnerable for these kinds of practices because of their importance to
major corporations and their lobbyists. It is quite well documented, for
instance, how the GATT was explicitly chosen as the most suitable arena
for pushing the liberalization of trade in services (Raghavan 1990). Simi-
larly, in tax issues, trade policy is likely to be the preferred policy field
for tax havens3, compared to other international fora.
However, we need to go deeper than this. Here, it is useful to analyze
trade policy as an expression of ‘new constitutionalism’ (Raghavan 1990;
Schneiderman 2000). The concept was coined for theorizing the globali-
zation of a given market discipline, which restrained the capacity of
nation-states to control the powers of international capital. As such
power is highly dependent on the laws and other institutions of nation-
state, the emphasis of the theory was on the creation of ‘disciplinary neo-
liberalism’ and its politico-legal dimension, in contrast to the general
‘liberalization’ of finance (Gill 1998a, Gill 2002). This disciplinary neolib-
eralism shares some key characteristics with constitutions at the national
level in entrenching policies, procedures and rights, and in being very
difficult to reverse even by majority vote, therefore, the term
‘constitutional’. Future governments are thus inhibited from reconsider-
ing economic policy as it is insulated it from the domain of traditional
politics. Trade agreements can be interpreted from this perspective as
transnational quasi-constitutions, protecting the interests of corporate
capital and transnational investors by creating global uniform and bind-
ing rules for this purpose (Clarkson 2002). As the field of trade policy has
expanded, trade agreements have taken ever more pronouncedly such
quasi-constitutional role in the global economy.
The domestic forms of such ‘new constitutionalism’ can take different
forms. The regulatory chill effect creates pressure on the domestic policy-
makers to consider only measures that are known to conform with the
‘constitutional’ agreements, while the lock-in effect effectively binds gov-
ernments to the current level of liberalization (Krajewski 2011). Thus the
former self-disciplines politicians and regulators, while the latter leads
into actual sanctions by supernational political bodies. Domestically
important policies can be sanctioned and outlawed by dispute settlement
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bodies (DSBs), when a trading party actively seeks to undermine these
domestic policies. This can lead to a regulatory chill, as policy-makers
become wary of using politically efficient means for achieving given pol-
icy goals.
Researchers have pointed out examples of ‘policy lock-in’ in virtually
all kinds of trade negotiations, with possibly the most evident case being
negotiation on trade in services such as GATS (Robertson 2003, Sreeniva-
san 2005). Russell Williams sees the very essence of ‘new con-
stitutionalism’ to be an attempt to ‘strike when the iron is hot’: while
support for given practices might decline over time, deliberate policy
lock-in hinders the attempts to push through changes at a later point
domestically (Williams 2002, 80). While some policy issues might remain
open after signing the agreements, they quickly take the form of judicial
matters instead of traditional political disputes. There are also examples
of attempts to push for comprehensive deals that do not allow with-
drawal. As one researcher observed on the GATS negotiations: ‘teams
from OECD nations deliberately tried to “bamboozle” opposing coun-
tries […] The attitude of the developed countries negotiation teams was
“sign now, define later”’ (Raghavan 1990, 108).
Yet curiously, this theorizing almost invariably associates democratic
politics with national sovereignty, as popular sovereignty is taken as a
manifestation of democratic powers (Schneiderman 2000). Nonetheless
the opposite can be the main concern in taxation issues. In discussions on
tax havens, for instance, a commonly noted problem has been the capac-
ity of small states to commercialize their sovereignty (Palan 2002) by
using their national sovereignty to create legal ‘innovations’ demanded
by the tax avoidance industry. Therefore, in contrast to much of the new
constitutionalism literature, progressive tax policy does not necessarily
equal protecting national jurisdictions from transnational policy lock-ins.
This is true especially in an era when the Big 4 auditing companies are
helping secrecy jurisdictions to design their tax laws and large corpora-
tions can easily discern their internal wealth chains from value chains
(Christensen and Murphy 2004; Otusanya 2011; Seabrooke and Wigan
2014; Seabrooke and Wigan in press; Sikka in press; Sikka and Hampton
2005, Sikka and Willmott 2010). Rather, progressive trade policy should
be seen as a tool used by sovereign nations to push other sovereigns to
adhere with effective tax information exchange and other similar
initiatives.
In other words, the new constitutionalism of trade policy can set the
limits within which both popular sovereignty and commercialized sover-
eignty can operate. The question is, then, how can trade policy be effec-
tively used in taxation issues. The political core of trade policy in such
cases does not appear to be introducing (binding) rules but rather effec-
tive tools, which can be used at will to affect global policies on other
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policy fields. What is more, the ability to use these tools requires sophisti-
cated expertise from fields that have so far been marginalized in interna-
tional tax discussions, which highlights the role of epistemic arbitrage in
policy making. This issue is further complicated by the fact that global
trade policy consists of several overlapping, yet imperative, trade policy
systems.
Next, we will move on to discuss the overlap and the convergence of
trade and tax policies based on this theoretical background. The discus-
sion on the history of policy convergence and recent case studies will
demonstrate how the dominant economic forces are ‘insulated from dem-
ocratic rule and popular accountability’ (Gill 1998b, 23), yet in a manner
which calls for some reconsideration of the form of lock-in as it is typi-
cally described by the new constitutionalist theory.
3. TRADE AND TAXES: A MIXED HISTORY OF POLICY
CONVERGENCE
Tax issues have become more prominent in the trade agenda with the
emergence of trade in services. As services naturally include financial
services, and tax avoidance increasingly happens through intangible
rights, trade agreements might facilitate illicit financial activities. Defin-
ing investment broadly in the agreements to include complex financial
instruments, mere expectations of gain, and so on further exacerbates the
problem. Moreover, the concept of state aid has recently expanded at
least in the EU, encompassing not only direct subsidies to local compa-
nies but also different forms of ‘tax competition’ or tax wars. These
changes force to reconsider the complementarity of the two regimes.
The first interventions of trade policy into tax issues broadened the def-
inition of tax-related export subsidies to include ‘the full or partial
exemption, remission or deferral [of tax] specifically related to exports’ in
the 1979 GATT Subsidies/Countervailing Measures Agreement (McDa-
niel 2000, 1628). The pre-1985 version of GATT does not appear to have
been invoked frequently in tax-related disputes. The notable exception is
the challenge by the European Community and Canada to the US
Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) regime. A panel of
experts established by the GATT Council deemed ‘that DISC conferred a
tax benefit related to exports’. The Treasury aggressively promoted the
use of DISCs by US corporations and issued annual reports showing that
exports had increased as a result of the DISC regime. This evidence made
it rather easy for the panel to conclude that DISC constituted an ‘export
subsidy’ (McDaniel 2000, 1627). The same panel concluded that the
French exemption of income from export sales likewise was a subsidy
under GATT. The key to this seemingly surprising result was that France,
Belgium, and the Netherlands were applying their exemption systems to
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transactions that originated in their respective countries, not just to trans-
actions that took place wholly outside their countries (McDaniel 2000,
1628).
The realization of tax holidays as potentially trade-distorting acts was
the first clear instance of the conflict between these two policy domains.
The prominence of the trade-in-services negotiations in the Uruguay
Round, and the growing presence of foreign direct investment,
highlighted how taxation of factor incomes can constitute a fiscal barrier
to trade (Slemrod and Avi-Yonah 2001, 533). The GATT Subsidies Code
defines ‘subsidy’ as including cases where government revenue that is
otherwise due is foregone or not collected. To be actionable under the
GATT, a subsidy must be ‘specific to an enterprise or an industry or
group of enterprise or industries’ (Avi-Yonah 2001, 1684-1685).
Subsequently, new rounds of GATT created the WTO and expanded
significantly its scope in tax affairs. The first step under the WTO pro-
cesses is to establish that a challenged provision is a subsidy. A
‘prohibited subsidy’ is contingent on export performance or requires the
use of domestic rather than imported goods, i.e. an export subsidy. In
turn, the term export subsidy includes ‘full or partial exemption, remis-
sion or deferral, specifically related to exports, of direct taxes’, and the
allowance of ‘special deductions’ directly related to exports or export
performance (Avi-Yonah 2001, 1630).
The EC has moved quite aggressively to challenge special tax provi-
sions that it believes conflict with Article 92(1) and its own tests interpret-
ing that article. In 1998, it adopted a formal set of guidelines which, if
violated, would prohibit all preferential tax provisions that adversely
affect trade and competition among EU states (Avi-Yonah 2001, 1634).
These guidelines coincided with the aforementioned OECD’s Harmful
Tax Practices initiative but have not received equal attention in the global
governance research, even though it marked the beginning of a signifi-
cant shift in the definition of state aid in the EU. Originally restrained to
direct subsidies, the soft law approach adopted by the EC and supported
by the 1998 Code of Conduct of Business Practices has gradually
expanded to tax issues. One milestone in this development were the 2014
landmark decisions that prohibited the tax incentives that Ireland and
the Netherlands had granted to Apple and Starbucks as market-distort-
ing state aid (EC 2014a; 2014b).
Transfer pricing and the taxation of TNCs pose the biggest challenge to
current trade regimes, as identifying and measuring ‘market-based’ pri-
ces for exports, imports, and even for intra-firm financing is extremely
difficult. There are several potential problems. First, it is sometimes diffi-
cult to determine whose income is identified and measured. The defini-
tions of resident and nonresident taxpayers differ. Second, the arm’s
length principle championed by OECD and bilateral tax treaties that are
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usually based on it provide rules for dividing incomes within companies,
but their application is far from straightforward (Clausing 2003; Durst
and Culbertson 2003; Eden 2016; Picciotto 1992; 2016), and the new initia-
tives by OECD and individual countries have fallen short from abolish-
ing artificial profit shifting. As a result, corporations get large freedoms
to decide where they want to show profit (Yl€onen and Teivainen 2015).
Considering all this, EC’s decision to consider transfer-pricing related tax
incentives as de facto subsidies was in many ways understandable
(Braumer 2005, 279).
Typically, trade agreements permit a wide range of exceptions, but
these exceptions need to be explicitly specified in the contract. Thus prob-
lems arise when required policies have not been foreseen in the trade
negotiations. There are examples of trade agreements where one party of
the agreement has knowingly under-regulated some aspect of its econ-
omy, and the other party has later unsuccessfully challenged this under-
regulation in WTO.4 Therefore, one could expect that a country with
intentionally under-regulated financial services could find interventions
against these practices as a violation of the trade agreement. Further-
more, the use of investor-state dispute settlements has grown in place of
conventional inter-state disputes. This increases the likelihood that finan-
cial actors use arbitration panels to protect themselves against anti-tax
avoidance policies.
To further complicate the issue, Bastin (2014) has suggested that WTO
rules could also be used to advocate for more stringent control of trans-
fer-pricing rules. In key role here is the Committee on Customs Valua-
tions (CCV) of the WTO and its sister committee in the World Customs
Organization, namely the Technical Committee on Customs Valuations
(TCCV). Both committees are engaged in transfer pricing related work.
According to Bastin, the most important outcome from the CCV’s and
TCCV’s work on transfer pricing to date is the TCCV’s Commentary 23.
This Commentary points to the Article 1(2)(a) of the WTO’s Customs Val-
uation Agreement5, which states that the ‘circumstances surrounding the
sale’ should be used to assist the determination of whether the relation-
ship between the parties influenced the price (Bastin 2014, 69). This arti-
cle could potentially be used to tackle aggressive corporate tax
avoidance. Moreover, Bastin (2014, 76) highlights the Article XXIII(1)(b)
of GATT. It dictates that
(1) if any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing
to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or
impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is
being impeded as the result of (…)
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure,
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement (…)
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the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment
of the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other
contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any
contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consider-
ation to the representations or proposals made to it.
In principle, this article could also be used to challenge tax-driven
transfer-pricing decisions. However, effective application of these articles
and commentaries would require both sufficient knowledge on interna-
tional trade and tax law, and the political will and vision to employ this
knowledge. The concept of epistemic arbitrage by Seabrooke (2014, 50)
can be useful in understanding this dynamic. Epistemic arbitrage refers
to the ways in which ‘particular professionals are able to exploit differen-
ces in professional knowledge pools for strategic advantage by position-
ing particular forms of knowledge as the most appropriate to deal with
particular problems’. When successful, ‘those engaging in epistemic arbi-
trage—the arbitrageurs—can become epistemic “arbiters” who decide
how to address transnational problems and who can address them’
(Seabrooke 2014, 50). While the significance of expertise has been noted
for example in reference to the capacity of civil society organizations to
influence trade policy (Trommer 2014), increasing convergence of trade
and tax policies creates a demand for new kinds of experts or teams of
experts that can operate simultaneously in both domains. Thus the suc-
cessful utilization of the lock-in of policy tools depends increasingly on
how well states or interest groups are able to tap in to these epistemic
communities. Related to this, the next section will discuss how Panama
was able to invoke WTO rules to defend its tax regime.
4. THE CASE OF PANAMA
As noted in the beginning of this article, Panama has been active in link-
ing tax issues to the broader trade agenda. Of particular interest are the
two WTO arbitration cases that Panama has initiated in recent years. The
first case dealt with anti-money laundering efforts by Colombia, and the
second one tried to overhaul Argentinian attempts to enforce an interna-
tional ‘black list’ of tax havens. Both cases can be deemed as wins for Pan-
ama, although the results of the latter case were mixed. A point of further
interest is how these cases have influenced trade policy related discus-
sions in the United States amidst the negotiations for the US–Panama
FTA and the Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) that was
negotiated around the same time.
A country with a population of less than four million people, Panama
is home to more than 350,000 secretive International Business Compa-
nies, second only to Hong Kong and the British Virgin Islands. Panama
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has been an active promoter for secretive and tax-evading trusts and
foundations, as well as being a major player in insurance, boat and ship-
ping registration (Financial Secrecy Index 2015). This offshore interface
(Christensen 2011) and the accompanying ancillary legal and tax services
have made Panama a prominent destination for tax-driven financial
flows. It occupies the 15th place in the 2015 Financial Secrecy Index,
which compares jurisdictions based both on the infrastructure they offer
for concealing investments, as well as their importance in the world
economy.6
The history of Panamanian financial services dates back to 1903, when
the United States supported a revolution in the area that had been a prov-
ince of Colombia. A year after this W. H. Taft, who was the US Secretary
of War and commissioner of the projected canal, drafted a legislation that
formed the basis of the Panamanian financial system. In the same year,
the predecessor of Citibank started business in Panama (Naylor 2004,
186). The Panamanian Flag of Convenience registry began operation in
1919, when Panama helped Standard Oil to avoid US taxes by starting to
register foreign vessels. Financial flows followed, as Wall Street interests
pushed Panama to introduce secrecy-oriented business incorporation
laws in 1927 (Robinson 2003; Shaxson 2011) and trust legislation in 1941
(Aguilar-Alfu 2012). As late as in the 1960s, Panama was one of the only
11 financial centers listed by the US Federal Reserve (quoted in Naylor
2004, xi), highlighting its pioneering role. This can be contrasted with
some 70 centers the IMF listed in the late 1990s (Errico and Musalem
1999).
The OECD’s Harmful Tax Practices initiative began in 1998. Panama did
not commit to reforms based on the OECD’s blacklist of non-compliant
jurisdictions (Sharman 2006, 15). What is more, it was also one of the 14
jurisdictions that formed the International Tax and Investment Organiza-
tion ITIO in March 2001 to counter OECD anti-tax-avoidance efforts
(Sharman 2006, 59).7 In the post-financial crisis environment, Panama
also reacted aggressively to the OECD-led blacklisting effort, for example
by denying Spanish companies access from bidding on the lucrative con-
tracts in the expansion of the Panama Canal (Panama Investor 2008).
At the time of writing, Panama has 14 double tax agreements (DTAs)
and nine TIEAs in force and more pending (International Bar Association
2016). The DTA partner countries involve major economies such as the
Czech Republic, France, Israel, Mexico, Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom, but also Barbados, Luxembourg and the United Arab Emi-
rates. With the exception of Canada and the United States, Panama has
signed all of its TIEAs with a group of Nordic countries that negotiated
these agreements jointly after the 2007–2009 financial crisis, offering
many tax havens a convenient way to escape the second coming of the
OECD’s blacklists.8 Moreover, both the Canadian and the US TIEA
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contained a clause that allowed Panama to deny an information request
‘where the disclosure of the information requested would be contrary to
the public policy of the requested Party’.9 Finally, Panama has also been
one of the few tax havens to effectively opt out from the OECD’s ongoing
effort to expand automatic exchange of tax information, even though the
OECD model still retains several loopholes and thus leaves room for con-
tinuing a secrecy-based development strategy (see, e.g. Bachus 2015; Car-
diel 2016; Rose 2016).
Panama’s refusal to engage in effective international tax cooperation
has been accompanied with its use of trade policies to restrict attempts
by other countries to curtail tax flight and financial crime. Panama has
been a member of the WTO since 1997. During that time, it has been
complainant in seven disputes, a respondent in one dispute and a third
party in eight cases. Since October 2012, Panama also has a new trade
agreement in force with the United States, replacing US unilateral prefer-
ential trade treatment under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act, the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act and the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) (Hornbeck, 2012). Panama has typically
signed cooperation agreements only under pressure and even then, com-
pliance has often remained half-hearted.
We focus on two particular cases in which Panama was the complainant,
out of the total of five issues that Panama has brought to the WTO (one
issue consisting of three similar cases related to banana trade with the EU).
Case 453 is related directly to anti-tax avoidance initiatives applied by
Argentina. Case 366 dealt with Colombian efforts to enforce anti-money
laundering measures. We will present these two cases in Subsections 4.1
and 4.2. The cases are similar to each other in their political significance:
using trade agreements to avoid being subject to effective policies against
tax flight. Yet they utilize different domains of trade agreements: trade in
goods covered by the GATT in 1994 in the case of Colombia, and trade in
financial services covered by the GATS in the case of Argentina.
4.1. The case against Argentina’s anti-tax haven efforts
The case against Argentina started in December 2012, when Panama
brought a complaint to the WTO regarding a range of tax, investment,
and services measures that Argentina had imposed against a number of
countries, which it classified ‘non-cooperative’. The non-cooperative
country status was assigned to countries that refused to sign an agree-
ment with Argentina on the exchange of tax information, or initiate the
necessary negotiations (Panel report10 7.182, referring to Argentine legal
code 589/2013). The measures included ‘less favorable tax treatment in
the collection of profits taxes, discriminatory tax treatment on funds
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entering from the listed countries, discrimination in the valuation of
transactions with persons from the listed countries, and discriminatory
criteria with respect to tax deductions’ (Zagaris 2015, 40), as well as the
criteria for entering the Argentine reinsurance market. The contested leg-
islation consisted of eight separate measures (Panel report 2.13, 2.17,
2.19-2.20, 2.21-2.22, 2.26-2.27, 2.35, 2.37, 2.39-2.40).
Panama argued that these measures illegally discriminated against for-
eign service providers. According to the challenge, Argentina restricted
market access for reinsurance and retrocession services from the listed
countries and imposed authorization requirements ‘for the purchase of
foreign exchange and the repatriation of direct investments by entities in
the listed countries’. Panama considered these measures a violation of
Argentina’s WTO commitments as well as the organization’s core princi-
ples (Zagaris 2015, 40). Specifically, Panama challenged the consistency
of the measures with Article II:1 of the GATS.
In a significant passage, Argentina informed that it had now removed
any references to ‘countries with low or no taxation’, including Panama,
from the decrees (Zagaris 2015, 40). This effectively aligned Argentina’s
decrees with the fiscal transparency coordination criteria of the OECD.
Despite the loopholes in the OECD’s information exchange models, Pan-
ama was not convinced. It deemed the changes ‘superficial’ and
‘cosmetic’. In way of a response, WTO’s DSB decided to establish a panel
to settle the dispute on 25 June 2013. The panel report was circulated in
September later that year, and the final appellate body report was pub-
lished in 14 April 2016.
In its response to the DSB, Argentina argued that the measures were
‘defensive tax measures’, and were in line with the recommendations of
the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax
Purposes (Panel report 7.527), as well as with G20 guidelines. According
to Argentina, the measures were designed to prevent tax evasion, tax
avoidance and fraud (Panel report 7.527, 7.534). Argentina further argued
that Article XIV(c) of the GATS allows actions to prevent deceptive and
fraudulent practices, and as its measures aimed at countering harmful
tax practices, they were arguably consistent with the GATS (Panel report
7.534-7.535). Furthermore, Argentina argued that paragraph 2(a) of
GATS Annex on Financial Services justified some of the measures, as it
allows protecting ‘financial consumers from distortions and abusive
situations’.
In its complaint, Panama argued that GATS aimed solely at securing
non-discrimination between producers of (financial) services, suggesting
that Panama saw trade policy, and particularly GATS, as tools to con-
tinue resisting international tax cooperation. It argued this position
clearly in a submission to the appellate body after the panel decision,
which itself was positive for Panama. Panama appeared to understand
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the rationale behind the imposed measures, but argued that they went
beyond the means necessary to secure compliance with laws and regula-
tions on fraudulent transactions (Panama’s appellants’ submission 5.100,
referred to in Appellate body’s report 6.214). Panama maintained that
the policy statements derived from the OECD and G-20 reports were gen-
eral, abstract, and non-country-specific (Panama’s appellant’s submission
4.37, appellate body’s report 6.149). Furthermore, Panama emphasized
non-discrimination and equally favorable treatment, and saw any politi-
cal sensibilities as a secondary concern. (Appellate body’s report 6.62).
Noteworthily, the panel accepted Argentina’s argument that transac-
tions with entities of non-cooperative countries enable tax evasion
because of the secrecy laws in these countries (Panel report 7.655). The
Panel argued that most of the contested measures contributed to the safe-
guarding Argentina’s tax collection system and to the prevention of
money laundering (Panel report 7.713, 7.717). It also found support for
Argentina’s claim on the importance of accessing tax information in sev-
eral documents by the G20, OECD and the Global Forum (Panel report
7.509-7.513). It even considered the measures to have very little restrictive
impact on international trade, with the exception of one specific measure
(Panel report 7.727). The panel found that Panama was unable to identify
any ‘alternative measures reasonably available for Argentina less trade-
restrictive but with the same objectives’ (Bridges weekly, 21).
The panel did however dismiss Argentina’s claim that general GATS
exceptions allow using measures that violate GATS obligations. As
argued by Panama, paragraph 2(a) should be invoked only when the
measure in question qualifies as ‘domestic regulation’, such as a
‘supplier’s technical standard, qualification or license’ (Panel report
7.828). Practically, the decision delineated the legitimate policy space
available in implementing measures against tax evasion, and the extent
to which GATS exceptions can be invoked. The legal reason given for the
effective lock-in promoted by the panel was mostly based on the concept
of ‘likeness’ (Panel report 7.185–7.186). GATS stipulates that similar treat-
ment should be accorded to ‘like’ services from any origin. Interestingly,
the requirements for ‘like’ treatment include also service suppliers. In
addition to like treatment of ‘service suppliers’ of different origins, a
‘service supplier’ is defined in extremely broad terms (GATS XXVIII b,
g). Thus, the panel reasoned that Argentina treated services and service
suppliers from non-cooperative countries differently than those from co-
operative countries (Panel report 3.1.a-h). In the same vein, some of
Argentina’s measures were seen to accord less favorable treatment to
Panamanian services than like domestic services (Panel report 3.1 b-d).
The panel also noted that Argentina used origin as a basis for distin-
guishing service suppliers on which it imposed the contested measures.
The key point appeared to be, whether Argentina’s measures are
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accorded exclusively on the basis of origin. Superficially, of course, the
distinction used in Argentina’s measures was based exclusively on ori-
gin, since the problems arose directly from the tax haven regime of Pan-
ama. Eventually, ‘like services’ were defined as ‘services which are in a
competitive relationship’ (Panel report 7.159), and the burden of proof to
show that tax avoidance affects the competitive relationship of service
providers was put on Argentina (Panel report 7.179). The panel eventu-
ally found the evidence provided by Argentina insufficient.
The case highlights the diminishing policy space for effective work
against tax evasion when a tax-haven country manages to use epistemic
arbitrage through WTO. The recognition of Argentina’s purposes and the
lack of alternative means did not allow using the exceptions stipulated in
GATS. The Panel explicitly stated that all measures imposed by Argen-
tina fall under the scope of GATS. Therefore, anti-tax evasion policies can
become trade policy issues also in the future. While some of Panama’s
claims were rejected, all eight measures were seen as inconsistent with
GATS II:1 (Panel report 8.2.a), as they do not accord similar treatment to
like services from co-operative countries (Panel report 8.2.b). The appel-
late body further reversed some of the Panel’s findings, but this does not
remove the fact that all WTO organs considered the case to fall within
the scope of GATS. This turns trade agreements into policy tools for tax
havens, and potentially also for countries aiming to oppose them.
4.2. The case against Colombia’s anti-tax haven efforts
Another case in which Panama used trade treaties to challenge anti-
money laundering efforts was the case of Colombia in 2009. This case
once again demonstrates how a country can be forced to prioritize trade
agreement commitments over anti-money laundering policies, even
when their impact on trade is questionable.
Colombia is a prime example of a country suffering from the effects of
money laundering facilitated in great extent by Panama (Panel report
4.14211). According to estimates, over 80 per cent of Colombia’s trade
with Panama is contraband trade. Problems are further exacerbated by
the lack of control in Panama’s free trade zone Colon. It has been identi-
fied as a focal point for illicit trade (Panel report 4.60) and as a key point
for the laundering of Colombian narco-trafficking money. Panama’s
reported exports were threefold in comparison to Colombian imports
from Panama, which indicates under-invoicing and smuggling. Thus
Colombia was faced with an important domestic problem, which it
needed to address (Panel report 4.81).
The uncooperativeness of Panamanian authorities emptied Colombian
attempts to find common solutions (Panel report 4.85). The response rate
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to Colombian assistance requests in customs co-operation was 0.65 per
cent in 2001–2005 (Panel report 4.173). Therefore, Colombia decided to
introduce new measures, requiring certain Panamanian imports such as
footwear and textiles to enter through designated ports of entry (the air-
port of Bogota and the seaport of Barranquilla). These ports were mod-
ern, well-staffed and close to relevant markets, and had dedicated
personnel for contraband concerns (Panel report 4.5; 7.217). In addition,
Colombia established ‘indicative prices’ for certain products for dealing
with price distortions (Panel report 2.11). The policies were a rational
response to a well-established problem: they represented an effective use
of scarce means to counter a specific problem, and their trade-distortive
effect was designed to be minimal, or non-existent, (Panel report 4.171).12
Panama challenged these policies, claiming that the indicative prices
system discriminated internal tax in excess to taxes on like domestic
products, making it inconsistent with Article III:2 of the GATT 1994
(Panel report 4.18), as well as with parts of the Customs Valuation Agree-
ments (Panel report 4.44). Furthermore, Panama argued that restraining
the ports of entry imposed quantitative restrictions that were applied in a
discriminatory way (Panel report 4.33, 4.40), violating the Article XIII:1 of
the GATT 1994 (Panel report 4.32). In its response, Colombia maintained
its position that customs duties based on indicative prices should be seen
as a deposit rather than a payment (Panel report 4.100), and that Colum-
bia has the right to use these indicative prices in examining whether
declared values of goods are truthful or accurate (Panel report 4.105).
Moreover, Colombia claimed that Panama had failed to provide any evi-
dence proving that the referenced measures did indeed restrict trade
(Panel report 4.63).
In its decision, the Panel (WT/DS/366/9) found the indicative prices
measure inconsistent with the Agreement on customs valuation of the
GATT (Panel report 8.1, 8.2) and the ports of entry requirement inconsis-
tent with Article I.1, V:2, V:6 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994. The panel
rejected Colombia’s defense that the ports of entry measure was justified
under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 for securing compliance with
Colombia’s customs legislation (Panel report 8.7), and saw the indicative
prices as discriminatory payments rather than deposits (Panel report
7.87). The panel recognized that the measures were designed to secure
compliance with Colombian legislation and noted the importance of
combating under-invoicing and money laundering (Panel report 7.543,
7.566). Yet it found that Colombia had not proved that the ports of entry
measure contributed to these goals (Panel report 7.585, 7.588, 7.618). The
panel referred merely to the ‘undoubtedly’ increased transaction costs
for Panama. Colombia appears to have been penalized for simulta-
neously using several tools in its anti-money laundering efforts, as it had
644
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
to assume the burden of proof. It would have been far easier to demon-
strate the marginal contribution of a single policy tool.
As a result, Colombia was forced to revise its policies. Furthermore, it
was expected to make the revisions within months, and thus to prioritize
fast compliance with the ruling over normal political and legislative pro-
cedures. Colombia requested a 15-month implementation period so that
it could explore legislative alternatives and their WTO-consistency for
complying with the Panel decision while continuing its anti-tax evasion
efforts (Arbitrator’s report, 13–15). Colombia suggested the increased
number of ports of entry required new legislation in order to continue its
anti-smuggling efforts. Once again, Panama managed to use the WTO
framework to force fast compliance at the expense of political sensibilities
(Arbitrator’s report, 111), even though some previous arbitrators had
noted that new legislations were based on the need to safeguard public
morals and order (Arbitrator’s report, 29). Panama saw the need to
address the underlying problems of customs fraud and contraband irrel-
evant in determining the pace of compliance. Panama thus saw the
implementation as separate from the removal of ‘underlying economic or
social conditions’ (Panama’s submission, para 6, referred to in Arbi-
trator’s report, 37).
Panama argued that there was no ‘unfettered right to any method of
implementation’, and that it only accepted the withdrawal of the indica-
tive prices and ports of entry measures (41). The claim was based on the
idea that any means to replace the ‘payment’ system in indicative prices
with a compulsory ‘guarantee’ system, and restraining the ports of entry,
would violate the same GATT articles (Agreement on customs valuation
and Article XI). Clearly, Panama aimed to ensure that the WTO process
would block any attempts to replace the measures with similar ones.
Several issues stand out in the challenge and in the decisions of the
Panel and the arbitrator. First, there was no existing precedent of such a
case. Second, the status of being a developing country did not deter Pan-
ama from entering the process. Third, Panama launched the case on
behalf of its offshore, not onshore, firms. What is more, the panel did not
require Panama to demonstrate that anti-money laundering rules had a
negative impact on trade. All these issues ought to have led to further
concern, that Panama (or other tax havens with similar characteristics)
could use FTAs to block progressive taxation policy by branding them as
inconsistent with trade treaties. For example the US-Panama FTA has
raised concerns that it provides Panama measures for similar legal strug-
gles against progressive tax legislation. While this concern has mostly
been voiced by the civil society (Tucker 2011), even the US administration
was hesitant to enter the FTA before signing a TIEA with Panama (Horn-
beck 2012, 2–3).
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5. RETHINKING THE TRADE-TAX NEXUS
Trade, investment, and tax policies have traditionally been seen as com-
plementary (Slemrod and Avi-Yonah 2001, 533), and the supranational
dimension of the WTO or other trade treaties has not been thought to
affect the operation of the international tax regime. When tax and trade
policies have been discussed together, they have usually been compared
to each other instead of analyzing the ways in which these two spheres
overlap (Rixen 2008, 178). While this arrangement did not cause any seri-
ous problems for long periods of time, the conflict between the interna-
tional trade and tax regimes has now become more pronounced (Bastin
2014; Brauner 2005, 256; EC 2014a; 2014b).
What is changing, to begin with, is the comprehensiveness and regula-
tive form of the policy domains. The WTO aims to harmonize domestic
legislation, operating in a virtual international economic space as an
interface between the various legal systems. In general, WTO does not
directly modify or relate to any specific domestic regulation, but rather
dictates standards with which member countries align their laws. Trade
treaties are based on pooling together sovereignty for a common cause,
which can either restrict or support international cooperation against tax
avoidance and evasion. In this sense, the pooling process differs
markedly from the pooling of sovereignty witnessed in the field of tax
policy, which is more typically geared to combating international tax
wars (Christensen and Shaxson 2016) between states than it is to acceler-
ating them (Genschel and Rixen 2015).
The trade policy regime, which was for a long time moving towards
more coherence, has reached something of an impasse. It is now evolving
again through a myriad of regional and bilateral treaties, and thus func-
tions as a platform for sporadic harmonization. In the case of tax policy,
on the other hand, there have been frequent attempts to form ever more
comprehensive policies, in part because there is a strong push for multi-
lateral solutions, manifested already in the development of multilateral
tax information exchange. This shifting dynamic also both intensifies
negotiations between the two policy domains, and creates more opportu-
nities for policies and business practices that seek to benefit from the
overlaps. In earlier decades, the fragmented international tax regime
could operate relatively independently from the coordinated trade
regime. Now, the increasingly patched trade policy regime can, in sur-
prising ways, affect efforts to build a more coordinated tax policy regime,
instead of being the policy domain dictating global uniformity in policies.
The increasing overlaps between trade and tax agendas create also
challenges for the prevailing theories in IR and global political economy
that have been used to explain these kinds of phenomena. In particular,
this calls for reassessment of the traditional theories of new
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constitutionalism. This theory has correctly pointed out that policies
advocated in trade deals to be very resistant to political change, and that
the ‘power of transnational capital depends on the form and character of
state institutions’ (Gill 2008, 116). However, our case studies show that
this lock-in should in some cases be seen rather as a tool for given gov-
ernments to push their agenda, instead of as a strict and pre-negotiated
limitation on the existing policy space, or even a ‘regulatory chill’. While
lock-in effect might be very real in the sense of effective insulation from
democratic politics, the case studies demonstrate that the ways that poli-
cies are locked in can be unanticipated when the treaties are signed. The
new constitutional theory generally does a good job in picturing the bal-
ance of power between capital and the political realm, but it typically
assumes that global uniform treaties limit the policy space especially of
smaller national states (Gill 2008, 138–142). Yet it appears that the power
of capital might enable even miniscule nations means to affect or direct
the power of mobile international capital. The ‘constitutional’ power in
trade policy needs to be understood not as a straightforward lock-in, but
rather locking in policy tools, which can be utilized by experts to differ-
ent ends.
Even though these notions might appear as purely theoretical in the
cases discussed at length above, in other instances a similar trade-tax
convergence can create tools for pushing for more progressive agendas.
As an example, we pointed out that the existing trade treaties could cre-
ate grounds for challenging aggressive transfer pricing regimes and poli-
cies. Moreover, we highlighted how the state aid regulation in the EU
has developed rather sporadically to a point where tax concessions
granted for companies like Starbucks and Apple are commonly seen as
illegal subsidies, even though the majority of the revenues to these Irish
and Luxembourgian subsidiaries come from other countries.
These notions point to the significance of the role of arbitration special-
ists not only in traditional trade issues (Schneiderman 2000), but also as
gatekeepers in trade disputes whose outcomes can either promote or hin-
der policies against tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax havens. Looking
at the myriad of different ways trade policies have influenced or can
influence tax policies through WTO, EU and other channels, it would be
a grave oversimplification to say that these developments would have
outright separated ‘the “economic” from the “political” and “locked in”
already-adopted free market policies through use of legal guarantees and
sanctions to favour private determination of economic policy’ (Gill
1998b, 25). Rather, the intertwining of tax and trade policies gives more
power to the agents that understand the connections between these pol-
icy spheres and can either exploit them or recruit the necessary expertise
for doing that. These agents can either be states or advocacy groups that
are able to make states to adopt their agenda. Thus while the outcome of
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the processes described above can indeed be in line with what is called
neoliberal, the politics are not outright ‘disciplinary’ (Gill 2008, 137–138),
but rather open a space for the experts to maneuver. In such a contested
space, the existing policy tools can well be locked-in in a very constitu-
tional manner, but the political outcomes are not completely closed or
predetermined. This can be highlighted also by the evolution of the EU
state aid regime: in absence of clear policy coordination from the Euro-
pean Council, the civil servants in the European Commission have grad-
ually expanded the state aid regime to include also tax avoidance issues.
Even though Panama has a population of less than 4 million people, it
has had the required expertise and the will to come up with ways to har-
ness WTO rules for promotion of its political goals. This expertise
appears to be significant in the cases described above, implying that geo-
political hegemony (Cox 1983) is not sufficient in analyzing political pos-
sibilities and limitations to maneuver in the context of global policy.
Rather, the cases are an example of epistemic arbitrage (Seabrooke 2014)
where the holders of particular kind of specialized information become
gatekeepers in policy-making. However, the examples highlighted earlier
by Bastin demonstrate that some other small or big state could do the
same by employing different GATS articles for curbing international tax
avoidance and evasion. What is more, the EC has also resorted to plenty
of improvisation in its gradual shift that has resulted in seeing some
aggressive corporate tax practices as state aid. In this case, the shift has
been a result of unwillingness of the European Council to provide politi-
cal guidance, which has increased the role of soft law and improvisation
in EC’s alignments.
As we noted briefly in the Section 2, this fragmentation can also greatly
affect the commercialization of sovereignty (Palan 2002). Whereas exist-
ing research has highlighted the importance of tax legislation and tax
advisory firms in attempts to lure investors and companies to tax havens
(Fichtner 2016; Hakelberg 2016; Sikka and Hampton 2005; Sikka 2008),
the Panama case studies demonstrate that the ways in which trade poli-
cies are enforced can also be a major factor. Secrecy jurisdictions have
typically been quick to copy new financial ‘innovations’ from each other,
and there is no reason to expect that the aggressive use of trade policies
would be an exception.
Much depends also on how major onshore states see the trade-tax
nexus. Traditionally, the United States has expressed the view that trade
agreements should not impact the national tax system(s). The rationale
behind this is that the interaction of tax systems should remain the sub-
ject of bilateral tax treaties. However, the EU has moved more aggres-
sively to bring trade and tax rules into closer harmonization for a long
time (McDaniel 2000, 1621). One potentially complicating factor is also
that both the United States and the EU host significant tax havens.
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Moreover, as noted in section two, trade policies can, in some cases, also
help to curtail international tax avoidance. In the case studies we demon-
strated how a ‘traditional tax haven’ focusing on banking and financial
secrecy practices was able to use trade policies to dodge attempts for bet-
ter tax regulation.
What lies in the future? Brauner suggests, that the international trade
and tax regimes should be co-ordinated, even though they cannot be sim-
ply reconciled. It is easy to second this call. According to Brauner, such
coordination would benefit from the establishment of an international
tax organization, separate from the WTO. Such an organization should
be tasked with the responsibility of making the evolving international tax
regime more compatible with the international trade regime (Brauner
2005, 254). The ‘disconnect’ between the trade and tax regimes is seen as
detrimental to the international tax regime (Brauner 2005, 258). Most
countries (including the United States) do not coordinate their trade and
tax regimes. As best expressed by one US scholar, ‘[t]his country’s tax
framework is about as poorly adapted to GATT as is imaginable’ (Brau-
ner 2005, 262). Recently, similar calls for international tax organization
(which in itself is an old idea) have been also voiced by prominent schol-
ars of international tax governance, such as Tanzi (2016).
Our contributions in this article are in part forward-looking. To the best
of our knowledge, only Panama has used the WTO complaint route to
put a curb on attempts to enforce anti-tax abuse rules. It remains to be
seen when and how other tax havens will follow its example. Given the
fast pace of mimicking of financial innovations in the offshore industry,
it would be surprising if other tax havens remained idle while Panama
vigorously defends its tax regime.
We note that further research could be conducted in at least four fields.
First, the existing WTO treaties may have an impact on recent interna-
tional policy measures for the regulation of international tax matters. Sec-
ond, since the early 2000s, the focus of trade policy discussions has
shifted from the WTO to regional and bilateral treaties. This new and
more dispersed body of regulation can also have diverse impacts on
international tax regulation. And third, further studies could be done on
the relationship between the international tax regime and other policy
areas. As for example, most of the debt conditionalities imposed by the
World Bank, the IMF, and more recently by the EU typically include a
myriad of tax-related provisions. Given the large number of these pro-
grams during the past 35 years, their impact on the international tax
regime must also be considerable. Fourth, motifs behind Panama’s
actions merit further research: why and how Panama ended up choosing
WTO as a platform to defend its secrecy regime?
In addition to the broad analysis of global tax governance and the role
of FTAs, we suggest that the theory of new constitutionalism should also
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accommodate notions rising from the analysis presented above. Specifi-
cally, ‘locking in’ policies should not be seen as only restricting demo-
cratic sovereignty with supranational ‘constitutional’ means. As we have
shown, the politics of new constitutionalism in trade policy can also
mean locking in the power of globalized capital by providing political
tools for ‘commercialized sovereigns’ to resist attempts to universalize
and harmonize progressive schemes within other policy fields. Thus the
study of the intersections of trade and tax policy also calls for further the-
oretical reconsideration.
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NOTES
1. Many of these initiatives (especially the ones related to information
exchange) address also other issues than just tax-haven tax avoidance.
2. Neo-realist scholars would argue that this forum shifting is made possible by
overlapping ‘regime complexes’ (e.g. Orsini et al. 2013 and Keohane and Vic-
tor 2010), which enable political players to advocate similar measures under
various regimes.
3. We speak interexchangeably of tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions. Devel-
oped originally by Murphy (2008, see also Meinzer 2016, 268), the latter con-
cept is less known but more accurate, since secrecy is the most important
characteristic of tax haven structures. The choice of terms is more than
semantics, not least because any meaningful definition or listing of tax
havens has to take into account prevailing secrecy laws and practices.
4. See e.g. NAFTA Arbitration pursuant in chapter 20 on the matter of cross-
border trucking services (File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01), Final report of the
panel, x259-260.
5. Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, 1994.
6. In addition to small island states such as Panama, the index features also sev-
eral major powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom as the
City of London is also a major tax haven. The top three jurisdictions in the
2015 index are Switzerland, Hong Kong and the United States, the latter
because the combination of a great importance in the world economy and
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serious defects in company ownership data, publicity and international tax
information exchange.
7. An exception was the post 9/11 situation, when Panama followed many
other Caribbean tax havens in agreeing to exchange tax information with the
United States in late 2001 and early 2002 (Sharman 2006, 74). Moreover, ITIO
later changed its name to International Trade and Investment Organisation.
8. As a further detail, the Nordic group also involved the Faroe Islands and
Greenland. The relatively small combined economic importance of these
countries led some scholars to judge the OECD’s blacklist exercise as white-
washing (e.g. Sawyer 2011).
9. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Republic of Panama for Cooperation and the
Exchange of Information Relating to Taxes (2010) and Agreement Between
Canada and The Republic Of Panama for Tax Cooperation and the Exchange
of Information Relating to Taxes (2013).
10. We use ‘Panel report’ to refer to WTO (2015) and ‘Appellate body’s report’ to
refer to WTO (2016) in this subchapter. Numbers in these references refer to
paragraphs in the document, not page numbers.
11. We use ‘Panel report’ to refer to WTO (20009a) and ‘Arbitrator’s report’ to
refer to WTO (2009b) in this subchapter. Numbers in these references refer
to paragraphs in the document, not page numbers.
12. Apart from the location and adequate staffing of the ports, the indicative pri-
ces were based on market surveys.
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ABSTRACT
Intra-firm trade is an emerging issue. One of its key elements is the
international shifting of profits, for example, through transfer pricing that
big enterprises use to cross-subsidise their subsidiaries, often to avoid
taxes. Accounting rules conceal much of the information about transfer
pricing, reproducing secrecy and facilitating the use of administered
prices. Given the prevalence of administered price setting, a significant
amount of international trade cannot be meaningfully analysed as market
transactions. This provokes questions about the validity of market
assumptions in research on trade in particular and global capitalism more
generally. Our specific contribution focuses on the role of the arm’s
length principle and the significance of cross-subsidisation and other
forms of corporate planning in intra-firm trade. Under certain conditions,
price planning by private corporations should be analysed as political rule
within the economic sphere. Since the politics of the world economy is
not merely related to governmental intervention, corporations should also
be theorised as potentially political entities. Crossing the disciplinary
boundaries between political economy and normative political theory, we
suggest that the politicisation of intra-firm trade opens possibilities for
creating more effective responses to price administration and for creating
more democratic ways of governing the global economy.
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Introduction1
The societal power of the corporation has become a much-debated topic in many fields from
accounting and management studies to economics, tax law, business ethics, and global political
economy.2 Intra-firm trade has been highlighted as an increasingly important phenomenon in this
growing body of research (the second section). Our contribution focuses on largely neglected
aspects of intra-firm trade: namely, the impacts of the planned intra-firm prices for analyses of the
global ‘market’ economy and the opportunities this can create for democratic politics. We argue
that the dominant free-market ideology faces an anomaly, as statistics suggest that a significant
part of world trade is based on pricing planned in corporate headquarters. Intra-firm trade offers a
suitable starting point for understanding the political aspects of the corporate form because of its
significance for global corporate-driven capitalism. We argue that understanding the political
aspects of the corporation requires revising some key assumptions about the role of markets in
global political economy.
In the third section, we continue by arguing that the legitimacy of hierarchic corporate control
over significant aspects of society is based on concealing its political dimensions, and suggest that
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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the non-market dimension of the firm has far-reaching theoretical and normative implications. Even if
scholars have started to pay more attention to intra-firm trade, most analyses of the global economy
tend to assume a dichotomy between politics and markets, with corporations neatly belonging to the
latter. We suggest that this dichotomy should be questioned in order to understand the politics of
intra-firm trade. To conclude, in the fourth section, we discuss the policy lessons of our findings.
Our contributions are relevant both for developing concrete policies that would hinder illicit tax
avoidance, as well as for creating space for more democratic rules of world trade. The existing
reform proposals for international corporate taxation tend to pay insufficient attention to the ideo-
logical nature of these rules.
Our analysis draws from previous studies that have revealed that transactions planned in corpor-
ate headquarters constitute a significant proportion of global trade. In 1996, the United Nations (UN)
estimated that one-third of world trade was conducted within transnational corporations (UNCTAD
1996). In 2004, United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) assessed that
half of the service trade from the United States could be considered intra-firm (UNCTAD 2004).
Using 2009 customs data, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
found that intra-firm trade accounted for 48 per cent of US goods imports and about 30 per cent
of US goods exports (Lanz and Miroudot 2011). The authors also pointed out that
intra-firm transactions are more common among OECD countries than among emerging economies. In 2009, 58
per cent of U.S. goods imports from OECD countries were intra-firm, while only 29 per cent of US goods imports
from Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa (so called BRIICS economies) occurred
between related parties.3
There is plenty of direct and indirect evidence that intra-ﬁrm prices often differ from market-based
prices (see, e.g. Overesch 2006, Webb 2006, Ylönen and Laine 2015).
Planning may seem a natural aspect of any strategic action. Intra-firm trade, however, involves
planning of a foundational market-economy mechanism, namely prices, which can be adjusted for
avoiding taxes or for hiding risk. As many authors have shown (e.g. Picciotto 1992, Overesch 2006,
Sikka and Willmott 2010, Christensen 2011, Jenkins and Newell 2013, Keuschnigg and Devereux
2013, Genschel and Rixen 2014, Durst 2016, Fichtner 2016, Mehta and Siu 2016), tax authorities
face enormous challenges in monitoring intra-firm trade and enforcing domestic tax laws. It is
thus not surprising that aggressive tax avoidance has been highlighted as a key issue in much of
the academic research on the intra-firm trade (see, e.g. Sikka and Willmott 2010, Christensen 2011,
Pogge and Mehta 2016).
Intra-firm trade deviates from the basic ideals of the market economy, as it takes place between
units of the same corporate entity. These non-market aspects of the firm have also been recognised
by the mainstream economics and accounting scholarship.4 In economic theory, the transaction costs
approach pioneered by Coase (1988) has played a particularly important role in determining why it
may make more economic sense to organise production hierarchically within a firm rather than
through market transactions.5 One dimension of the social acceptability of hierarchic organisation
can be measured by the performance of the bottom line.
The double role of the arm’s length principle
How can a ‘free’ market be based on administered and planned prices? Since the legitimacy of the
existing framework of world trade is often based on free-market assumptions, the question is also
normative. One way to deal with the mismatch between the theory of markets and the reality of
price planning is through artificially establishing competitive markets in those parts of the world
trade that deviate from the market assumptions. To accomplish this, states have agreed on national
and international norms for facilitating market-based transactions within big corporations. As regards
the intra-firm trade, the two most important norms are the separate entity principle and the arm’s
length principle. The separate entity principle goes back to the early development of the corporate
2 M. YLÖNEN AND T. TEIVAINEN
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law in the United States and Britain, as courts and legislators started to view companies belonging to
a single enterprise as separate entities in front of the law (e.g. Biondi et al. 2007, Robé 2011, Ireland
2016). This not only facilitated the growth of the modern corporations, but it also enabled corpor-
ations to benefit from the differences between states and other territorial jurisdictions.
Championed by the OECD, and to a lesser extent by the UN, the arm’s length principle dictates
that whenever two parts of the same corporate entity trade with each other, they should set the
prices as if they were at ‘arm’s length’ from each other (Eden 2016).6 This principle helps combine
the anomaly of planned prices with an analytical framework of ‘free’ markets. According to Aspers
(2011: 4), markets are ‘constituted by two roles, buyer and seller, each standing on one side of the
market, facing the other’. In this structure, the arm’s length principle can function as a mechanism
that helps corporations simulate or construct markets in their intra-firm trade. In practice, it is difficult
to find evidence that the arm’s length principle would significantly contribute to sustaining genuine,
functioning markets within corporations. Instead, as we will argue in more detail below, it plays an
important ideological role in legitimising non-market aspects of world trade.
Definitional ambiguities and enforcement difficulties have always restricted the applicability of the
arm’s length principle. Its history dates back to the US War Revenue Act of 1917 (Avi-Yonah 1995: 94),
the work of the International Chamber of Commerce Conference in the 1920s (OECD 2005: 81), and
the League of Nations Model Tax Conventions that prevailed during the first half of the twentieth
century (de Ruiter 2012, Vega 2012). Since the early years, corporations have actively tried to
shape the arm’s length regime. The development of the US transfer pricing regulation is a telling
example, as it was partly a result of active lobbying by large pharmaceutical companies. The 1963
Convention paved the way for the international triumph of the arm’s length principle, which can
now be found in most bilateral tax treaties that regulate taxation of transnational corporations
(Durst and Culbertson 2003).
The arm’s length principle was initially expressed in relatively general terms, and the lack of
detailed rules restricted its application in many countries (Linde 1977: 82 quoted in Vega 2012:
11). When the principle started to be applied in the US courts, the first cases combined a strict appli-
cation of the arm’s length principle based on market comparables with ad hoc methods that allowed
prices that seemed ‘not unreasonable’, or ‘fair and fairly arrived at’ (Avi-Yonah 1995: 100). This ambi-
guity was accentuated by the early, strict definition of the principle that focused on market compar-
ables. Specifically, the Revenue Act of 1934 stated that the ‘standard to be applied in every case is that
of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with another uncontrolled taxpayer’ (quoted in
Avi-Yonah 1995: 97). Conferences were organised already in the 1940s to tackle these problems (see
Palan et al. 2013: 192–3).
As recently as in the early 1970s, tax auditors used uncontrolled comparables only sporadically to
test compliance with the arm’s length standard (Durst 2010: 24). In 1972, Rädler tellingly pointed out
that ‘reference to the so-called arm’s length rule usually does not lead much further, since to an ever-
increasing extent similar or even comparable deliveries or services are carried out only within the one
multinational company’. This sporadic approach, however, did not mean that tax authorities were
idle. In the United States, tax authorities contested the tax agreements of several multinational cor-
porations from the 1930s onward, but often had to rely on other methods than using comparables. As
a consequence, the emphasis shifted from the ideal of ‘uncontrolled taxpayers’ to using other
methods to determine acceptable transfer prices.
In the 1960s, the US Treasury Regulation 1.482-2(e) described three methods for determining an
arm’s length price in international situations:7 the comparable uncontrolled price method, the resale
price method, and the cost plus method, in that order of priority. Where none of these were appli-
cable, the courts were left free to determine their own ‘fourth methods’ (Avi-Yonah 1995: 107).
According to Avi-Yonah, the result was ‘a deliberate decision to retreat from the standard while
still paying lip service to it’ (1995:112). The loosening of criteria did not, however, solve the inherent
problems of the principle. In 1985, the House Report on House Bill (quoted in Avi-Yonah 1995: 130)
noted how
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[the] fundamental problem is the fact that the relationship between related parties is different from that of unre-
lated parties. Observers have noted that multinational companies operate as an economic unit, and not ‘as if’ they
were unrelated to their foreign subsidiaries. In addition, a parent corporation that transfers potentially valuable
property to its subsidiary is not faced with the same risks as if it were dealing with an unrelated party.
These problems were further addressed in the United States in 1988 in a U.S. Treasury Department
white paper on intercompany pricing, and the consequent 1994 revision of the US tax code. The
white paper argued that the lack of comparables restricted application of the traditional arm’s
length principle. Methods introduced in 1968 had helped keep the system functioning, but the
white paper went further in introducing the option of using proﬁt-split methods as well, ‘as long
as the results reached were compatible with arm’s length results’ (Avi-Yonah 1995: 135). This was
a signiﬁcant step away from the idealised comparables and market-based prices. Major develop-
ments also took place in international forums, as the OECD Council approved the OECD’s Transfer
Pricing Guidelines in 1995, initially formulated in 1979. The 1995 Guidelines were an important
step toward a more comprehensive normative framework, despite many problems of monitoring
and enforcement remaining (OECD 2010: 3, 2013). In line with the US regulations, the OECD guide-
lines also allowed the use of various methods to determine taxable income where comparable prices
could not be found.
While the problems inherent in the transfer pricing regulation are old, they have been accentuated
as world trade has grown, characterised by its increasing concentration within large companies and
corporate groups that operate across national borders. The recent decades have also seen a massive
growth in the services trade, in tandem with a trend by which decentred corporations (Desai 2008)
separate their internal wealth chains (Seabrooke and Wigan 2017) from their value chains (Gereffi and
Korzeniewicz 1994, Henderson et al. 2002), for example, by centralising the ownership of intangible
rights from several group companies to one ‘Intellectual Property company’, often located in a low-
tax jurisdiction (see Palazzi 2011: 24).8 These developments have made it even more difficult to deter-
mine the comparable market prices, even though states have begun to monitor the intra-firm trade
more rigorously. The arm’s length system is thus highly vulnerable to manipulation. These policy
changes have been helping tax authorities and companies to go on with their day-to-day business,
but they have distanced the arm’s length principle far from its original purpose. Yet, as we will argue,
the principle continues to play an important ideological role.
Most transfer pricing-related profit shifting is conducted with small deviations from the estimated
market prices, with major impacts on the geographical distribution of income within large corpor-
ations (Seabrooke and Wigan 2017).9 Companies can, however, also engage in more aggressive
forms of planning, enabled by the difficulties states face in enforcing and monitoring their transfer
pricing rules. De Boyrie et al. (2007: 474) have described how
in November 2005, a set of golf clubs is imported into Nigeria for $4,976, while the US/World median price for the
same set of clubs is only $82. During the same month, a gasoline generator is imported into Ghana from the USA
at a price of $60,000 that could be purchased at the US/World median price of $63.03.
Ylönen and Laine (2015) demonstrated how the major pulp and paper company Stora Enso was able
to handle the invoicing of its pulp trade between Brazil and its internal customers in Europe via a
subsidiary in the Netherlands, even though the pulp was shipped via Belgium. The arrangement gen-
erated 300 million of euros of proﬁts in the Dutch invoicing centre between 2005 and 2010, with an
effective tax rate of 3 per cent. The arrangement was based on the use of low transfer prices in the
trade between Brazil and the Netherlands, combined with the use of market-based prices in sales
from the Dutch subsidiary to the parent company.
Furthermore, determining the market-based comparable prices can be genuinely difficult for both
corporations and states. Corporate secrecy and inadequate statistics make it difficult to estimate
market-based prices for many commodities and services. Consequently, corporations are often
unable to even roughly estimate the prices their competitors use in their internal trade. Increasing
the transparency of country-level financial information through the so-called country-by-country
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reporting promoted by many scholars, organisations and tax justice activists could alleviate this
problem at least for tax authorities. Unsurprisingly, corporate interest groups have opposed such
measures. In its broad version, the country-by-country reporting initiative would make the essential
country-level financial information on transnational corporations publicly available at the company’s
website. At the moment, these data are scattered across national company registers whose level of
openness and accessibility varies greatly (see Murphy 2009, 2016). Greater transparency would help
tax authorities and the public to understand the tax avoidance arrangements, but it would not solve
the underlying problems of the arm’s length principle.
Consequently, we argue that the arm’s length principle plays a double role. On the one hand, it is
an instrument to establish markets within hierarchical corporate structures. There is enough evidence
to suggest that the arm’s length principle is a failure in market creation, demonstrated by the slow
but steady shift of transfer pricing rules from the search for comparables to other pricing
methods. Michael Durst, former director of the Advance Pricing Agreement Program of the US
Internal Revenue Service, has aptly noted that ‘despite many efforts at reform around the world
during the 40 years or so in which the current system has played an important international role, gov-
ernments have never been able to administer the system effectively’. What is more, he saw little pro-
spect of getting the system to function in the future ‘no matter how hard one seeks to reform’ it
(Durst 2010: 247).
There exists, however, a role in which the arm’s length principle has been more successful. We
suggest that the principle also helps maintain non-market planning operations within corporations.
The principle offers a basis for assuming that markets exist in places where their presence is difficult
to verify in practice but ideologically important to simulate in theory. In this sense, it clearly plays an
ideological role. This role of the arm’s length principle can be compared to another body-part meta-
phor, the invisible hand. As in the human body, each part has a function that sustains the whole. The
invisible hand, albeit mentioned only in passing by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations ([1776] 2003:
572; see also Rothschild 1994, Watson 2005), has been constantly evoked to support the claim that
market economy contributes to the overall public good.
Scholars have debated both societal and academic roles of the invisible hand from various view-
points for decades (Rothschild 1994, Aydinonat 2008: 81–92). In world trade, the arm’s length prin-
ciple arguably plays an even more fundamental role, because it can be evoked to resolve the prior
question of whether a market economy actually exists. Even if it is sometimes recognised that its
flaws and ambiguities favour corporate interests (see Webb 2006: 110–11), the ideological role of
the arm’s length principle has not received the critical examination it deserves.
These monitoring and enforcement problems imply that the arm’s length principle has been a
failure only if we judge by its ability to create markets where they do not exist. The same difficulties,
however, can be considered important elements in the success of the principle in justifying the non-
market aspects of intra-firm trade, so that they seem compatible with the normative foundations of
the market economy. Its success is not perfect, as demonstrated by the insufficient OECD-driven
attempts to ‘fix’ the arm’s length principle with its Base Erosion Profit Shifting (BEPS) project
(OECD 2013); the increasing calls for unitary taxation; and the growing public attention to these
issues. By focusing on these aspects of world trade, we hope to contribute to further understanding
of the politics of price planning in big corporations.
What does it mean to analyse corporations as systems of planning?
The political planning of intra-firm trade
According to Aspers (2011: 4), a key feature of the market is that its ‘actors – individuals and firms –
compete with each other’. In addition, Lazonick (1991: 59) has noted how the ‘definitional social
characteristic of a market is the impersonal relation between buyer and seller’. Both characterise
markets as dominated by independent, rival firms. In the intra-firm trade, the buyer and seller are,
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however, part of the same decision-making structure. Therefore, the relationship is far from ‘imper-
sonal’, and not ‘competitive’ in the standard market-economy sense. The veil of corporate secrecy
protects intra-firm transactions, whereas the market ideal assumes that relevant information is avail-
able to all key participants. This reasoning suggests that a significant part of world trade could hardly
be characterised as a market economy. There is evidence that corporate planning conducted through
cross-subsidisation and administered prices is so widespread that characterising real-world global
capitalism as a market economy is misleading.
Even if the simplistic market assumptions about world trade are non-realistic, planning the intra-
firm trade surely also involves market considerations. If the intra-firm price of a particular good or
service deviates from ‘going market price’, thus violating the arm’s length principle, the overall
price planning of the company still needs to respond to various external pressures that include unde-
niable market elements.10 This does not, however, invalidate our hypothesis of big corporations as
centralised planning entities. After all, states need to take market considerations into account in
their economic planning as well. For example, trade treaties include elements that induce states to
imitate markets by transforming government functions into state-owned companies (Schneiderman
2000). The prices used in this trade are also supposed to reflect market-based prices, but determining
the latter is often impossible. Even in cases where governments are strongly conditioned by such
rules and market signals, few would argue that this would turn them into non-political entities.
This establishes our first argument for questioning any strict demarcations between markets and poli-
tics in corporate sphere, as being conditioned by markets and being political are not mutually exclu-
sive conditions. Nevertheless, we still need to address the question of how to best define the
relationship between politics and markets in the non-market setting of intra-firm trade. Toward
this end, it is useful to address also terminological issues.
In the academic literature, the difficulty of determining ‘true’ transfer prices has been discussed
using terms such as ‘misuse of transfer pricing’ (as in Lakhal 2006: 545), ‘abusive transfer pricing’
(as in Lesage et al. 2010: 156), ‘distortion of transfer prices’ (Fuest and Riedel 2010: 5), ‘abnormal
prices’ (Fuest and Riedel 2010: 7), ‘enlarged import prices’ (Fuest and Riedel 2010: 17), and ‘over-
and under-invoiced prices’ (Eden 2003: 11). Most of these terms point to an intentional agency
that directly impacts price formation in intra-firm trade. Even if the value-laden nature of these
terms is often forgotten, the choice of ethically loaded terms such as ‘abusive’ is at least potentially
politicising, as it suggests that there is something else at play than the market mechanism. On the
other hand, terms such as ‘enlarged’ or ‘distorted’ prices implicitly suggest that it is possible to
define market-based prices. As argued earlier, this is often not the case.
The term ‘profit shifting’ avoids this assumption but lacks the ethical tone. Used already in the
1960s by Kaldor (1963: 20), it has recently become a popular concept, not least because of the
OECD’s Base Erosion Profit Shifting project (2013). In addition, ‘profit shifting’ has featured in many
other publications (e.g. Development Working Group 2011, FitzGerald 2012). One way to define
profit shifting is to see it as ‘strategic actions taken by firms that result in profits being reported in
a tax favorable jurisdiction’ (Cederwall 2015). Related to this, the OECD understands base erosion
and profit shifting as ‘shifting profits away from the jurisdictions where the activities creating
those profits take place or by exploiting gaps in the interaction of domestic tax rules where corporate
income is not taxed at all’ (2015: 42). However, there are two further concepts that succeed in high-
lighting the planning aspect of intra-firm trade, namely cross-subsidisation and administration of
prices.
To recap the argument so far, we made the case that states and large corporations have more in
common than prevalent dichotomies of trade research often assume. States increasingly operate
under market-based assumptions. Even more importantly, non-market-based economic planning is
more prevalent in large corporations than many political-economy analytical frameworks assume.
Hence, there is a case to be made to analyse large corporations without the economistic assumptions
that associate planning only with state intervention. Both large corporations and states participate in
planning the markets and marketing their plans. There are obvious differences between them,
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including the territorial boundaries that delimit the potential for state action, the greater role of states
as creators of binding normative frameworks, and the ability of states to declare a state of exception
(Schmitt 1927, Agamben 2005). However, both governments and corporations can be rule-makers as
well as rule-takers, although often in different venues and processes. At times, corporations can make
their own rules directly in private regulative bodies. On other occasions, corporations influence the
rules indirectly through economic planning.
Given that the ‘political’ sphere of states and the ‘economic’ sphere of corporations are more inter-
twined than is commonly understood, we need to ask a further question: could corporations also be
conceived as political entities? We will focus on this question in the next section, arguing that the
theoretical question also has practical implications. States often claim to base their legitimacy on
democratic consent, whereas corporations are typically shielded from the validity sphere of demo-
cratic norms. Even though advancing better norms for international taxation can be successful
within the existing conceptual frameworks, understanding corporations as political entities can
also be used in arguments for more democratic international tax governance. We contribute to
this important task by exploring how a realist analysis of intra-firm trade provides one avenue for
this kind of politicisation.
Corporations as political entities: some normative issues
Among the multitude of debates in political theory about what it means to call an entity ‘political’,
Unger’s two basic definitions of ‘politics’ (1987: 145–6) provide a helpful starting point. For him,
the narrow sense of politics can be called ‘conflict over the mastery and uses of governmental
power’. To analyse other than governmental politics of practices and spaces, it is more useful to
rely on Unger’s broader definition of politics as ‘struggle over the resources and arrangements
that set the basic terms of our practical and passionate relations’. According to Unger (1987: 145–
6), the most important of these arrangements is ‘the formative institutional and imaginative
context of social life’. Politics in the narrow sense represents a special case of the politics in the
broader sense.
The widely acknowledged role of non-governmental actors in the ‘private’ governance of the con-
temporary global economy alone would favour endorsing the ‘broad’ definition. However, our
primary focus is not on decision-making bodies, as the term ‘private governance’ is sometimes under-
stood in the literature. Rather, we maintain that intra-firm planning can have major impacts on taxa-
tion, regulation, and the financial transparency of corporations. Consequently, corporations can
consciously affect these ‘resources and arrangements’ by intra-firm planning. Therefore, state-
centred definitions of the political nature of such planning are insufficient. Limiting the analysis of
corporate power only to the influence on state actions can render other significant areas of corporate
power invisible.
Before focusing in more detail on the political nature of the intra-firm planning in corporations, we
should ask why bother. Is it simply a matter of definitional taste whether one considers corporate
activities such as intra-firm trade to be political, or whether the term ‘political’ should be reserved
for the activities of governments, as in the more narrow definition of Unger? The standard use of
terms such as ‘economic planning’ and ‘political intervention in the market’ associates these activities
with state governments. In addition to paving way for more efficient policy responses, the realisation
that corporations practise planning and intervene politically in the markets without direct mediation
by states opens up new ways to reflect on the legitimacy of many aspects of the corporate sphere. In
particular, understanding corporations as potentially political entities raises questions about their
democratic legitimacy. These questions, apart from their practical implications, also help expand
the boundaries of political economy research toward normative political theory.
Another justification for studying corporations as political entities can be found in the basic tenet
of science as an endeavour intended to increase our capacity to explain and understand reality, in this
case the anomalies described in the previous sections. Within mainstream economics, there have
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been influential attempts to dismiss the importance of realist assumptions in scientific research, most
famously in the often-cited article by Friedman (1953). While acknowledging that non-realist simpli-
fications may sometimes be needed in science, we suggest that the mismatch between free-market
assumptions and the non-market realities of intra-firm trade has become of such a magnitude that
the assumptions violate the basic tenets of scientific research.
The relative absence of these questions in the scholarship on corporations at least partially results
from the division of labour between academic disciplines. Scholars in economics, accounting, man-
agement, and related fields may simply think that analysing issues of democratic legitimacy is for pol-
itical scientists. Most of the well-established approaches in the fields of management and economics
tend to pay little attention to the historical development of their own disciplines, and even less so to
others. In political studies, questions of intra-firm trade are generally considered issues of inter-
national political economy. Research in international political economy, on the other hand, is often
conducted as if it was about interactions between political and economic entities that are rep-
resented respectively by states and markets. Understanding the political role of corporations and
their economic planning requires transgressing the depoliticised conceptions of the economic as a
separate sphere. The concept of planning enables us to analyse corporations as political entities.
One of the main assumptions that help legitimise and reproduce corporate power is the idea we
discussed in the second section, namely that democratic norms are only valid within the political
sphere and not within the economic sphere (Teivainen 2002). If academic research establishes that
important aspects of corporate action in fact form part of the political sphere, as we believe any
serious analysis of intra-firm trade suggests, we have a case for asking political questions that may
seem uncomfortable for the current power relations. Politicising an entity that has traditionally
been considered apolitical reveals its potentially democratisable nature. As we will argue in the
next section, this can be important, for example, when designing ways of governance of unitary taxa-
tion of large corporations.
Both political economy and radical activism have a long tradition of politicising economic issues.
The tax-related issues of intra-firm trade have, however, remained without much public attention
until recently. Less than a decade ago, Webb (2006: 109) noted the ‘virtual absence’ of non-govern-
mental critical activism on international corporate taxation. Since then, the situation has changed, as
evidenced by the appearance of tax-related scandals in the media and the visibility of tax-themed
NGOs such as Global Financial Integrity and the Tax Justice Network (Seabrooke and Wigan 2016,
Dallyn, in press).
Until recently, discussions on corporate social responsibility (CSR) were characterised by an almost
total absence of corporate finance and tax functions (Ylönen and Laine 2015). Both the public and
corporate framing of corporate responsibility leaned heavily toward the social and environmental
aspects of the corporation (e.g. Golob and Bartlett 2007: 3).11 In the past two decades, growing
public attention to tax planning has resulted in calls to discuss tax policies ‘in the boardroom’
(KPMG 2006). In accounting studies, Gray and Laughlin maintained only a few years ago that ‘taxation
remains [here], as it does throughout much of accounting research, something of an un-explored
desert’ (2012: 237). This situation has been changing since the financial crisis of 2007–2009, but
tax issues are still rarely discussed in detail in corporate responsibility reports (Soederberg 2010,
Lee 2015). Corporations tend to dislike the emergence of tax-related aspects of intra-firm planning
in the corporate responsibility agenda. One of the mechanisms to avoid it is through highlighting
the various kinds of mandatory taxes they already pay, giving little meaningful information on the
intra-firm dimensions of tax planning (Ylönen and Laine 2015).
In other words, there is an ongoing discursive struggle on how to frame corporate tax planning in
a situation where critical debate on corporate taxation ‘is out and there’s no going back’ (KPMG 2006:
4). Moreover, the narrow framing of the voluntary tax footprint reports suggests that corporations
would rather remain silent on political aspects of corporate taxes and tax planning.12 It is thus
evident that the doctrine of economic neutrality characterises both corporate and scholarly discus-
sion on tax planning (Swedberg 1986, Teivainen 2002). The corporate responsibility discourse has
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partially challenged this doctrine by integrating conscious choice and social consequences into the
responsibility debate.
In this context, mildly moralising terms such as over- or underpricing tend to suggest that the
anomaly of wrongly priced products can be corrected by either hoping or assuming that corporations
will conform to arm’s length prices. While ‘profit shifting’ can be seen as a more neutral substitute that
avoids such assumptions, we believe that ‘administered prices’ and ‘cross-subsidisation’ can be par-
ticularly useful concepts in analysing corporate power. In the 1970s, Barnet and Müller defined cross-
subsidisation as ‘the use of power and resources developed in one “profit center” to start or to expand
another’ (1974: 255), maintaining that the ‘widespread use of transfer pricing so central to the cross-
subsidisation strategies of the global corporation is designed, as we have seen, to create what
amounts to a private economy’ (277).
While we find the concept of a ‘private economy’ ambiguous,13 the idea of cross-subsidisation
captures two important dimensions of intra-firm transactions: subsidising specific parts of a business
unit for market-related reasons (e.g. setting up a new business or outbidding competitors) and
setting non-market transfer prices in order to gain tax related or other advantages. Cross-subsidisa-
tion includes various forms of planning that deviate from the arm’s length principle, from non-market
transfer pricing to debt-related arrangements. The goals vary from lower tax rates to avoiding regu-
lation, or concealing risks.
Cross-subsidisation entails that the prices used in intra-firm trade may be ‘administered’ in ways
that violate market principles. Means and Berle argued already in the 1930s in their seminal study of
the modern corporation (Berle and Means 1934: xxxiv) that, contrary to the mainstream market
theory, corporations are able to ‘administer’ their prices. According to Means (quoted in Auerbach
1962), an ‘administered price’ is ‘a price set by someone, usually a producer or seller, and kept con-
stant for a period of time and for a series of transactions’, as distinguished from a ‘market’ price, which
‘fluctuates on the basis of supply and demand as these forces are felt in the market’.14
Our framework resonates also with the idea of large corporations as enterprise entities. Drawing
partly on early evolutionary economists, Yuri Biondi and others have argued in recent years that while
the group companies of multinational enterprises are treated as individual legal entities in jurisdic-
tions where they operate, in reality these large corporations plan their activities as unified enterprise
entities. According to Biondi and others, many of the difficulties in taxation and regulation of large
corporations result from this mismatch between their legal treatment and their internal operational
logic (Biondi et al. 2007, Biondi 2013). In a way, the enterprise entity approach and our framework
complement each other, as they illuminate different aspects of corporate planning and its effects.
Our framework can also help deepen the understanding of concepts such as ‘illicit financial flows’.
Baker (2005: 23) has used the terms ‘dirty money’ and illicit money interchangeably, defining the
former as money ‘that is illegally earned, illegally transferred, or illegally utilised’. Consequently,
the term ‘illicit financial flows’ has become widely applied in the development and tax policy com-
munities. From the planning viewpoint, illicit flows can include various degrees of lawlessness con-
ducted by the administering of prices. In the case of states, we have become accustomed to
attaching labels such as endemic corruption or rule by the mafia to situations where one group in
society is constantly bending the laws. However, we maintain that the strict separation of market
and politics hampers our ability to see the similarities between the use of power in these two
realms when we address similar situations in the corporate realm. Finally, it should be noted that
from a normative perspective analysing corporations as potentially political entities can also have
ambiguous implications, as it can lead also into situations where corporations are granted political
rights without any responsibilities of political accountability.
To recap, we started by presenting the case that much of world trade takes place under conditions
that the market-based lexicon captures poorly. We argued that the intra-firm trade could be analysed
using the concepts of corporate planning, administration of prices, and cross-subsidisation. We also
maintained that this planning and cross-subsidisation can give corporations power to affect the
‘resources and arrangements’ in states and societies where they operate, relying on Unger’s broad
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definition of politics. Consequently, we believe that there are grounds to analyse not only states but
also corporations as political actors.
This does not mean that all corporate planning, price administration, and cross-subsidisation could
be considered equally political. Even thoughmany individual, isolated decisions collectively affect the
resources and arrangements in societies, not all these decisions should therefore be subjected to pol-
itical norms such as democratic accountability. For example, one could think of a large corporation
that operates in a small state and forms a significant part of the economic activities within that
state’s jurisdiction. There are significant reasons to consider the corporation as political if it uses its
planning power to conceal significant risks or to deprive the state of the revenues it is legally entitled
to. The precise borderlines between markets, planning, and political planning clearly require further
research.
Another point of interest is how easily corporations can circumvent national tax laws. While
there are many countries where companies can violate environmental or labour legislation, it is dif-
ficult to think of an area where it is so common to break the spirit of the law as in tax payments.
States are often incapable of effectively implementing the corporate tax laws that are supposed
to condition the ‘resources and arrangements’ of corporate affairs. Meanwhile, there are occasions
on which corporations can use the commercialised sovereignty (Palan 2003) of tax havens to cir-
cumvent tax laws in other countries. Even more importantly, corporations can circumvent national
tax laws or other regulations by cross-subsidising their subsidiaries in low-tax and high secrecy
jurisdictions.
From the arm’s length principle to unitary taxation?
Today, the efficiency of the arm’s length principle is debated more than ever (e.g. Eden 2016). The
principle has failed in its declared goal of establishing markets within large companies. The principle,
however, also has another, much less discussed ideological role that helps legitimise international
corporate tax governance. We argued above that this legitimising role could be compared to discus-
sions on the concept of ‘invisible hand’. We pointed out that while there is a huge body of critical
discussion on the invisible hand, there has hardly been any discussion on the normative implications
of the arm’s length principle. Consequently, we call for scholarly attention to these aspects. Relying
on Unger’s broader definition of politics as ‘struggle over the resources and arrangements that set the
basic terms of our practical and passionate relations’, we also argued that in order to understand cor-
porate planning, it is important to focus on how it constitutes a political dimension in corporate
affairs.
The first step in recognising the double role of the arm’s length principle is realising that the idea
of using market-based comparable prices in intra-firm transactions has never been a success. The de
facto rules of intra-firm trade have allowed using other mechanisms than comparable pricing at least
since the 1960s. From the 1990s onwards, the applications of the arm’s length principle have moved
even further from the market. While the use of comparable prices is still the first pricing method in the
transfer pricing guidelines, it has long been overshadowed by other pricing mechanisms such as the
cost plus method and the resale price method.
We acknowledge the work of many scholars who have analysed these issues (e.g. Avi-Yonah 1995,
Durst and Culbertson 2003, Biondi et al. 2007, Ireland 2016) and the emerging discussion on the plan-
ning aspects of transnational corporations (Pistor 2014, May 2015). Nevertheless, the arm’s length
principle is often discussed with an assumption that it is possible, at least in theory, to identify
market-based prices. Bandyopadhyay (2012: 111) suggests that preferred price should be a ‘fair
one, that is, a price that would be charged between the parent and subsidiary companies, as if
they are “unrelated companies”’. This fairness is often not achieved, he continues, since ‘companies
often manipulate the transfer price to escape taxes’. Essentially, this formulation can create the
impression that it is generally possible to determine comparable prices but that they are currently
subject to manipulation.
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Similarly, Keuschnigg and Devereux (2013) maintain that ‘tax authorities typically apply the arm’s
length principle in corporate taxation and use comparable market prices to “correctly” assess the
value of intra-company trade and royalty income of multinationals’. As a third example, Jenkins
and Newell (2013: 390) recommend that companies should ‘commit to using arm’s length pricing
in all transactions with related parties as recommended by the OECD Guidelines on Multinational
Enterprises’. They then note that it is not ‘always easy to establish arm’s length prices for all trans-
actions’, but point out that there are regularly updated principles laid out in the OECD Guidelines
that guide this process. One of our main arguments is that a fine-tuning of these principles is unlikely
to result in market-based transfer prices, as the arm’s length principle is inconsistent with the ways
corporations plan their internal transactions. Therefore, we call for careful attention to the double role
of the principle and its implications for markets.
Understanding the ambiguities in current transfer pricing regulations and their various methods
helps demystify intra-firm trade and opens up discussions on both more efficient alternatives and on
their more democratic governance. Regarding the former, we believe that recognising the role of arti-
ficial formulas and estimations in currently existing intra-firm pricing is useful for discussing unitary
taxation (e.g. Cockfield 2004, Avi-Yonah and Benshalom 2011, Avi-Yonah 2016, Picciotto 2016). Under
unitary taxation, the global taxable income of corporations would be divided by a method called for-
mulary apportionment between the jurisdictions where the company has genuine operations (Avi-
Yonah et al. 2009). This is not a new idea, as the United States applies formulary apportionment
between its states. Neither would the arrangement have to be global – it would also be possible
for a smaller group of countries to pave the way. The arm’s length principle and formulary apportion-
ment are not mutually exclusive systems but more like two ends of a continuum (Avi-Yonah 1995).
The key issue is, therefore, to tackle the ideological assumption that it is possible to create markets
within firms. As soon as we abandon this presumption, it will become easier to conduct meaningful
analytical debates on what kinds of formula we should use for dividing the part of the added value
created by corporations that belongs to the states.
Real unitary taxation would help the task of addressing corporations as centrally coordinated enti-
ties (Biondi 2013). It would take some of corporate planning out of private hands and make it an issue
of global governance by adopting an internationally agreed formula to divide the taxable income
from transnational corporations between the states where they operate. This would strengthen econ-
omic planning by states over corporations, as each state would get a share of corporate tax revenues
based on a formula derived from the company’s accounts. In less state-centric possible futures, other
actors could also participate in norm building or receive corporate tax incomes. Understanding large
corporations as global planning entities gives weight for demanding global or regional (e.g. an EU-
level) decision-making of their tax matters, possibly through channelling parts of the revenues into
regional or global funding mechanisms.
The discussions of unitary taxation have evolved rapidly in recent years. In September 2013, the
G20 group stated in its St. Petersburg summit declaration that ‘profits should be taxed where econ-
omic activities deriving the profits are performed and where value is created’ (G20 2013: 12). While
this was not an outright endorsement of unitary taxation, it gave more weight to similar demands.
The international efforts to tackle corporate cross-subsidisation have centred around the OECD’s
BEPS initiative complemented by initiatives of the EU and the OECD (Eccleston and Smith 2016). It
is evident, however, that these initiatives fall short of fixing the underlying problems.
The more opportunities corporations have for shaping the ‘resources and arrangements’ of the
places where they operate, the more vulnerable they may also become to demands to bring their
operations under more public scrutiny and accountability. Unitary taxation would diminish the
current opportunities for corporate tax planning and expand the sphere of public planning. Although
in itself this would not necessarily lead to a significantly more democratic system of global tax gov-
ernance, it could provide new opportunities for establishing state-led or otherwise democratic
alternatives to corporate power.15 Among other things, the policy responses depend on how well
the corporate planning power we have described in this article is understood.
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Concluding remarks
Depending on the formula and its application, unitary taxation could significantly diminish corporate
non-market planning. The most likely short-term impact would be an increase in the overall planning
power of states, but only as a result of international negotiations. The discrepancies in power
between states would most likely affect the outcome of the formula, favouring some states over
others. By reaching an agreement on the formula, states could significantly restrict the scope of
‘tax wars’ between nations (Christensen and Shaxson 2016), as states would delegate some of
their planning power on corporate taxation to the international bodies. Effectively, with formulary
apportionment, much of the current corporate planning related to intra-firm transfer pricing could
be rendered useless.
On the other hand, partial solutions to the problems of transfer pricing may lead to ideological
biases not unlike the double role of the arm’s length principle. This has already been evident in
the significant expansion of advance pricing agreement (APA) programmes in various countries.
APAs are essentially tools that companies use to negotiate transfer prices before applying them. Com-
panies give up some of their planning power in exchange for reducing possible tax litigation risk.
Moreover, as the LuxLeaks scandal of 2014 demonstrated,16 the APAs can also be used for aggressive
tax planning and in order to avoid taxes in other countries. While by no means a panacea, multilateral
negotiations for genuine unitary taxation could be an effective way of dealing with the issues of cor-
porate planning that we have explored in this article.
A crucial question for any alternatives is the direction the recent public interest will take.
Should the public interest in tax governance issues wane, the political momentum will most
likely suffer as well. We hope this article can participate in opening new ways to connect the
often-technical debates on intra-firm trade with more fundamental normative questions. In par-
ticular, we hope our focus on the mismatch between the market assumptions of the arm’s length
principle and the reality of non-market planning in intra-firm trade can contribute to increasing
public attention and political pressure. If the academics, policy-makers, and social movements
are not aware of the normative implications of the terms they use, they run the risk of letting
these normative aspects guide their messages and analyses. A more realist conceptual under-
standing of the non-market elements of world trade can be helpful also for putting democratic
norms into practice.
Notes
1. An early version of this article won the 2015 Amartya Sen Prize in a contest organised by Yale University, together
with Global Financial Integrity and Academics Stand Against Poverty.
2. Some key contributions in business ethics studies are Doyle et al. (2009), Huseynov and Klamm (2012), Muller and
Kolk (2015), Preuss (2010, 2012), and Weyzig (2013). In political economy, see, e.g. Christensen (2011), Christensen
and Murphy (2004), Dietsch and Rixen (2016), Jenkins and Newell (2013), Leaman and Waris (2013), May (2015),
Otusanya (2011), Palan et al. (2013), Pogge and Mehta (2016), Rixen (2011), Seabrooke and Wigan (2017), and
Webb (2006). For discussions in economics, see, e.g. Clausing (2003), Desai and Dharmapala (2006), and
Haufler and Schjelderup (2000). In accounting, see, e.g. Hasseldine and Morris (2013), Sikka (2013, in press),
and Sikka and Willmot (2010). In legal scholarship, see, e.g. Avi-Yonah (1995), Durst and Culbertson (2003),
Eden (2016), Ireland (2016), and Picciotto (2016).
3. In its 2002 Economic Outlook, the OECD also gave an important estimate that "Across all OECD countries ... intra-
industry trade in more sophisticated products such as chemicals or machinery and transport equipment is typi-
cally around 60 or 70 per cent, whereas for manufactured goods involving simpler transformation processes, such
as food products, it is typically around 40 per cent or less” (OECD 2002: 161). In the same year, the OECD Observer
magazine also also stated that approximately 60 per cent of the world trade is intra-firm (Neighbour 2002).
4. Horngren et al. (2012: 773) note in their widely used textbook of managerial accounting that ‘top management
uses transfer prices (1) to focus managers’ attention on the performance of their own subunits and (2) to plan and
coordinate the actions of different subunits to maximise the company’s income as a whole’, also noting that ‘man-
agers of different subunits often have very different preferences about how transfer prices should be set’.
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5. Many of the key benefits of hierarchically organised operations supposed by the transaction cost theory, such as
lower transaction costs and economic efficiency, are based on assumption that companies do not operate intern-
ally according to market mechanisms (Avi-Yonah 1995: 148).
6. The concept of ‘arm’s length’ is also used in many other contexts, meaning ‘avoiding intimacy or close contact’
according to the Oxford Dictionary of English Idioms. In political economy, it is sometimes applied when discussing
such matters as borrowing (Agarwal and Hauswald 2008) or international production networks (Kimura 2006), but
the concept also appears in studies of arts funding (Madden 2009).
7. This should not be confused with corporate taxation in trade conducted within the United States, where the tax
revenue belonging to individual states is determined using formulary approach. See, e.g. Clausing (2014).
8. Intellectual property rights can also be exploited in many other ways. See, e.g. Dharmapala (2008), Graham and
Tucker (2006), Grubert (2003), and Rixen (2011).
9. Recently, a growing body of statistical research has emerged on this issue. In their article focusing on the 2011
financial accounts of S&P 500 companies, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) estimated that 72 per cent of their
profit shifting took place using non-financial (e.g. typically transfer-pricing-related) channels. For a review of other
relevant research, see, e.g. European Commission (2015).
10. As, for example, providing reliable information on performance of different geographical and business segments
interests not only tax authorities, but also investors (Horngren et al. 2012).
11. However, it is interesting to note that responsibility aspects of taxation are mentioned in Howard Bowen’s foun-
dational CSR book Social Responsibilities of the Businessman (1953: 207).
12. The tax footprints often focus on the indirect taxes paid by the corporations with little or no attention to the
importance of tax planning.
13. There is a danger that it may be interpreted as a closed but market-based system (in contrast to the planning
system that regularly violates market principles), even though Barnet and Müller probably did not mean this.
14. Elsewhere, Means argued that ‘market’ prices are to be found only in agricultural commodities and some raw
materials, whereas most industrial prices, many retail prices, and most wage rates are ‘administered’ (quoted
in Auerbach 1962: 144). In the US Senate antitrust hearings of 1957–1961, Means also maintained that ‘“adminis-
tered” prices should be of special concern to the Subcommittee because the greater the concentration, the less
the restraint upon pricing discretion imposed by market forces and the greater the possibility of the abuse of
discretion’ (quoted in Auerbach 1962: 144).
15. On transnational democratic non-state politics, see Teivainen and Trommer (2017).
16. The LuxLeaks scandal centred on a massive leak of APAs from Luxemburg drafted by the Big 4 auditing firm and
published by the members of ICIJ, the International Consortium for Investigative Journalists.
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1 Introduction 
I analyse the evolution of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) tax policies through a multiple 
case study (Yin 2003: 46) of three key countries often used for global corporate tax avoidance or 
individual tax evasion. The first country is Seychelles, which is used for both corporate holding 
company structures and individual tax evasion. The second country is Panama, whose role in 
international tax evasion was highlighted in the Panama Papers scandal in 2015. Both countries 
host export processing zones, which facilitate harmful tax competition by offering foreign 
companies special tax rates and other exemptions (Farole and Akinci 2010). The third country is 
the Netherlands, a major hub for holding company structures for large multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). While representing only a small portion of the IMF member states, they provide 
important insights into the effectiveness of the IMF in its work against corporate tax avoidance 
and evasion. 
These issues could hardly be more topical, highlighted by information leaks from various tax 
havens. Recently, the high-profile Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has generated attention, 
although resulting only in modest reforms. International tax flight has also emerged as a 
development policy concern in various international organizations (IOs) (e.g. High Level Panel on 
Illicit Financial Flows from Africa 2015; Reuter 2012) and in the Agenda 2030 development goals. 
The IMF also started to focus on these issues gradually from 2011 onward. However, my case 
studies demonstrate that the IMF policy advice has been inconsistent and insufficient. The 
deficiencies in the IMF policy advice for Panama and the Netherlands are grave enough for arguing 
that, so far, the IMF has not managed to live up to its new commitments. 
I utilize the case studies to highlight under-researched aspects of policy diffusion in world politics 
generally and in global tax governance (Dietsch and Rixen 2016) more specifically. The past 
decades have seen an emergence of constructivist literature on IOs (e.g. Barnett and Finnemore 
2004) and how they can teach new norms to member states, using shaming, persuasion, and praise 
(Finnemore 1993). Similarly, plenty of research has emerged in international relations (IR) on how 
policy convergence and policy diffusion1 affect IOs (for a review, see Marsh and Sharman 2009). 
However, these studies have suffered from ‘an excessive preoccupation with Western countries’ 
(Marsh and Sharman 2010: 270), and little attention has been paid to how IOs themselves 
‘consume’ norms produced by other actors (Park 2005, 2006).2 
My case studies contribute to these discussions in several ways. The first is methodological; there 
has been little qualitative country-level research based on the IMF policy documents, and I argue 
that this approach has much potential. Second, I demonstrate how imposing new high-level policy 
obligations through major generalist IOs (in this case, the IMF) can increase the dependency of 
their country teams on assessments of smaller, thematically focused IOs. Third, the case studies 
show how new policy commitments imposed on an IO such as the IMF can increase the 
dependence of country-level teams with the other departments of that IO. Together, these trends 
                                                 
1 Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 5) define policy convergence as a process by which ‘knowledge about policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in development of 
policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting’. Diffusion, on the other hand, 
focuses typically on inter-state processes (Simmons and Elkins 2004: 171). 
2 As a rare exception, Nielson and O’Keefe (2010) have argued that in some instances IOs can consume norms 
produced by other IOs, highlighting how emulation may play an important role in norm diffusion between IOs. 
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demonstrate the importance of interplay between consumption of ideas both from outside and 
inside the IMF. This mix of causal and arbitrary factors behind the case studies further highlights 
the importance of ‘seeing like an IO’ in any attempts to understand these kinds of phenomena 
(Broome and Seabrooke 2012), in contrast with the mainstream conception of the IMF as ‘an 
institution that responds to the interest of its key members, such as the US’ (Seabrooke 2012: 3; 
see also Koremenos et al. 2001).  
Specifically, the case studies highlight the dependence of the IMF country-level tax policy advice 
on assessments based on criteria developed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Global 
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (hereafter Global Forum) 
of the OECD, and other bodies. Established in 1989, FATF is an inter-governmental body 
currently with 37 member countries. Several regional bodies also oversee the FATF 
recommendations. The Global Forum is the successor of a forum created in the early 2000s, when 
the OECD started addressing non-cooperative tax havens. Both organizations conduct peer 
reviews of their members, with the FATF focusing on anti-money laundering (AML) and the 
Global Forum on the implementation of standards on tax transparency and tax information 
exchange.  
The IMF’s reliance on these bodies underlines the cataclysmic role of the IMF in the policy 
consensus facilitated by thematic IOs. At best, its policy advice has been as good as the underlying 
criteria. This highlights the importance of diffusion between IOs and the importance of policy 
assessments in world politics. The underlying dynamic is highlighted in Figure 1, which describes 
the key mechanisms through which international concerns related to international tax avoidance 
and tax evasion have emerged in the IMF Country Reports. While it describes these influences 
only one-directionally and does not include all possible linkages, it still highlights the complexity 
of the underlying phenomena. I will analyse its components in the country studies after discussing 
key definitions and measurements in the next subsection. 
Figure 1: Simplified influence map of key actors  
 
Note: * On the role of TANs in global tax governance, see Dallyn (in press) and Seabrooke and Wigan (2013). 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
1.1 Definitions and estimations 
According to the OECD, tax avoidance intends to reduce ‘tax liability and … although the 
arrangement could be strictly legal, it is usually in contradiction with the intent of the law it 
purports to follow’ (OECD 2017). It is the key concern in the corporate sector, where even 
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successful court cases rarely fall under criminal law. Tax evasion, which is illegal, is more relevant 
to individual investors. Both phenomena benefit from tax havens, or secrecy jurisdictions 
(Picciotto 1992). While no single commonly agreed set of criteria for a tax haven exists, the 1998 
landmark report Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (OECD 1998: 27) identified four 
key factors: no or low effective tax rates, ‘ring fencing’ the offshore market from the domestic 
economy,3 lack of transparency, and lack of effective exchange of information. The OECD’s first 
initiative was sidelined, partly as a result of lobbying by Panama and other Caribbean tax havens 
(Sharman 2006). Subsequently, several attempts towards listings of tax havens have emerged 
(Kudrle and Eden 2003). To highlight one such attempt, the Tax Justice Network’s Financial 
Secrecy Index weighs various secrecy features against the importance of a given jurisdiction in the 
global economy and finance (Tax Justice Network 2015).4 However, the ‘havens’ for corporate tax 
avoidance do not necessarily rely on secrecy. Countries such as the Netherlands offer special tax 
exemptions and a network of bilateral tax treaties that allow easy repatriation of profits (Weyzig 
2013). 
Both tax avoidance and evasion are related to illicit financial flows, which have been defined as 
‘money that is illegally earned, transferred or utilized’, originating from: 1) commercial tax evasion, 
trade misinvoicing, and abusive transfer pricing in intra-firm trade; 2) criminal activities; and 3) 
governmental corruption (High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa 2015). While 
the poor quality or unavailability of data from tax havens and some other countries makes 
estimating magnitudes difficult, some notable attempts exist. Comparing differences in foreign 
direct investment stocks, the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
has estimated that the tax revenues that developing countries receive from investments are some 
1–1.5 percentage points lower when they are routed through low-tax jurisdictions. Based on this, 
it assessed the losses to inward investment stocks directly linked to offshore hubs for developing 
countries to be in the scale of US$100 billion of annual tax revenue (UNCTAD 2015: 200–03). 
Despite uncertainties,5 this is one of the most reliable estimates. However, it does not include tax 
losses from intra-firm financing arrangements or individual-level tax evasion. 
The rest of the paper unravels as follows. Section 2 discusses the country-level policy work of the 
IMF. Section 3 discusses the IMF’s tax work and the slow evolution of the IMF’s alignments 
related to tax avoidance and evasion. Section 4 focuses on the case studies. Section 5 mirrors the 
key findings to the established literature on the IMF and IOs. I conclude in Section 6 by discussing 
the limitations of the study and avenues for further research. 
2 The IMF country-level work and loan conditionalities 
The IMF advises its members states in relation to its loan programmes and as an ongoing activity, 
and the ‘soft power’ of the IMF can influence national legislations even in non-indebted countries 
(Schäfer 2006). It also gives a green light to loan programmes managed by the World Bank. As the 
2010 Article IV report from Panama (IMF 2010a:  4) notes, the ‘staffs of the World Bank and the 
IMF are working in close collaboration, including frequent exchange of data and information and 
coordination of policy advice’. Conditionalities are stipulated in the Letters of Intent (LoI) papers 
negotiated by the IMF staff and the debtor countries. They are accompanied by Technical 
Memoranda of Understanding, which specify the loan terms. They often include structural 
                                                 
3 Typically this means offering lower tax rates on certain incomes only to foreign investors or companies. 
4 The IMF mentioned the Financial Secrecy Index in at least one recent report on Panama (IMF 2016b: 17) 
5 For example, there may also be non-tax related reasons for these differences.  
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benchmarks with specific conditionalities that should—in principle—be met for future 
disbursements. The monitoring takes place mostly through the Article IV missions, which are also 
the main tool for policy monitoring and advice in other IMF member states. In addition, country 
teams and other IMF departments occasionally issue policy-relevant thematic reports. The focus 
of the IMF policy conditionalities has increasingly shifted to more subtle forms of guidance. 
The IMF’s work is based on its Articles of Agreement (hereafter the Articles), originally negotiated 
at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. They stipulate that the IMF should promote 
‘international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution which provides the 
machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems’ and facilitate 
‘the expansion and balanced growth of international trade’, contributing ‘to the […] development 
of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy’ (IMF 2016 
[1944]: 1). Finally, the important Article IV states (IMF 2016 [1944]: 6), ‘the Fund shall oversee 
the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective operation, and shall oversee the 
compliance of each member with its obligations under Section 1 of this Article’. Interestingly, one 
could argue that the statement of purpose section could provide a relatively strong mandate for 
addressing the problems created by international tax avoidance and evasion, given their major 
impact on international trade flows. 
Loan conditionalities have been a heated political topic since the Mexican debt crisis escalated in 
1982.6 Recently, they have also emerged as a prominent research topic, often by utilizing large 
datasets to analyse macroeconomic conditionalities, in contrast to the case study approach in this 
paper. The most extensive study reviewed more than 55,000 individual loan conditionalities from 
1985 to 2014 (Kentikelenis et al. 2016). Referring to an IMF study from 2009, researchers 
concluded that ‘the IMF’s claim that programmes now “creat[e] policy space” by exhibiting 
“responsive design and streamlined conditionality”’ is not accurate (Kentikelenis et al. 2016: 24). 
Other studies by academics (Gabor 2010; Güven 2012), IOs (Ortiz and Cummins 2013), and non-
governmental organizations (Griffiths and Todoulos 2014; Muchhala 2011; Weisbrot et al. 2009) 
have reached similar conclusions. 
The IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) has also highlighted the IMF’s failures and 
tainted reputation in much of the developing world and its ill-tailored responses in financial crises 
(IEO 2014: 1). The IEO has concluded that extensively used policy conditionalities from 1995 to 
2004 ‘had little structural depth and only about half of them were met on time’. What is more, 
compliance correlated only weakly with progress in structural reform (IEO 2008: 1), with the key 
determinant for real change being country ownership and the proximity of the conditionalities to 
the IMF’s core agenda (IEO 2008: 1). Another IEO report noted that effective policy advice 
requires ‘overwhelming intellectual leadership’, which demands ‘a perception that the Fund speaks 
as an authoritative and unbiased source of knowledge and policy advice’ (Bernes 2014: 2). 
However, the IMF has been ‘increasingly viewed as having a limited role with respect to emerging 
markets’ (Bernes 2014: 2), and ‘the Fund paid too little attention to the technical expertise and 
other skills that might have added value, and neglected to manage pressures that staff felt to 
provide overly cautious country assessments’ (IEO 2009: 1; see also IEO 2014).  
                                                 
6 This began the period of infamous structural adjustment programmes and associated Washington Consensus policies 
(Williamson 1993; Rodrik 2006), characterized e.g. by a focus on state failures, deregulation of trade and finance, and 
privatizations.  
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3 The slow rise of anti-tax avoidance and tax evasion agendas 
The long-term omission of international tax avoidance and evasion in the IMF policy advice is 
important not least because of the IMF’s role as the ‘number one driver of the tax reform agenda’, 
and its central role in the ‘epistemic community of tax professionals, which includes employees of 
national tax administrations and of international organisations’, supported by ‘economists, 
accountants and lawyers specialising in taxation in academia and in consultancy organisations’ 
(Fjeldstad and Moore 2008: 238–40). The IMF’s impact is most apparent during crises, but it has 
also been ‘a major source of expertise, ideas and publications on tax reforms’ (Fjeldstad and Moore 
2008: 238). As Adam and Bevan (2001: 60) have argued, ‘during recent decades, a powerful 
consensus has developed […] [which] has included not only the structure of taxes, but also the 
level of tax rates’. This ‘global tax consensus’ (Cobham 2007; see also Christians 2010; Emran and 
Stiglitz 2005; IMF 2011a: 4) has stressed first the neutrality of the tax system, second, the need ‘to 
pursue redistributive goals (if any) via expenditure not taxation, and third, to achieve revenues of 
the order of 15–20% of GDP’ (Cobham 2007: 3). Or, as Moore (2004: 21) argues, the IMF has 
advocated ‘fewer taxes, fewer rates for individual taxes, fewer exemptions, and less discretion on 
the part of the tax collector and therefore a reduction of the attendant incentives for corruption’. 
In a report covering the years the 1998 to 2008, Marshall (2009) (see also Damme et al. 2008) 
examined the IMF tax policy advice in Sub-Saharan African countries, highlighting:  
- reductions in the rates of corporate and, to a lesser extent, personal income taxation, 
- trade liberalization (reduction of export and import taxes), 
- the introduction or expansion of sales taxes (VAT in particular), often including regional 
harmonization,7 
- the reduction of the number of incentives and exemptions, and  
- the structural overhauls of tax administration. 
The most frequent recommendation concerned trade deregulation: nearly 60 per cent of IMF 
papers suggested reducing import tariffs while almost 22 per cent promoted reducing export taxes 
(Marshall 2009: 10). According to a working paper published by IMF researchers, the results have 
been ‘troubling’: ‘revenue recovery has been extremely weak in low-income countries’ which ‘have 
recovered, at best, no more than about 30 cents of each lost dollar’ (Baunsgaard and Keen 2005: 
1).  
After years of inaction, the IMF has slowly started to address the international structures and 
mechanisms of tax flight. In 2016, the IMF’s Managing Director, Christine Lagarde, saw ‘toxic’ tax 
avoidance and tax evasion as ‘major concerns’. What is more, she argued that ‘the initiative to 
launch and complete the BEPS and automatic exchange of information’ needed to be continued 
with ‘yet a second wave of momentum […] followed up by delivery, which is something we all 
need to work on’ (Lagarde 2016). In 2011, the IMF co-authored a report Supporting the Development 
of More Effective Tax Systems (IMF et al. 2011), written for the G20 group in collaboration with the 
OECD, UN, and the World Bank. It reflected ‘a broad consensus among these staff’ (IMF et al. 
                                                 
7 First introduced in France in 1948, today more than 140 countries have adopted a value added tax (VAT) (Keen 
2013). By the early 2000s, some 90 per cent of Sub-Saharan African countries had a value added tax (Christians 2010: 
257). 
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2011: 1) and introduced several action points. Among other things, it called for deepening 
international cooperation, including spillover analyses ‘of the impact of any significant changes in 
our own tax systems on those of developing countries’ (IMF et al. 2011: 13), ‘for example in trade 
and international taxation’ (IMF et al. 2011: 30). Moreover, the report underlined the collective 
commitment to strengthen ‘programmes to assist developing countries to effectively implement 
transfer pricing rules, in the context of their broader tax administration capacity development 
efforts’ (IMF et al. 2011:13). 
Similar statements have been issued by the International Monetary and Financial Committee 
(IMFC) and the Development Policy Committee (DPC)—the key joint decision-making forum of 
the World Bank and the IMF. Whereas the IMFC communiqués published in 2001 to 2012 only 
vaguely mention ‘domestic resources mobilization’, most communiqués from 4/2013 onward have 
highlighted the importance of tackling illicit financial flows, tax avoidance, and tax evasion.8 
Communiqué 4/2013 (International Monetary and Financial Committee 2013a) argued that 
‘Fighting tax evasion is critical to help strengthen fiscal resilience of all our member states. In this 
regard, we are determined to promote transparency in the tax, AML and counter-financing of 
terrorism areas’. Tax avoidance was also mentioned in Communiqué 10/2013 (International 
Monetary and Financial Committee 2013b), which called on the IMF ‘to examine these issues as 
part of its bilateral and multilateral surveillance, and to work in collaboration with other 
international institutions’. In April 2014, the IMFC noted the need to enhance data provision, 
‘fiscal transparency, and fight cross-border tax evasion and tax avoidance’, as well as improving 
‘the transparency of beneficial ownership of companies and other legal arrangements, including 
trusts’. In the Development Policy Committee, Communiqué 10/2015 welcomed the joint World 
Bank-IMF efforts to ‘build capacity for developing countries, including on international tax issues’, 
and Communiqué 10/2016 highlighted the need to ‘foster policies and transparent institutions that 
advance’ the mobilization of domestic resources and that address illicit financial activities 
(Development Committee 2015a, 2016). 
Another key report was a discussion note called From Billions to Trillions: Transforming Development 
Finance Post-2015 Financing for Development: Multilateral Development, prepared jointly by the IMF, the 
World Bank Group and regional development banks for the April 2015 meeting of the 
Development Committee (Development Committee 2015b). The purpose of this note was to 
develop ‘a preliminary vision for the collective role of our institutions’ (Development Committee 
2015b), highlighting several initiatives for fostering tax-related work in the IMF. The note 
underlined the problems created by BEPS of large MNEs and the negative impacts of spillover of 
tax policy measures from one country to another, underlining the need for exchange of 
information between tax administrations and the tackling of illicit financial flows. Finally, it 
emphasized the importance of expanding policy guidance and technical assistance for domestic 
resources mobilization. 
The Addis Tax Initiative declaration that the IMF co-designed some months later went much 
further. In addition to the IMF, World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, the signatures 
included 37 countries, private foundations, and other IOs such as the OECD and African Tax 
Administration Forum. They wanted to expand cooperation in ‘enabling partner countries take 
advantage of the progress made on the international agenda’, such as the BEPS project and tax 
information exchange, ‘integrating partner countries in the global tax debate’, improving the 
‘taxation and management of revenue from natural resources’, and a range of other matters (The 
Addis Tax Initiative 2015: 2). Furthermore, it emphasized ensuring that domestic tax policies 
support domestic resource mobilization by ‘applying principles of transparency, efficiency, 
                                                 
8 See full list of Communiqués from 2000 to 2017 in Annex I.  
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effectiveness and fairness’ (The Addis Tax Initiative 2015: 3). The signatories agreed ‘to enhance 
cooperation to combat tax evasion, fight corruption, tackle illicit finance, and promote good 
financial governance, transparency and accountability’. Finally, they committed to measure 
progress by specific targets and indicators (The Addis Tax Initiative 2015: 4). So far, one concrete 
outcome has been the establishment of two new joint trust funds in 2016, with a focus on revenue 
mobilization and managing of natural resource wealth (IMF 2016a). 
In other words, a framework for gearing up the IMF work along these themes has been in place 
from 2011, and increasingly so in later years. However, the key question is, whether and how these 
alignments have been implemented at the country level. In order to get beyond motivational 
speeches and policy statements, I turn to the case studies. 
4 The case studies 
At first glance, Panama, the Seychelles, and the Netherlands may not have much in common. 
Panama is a developing country and one of the world’s oldest tax havens, whereas the smaller 
Seychelles is a recent entrant in this business, and the Netherlands is an EU member state that 
rarely features in tax haven lists. However, the one thing that connects these countries is their 
central role in facilitating international tax flight. The most pressing issue with Panama and the 
Seychelles is their role in international tax evasion and money laundering, whereas the Netherlands 
is a major hub for corporate tax avoidance structures. The research involved going through policy-
relevant country documents from the three case study countries that the IMF has issued on its 
country websites and in its archives. As change in any large IOs, such as the IMF, is gradual, the 
case studies cover the years from 1999 to 2016. The analyses in the next section are mostly based 
on LoI agreements, Article IV documents, and other loan monitoring documents, as well as 
occasional Selected Issues papers and Country Reports in cases where they discuss issues that are 
relevant. The documents are listed in Annex 2.  
4.1 Panama 
Panama is a developing country, with more than 10 per cent of the population living in extreme 
poverty and nearly one-fifth being poor in World Bank terms (World Bank 2016). In addition to 
its tax haven industry, Panama also hosts export processing zones which have commonly been 
associated with the facilitation of money laundering, especially the Colon Free Zone (Eskelinen 
and Ylönen 2017). Panama has been dependent on both World Bank and IMF financing. The last 
loan programme with the IMF ran from 2000 to 2002. Panama has also received several loans 
from the World Bank’s International Development Association and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development throughout the 2000s. This section reviews relevant IMF 
country documents from 6/2000–11/2016, as listed in Annex 2. Additional material was drawn 
from reports published by the OECD’s Global Forum in 2010 and 2016.  
The years 2000 to 2007 
The LoI signed in 2000 (IMF 2000a) was supportive of Panama’s offshore financial sector in a 
period when the backlash against the first wave of OECD-led work against harmful tax 
competition was underway, with Panama playing an important role in the effort to block the 
OECD’s proposals (Sharman 2006). The LoI noted, ‘real progress has been achieved with reform 
of bank regulation and supervision in Panama’, with a typical set of IMF recommendations, such 
as broadening the VAT base and reorganizing the tax administration. The Article IV document 
published in 2001 shared this optimism, arguing that the ‘[s]uperintendency moved rapidly to put 
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in place sound prudential regulations based on accepted international practice and achieved its goal 
of inspecting over 30 per cent of the banks’, among them a number of offshore banks (IMF 2001: 
3). The IMF commended Panama for acting ‘expeditiously to pass two laws to fortify the anti-
money laundering regime’. ‘Know Your Customer’ requirements were deemed satisfactory, despite 
a negative review by the Financial Stability Forum in June 2000. Based on these and other 
observations, an appropriate regulatory framework was judged to be in place, and its ‘rigorous 
implementation’ was needed. However, this was not part of the loan’s structural performance 
criteria. 
The Article IV report published in 2002 (IMF 2002a: 30) mentioned that ‘reforms in the nonbank 
financial system have lagged behind those in the banking system’. However, the Article IV report 
for 2005 (IMF 2006a: 17) labelled Panama as largely compliant with international standards for 
anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism, with weaknesses remaining in: 
(i) implementation of obligations ‘for insurance companies, other financial and nonfinancial 
activities, and lawyers; (ii) regulation to ensure that owner information is retained by the resident 
agent for Panamanian corporations; and (iii) extension of the authority to permit provisional 
freezing and seizure of assets in all criminal cases’. In 2006, the Article IV report (IMF 2007a: 10) 
argued that ‘Panama’s sound banking system will continue to contribute to the favorable outlook’. 
In 2007, the Article IV consultation was either not held, contrary to the suggestion in the previous 
year, or the report has not been published,9 but other reports from 2000 to 2008 indicate that 
regulating the offshore business was not a major priority. In subsequent reports, the IMF 
continued to advocate a typical set of policies, such as reforming tax administration and broadening 
the tax base. The Article IV report of 2004 (IMF 2006b)10 noted that the authorities regarded fiscal 
discipline and transparency as essential preconditions for poverty reduction and job creation, and 
highlighted the need to promote accountability, transparency and anti-corruption efforts. 
However, these aims were related to the budget process instead of financial secrecy. The report 
further noted that ‘the new administration’s emphasis on fiscal discipline, transparency, and good 
governance are commendable’ (IMF 2006b: 16). Moreover, the financial system was deemed 
‘essentially sound’ (IMF 2006b: 4). Tax evasion and avoidance were mentioned only in passing. A 
year earlier, the Article IV report mentioned that the tax administration should have the ‘legal 
framework to enforce the law and reduce tax evasion’ (IMF 2006c: 18), but without further details. 
The recommendations for supervision of the financial sector focused mostly on the banking 
sector, driven partly by the Assessment of Financial Sector Supervision and Regulation that the Monetary 
and Capital Markets Department of the IMF published in September 2006 (IMF 2007b). It found 
Panama to be largely compliant in ensuring an effective system of banking supervision with ‘clear 
responsibilities and objectives for each agency involved in the supervision of the banks’ (IMF 
2007b: 7), and fully compliant with providing adequate resources and a suitable legal framework 
for supervision. Even though some deficiencies were found in AML, capital markets, and 
insurance sectors, Panama was deemed largely compliant with global consolidated supervision of 
internationally active banks. The assessment did not seriously question the Panamanian tax haven 
industry. 
  
                                                 
9 Article IV evaluations are typically published annually, but frequencies vary. Most IMF documents are also published 
only with the approval of the member country (Marshall 2009: 6). 
10 The reports are occasionally made public with significant gaps. 
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The 2007–2009 financial crisis and its aftermath 
After the 2007–2009 financial crisis, the OECD issued its infamous ‘black lists’ of tax havens, 
which only singled out havens with fewer than 12 bilateral tax information exchange agreements. 
The 2009 Article IV report (IMF 2009a) highlighted the importance of the prudent monitoring of 
banks, arguing that the inclusion of Panama in the list ‘poses an additional challenge’, (IMF 2009a: 
20) noting that a dialogue with the private sector had begun to ‘address Panama’s inclusion in the 
list’. The report also noted that the ‘strategy could involve changes to financial industry regulations 
in line with an earlier agreement with the OECD that had been only partially implemented’. The 
other options under consideration were ‘limitations to the use of bearer shares, modifications in 
bank secrecy regulations, and permission to exchange tax information’ (IMF 2009a: 20), in line 
with reforms that had already been adopted in other jurisdictions. The IMF mission ‘strongly 
endorsed the authorities’ cooperative approach’ (IMF 2009a: 20). However, these issues did not 
feature in the main recommendations of this report or the one published in the following year, 
where the IMF mentioned that the ‘authorities have made substantial progress towards Panama’s 
removal from the OECD grey list of tax havens’ (IMF 2010a: 12). Overall, the main focus was on 
areas closer to the IMF’s traditional tax agenda, and the staff welcomed ‘sound tax reforms’ (IMF 
2010a: 18). 
The IMF’s assessment only started to change in 2011, when upgrading of financial sector 
regulation, supervision, and infrastructure were elevated as Panama’s key medium-term challenges. 
The 2011 Article IV report urged Panama to prioritize ‘[i]mprovements in risk-based and 
consolidated cross-border supervision’, and strengthening ‘the capacity to identify and monitor 
financial system risks’ (IMF 2012a: 1). This implied bringing financial oversight in line with 
‘international best practices’ and ‘upgrading all non-bank segments of the financial system’ (IMF 
2012a: 17). Strengthening financial sector governance was needed for managing reputational risks 
and for being ‘competitive in a broader range of investment and wealth management services’ 
(IMF 2012a: 17). Moreover, the report noted Panamanian efforts to tighten controls in the Colon 
Free Zone (IMF 2012a: 15). 
These changes did not generate growing pressure. The key issues section in the 2012 Article IV 
report (IMF 2012b) only noted that the ‘ongoing efforts to upgrade financial sector supervision 
and strengthen the financial safety net should be accelerated, including by closing existing data 
gaps, enhancing non-bank supervision and establishing a liquidity facility’ (IMF 2012b: 1). Further, 
the IMF stated that the authorities were making ‘good progress in strengthening regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks for bank and nonbank oversight’ (IMF 2012b: 7) and that the legal 
frameworks for AML were being updated, without any new openings in these themes. In 2013, 
the IMF also published a tax-related Selected Issues report (IMF 2013a), which did not develop 
these openings any further. No Article IV report from 2013 exists either on the IMF’s Panama 
country page or in its online archives. 
In 2014, the Legal Department of the IMF published two reports assessing Panama’s compliance 
with the FATF criteria, whose recommendations influenced Article IV reports published from 
2014 onward (IMF 2014a, 2014b). The assessment was based on FATF’s Forty Recommendations 
from 2003 and the recommendations on terrorist financing (FATF 2003). The assessments 
criticized Panama’s vulnerability to money laundering, substantial gaps in its regulation, and the 
limited administrative resources and statistics. Problems created by bearer shares, trusts, and the 
exclusion of the Colon Free Trade zone and certain key professions (such as lawyers and company 
services) from AML measures were noticed. The reports also included extensive, detailed sets of 
recommendations regarding key areas of the FATF standards. 
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The key issues section of the 2015 report noted that ‘delayed reforms to financial transparency are 
an important risk that could restrict access to global capital and the international payments system’ 
and that it is essential to strengthen the AML regime, as well as implement the remaining action 
points from the 2011 Financial Sector Assessment Program (IMF 2015a: 1). However, the staff 
also ‘commended the authorities for their significant efforts’ (IMF 2015a: 10). Finally, the 2016 
Article IV report (IMF 2016b) continued urging the authorities to strengthen the AML regime, 
noting also Panama’s removal from FATF’s ‘grey list’ where it had been since 2014. The Panama 
Papers scandal was mentioned several times in the report, for example through reputational risks. 
The report also noted Panama’s poor ranking in the Financial Secrecy Index and its shortcomings 
in automatic tax information exchange. 
Summary  
The IMF country documents for Panama paint an interesting picture. Considering the relatively 
high attention to various AML and tax-related issues in the reports and assessments published in 
2015 and 2016, many things have changed since 2000 when the LoI document commended ‘real 
progress’ with bank regulation and supervision. In addition to being late, however, the most 
striking aspect of the recent IMF tax policy advice for Panama is the absence of almost any 
references to the recommendations by the OECD’s Global Forum. Whereas AML assessments 
feature prominently in several Article IV reports, the recommendations of the OECD’s Global 
Forum are mentioned only briefly in the Article IV report of 2016 (IMF 2016b). This is surprising, 
given that the Phase 1 assessment of the Global Forum for Panama had already been published in 
2010. As demonstrated in the following section, the Global Forum recommendations have been 
influential in the IMF work in Seychelles.  
Many of the recommendations in the 2010 Global Forum peer review (OECD 2010: 61–65) 
criticize the Panamanian secrecy regime, calling for: 1) strengthening the identification of the 
owners of bearer shares; 2) granting the authorities power to identify the person on whose behalf 
the shares held through nominees are registered; 3) amending the ‘know your client’ rules for 
resident agents to identify all key personnel and beneficiaries behind companies and foundations; 
4) strengthening penalties for failing to maintain up-to-date stock registers; 5) extending the 
record-keeping requirements to all companies and partnerships; 6) clarifying the record-keeping 
requirements for trusts and foundations; 7) signing agreements for exchange of information with 
all interested partners; and 8) ensuring that professional secrecy rules do not prevent the disclosure 
of information for exchange purposes beyond the limits permitted in the international standards. 
While some of these demands also featured in AML assessments, the Global Forum assessments 
go much further.  
By way of a conclusion, three things stand out. First, the standard IMF tax policy recommendations 
(such as broadening the tax base) have featured regularly in the executive summaries and other 
sections of various reports from 2000 to 2016. Second, however, concerns related to the AML and 
anti-tax evasion issues have only started to receive more attention very recently, driven by 
assessments of the IMF’s legal department. Many of these demands have relied on the criteria 
developed and updated by FATF.11 Third and most crucially, in its policy advice, the IMF has 
completely bypassed the scathing peer review that the OECD’s Global Forum published in 2010 
(OECD 2010)—in contrast with Seychelles, where these peer reviews have featured prominently.  
                                                 
11 The Article IV report of 2015 (IMF 2015a) is, however, an exception. While aligned with the FATF assessment, the 
2011 Financial Sector Assessment Program, and the staff commending ‘the authorities for their significant efforts’ 
(IMF 2015a: 10), the concerns brought up by the Panama Papers scandal were also addressed. 
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There are no objective grounds for the IMF to decide to take a more stringent position in 
Seychelles than in Panama. To highlight just one example, Panama ranks 12th in the Financial 
Secrecy Index, while Seychelles ranks 72nd. Panama’s higher ranking comes mostly from being a 
heavyweight in the global offshore industry, but it has also been deemed to be more secretive than 
Seychelles. If the IMF wants to be serious in its global effort to tackle secrecy regimes, it would 
make much more sense to put at least as much weight on its work in Panama as in Seychelles—or 
more. 
4.2 Seychelles 
Seychelles is a small republic with 115 islands located some 1,500 km east of mainland Africa. With 
some 90,000 inhabitants on 451 km2, it has the smallest population in Africa. Gaining 
independence from the United Kingdom in 1976 and establishing a constitution in 1993, 
Seychelles started its rise to become a major African tax haven in 1994 with the introduction of 
the Seychelles International Business Companies (IBC) Act. Subsequently, over 100,000 IBCs have 
been registered (Seychelles Offshore 2017). Seychelles has also become known for providing many 
other instruments for tax evasion and money laundering. The gross domestic product per capita 
is US$28,000, comparable to that of Poland and Portugal (CIA 2017). Despite this and the fact 
that Seychelles has the lowest poverty rates outside the OECD countries, Seychelles has been 
taking several loans from the World Bank Group from the mid-1980s onward (World Bank 2017). 
Since 2008, Seychelles has also been indebted to the IMF (IMF 2017a). In Seychelles the IMF has 
drawn both from AML assessments and peer reviews of the OECD’s Global Forum. Article IV 
reports were available annually, with the exception of 2001 and 2007. 
In 2000, the Article IV report saw the financial sector in Seychelles as ‘essentially sound’ (IMF 
2000b: 19). Acknowledging that Seychelles was an offshore financial centre,12 the report 
highlighted that the ‘authorities have undertaken a number of reforms, strengthening their fight 
against money laundering activities’, which ‘has helped improve the international reputation of 
Seychelles in this area as evidenced by the recent endorsement given to the country by the FATF’ 
(IMF 2000b: 19–20). The Seychellois request for the IMF’s technical assistance ‘to assess and 
strengthen their offshore sector legislation’ was also noted (IMF 2000b: 20). However, in an Article 
IV report covering the year 2002, the ‘authorities stated that their growth strategy included 
developing a more extensive’ and ‘clean’ offshore financial centre (IMF 2002b: 13). In the same 
year, the IMF also performed its assessment of the Seychellois financial sector regulation, which 
was published in 2004 (IMF 2004a). 
In 2003, the IMF commended Seychelles for making ‘progress in establishing a credible 
supervision framework’, even though ‘additional steps are necessary to bring the legal and 
regulatory system in line with international practices and standards’ (IMF 2003: 14). The report 
noted that the aforementioned ‘2002 Offshore Financial Center Module 2 assessment by Fund 
staff found only moderate compliance with international standards for anti-money laundering’ 
(IMF 2003: 14). Surprisingly, the Article IV report published in 2004 (IMF 2004b) did not discuss 
these themes, but in 2005 the Article IV report noted how ‘a body for the supervision of 
nonbanking financial services has been established at end-2005, and the Anti-Money Laundering 
(AML) legal framework is being finalized’, resulting in the establishment of a Financial Intelligence 
Unit (IMF 2006d: 20) which began its operations a year later (IMF 2007c: 11–13). The 2006 Article 
IV report (IMF 2007c) included the strengthening of the AML framework as a structural 
                                                 
12 The term ‘offshore financial centre’ is typically used as a more positive term for a tax haven. In this context, ‘onshore’ 
refers to states and practices that are not associated with tax havens (Palan 2003). 
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benchmark, although it is not entirely clear from the document which year the benchmark was 
established.  
The 2008 loan programme  
In 2008, the IMF initiated a loan programme with Seychelles, and the Eastern and Southern Africa 
Anti-Money Laundering Group—a FATF-styled regional body—published its mutual evaluation 
report on the Seychellois efforts towards AML and combating the financing of terrorism 
(ESAAMLG 2008). The Seychellois AML Act had been amended in 2006 to establish a Financial 
Intelligence Unit (FIU), but this did little to curtail the growth of the Seychellois offshore industry. 
The AML assessment did include several smaller criticisms, but it concluded (ESAAMLG 2008: 
22) that, overall, Seychelles ‘has put into an adequate legal and regulatory regime to address’ money 
laundering and terrorism financing threats. The assessment was based on older FATF criteria than 
the one currently in use.  
The LoI distributed with a review document published in April 2009 (IMF 2009b: 50) called for ‘a 
fundamental review of the tax system’, but excluding the offshore sector. It criticized ‘high overall 
tax rates for business’ and also ‘a significant number of exemptions, particularly for foreign 
investors’ (IMF 2009b: 50). The LoI also urged performing tax audits in the 20 largest enterprises. 
This became a structural benchmark criterion in the LoI published in 2009, in addition to the 
adoption of a tax policy reform strategy and amending the Business Tax Act. The 2008 LoI 
highlighted the importance of transparency, but only in the treatment of potential investors. 
Several reports emphasized the need to improve financial markets, but not in the context of 
offshore companies. 
A LoI published in June 2009 highlighted progress in advancing the traditional IMF tax agenda 
(IMF 2009c: 28–29), noting also the ongoing amendment process of the Financial Institutions Act 
with technical support from the IMF (IMF 2009c: 33). This became a structural benchmark 
criterion, in addition to the amending of the Business Tax Act. While the Act improved the 
oversight of trusts and some other company forms, it was not comprehensive enough. As the 2011 
peer review of the Global Forum (OECD 2011: 35) noted, foundations are expressly outside the 
scope of the Business Tax Act and its tax and information obligations. Moreover, the Act did little 
to address the secretive IBCs. 
The Global Forum peer review 
The LoI published in June 2010 noted (IMF 2010b: 32) the continuation of Seychellois efforts to 
promote transparency in its offshore sector ‘through strengthened supervision by the central bank’ 
and other authorities. The Global Forum peer review was underway, and a LoI published in 
December 2010 noted that Seychelles had signalled to the OECD’s Global Forum its commitment 
to promote ‘transparency and exchange of information’ (IMF 2011b: 58). However, this was not 
reflected in the structural benchmarks for 2010–11. A LoI published in May 2011 (IMF 2011c) 
reviewed initiatives launched after the peer review (OECD 2011). The IMF noted (IMF 2011c: 43) 
that ‘a new Companies Act will unify the existing “dual” system’ of onshore and offshore acts, 
providing ‘a stronger regulatory framework’. Moreover, it highlighted the negotiation of new 
bilateral information exchange agreements with the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, as well 
as regulations catering for the ‘obligations to exchange information with third countries’.13 The 
                                                 
13 At the time, the OECD promoted signing bilateral tax information exchange agreements that were based on 
exchange of information on request, in contrast with the OECD’s newer automatic exchange of information also 
under a multilateral convention (Meinzer 2017). 
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establishment of a Financial Services Commission was also applauded as a tool for ‘enforcing 
transparency of the offshore sector’ (IMF 2011c: 43). Finally, it highlighted progress in 
implementing the recommendations of the earlier AML evaluation. The IMF’s assessment 
weighted the Seychellois responses with the criticism it had received from other IOs (Global 
Forum), but these action points were not included in the IMF’s structural benchmark criterion. 
While the next LoI (IMF 2012c) mostly reiterated the ongoing work, in May 2012 the IMF noted 
that the ‘FIU is in the process of recruiting more staff to increase efficiency and speed up the 
resolution of cases’, and that amendments were underway for new legislation ‘governing offshore 
financial sector activities such as trusts and funds, as well as their taxation’ which should also 
facilitate international coordination, including through Seychelles’ entry into the Egmont group 
(IMF 2012d: 32).14 These notions were repeated in the LoI published in November 2012 (IMF 
2013b). Banking sector regulation had also featured regularly in LoIs, but mostly from the 
viewpoint of the Basel recommendations, with little or no mention of the regulation of offshore 
banks and the investment vehicles that they market to their clients.  
The LoI published in November 2013 (IMF 2014c) was narrower than others, but the May 2014 
LoI noted that the government had recruited specialized audit personnel ‘to strengthen its 
investigative and auditing function’ and that it was ‘taking measures on international tax 
cooperation’ (IMF 2014d: 48). Furthermore, the newly created Financial Service Authority was 
seen to have a key role for ‘regulating offshore financial services’ such as IBCs, trusts and 
foundations’. The LoI also stated that the new Financial Services Authority differed from its 
predecessor (International Business Authority) in not promoting offshore services. Regarding tax 
cooperation, the LoI noted the Seychellois ‘intention in becoming a signatory to the Multilateral 
convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters’, as well as continuing its efforts 
to reform regulation of trusts, IBCs, and other vehicles (IMF 2014d: 58). 
International tax cooperation emerges as a performance criterion 
The IMF has a long history in giving AML-related technical aid to Seychelles. However, in May 
2015, international tax cooperation made its first appearance as a structural benchmark. 
Specifically, the LoI (IMF 2015b) required a ‘submission to the National Assembly of (i) 
amendment of Seychelles Revenue Commission Act to be consistent with international standards, 
and (ii) ratification of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters’ (IMF 2015b: 30), and a ‘submission to National Assembly of new legislation on 
International Business Companies consistent with international standards’ (IMF 2015b: 31). The 
government’s efforts to enhance its capacity to monitor and enforce transfer pricing of large 
MNEs and the admission of Seychelles as a candidate for the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative were also mentioned (IMF 2015b: 63, 68).  
The LoI published in December 2015 mentioned a forthcoming evaluation against the FATF 
standards (IMF 2016c: 38) and several new obligations for corporate service providers, such as 
strengthening sanctions for non-compliance, prohibiting bearer shares, obliging IBCs to declare 
their compliance with ownership and accounting regulations, obliging service providers to 
maintain the share registers in their offices in Seychelles, strengthening the supervisory powers, 
increasing the number of inspections to IBCs, and applying penalties for non-compliance (IMF 
2016c: 40). These measures gave Seychelles a ‘largely compliant’ label from the OECD’s Global 
Forum, which also published the second part of its peer review of Seychelles in 2015 (OECD 
2015). The LoI from December 2016 added a few details, such as new regulations for the bonded 
                                                 
14 Egmont group is an informal network of national financial intelligence units. 
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warehouses. The structural benchmarks were extended by a requirement to submit a ‘new 
legislation on International Corporate Service Providers and Trusts consistent with international 
standards’ and by a ‘cabinet approval of a strategy to tackle AML/CFT risks, drawing on the 
National Risk Assessment’ (IMF 2017b: 52). 
Summary 
Especially since 2015, the IMF tax policy has drawn from a broad range of outside assessments in 
Seychelles, focusing on compliance with both the FATF and the Global Forum criteria, even 
though both criteria have their faults (see Meinzer 2017 on the Global Forum). However, it should 
also be noted that these issues have only recently featured in the structural benchmark criteria. 
4.3 The Netherlands 
The Netherlands provides an interesting contrast to the two earlier case studies. Overall, the Dutch 
AML legislation is largely aligned with the FATF criteria, and the government has a long tradition 
of participating in international tax information exchange. Yet, many scholars (Dharmapala and 
Hines 2009), politicians such as Barack Obama (Expatica 2009), non-governmental organizations 
(Oxfam 2016) and the media (The Economist 2015) have perceived the Netherlands as a major haven 
for transnational corporate tax avoidance, which erodes tax revenues in other countries. For this 
reason, ‘fostering policies and transparent institutions that advance’ the mobilization of domestic 
resources (Development Committee 2015a, 2016) would require addressing the special laws in the 
Netherlands and other holding company hubs. 
There are several reasons why MNEs find the Netherlands so attractive, the first being the large 
network of bilateral tax treaties with other countries. In April 2017, the government had tax treaties 
with nearly 100 jurisdictions (Belastindgdienst 2017). Even though some treaties have been 
renegotiated in the 2000s, they still ‘strongly reduce the treaty partners’ standard withholding tax 
rates, or eliminate them, for payments to Dutch entities’ (Weyzig 2013: 8). In 2013, only six of the 
47 treaties that the Netherlands had negotiated with low- and middle-income countries outside the 
EU contained anti-abuse provisions for interest and royalties (Weyzig 2013: 8). Moreover, it is 
relatively easy to repatriate profits from Dutch subsidiaries to parent companies under the EU’s 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive or tax treaties. MNEs can also gain tax benefits from Dutch advance 
pricing agreements that lock in the prices used for taxing intra-firm trade for certain periods of 
time (Ylönen and Laine 2015). 
Recent years have seen several case studies where the Netherlands has been used for profit shifting 
(e.g. Hearson and Brooks 2012; Ylönen and Laine 2015). Consequently, there have been plenty of 
arguments pointing out the inconsistencies in the Dutch development policies: on the one hand, 
the Netherlands has for a long time been a staunch supporter of key development policy targets, 
but on the other hand its tax systems have clearly hindered other countries’ efforts to mobilize 
their domestic resources. As Weyzig (2013: 13) has argued, the Dutch tax policies are harmful 
‘because they are incoherent with the aims of Dutch development policy and against the interests 
of developing countries’. 
No mention of BEPS in Article IV reports of the Netherlands 
The incoherence between Dutch development and tax policies makes it interesting to ask how the 
IMF has approached these issues. Even though it has issued a dedicated report on tax issues in the 
Netherlands, this and other reports have bypassed its position as a major enabler of tax avoidance. 
When the reports discuss these themes, the referral point is either money laundering or broader 
international developments. The first mention of the Dutch money laundering regulations was in 
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an Article IV report published in 2002 (IMF 2002c). In 2011, the Legal Department of the IMF 
also conducted a major assessment of the observance of the FATF recommendations, whose 
follow-up actions were then monitored in the following Article IV documents. As important as 
these analyses and recommendations are for AML purposes, they do not address the key issues 
that maintain the country’s status as a major holding company hub. At best, they included criticism 
of the difficulties in identifying the ultimate beneficial owners of some companies (e.g. IMF 2011d: 
6). 
For these reasons, the Article IV reports fall short in addressing BEPS or in fostering policies and 
institutions that help with mobilizing domestic resources, even though several Article IV reports 
had dedicated sections not only for tax issues but also for international tax competition and cross-
border spillovers (IMF 2011d: 7). Regarding the former, a selected issues report published in 2008 
(IMF 2008) discussed tax competition from the viewpoint of the new EU member states, 
maintaining the concern ‘about governments competing to undercut each other’s corporate 
income tax (CIT) rates to attract mobile tax bases’ (IMF 2008: 37) as the new member states 
generally have lower CIT rates than the old member states. Tax competition was seen as a 
phenomenon that takes place with tax rates and from which the Netherlands would suffer rather 
than facilitate it.  
This being said, the selected issues report (IMF 2008: 43) noted that ‘the Netherlands may have 
benefited from international profit shifting’ through its generous corporate tax regime, and 
particularly its ‘attractive holding company tax legislation’. What is more, the Article IV report 
(IMF 2007d) published a year earlier noted that re-exports ‘would appear very competitive in light 
of their strong growth’, implying that at least some transactions are routed through the Netherlands 
for tax reasons. However, these remarks were rather marginal and omitted development aspects. 
The 2015 Article IV report was the first to explicitly discuss BEPS (IMF 2016d: 10). However, it 
was purely descriptive, explaining the modifications to the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act to 
comply with the BEPS requirements, and also discussing country-by-country financial reporting 
(Murphy 2016) requirements for national corporations and international tax information exchange. 
The coverage in the Selected Issues paper on tax reform in the Netherlands was even smaller. A 
number of Article IV reports also applauded the commitment of the Dutch government for official 
development aid (IMF 2007d: 17, 2008: 21) 
Summary 
The IMF has neglected the role that the Netherlands plays in international corporate tax flight. 
While one could argue that the Netherlands does not have any loan programmes either with the 
World Bank or the IMF, the IMF has nevertheless issued and monitored policy recommendations 
to the Dutch government in various reports. Hence, should the IMF be serious about its 
commitments to tackle corporate tax flight from developing countries, it should address the 
international structures in which the Netherlands plays a significant role. 
5 Discussion 
More than a decade ago, Mick Moore (2004: 8) noted that ‘taxation issues have been far less 
prominent on the public political agendas in the South than within the OECD’. Since then, 
international tax issues in general and tax avoidance and evasion in particular have emerged onto 
the development agenda (Durst 2010; Mehta and Siu 2016). The IMF has recently started to catch 
up with these developments. However, the case studies presented here show that its responses 
have been heavily tilted towards AML issues at the expense of tackling corporate tax avoidance or 
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bottlenecks in international tax information exchange. Moreover, the country-level policy advice 
has been inconsistent. The OECD’s Global Forum reviews have been an important source of IMF 
policy advice in Seychelles, but not in Panama. This has resulted in more positive assessments of 
Panama and an unequal treatment of countries. What is more, the Netherlands country reports 
have completely bypassed its role in facilitating international tax flight, despite a large body of 
research and policy debates around the Dutch corporate haven.  
All of the case studies highlight the dependency of the IMF on policy assessments made by other 
IOs. Moreover, they underline the dependence of the IMF country teams on the assessments 
performed by the IMF’s other departments. The resulting path dependencies and restraints stress 
the soft power of international assessments and indices for global governance. An interesting 
question is whether this approach is enough for the IMF’s new commitments to tackle 
international tax avoidance and evasion. The results are most likely only as good as the underlying 
criteria of the Global Forum, FATF, and the OECD, which is highlighted by the half-hearted 
efforts to tackle corporate tax avoidance. Interestingly, the OECD’s BEPS recommendations were 
only mentioned at a very general level and were not utilized for policy recommendations in any of 
the three jurisdictions. The IMF’s Articles of Agreement highlight its role in ‘the expansion and 
balanced growth of international trade’, and the tax policies of the Netherlands and other corporate 
havens distort this balance (IMF 2016 [1944]: 2). 
Even if the IMF had utilized all available outside assessments (the OECD, Global Forum) in all 
of the case study countries, the deficiencies in the original criteria would have resulted in significant 
loopholes. However, an alternative approach would require the IMF to significantly build up its 
own capacity and assessment tools in all of these areas, competing and overlapping with the work 
conducted by the OECD, FATF, and other bodies. There are no easy solutions to this dilemma. 
However, it underlines the need for an international dialogue that goes beyond simplistic directives 
and policy statements and takes seriously the loopholes left in the existing initiatives. 
The case studies underline the need for bottom-up analyses of the IMF work, in addition to the 
birds-eye perspective adopted in many of the mainstream studies of the IMF. As Adler and Pouliot 
(2011:1) have argued, by focusing on practices in IR, ‘we can understand both IR theory and 
international politics better or differently’. Constructivist and post-structuralist studies on the IMF 
have contributed to this endeavour by highlighting the worldviews and norms of different actors 
in the IMF (Chiewroth 2015) and the importance of understanding country-level variations in the 
IMF policy advice (Broome and Seabrooke 2008). However, the problems in the mainstream 
approaches go deeper than that, as illustrated by Figure 1 (see Section 1), which portrays a very 
simplified form of influences that have resulted in the policy recommendations that the IMF has 
given in the three case study countries. From that figure we can see that even though large member 
states have a key steering role in providing policy alignments, they are influenced by transnational 
advocacy networks. By the time these policy alignments are turned into concrete actions, they are 
influenced by other departments of the IMF and—significantly—by other IOs. 
Furthermore, the case studies have important implications for the emerging body of international 
political economy-related tax research. So far, most of this research has analysed international tax 
governance as a separate sphere of global governance, facilitated by tax-specific work in dedicated 
departments of the OECD, the UN, and elsewhere. Complementing an earlier case study on the 
trade-tax nexus (Eskelinen and Ylönen 2017), the case studies presented there underline the 
important inter-linkages between tax governance, politics of debt, and the overall economic policy 
monitoring conducted by the IMF and other IOs.   
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6 Final remarks 
There is a need for a better understanding of how the IMF shapes international tax governance 
together with other IOs working in this and related areas. This would call for more country-level 
case studies. Overall, the IMF’s work has received hardly any attention in the recent literature on 
global tax governance, which hinders our understanding of the scope and capabilities to address 
the underlying concerns. 
Regarding the limitations of this paper, it should be noted that there has been much debate on 
whether the IMF interventions in its member states are just, and if so, under which conditions, 
but, unfortunately, space constraints do not allow a thorough discussion of these matters here. 
However, at a general level it can be said that international tax avoidance and evasion poach the 
tax bases of other countries; for this reason, the relationship between national sovereignty and 
outside intervention is potentially more complicated than in, say, privatization of state-owned 
enterprises. This issue would merit more research. Moreover, the three countries assessed here are 
only a small sample of the world’s tax havens. Broader case studies would certainly be useful in 
highlighting the variations and nuances in the IMF policy advice on tax havens. 
Finally, the research material employed in the case studies does not enable a conclusion to be 
drawn about why the IMF chose to neglect the Global Forum peer review in Panama even though 
it utilized the Global Forum assessment’s recommendations in Seychelles, or why the Netherlands 
was treated so light-handedly. There may be various factors behind these decisions, including how 
forthcoming the authorities were in these jurisdictions, the composition of country teams, and so 
on. This would merit in-depth country-level studies based on interviews and other material. 
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Seychelles: Third Review Under the Extended Arrangement, Request for Modification of 
Performance Criteria, Financing Assurances Review—Staff Report; Staff; Press Release on 
the Executive Board Discussion. IMF Country Report No. 11/134. June 2011. 
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Seychelles: Third Review under the Extended Arrangement and Request for Modification of 
Performance Criteria—Press Release; and Staff Report. IMF Country Report No. 16/15. 
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Kingdom of the Netherlands—Netherlands: Staff Report for the 2000 Article IV Consultation. 
IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/73. June 2000. 
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Cities as world-political actors? The “tax haven-
free” cities initiative and the politics of public
procurement
Matti Ylönen1
ABSTRACT In recent years, interest in the world-political role of cities has grown. The use
of public procurement for promoting world-political goals has also gathered scholarly
attention, as has the tax justice policy agenda. This article contributes to these discussions by
demonstrating how global responsibility became part of the city of Helsinki’s policy align-
ments, which were then turned into several concrete initiatives. In particular, I focus on the
contrast between the relative ease with which Helsinki became a “Fair Trade” city on the one
hand and the difﬁculties it faced in its attempts to become a “Fair Tax” city on the other.
I argue that that these initiatives illustrate how cities can utilize public procurement to
promote world-political goals. I also show how the increasing complexity of the required
procurement criteria can make the success contingent on help from “emergent entrepre-
neurs” of social movements. These developments highlight the contradictory and complex
effects of the “economization” and “marketization” of the political sphere. While econo-
mization isolates many societal issues from political control, it can also allow for politicizing
local and global issues in ways that were unthinkable. Finally, adding to the existing research
on the world-political role of cities, I demonstrate that a city does not need to be a metropolis
in order to act in world politics.
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Introduction
This article analyses the dual role of cities in world politicsthrough their procurement activities. Cities can act inworld-political arenas in their own right in addition to
providing a platform for social movements to leverage their
campaign activities. However, I will show how the ease of
harnessing public procurement for these purposes depends on the
level of economization and the complexity of the required
procurement criteria. The more complex the needed criteria is,
the more likely it is that social movements and city-level decision
makers will need help from “emergent entrepreneurs” (Seabrooke
and Wigan, 2015) who can provide them with the required
technical expertise. These are relatively new domains of research.
The academic literature on the world-political role of cities is
scarce, and the role of procurement activities in these processes
has received even less attention. Even though tax policies have
already started to gather attention in world politics for some
years,1 the majority of the scholarly literature on tax justice
campaigns is very recent (for example, Lesage and Kacar, 2013;
Seabrooke and Wigan, 2013; Seabrooke and Wigan, 2015).
One of the few scholars who has written extensively on cities as
political actors, Acuto (2009: 175), has tellingly noted how “it is
possible to count international studies publications concerned
with the city as a site of global inﬂuence on the ﬁngers of a hand”.
I will argue that scholars of political science and world politics
would beneﬁt from a better understanding of the procurement
activities in an era when issues that have traditionally been
considered political have become increasingly economized
(Çalışkan and Callon, 2009). This is highlighted by the fact that
within the European Union (EU), the public procurement
represents nearly one-ﬁfth of the gross domestic product
(European Commission, 2014). Hence, I will argue that both
the rules governing procurement tenders and the way they are
applied impact not only what kind of products and services are
being procured, but also the societal arrangements that govern the
production of these products and services. The effects can be
observed in developing countries and other places far away from
the city’s borders.
I discuss these issues with reference to two international civil
society movements and the City of Helsinki (Finland), which has
aimed to harness its procurement activities in support of these
international developments. Speciﬁcally, I will show how under
certain conditions, the economized political processes can foster
the world-political role of cities and not just limit it, as is usually
assumed. I describe how Helsinki began to recognize its world-
political inﬂuence and the responsibilities it associated with this
power and how it has reﬂected these in its policy alignments and
strategies. On the basis of this work, Helsinki decided to become a
“Fair Trade city” in 2012 and started to use fair-trade-related
criteria in its procurement tenders (City of Helsinki, 2012a). In
addition, Helsinki decided to commission an internal report on
the possibilities of using tax-related criteria in the procurement
tenders. The results were much less encouraging than with the
promotion of fair trade. In the end, Helsinki failed to come up
with a proposal that would have gathered enough political
support and that would have, most importantly, conformed to the
EU’s procurement directive—at least for the time being.
Importantly, the experience of Helsinki reﬂected a similar
outcome in the city of Malmö, Sweden.
I believe that by focusing on the reasons behind the success of
the ﬁrst initiative and the failure of the second, we can gain
several important insights on the world-political role of cities in
increasingly economized frameworks of governance. Conse-
quently, this article makes several contributions to the small
body of existing literature. First, I present a case study of a city
that has recognized its potential world-political inﬂuence and
aims to increase it, despite the fact that it can hardly be described
as a global economic or political hub. This provides a contrast
with the earlier studies that have mostly discussed the world-
political role of cities in the context of large metropolises. Second,
this example helps us to increase our understanding of the
opportunities and limits of using public procurement to promote
world-political goals, which often depend on the level of
abstraction and the complexity of the required procurement
criteria, as well as possible help from the “emergent entrepre-
neurs” of social movements. While key scholars in this ﬁeld have
mentioned the importance of public procurement when discuss-
ing the world-political role of cities, I go further by discussing the
double role of public procurement in both constraining cities and
enabling them to address world-political goals. Third, I analyse
the interconnections between the world-political role of cities and
other world-political actors, especially social movements. I will
argue that the analyses of the world-political role of cities and
social movements alike would beneﬁt from more nuanced studies
of these relationships.
The research material consists of documents issued by the city
of Helsinki, the Tax Haven Free Cities initiative, the Fair Tax
Mark foundation, city of Malmö and other relevant actors. The
material includes strategy papers, board and council resolutions,
and Helsinki’s Global Responsibility strategy. I also conducted a
semi-structured interview of the primus motor of the initiative in
Helsinki, Thomas Wallgren, who is a city council member from
the social democratic party and a lecturer in philosophy with a
long experience in social movements. In addition, I have gathered
information by discussing the initiative with city council
members from competing political parties. Finally, discussions
and presentations in a seminar on public procurement and
taxation organized in Helsinki in April 2015 contributed greatly
to this article.
I begin the article by reviewing and discussing the body of
literature focusing on the role of cities as actors in world politics.
I then continue by introducing the key studies of the use of
procurement to promote social goals. Subsequently, I demon-
strate how Helsinki managed to use public procurement to
promote fair-trade-related goals, but failed to utilize public
procurement for tax-related criteria (again, at least for the time
being). In the ﬁnal discussion section, I demonstrate how lessons
from Helsinki can contribute to the small body of existing
research on the world-political role of cities and the role of public
procurement in promoting political goals.
Review of the earlier literature: sites of action or actors in
their own right?
The role of cities in the global economy has gathered increasing
scholarly attention in recent decades. Spearheaded by the work of
Sassen (for example, Sassen, 1991; Sassen, 2000), several scholars
have studied the role of cities in the global economic system.
Sassen has argued that by including cities in analyses of the global
economy, we can add to “our focus from the power of large
corporations over governments and economies” to “the range of
activities and organisational arrangements necessary for the
implementation and maintenance of a global network of factories,
service operations, and markets”. This conceptual shift helps to
analyse places that are associated with the activities of the global
network (Sassen, 1996: 88).
Building on the Sassen’s concept of the “global city”, a school of
comparative research has emerged, evaluating and ranking cities
according to their importance and efﬁciency in global networks
(Calder and de Freytas, 2009: 80). These studies have typically
focused on cities as sites, hubs and facilitators in the networks of
economic and ﬁnancial globalization. While this approach can
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provide much important information on the workings of the
global political economy, it is less useful in illuminating the
possibility that cities could also be actors in global politics in their
own right, as Calder and de Freytas (2009; see also Walker, 2010:
209) have correctly pointed out. This has resulted in a situation
where cities are seen to have a central role in economic and
ﬁnancial globalization, though they may lack the power to
inﬂuence the economic processes they host and facilitate. While
this holds true in some cases, it can hardly be taken as a universally
applicable fact.
Sassen’s critics have pointed out how cities have become active
in attempts to tackle climate change (Acuto, 2013), as well as
other policy processes that are conventionally understood to
belong to the sphere of world politics. Hence, Calder and
de Freytas point out that while “the comparative assessment of
the social and economic dimensions of global cities” conducted
by Sassen and her followers has been important, “systematic
analysis of their political functions remains underdeveloped”
(Calder and de Freytas, 2009). This article presents one attempt to
develop a more systematic analysis of the political functions of
cities and their interaction with the civil society organizations and
movements. In order to do that, I argue that we should critically
review some common perceptions that have so far been put
forward as answers to this challenge. In an attempt to develop a
more nuanced analytical framework, Calder and de Freytas
(2009) introduce the concept “global political city” as one that
“exhibits the broad characteristics of a global city, as conceptua-
lized by Sassen”, but that also serves as a “micro-setting for global
political transactions”. According to Calder and de Freytas, the
key elements of these global political cities are:
(1) Being a policy hub and exercising disproportionate inﬂuence
on global policy debates;
(2) Having a political-diplomatic community, with dense net-
works of ofﬁcial and non-ofﬁcial actors shaping global
affairs; and
(3) Functioning as a strategic information complex, within which
important political, military and country-risk information of
global importance. (Calder and de Freytas, 2009: 81)
Calder and de Freytas analyse the concept of global political cities
by discussing the historical hubs of Rome, Baghdad, Paris, as well
as current power centres such as Brussels and Washington D.C. On
the basis of these examples, Calder and de Freytas (2009: 94)
conclude that their case study “illustrates how cities can potentially
inﬂuence the overall proﬁle of international affairs”. However, the
problem with this approach is that it does not radically differ from
the earlier analyses on cities as sites of political action. This has also
been highlighted by Acuto, who has criticized Calder and
de Freytas by stating that despite the promises of their title,
“which uses the term ‘actors’ to indicate participation of global
cities in international affairs, the article does little to theorize
agency” (Acuto, 2009: 175). He argues, in my view correctly, that
“global cities are not solely places of, but also agents in global
governance and world politics” (Acuto, 2009: 175). This implies
that “studying the city as an actor means allowing for that actor to
be a participant in the phenomena international scholars tackle on
a daily basis, ranging from security and political economy to the
environment and human rights” (Acuto, 2009: 175).2
This calls for the challenging question of what it means to “act”
in world politics. If one adopts a narrow view of politics, this
would probably mean acting within the established frameworks of
international governance, for example, in international negotia-
tions or bodies. This approach directs attention to formalist and
traditional state-centred conceptions of politics and international
relations. These conceptions have become outdated at least since
the growth in the past decades of private transnational
governance, as well as international non-governmental organiza-
tions and movements. Therefore, we need to focus not on the
form of the actors in the international arena, but rather on these
actors’ substantial impacts on the “struggle over the resources and
arrangements that set the basic terms of our practical and
passionate relations”, as Unger (1987: 145–146) has deﬁned
politics in its broader sense.
Acuto (2009,2013) adheres to a similar view by analysing cities
as actants (places of action) and actors in international arenas.
However, he does this by associating the size of big cities (global
cities) with their potential to inﬂuence global affairs. While it is
most likely that a correlation exists between these two, I believe it
would be unwise to assume (even implicitly) such a correlation. In
an international arena occupied not only by states but also by
NGOs, private actors and informal groups, the political inﬂuence
of a municipality may arise from active work in international
networks even if the city is not a metropolis. This can be
illustrated by a comparison with the state-system, where both
small and large states can inﬂuence international relations, even
though the bigger states are more likely to possess greater
power than the smaller ones. However, the smaller states
generally need to be more creative to exert power over global
affairs, for example, by using skilful diplomacy or developing a
strategic focus on a few key areas in global governance. I argue
that the same logic applies to cities.
Most of the existing studies on the world-political role of cities
have focused on city-level diplomacy and action in climate policy.
For example, authors such as Kousky and Schneider (2003), Selin
and VanDeveer (2007), Andonova et al. (2009), and Bulkeley
and Betsill (2010, 2013) have gone to great lengths in
documenting the role and inﬂuence of cities and city networks
in tackling climate change. However, less attention has been paid
to how cities can use public procurement to promote world-
political goals, or be used by social movements for these purposes.
Next, I will proceed to discuss this issue.
Public procurement, world politics and the economization of
municipal governance
Understood as “the acquisition of appropriate goods and/or
services at the best possible total ownership cost to meet the needs
of the purchaser in terms of quality and quantity, time, and
location” (Acuto, 2013: 130), procurement has become a major
function for municipalities around the world. Moreover, public
ﬁnance literature has identiﬁed procurement activities as one of
the four major governmental functions, the other three being
providing a legal framework for all economic activities,
redistributing income through taxation and spending, and
providing public goods and services to the general population
(Thai, 2001: 9; see also McCrudden, 2004: 257). Despite the
academic- and policy-level interest in connections between public
procurement and corporate responsibility, public procurement
has received little attention from scholars of political economy. As
the authors of the report Linking procurement and political
economy note, “there are no analytical tools available that link
political-economy analysis and procurement” (Frøystad et al.,
2010: iii). The work of Acuto has been one exception to this rule,
as he has noted that the “logic of public-private hybridization”
has “recast the traditional political-economic dependences of
these cities on their global market bases” (Acuto, 2013: 131). This
being said, there is clearly a need for a better understanding of the
relationship between cities, procurement and world politics.
There is a long history of linking public procurement with the
promotion of political goals. Social justice issues became
interlinked with procurement already in nineteenth century in
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the United States, the United Kingdom and France. In 1840, then
President of the United States, Martin Van Buren, issued an
executive order establishing a 10-hour workday for employees
working under certain government contracts. In 1891, the UK
Government passed a resolution to ensure “fair” wages for
companies working for the government. The primary beneﬁci-
aries of these early attempts to include social criteria in
procurement tenders were usually male breadwinners. The ﬁrst
major move to widen the beneﬁciaries was made by the
governments of United Kingdom and the United States after
World War I, when these governments began to use public
procurement to address the needs of people with disabilities
(McCrudden, 2004: 257). In the 1960s, requests for racial non-
discrimination found their way into procurement tenders. Anti-
discriminatory rules were later extended to cover other areas,
most notably gender-related goals (McCrudden, 2004: 260–261).
Essentially, early societal goals included in the public procure-
ment tenders were all related to domestic and workplace concerns,
and most of these demands later became binding legislation. Things
started to change only in the 1960s, when public procurement
became a tool for achieving international goals. The most notable
example of this development was the widespread campaign against
apartheid. This campaign was successful in introducing anti-
apartheid measures in public procurement tenders, while also using
other means such as consumer and investor pressure. Moreover, the
international dimension of procurement also became stronger in
the European community, which began to use procurement to
prohibit discrimination based on sex in third-country production
from the 1970s onward (McCrudden, 2004: 263–264). The work
of the International Labour Ofﬁce also had a role in these
developments (McCrudden, 2004: 265).
Developments in the 1980s and the 1990s further expanded the
international dimension of public procurement. These events can
be seen as the natural evolution of a situation in which the highly
developed states had begun to regulate most of the domestic
issues by binding legislation. The delivery of public services
underwent major structural reforms in various countries as
privatization, outsourcing and deregulation became the buzz-
words of the time. As a result of this, public purchases of goods
and services now correspond to 16 per cent of the GDP in the EU,
although there are great variations between countries (European
Commission, 2014). No similar statistics exist on the public
procurement of municipalities. Nevertheless, it is evident that,
collectively, municipal procurement decisions have a major
impact on both national and international economies. The
growth in the use of public procurement has intensiﬁed the
critiques against the contractual method of outsourcing, as
outsourcing was thought to produce unpleasant social outcomes
locally and in other countries. Consequently, the calls have
intensiﬁed for mechanisms that would address this disparity
(McCrudden, 2004: 264). This mood is reﬂected in demands for
better labour norms, human rights and “green” procurement that
found their way into procurement tenders in 1990s (McCrudden,
2004: 266).
It is helpful to analyse these phenomena in the context of
economization. Callon (1998) has deﬁned economization as “the
processes that constitute the behaviours, organizations, institu-
tions and, more generally, the objects in a particular society which
are tentatively and often controversially qualiﬁed, by scholars
and/or lay people, as ‘economic’ ”. In a somewhat similar fashion,
Commons ([1924] 1957, 8) already described in the 1920s how
value and economy became verbs instead of nouns; as “value
becomes valuing; economy becomes economising”. Since the
1980s, the wave of privatizations, outsourcings, ﬁnancializations
and other means of extending markets into new spheres (Harvey,
2005) have resulted in the increasing economization of politics in
different parts of the world. The growth of public procurement
(Maskin and Tirole, 2008: 1) is obviously one key example of this
phenomenon. These economizing processes are typically thought
to restrict the sphere of politics. While this is true in many cases,
the case studies will show that it is hardly a universal fact.
In principle, the sheer scale of procurement activities should
give municipalities and other public agencies an enormous
amount of power to use market mechanisms to exert political
pressure on states. However, the outsourcing wave has resulted in
the insulation of procurement activities from demands that could
be deemed as “political”. Especially in the EU, all such demands
have to be justiﬁed by proving that they relate to the “invisible
characteristics” of the product that is being procured. This
division line is arbitrary, as the invisible characteristics are, almost
by deﬁnition, ﬁctional (Commons [1924] 1957: 23–24). Indeed,
the power to deﬁne which claims could be conceived as “invisible
characteristics” of a product has become of paramount impor-
tance. Moreover, it should be noted that the level of expertise
required for drafting the procurement rules generally increases
with the complexity and level of abstraction of the criteria.
The “Fair Trade Cities” movement is an illustrative example of
this. Internationally, the fair-trade campaign has been the most
successful international attempt to link public procurement with
world-political goals. Initiated by NGOs and activists, spear-
headed by the international labelling organization known as the
Fairtrade Foundation, and fostered by cities that are often
members of national fair-trade platforms, this campaign is a
symptomatic example of new alliances that can shape the idea of
what it means to act in world politics. The concept of fair trade
has been evolving over the past 40 years, and it has gained broad
support from local, regional and international actors. According
to the Fairtrade Foundation, there are over 1.4 million farmers
and workers in 1,140 producer organizations across the Fairtrade
system. An estimated 7 million people have been said to beneﬁt
from fair-trade sales (Bowes, 2011: viii).
The basic idea behind fair trade is well-known. The
international certiﬁcation system aims to ensure better pay
and longer contracts for workers on small farms. Moreover,
part of the proﬁts should be used for community development
purposes. In the EU, there has been a growing interest in
promoting fair trade since the early 1990s from the EU level to
municipalities (European Parliament, 2012). Cities have been
particularly active promoters of fair trade. At a public meeting
in 2000, the people of the city of Garsland, UK, voted almost
unanimously for Garstang to become the world’s ﬁrst fair trade
town. Soon after this, the Fairtrade International seized upon
the idea of a “Fair Trade town” as a device that could be turned
into a national campaign (Low and Davenport, 2007; Malpass
et al., 2007). At the time of writing, the international network
of “Fair Trade town” is comprised of more than 2,200 members
in 18 different countries. A city has to meet ﬁve goals in order
to become a “Fair Trade town” (Fair Trade towns, 2015):
1. Local council passes a resolution supporting Fair Trade and
agrees to serve Fair Trade products (for example, in meetings,
ofﬁces and canteens).
2. A range of Fair Trade products are available locally (targets
vary from country to country).
3. Schools, workplaces, places of worship and community
organizations support Fair Trade and use Fair Trade products
whenever possible.
4. Media coverage and events raise awareness and understanding
of Fair Trade across the community.
5. A Fair Trade steering group representing different sectors is
formed to co-ordinate action around the goals and develop
them over the years.
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The 1990s saw a steady growth in the use of fair-trade-related
criteria in public procurement tenders. The developments in the
EU were of particular importance. In January 1994, the European
Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution to promote fairness and
solidarity in North–South trade. The EP called for the European
Commission (EC) to develop initiatives that would support fair
trade, with dedicated funding and the inclusion of fair trade in
community development and cooperation policies. In the same
year, the EC published a document on Alternative Trade,
expressing its support for strengthening fair trade both in the
South and the North. Consequently, in 1996 the Economic and
Social Committee of the EU welcomed the development of fair-
trade-labelling initiatives and called on the EC to create a
dedicated budget line in support of fair-trade activities. This
request was reiterated in the report on fair trade adopted by the
EP in 1998. This report also put forward a number of proposals
for further EC actions in support of fair trade (European
Commission, 2012).
After several further calls from the EU parliament and
committees for the ofﬁcial EU-level support of fair trade, in
2009 the EC introduced its ﬁrst communication on fair trade. The
communication associated the promotion of fair trade with “the
sustainable economic and social development of the developing
countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among
them; [with] the smooth and gradual integration of the
developing countries into the world economy; and [with] the
campaign against poverty in the developing countries” (European
Commission, 1999). In other words, already at that time the EC
noted how municipal-level procuring activities were connected to
world-political issues. The report acknowledged that “many
authorities are calling for tenders including sustainable objectives
or ‘fair trade’ in their procurement policies” (European
Commission, 2009: 9).3 Furthermore, the communication stated
that contracting authorities are free to deﬁne sustainability-
related procurement criteria as long as they are “linked to the
subject-matter of the contract and comply with the other relevant
EU public procurement rules, including the basic principles of
equal treatment and transparency” (European Commission, 2009:
9). This was a clear statement of political will in support for
linking public procurement with fair trade. In other words, one of
the biggest players in international relations began to underline
the world-political impacts of municipalities long before scholars
of international relations began to study this topic.
Despite ofﬁcial support from the EC, the legal status of fair-
trade-related procurement criteria has been unclear. In August
2008, a contract notice was published in the Ofﬁcial Journal of the
European Union for the supply and management of automatic
coffee machines from 1 January 2009 onward. Issued by the
province of Noord Holland in the Netherlands, this contract
notice provoked the EC to send a formal complaint to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands on 15 May 2009. According to the
EC letter, the speciﬁcations stipulated that the contract infringed
the EU’s public procurement directive (2004/18) by demanding
that the suppliers of tea and coffee adhere to the MAX
HAVELAAR and EKO labels. The Court ruled that Noord
Holland had violated the procurement directive by demanding
that the service providers had to obtain a particular label for their
products. In addition, the Court noted that “there is no
requirement that an award criterion relates to an intrinsic
characteristic of a product, that is to say something which forms
part of the material substance thereof”. Essentially, this meant
that it was possible to use fair-trade-related procurement criteria
as these criteria were understood to be “invisible” characteristics
of the product, but only when these criteria were listed in the
tender without demanding that the products offered should carry
a particular label (Paragraph 99). This was in line with the
guidelines provided in the EC communication.
Helsinki is an illustrative example of a city that has beneﬁted
from the Court’s judgment in the area of fair trade. Since the
1990s, the international activities of Helsinki have been guided by
international strategies that were succeeded by the Global
Strategy in 2012. Helsinki drafted its ﬁrst international strategy
already in 1994 as a “road map for a national capital that was
recovering from an economic slump and opening up inter-
nationally” (City of Helsinki, 1994). Three consequent strategies
then widened the focus by discussing issues such as EU
membership, multiculturalism and cooperation within the Baltic
region. At the time, little attention was paid to how Helsinki
could inﬂuence the world-political framework where it operates.4
In April 2009, the city board of Helsinki adopted a new general
strategy for its future work in which it stated that the city would
draft a separate strategy for its global responsibility. The mayor
convened a working group in September 2009 that presented a
draft version of the Global Responsibility Strategy in March 2012.
Comments and amendment proposals where then collected from
the city board, other municipal boards and the city agencies, and
the Global Responsibility Strategy was ﬁnally adopted in
September 2012 (City of Helsinki, 2012a: 2).
The global responsibility strategy presented a major step
towards extending the political role of Helsinki beyond its
traditional borders. According to Finnish law, “local authorities
shall strive to promote the welfare of their residents and
sustainable development in their area” (Local and Regional
Government of Finland, 2007: 4). Adopting a creative deﬁnition
of the “area”, Global Strategy stated that “to be able to fulﬁll the
goals speciﬁed in the Local Government Act, the municipalities
must be increasingly aware and cognisant of the global operating
environment of their own operations and, for their own part,
actively strive to inﬂuence the global development” (Local and
Regional Government of Finland, 2007: 4). In other words, the
city made headway in widening its understanding of its own role
in the wider global environment.
The strategy included a long list of issues that the city sees as
part of its global responsibility. Among these were the local efforts
to solve climate change and cross-border environmental protec-
tion issues, environmental and social effects, local efforts for
promoting immigration and diversity, guidelines for international
operations, cross-border measures in connection with the
management of ﬁnances and the ﬁnance market, and measures
related to work life and personnel. In addition, respect for human
rights, equality, and diversity were mentioned (City of Helsinki,
2012a: 3). Finally, the strategy mentioned the global impacts of
the city’s procurement activities. Related to this, in 2013 Helsinki
became a “Fair Trade town” and a member in the Finnish
network of fair-trade cities.5
The merits and perils of public procurement
The fair trade cities network and Helsinki are helpful examples
for illuminating several important and under-studied aspects of
economization. Çalısķan and Callon have noted how markets
require “generating and then reproducing a stark distinction
between the ‘things’ to be valued and the ‘agencies’ capable of
valuing them”. Furthermore, they note that two basic types of
entities result: “entities with paciﬁed agency that can be
transferred as property, and entities that are able to engage in
operations of calculation and judgment” (Çalısķan and Callon,
2010: 5). While this bipolar categorization may work with normal
market transactions, the Fair Trade cities example illuminates the
problems we encounter when this kind of dichotomy is applied to
public procurement. Essentially, the marketization of the public
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sphere has resulted in a situation where the capacity of the public
agencies for calculating and judging has itself been paciﬁed by the
procurement legislation. In the public procurement process,
municipalities have to give up parts of their regulatory power for
companies whose actions they can only inﬂuence periodically
during the renewal of the procurement contracts, and even then
their hands are bound by detailed procurement rules. However,
these very same procurement rules create opportunities to widen
the deﬁnition of “area” the way Helsinki did in its global strategy,
and to demand societal standards abroad in a way that would be
impossible if the municipality produced the same products itself.
In a way, these demands turn the economization process on its
head, at least in a limited area. The signiﬁcance of these
concessions can be debated, but they are nevertheless a real,
existing phenomenon.
The long and arduous process of getting an unquestioned
acceptance of the use of fair-trade-related criteria in procurement
tenders is an illustrative example of the merits and perils of using
procurement to promote societal goals. Drafting procurement
tenders are often difﬁcult, as small inconsistencies in wordings
may result in lengthy and costly delays and litigations. Therefore,
in the economized municipal policies the possession of this kind
of legal-economistic know-how has been elevated to a gatekeeper
role. On the one hand, those municipalities, agencies, or even
individual politicians or civil servants with access to this know-
how may be relatively well-equipped to harness procurement for
promoting world-political goals. On the other hand, without this
kind of knowledge, the only thing that municipal decision makers
can do is, more or less, to adhere to an already established and
tested set of “ethical consumerist” demands. In this way,
organizations such as the Fair Trade Organisation can also
become important gatekeepers. The procurement processes they
have managed to get tested in courts have become the “safe” ones
for municipalities, while even small deviations from these
processes may result in legal battles.
This gatekeeper role can be illustrated by contrasting the fair
trade campaign with a failure that another procurement-related
initiative faced in Helsinki, namely, the campaign for becoming a
“fair tax” city. In its global strategy, the City of Helsinki stated
that “the city cooperates with business life to further social
responsibility”, continuing that “the city ﬁnds it important to
prevent the use of tax havens and, thus, avoids cooperation with
companies linked to tax havens”. These demands were listed
under the section titled “Responsibility in the management of
ﬁnances and prevention of grey economy”, which stated that the
“city is in active cooperation with the tax authorities, other cities,
business life and civic organisations, to be able to prevent grey
economy both nationally and internationally”, and that “reports
on the implementation of the action programme against grey
economy are regularly being compiled for the City Board”.
Moreover, the strategy stated that “city acts responsibly when it
comes to investment activities and getting loan ﬁnancing” (City of
Helsinki, 2012a: 6–7).
However, even proponents of this idea lacked concrete
measures for achieving this goal at the time, especially given
the constraints imposed by the EU’s procurement directive.
Consequently, the city board commissioned a report from the
city’s civil servants on issues related to tax havens, with an aim to
draw from experiences from other EU countries and to map the
ways that municipalities could avoid cooperation with such
companies. The report was concluded in 2013, and it noted the
impossibility of using “voluntary or mandatory criteria for
excluding companies on the grounds that they have connections
with tax havens” (City of Helsinki, 2013: 12). The report then
discussed different quantitative and qualitative criteria that can
and cannot be included in procurement tenders. Regarding this, it
noted that according to procurement legislation, the “purchaser
cannot use criteria that would measure the qualities of companies
engaging in procuring activities”. For this reason, “it is impossible
to utilize criteria that would take into account the company’s
connections to tax havens” (City of Helsinki, 2013: 12). Finally,
the report noted that it would be very difﬁcult to obtain the
relevant country-level ﬁnancial information from the companies
and suggested that the “fair tax” issues are more relevant for
discussions of corporate social responsibility.
After the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2009, several municipalities
became interested in linking procurement with tax-related
objectives. Helsinki and the city of Malmö were particularly
active in taking these initiatives to the city board and council
levels, but similar developments also took place in France and
some other countries. In August 2012, the city council of Malmö
decided to examine the possibility of including transparency-
related criteria in procurement tenders for companies with
linkages to tax haven countries (City of Malmö, 2012).6 However,
in a report published in 2013, the city noted that the City Ofﬁce
had looked into this issue, but there was very little or no
opportunity to promote such transparency demands under the
current legislation (City of Malmö, 2013). In other words,
whereas the Fair Trade campaign had been made possible by the
international network, an international dimension alone could
not help the fair tax initiative to succeed.7
This international dimension included more than informal
exchange of ideas. In March 2014, international cooperation
geared up as the “tax haven-free cities” network was founded
during a conference organized in Stockholm, Sweden. The
network gathered the key people who were pushing these
initiatives in Finland, Sweden and other countries, and worked
as a platform for city-level activists to share information and ideas
and to spread knowledge on these topics. It aims for the
following:
! Cooperation and transparency instead of the secrecy provided
by tax havens, the corporate manipulated accounting and the
tax competition between countries
! A public register of companies’ real owners, including all
shadow structures like trusts, private foundations and shadow
companies
! A global agreement on automatic exchange of information
between tax authorities
! Country-by-country reporting by multinational corporations in
all sectors showing their ﬁnancial activities for each country in
which they operate to make visible their tax strategies
(Taxhavenfreecities.org, 2015)
In addition, the call stated that “local governments in all
countries can cooperate and better utilise the possibilities
available today to be ‘tax haven free,’ i.e. to prevent tax money
from going to companies, banks or other ﬁnancial institutions
that use tax havens for tax evasion”. However, the means for
achieving this were left open, illustrated also by the challenges
that Helsinki and Malmö faced in their attempts to take the idea
really forward. This is highlighted also in a barrister’s opinion
that was commissioned by the UK-based not-for-proﬁt company
Fair Tax Mark Limited. Founded in order to foster voluntary
disclosure of transparent and non-tax-avoiding tax policies in
multinational companies, Fair Tax Mark Ltd. wanted to ﬁnd out
whether it would be possible to use their Fair Tax Mark in public
procurement tenders. According to the barrister’s opinion:
[The] difﬁculty comes with the requirement that the labelling
criteria (i.e. criteria identifying anti-social tax behaviour as an
input to the subject matter of the contract) be objectively
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deﬁned. We recommend therefore that the deﬁnition of anti-
social tax behaviour in this context moves away from the
notoriously hard-to-deﬁne concept of “tax avoidance,” and
focuses instead on objectively identiﬁable input factors that
create tax risk for public exchequers. An example might be the
use of tax havens in supply chains. (Quentin, 2013)
In other words, while it could be possible in principle to
develop tax- or transparency-related criteria for public procure-
ment under current EU legislation, it would be challenging—but
not necessarily impossible—to formulate a set of criteria that
connects tax or transparency practices with the product being
procured.8 Procuring is a technically demanding activity, and
these difﬁculties are further accentuated by the corporate secrecy
applied in many of the procurement contracts, which makes
monitoring the decisions difﬁcult for elected representatives, the
media and other watchdogs. The more dependent the city
becomes on procuring activities, the bigger the threat will be that
it will lose its own expertise and become increasingly dependent
on the outside providers.
After the pessimistic conclusions in the aforementioned report
Helsinki conducted in 2013, the push for introducing tax-related
criteria to public procurement tenders lost some of its steam, at
least for the time being. Many parties and politicians were
sceptical or hostile towards the initiative from the beginning, and
the report conﬁrmed many of their concerns. In other words, the
same directive on public procurement that enabled a relatively
small capital to join the Fair Trade cities network by adopting a
wide deﬁnition of its “area” that went beyond the national
borders also restricted Helsinki from introducing any measures
related to the discrimination against companies based on tax-
related criteria. Using the terminology of Çalışkan and Callon, the
result was an entity with paciﬁed agency when it came to
valuating the ﬁnancial and tax structures of companies, but an
active agency in relation to workers’ rights abroad.
Reﬂections: politics in economized cities
Today, some of the biggest political struggles are fought over
decisions about whether or not particular services should be
outsourced. Politicians are often painfully aware of the fact that
after the procurement decision has been made, their power to
steer the use of public money reduces signiﬁcantly. In this
manner, public procurement “marketises” issues, processes and
structures that have traditionally been associated with the sphere
of politics. Çalısķan and Callon describe marketization as a
particular case of “economization”, which refers to “the processes
through which behaviours, organisations, institutions and, more
generally, objects are constituted as being ‘economic’ ”. Market-
ization, then, refers to the process of economization by
establishing markets. While markets are not identical, they
typically organize the conception, production and circulation of
goods, as well as the voluntary transfer of some sorts of property
rights attached to them’. Moreover, markets “delimit and
construct a space of confrontation and power struggles” (Çalısķan
and Callon, 2010: 3).
In other words, the conventional understanding of the
economization and marketization processes is that they delimit
the sphere of politics. However, the case studies presented in this
article show procurement activities can also create opportunities
to politicize issues that have already been marketized, thus
blurring some of the traditional borderlines between local and
international, or between markets and politics. In world politics,
this also questions the “level of analysis schema” of “man, states and
international system”, which has received too little critical appraisal
(Walker, 1993: 131; but see also Henderson et al., 2002: 456).
While many of the recent accounts of world politics avoid these
sorts of oversimpliﬁed categorizations, the discipline has not paid
sufﬁcient attention to the pervasiveness of world-political matters
in the ﬁelds of public procurement and city-level politics.
The example of Helsinki and the Fair Trade Cities network
illuminates how any city can promote world-political goals to the
extent allowed by the purchasing power of its procurement
activities. The scarce literature on the world-political role of cities
has so far stressed how large metropolises can inﬂuence world-
political affairs. While acknowledging that metropolises can in
many cases be better equipped for this task, this case study has
underlined that factors other than mere size should be taken into
account. As Henderson et al. have noted, “in order to understand
the dynamics of development in a given place, then, we must
comprehend how places are being transformed by ﬂows of
capital, labour, knowledge, power etc. and how, at the same time,
places (or more speciﬁcally their institutional and social fabrics)
are transforming those ﬂows as they locate in place-speciﬁc
domains” (Henderson et al., 2002: 438). Helsinki’s example can
shed light especially on this latter dimension.
While we should be careful not to overestimate the world-
political inﬂuence of any particular city’s procurement activities,
the sheer scale of public procurement activities means that they
can potentially be used for promoting world-political goals.
Moreover, procurement processes and regulations have become
more standardized, especially within the EU, thus creating more
space for international civil society and municipal governance
that promotes more “responsible” and standardized rules for
public procurement. In addition, many of the companies that
participate in procurement tenders operate in many countries,
which make it easier for civil society organizations to target
potentially irresponsible practices. Procurement criteria can also
act as “catalysts” for more far-reaching reforms, as the history of
public procurement has shown.
Therefore, the increase in the number of outsourcings and the
increasing signiﬁcance of public procurement play a double role
in reshaping the political sphere, not only by restricting the
political opportunities but also by expanding them. The former
aspect has been documented extensively in the management
literature. Outsourcings can restrict the political steering
capacities of elected representatives by making the political
alignments dependent on contractual formulations that can be
altered only when the contract period expires (Kuusela and
Ylönen, 2013), and the formulation of tenders requires high-level
technical and juridical expertise rarely possessed by the elected
representatives (Prince, 2012: 198–199). Outsourcings can also
restrict the ability of elected representatives to obtain information
from outsourced activities, as the companies providing the
services typically operate under private law (Siemiatycki, 2010:
389). Continuing reliance on outside providers can also lead to
the deterioration of the municipality’s ability to perform and
assess the substantial matter of the procurements, at the level of
both the administration and the political representatives (Saint-
Martin, 2000). The list of negative aspects of de-politicisation
could be continued. In other words, these impacts restrict and
diminish the political aspects related to public procurement.
The other, more positive role of public procurement lies in
harnessing it to promote world-political goals. Related to this, the
comparison between the Fair Trade and the Fair Tax initiatives
highlights several interesting aspects. The Fair Trade campaign
has been successful in building long-term growth based on raising
public awareness, campaigning on different levels of politics, and
building technical expertise and easily duplicable models that
decision makers can endorse without much technical expertise.
Especially since the endorsement from the European Court of
Justice, obtaining the Fair Trade Mark has become a relatively
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easy goal for both municipal politicians and local-level activists to
promote. However, in contrast with the fair-tax initiative, the
process was steered by civil society networks with longstanding
expertise in this area. Moreover, the idea of using procurement to
promote work-related rights also has a long and well-established
history, even though the fair trade campaign has added a new,
international dimension to it.
The loose campaign for introducing fair-tax-related procure-
ment criteria to procurement tenders provides in many ways a
contrasting example. There were two key reasons for the failure of
the fair-tax initiative beyond those related simply to the political
balance of power in Helsinki (which was also an important factor,
as many key decision makers categorically opposed the initiative).
First, neither the city’s decision makers nor the city ofﬁcials
possessed the know-how required for formulating a procurement
tender that could have functioned as a starting point for political
discussions of the matter. Second, there was a great deal of
uncertainty over whether the possible tax- or transparency-
related procurement demands would be compatible with the EU’s
procurement directive. Both of these reasons highlight the
importance of technical expertise in harnessing public procure-
ment for complex societal goals.
However, this situation might be changing. In December 2015,
the EP gave a resolution titled “Report with recommendations to
the Commission on bringing transparency, coordination and
convergence to Corporate Tax policies in the Union” (European
Parliament, 2015). Referring to the Fair Tax Mark as a precedent,
the Parliament called on the EC to bring forward a proposal “as
soon as possible on a voluntary European ‘Fair Tax Payer’ label”,
including “eligibility criteria, under which the label could be
awarded by national bodies”. Moreover, the Parliament
demanded that the “Fair Tax Payer” label only be “awarded to
those companies that have gone above and beyond the letter of
what is required of them under Union and national law”, and that
“companies should be motivated by this ‘Fair Tax Payer’ label to
make paying a fair share of taxes an essential part of their
corporate social responsibility policy, and to report on their
stance on taxation matters in their annual report”. When the EC
discussed the issue in connection with the development of a wider
country-by-country reporting initiative, it noted its interest “in
further promoting the use of fair tax payer labels as a private
market initiative” (European Commission, 2016).
This progress would most likely not have taken place without
the active role of the Fair Tax Mark initiative that draws on the
expertise of some of the key persons in the Tax Justice Network.
The emergent entrepreneurs (Seabrooke and Wigan, 2015) of the
network were partially the same people who played key roles in
elevating the mandatory country-by-country reporting of multi-
national companies to the policy agenda of the EU (Seabrooke
and Wigan, 2015). This highlights how “ideas are powered
through expertise” (Seabrooke and Wigan, 2015). At the same
time, the big tax advisory ﬁrms are busy developing their own
voluntary tax responsibility measures such as the “Total Tax
Contribution” of the PriceWaterhouseCoopers, thereby mimick-
ing “the vocabulary of transparency whilst providing no
information about its role in tax avoidance, the schemes that it
manufactures, the amount of tax that major corporations should
have paid, or even the fees that the ﬁrm charges for such spin and
whitewash” (Sikka and Willmott, 2013).
Finally, it should be noted that even though the labour issues
embedded in procuring fair trade products are at ﬁrst sight more
straightforward than the fair tax agenda, this difference is largely
illusory. When it comes to the characteristics of a particular
product, the labour rights promoted by the fair trade are
essentially just as “invisible” as demands related to corporate
structures or transparency. This highlights the political role of the
courts of justice in deﬁning what aspects of the capitalist
production process and its discontents are characteristics of the
products and which aspects should be seen as by-products that
can be ignored.
The efforts to link public procurement with tax compliance
and transparency continue both in Finland and internationally. In
2015, some of the key people behind Helsinki’s tax initiative
founded a non-proﬁt organization, which promotes “fair tax” in
public procurement and continues to develop demands that
would comply with the EU’s procurement directive. Internation-
ally, the British Fair Tax Mark has continued to generate interest
towards this thematic, even though it is not directly related to the
public procurement. Moreover, the payment of taxes has become
a growing social responsibility issue, with contestations between
businesses and their adversaries over how to deﬁne the limits of
this responsibility (Ylönen and Laine, 2015).
These kinds of contestations and clashes over private corporate
interests and increasingly economized municipal policy-making
are likely to increase in the future. One can only hope that the
scholars of world politics and global political economy will start
paying more attention to these developments and to develop
more nuanced theoretical framework and case studies that will
help increase our understanding of the linkages between
municipalities, public procurement and the world politics.
Notes
1 For example, Eden and Kudrle, 2005; Sharman, 2006; Eden, 2007; Rixen, 2008; Sagaﬁ-
Nejad et al., 2008; Rixen, 2010; Nölke, 2011; Palan et al., 2013.
2 This is echoed in the thoughts of (Walker, 2010, p. 209), who has noted that “the
prevailing traditions of political theory and theories of international relations still
assume that cities are where and what they are supposed to be, at considerable cost, I
would say, to their claims to scholarly credibility”.
3 “Contributing to Sustainable Development: The role of Fair Trade and non-
governmental trade-related sustainability assurance schemes.”
4 However, Helsinki had shared its lobbying ofﬁce in Brussels with some Finnish
regional associations and universities since 1996, which was brieﬂy noted in the 2008
strategy (City of Helsinki, 2008; City of Helsinki, 2012b).
5 Only four city board members opposed increasing the use of fair trade products and
applying the Fair Trade City status, with 75 board members showing their support
(City of Helsinki, 2012c).
6 The Swedish-language decision stated, “Under överläggningen yrkar kommunstyr-
elsens ordförande att det görs ett tillägg efter första att-satsen med följande lydelse; att
även undersöka möjligheten för att antingen offentlighetsprincipen skall gälla för
skatteﬁnansierad verksamhet i välfärdsektorn eller att kunna ställa krav på ekonomisk
insyn bl.a. för att undvika upphandling av företag kopplade till s.k. skatteparadis”.
7 International municipal-level networking activities have not gone unnoticed by the
civil society organizations campaigning for tax justice issues. Helsinki’s attempts to
connect taxes and public procurement have been addressed, for example, by Richard
Murphy, senior advisor and one of the founding members of the Tax Justice Network,
who praised these efforts in his blog and called for more action in the United Kingdom
(Murphy, 2012). In Scotland, both the UK’s largest public-sector service union,
UNISON, and the Ethical Consumer Association referred to developments in Helsinki
and Malmö in their submissions to the Procurement Reform (Scotland) Bill (UNISON,
2012; Ethical Consumer Research Association, 2013).
8 However, it should be noted that the public procurement directive was renewed in
2014 and is currently being implemented in national legislations. Of importance is the
Article 77, which addresses some public contracts in health, social and cultural ser-
vices. It includes a clause stating that, under certain conditions, companies engaged in
procurement should reinvest their proﬁts “with a view to achieving the organisation’s
objective” and “where proﬁts are distributed or redistributed, this should be based on
participatory considerations” (Paragraph 2b).
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